In most economies, in particular in presence of uncertainty, a fair allocation does not exist. Thus, it seems that we are condemned to live in a world where we are unhappy with what we have and we look at the others with envious eyes. In this paper we prove that if a cautious attitude towards uncertainty is socially accepted, then it is possible to have equitable and efficient allocations via a competitive equilibrium mechanism.
Are asymmetrically informed agents envious? / Pesce, Marialaura. - (2012). (Intervento presentato al convegno XXXVI Convegno AMASES tenutosi a Foggia nel 13-15 Settembre 2012).
Are asymmetrically informed agents envious?
PESCE, MARIALAURA
2012
Abstract
In most economies, in particular in presence of uncertainty, a fair allocation does not exist. Thus, it seems that we are condemned to live in a world where we are unhappy with what we have and we look at the others with envious eyes. In this paper we prove that if a cautious attitude towards uncertainty is socially accepted, then it is possible to have equitable and efficient allocations via a competitive equilibrium mechanism.File in questo prodotto:
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