Guilt-Aversion and Ambiguity in Generalized Hawk-Dove Games

This paper studies generalized Hawk–Dove anti-coordination games when players are affected by guilt aversion and may hold ambiguous second-order beliefs. The analysis distinguishes two subclasses of games according to players’ preferences over deviations toward symmetric outcomes and characterizes best replies and equilibria as guilt sensitivity changes. For Type 1 games, sufficiently high guilt aversion changes the equilibrium structure: a new pure- strategy equilibrium appears, the completely mixed equilibrium disappears, and additional equilibria with one player randomizing may arise, while the original asymmetric equilibria persist. Below the relevant threshold, the two asymmetric pure equilibria remain and a unique completely mixed equilibrium converges to the classical mixed equilibrium as guilt sensitivity vanishes. Ambiguity also matters: pessimism can eliminate the asymmetric equilibria and generate a unique symmetric equilibrium, whereas optimism neutralizes guilt aversion and restores the classical equilibria. For Type 2 games, guilt aversion affects the mixed equilibrium; pessimism can generate infinitely many mixed equilibria, while optimism leaves only the two asymmetric pure equilibria.