Control in organizations has long been a topic of interest for researchers and practitioners alike, who generally recognize that control in some form is inescapable. Managerialist interest in control mechanisms stems from their use as a means of securing the objectives attributed to organizations by their most influential stakeholders - usually, owners, managers and administrators. Control mechanisms may be designed and assessed in relation to their instrumental (is it efficient?) and/or their moral (is it acceptable?) adequacy. At least, they may be described, commended, justified or defended in such terms. Moral and instrumental aspects are invariably interwined. As a consequence, a mechanism that is judged by employees to be morally dubious, and perhaps even repugnant, is unlikely to be fully effective instrumentally. If a mechanism - such as a piece-rate calculation or a more to teamworking - lacks the moral authority to engender employee commitment in the form of increased effort, then it will be sub-optimal in delivering higher output. Evaluation of the moral dimension of control mechanisms is not, however, restricted to assessments of their instrumental contribution. Even if a mechanism is judged to be deficient in instrumental rationality, it may nonetheless by preserved and supported on moral grounds - either explicitly or covertly. Explicitly, suhc a mechanism may be defended in order to safeguard morale or goodwill, the loss of which might result in employees withdrawing psychologically and/or working to rule. Covertly, arrangements that with limited instrumental rationality are routinely sustained by vested interests (e.g. of managers), with the result that empires, pet projects and hierarchies lacking instrumental justification are preserved.
Management through collaboration project: managing in a networked world / Mangia, Gianluigi. - (2008). (Intervento presentato al convegno Academy of Management meeting 2008 - The Questions We Ask tenutosi a Anaheim (CA) nel 8-13 agosto 2008).
Management through collaboration project: managing in a networked world
MANGIA, GIANLUIGI
2008
Abstract
Control in organizations has long been a topic of interest for researchers and practitioners alike, who generally recognize that control in some form is inescapable. Managerialist interest in control mechanisms stems from their use as a means of securing the objectives attributed to organizations by their most influential stakeholders - usually, owners, managers and administrators. Control mechanisms may be designed and assessed in relation to their instrumental (is it efficient?) and/or their moral (is it acceptable?) adequacy. At least, they may be described, commended, justified or defended in such terms. Moral and instrumental aspects are invariably interwined. As a consequence, a mechanism that is judged by employees to be morally dubious, and perhaps even repugnant, is unlikely to be fully effective instrumentally. If a mechanism - such as a piece-rate calculation or a more to teamworking - lacks the moral authority to engender employee commitment in the form of increased effort, then it will be sub-optimal in delivering higher output. Evaluation of the moral dimension of control mechanisms is not, however, restricted to assessments of their instrumental contribution. Even if a mechanism is judged to be deficient in instrumental rationality, it may nonetheless by preserved and supported on moral grounds - either explicitly or covertly. Explicitly, suhc a mechanism may be defended in order to safeguard morale or goodwill, the loss of which might result in employees withdrawing psychologically and/or working to rule. Covertly, arrangements that with limited instrumental rationality are routinely sustained by vested interests (e.g. of managers), with the result that empires, pet projects and hierarchies lacking instrumental justification are preserved.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.