

# ADDITIONS, INTEGRATIONS, CORRECTIONS AND SUPPLEMENTS TO THE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ARNOLD JOSEPH TOYNBEE\*

by Teodoro Tagliaferri (University of Naples Federico II)

No. 192  
(January 21<sup>th</sup>, 2023)

Addition to Part I, Works by Arnold J. Toynbee

Arnold J. Toynbee, Contribution to *The Shanghai Crisis*, Record of a Discussion at Chatham House on February 22nd, 1932, introduced by Mr. O.M. Green, Major-General Sir John Duncan, Mr. G. Warren Swire, Mr. N.K. Roscoe, Sir Frederick Whyte, Sir Arthur Slater, in «International Affairs», XI, 2 (March, 1932), pp. 153-179. Toynbee's comments are summed up *in* ("Summary of Discussion"), pp. 173-174.

---

\* *A Bibliography of Arnold J. Toynbee*, compiled by S. Fiona Morton, with a Foreword by Veronica M. Toynbee, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1980.

## THE SHANGHAI CRISIS

by Arnold J. Toynbee,

Professor Arnold Toynbee said that this immense explosion in the Far East had made its tremors felt all over the world; and, interesting as its effects in Shanghai were, its effects in Great Britain were, in his opinion, still more interesting. After studying those effects, he had come to the conclusion that John Bull was dead, and he had therefore been delighted to hear his voice once again at this meeting. He himself was a mild man, descended from generations of Little Englanders; but it was one of the jokes of the day that the traditional parts had now been interchanged; the people who used to be Pacifists and Little Englanders had become combative, while the people who used to be of the opposite temper had become devotees of peace at any price. This might be a bad joke, but it appeared to be a true fact, and it cast certain interesting forward lights on the future policy and destiny of the country.

As he saw it, the Japanese had unmasked many things. First of all, they had driven a coach and four through all the arrangements for collective security which had been built up so laboriously since the War. He hoped that the League of Nations and the Kellogg Pact would still be saved; but, if they were, it would be no thanks to the Japanese. At the same time, the Japanese had demonstrated the disagreeable fact that the British Navy was totally incapable of operating in the Pacific. During the last week or two that had been made clear to the world; and the speaker believed that this demonstration was even more important than anything that was happening in Shanghai. For if the Japanese "got away with it", and if it was patent to the world that the collective system of guarantees had broken down, then every country in the world would run to cover – the old cover of arming to the teeth and seeking alliance with the strongest Powers that they could find to protect them. For underpopulated White countries in the Pacific, the strongest Power to turn to in such circumstances would not be that distant European Power which was now proved impotent in the Pacific. If Great

Britain had bluffed by making even a show of strength which would have prevented her impotence from becoming apparent, it might conceivably not have mattered so much to her to see the collective system break down. But as it was, now that her impotence had become apparent, it was surely of supreme importance for her to try to maintain the system of collective guarantees. Otherwise, when the world reverted to the struggle for existence, the British Empire would be the next carcase in the international shambles, the next Austria-Hungary – a ramshackle Empire which offered far richer pickings than the defunct Hapsburg Monarchy to ravenous and predatory Powers.