Principled Normativity and/or the Genesis of Values: On Critique/Post-critique, Pragmatism and Inclusion

In this paper, we are going to explore what a post-critical engagement with the question of inclusion—which is arguably one of the key ideas in contemporary educational debate—can look like. Our argumentation will develop at the crossroads of educational theory and philosophy, moral philosophy and sociological accounts of the “genesis of values” and the role of norms. We will take our cue from the first principle of the Manifesto for a Post-Critical Pedagogy, which advocates “a shift from procedural normativity to principled normativity” (p. 15). To start with, we will object to the possibly unfortunate adoption of the “normativity” vocabulary by redescribing this shift in terms of a transition from the language of norms to that of values. In this endeavour, we will build on Hans Joas’s (1999) distinction between norms and values. According to Joas, norms and values represent two different orienting factors for human action. While norms have to do with obligation and the limitation of possibilities of action, values are characterized by an ideal and inspirational function. In keeping with Joas's distinction, we will argue that limiting principled normativity to norms has undesirable consequences. Specifically, this limitation contributes to the excessive role assigned to normative critique which is decried by post-critical approaches. Against this backdrop, we will zoom in on the question of inclusion. We will address it in reference to pragmatism and we are going to suggest two possible outlooks: a critical pragmatist view of inclusion, as exemplified by some insights of José Medina (2012, 2014), and a post-critical understanding, which we will outline in reference to Joas but also—via him—to the classics of educational pragmatism. Famously, one of the main axes of the pragmatist stance is that of smoking out and defusing the either-ors that plague philosophy. In the final part of our paper, we are going to argue that critique and post-critique should not be engaged with in terms of either-ors nor even, to adopt a phrase of Dewey (LW 13: 5), in terms of “intermediate possibilities.” Rather, we have to do with a crucial distinction, which needs to be maintained in its ‘oppositional’ character. In other words, critique and post-critique should be taken as mutually exclusive. And, yet, we are going to preserve the pragmatist aversion to the either-or stance, by suggesting that critique and post-critique appeal to a quasi-Bohrian complementarity, which is not to be confused with any kind of Aufhebung or simple syncretism.