Maria Paradiso *Editor*

Mediterranean Mobilities

Europe's Changing Relationships

Springer

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paradiso@unisannio.it

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paradiso@unisannio.it

Editor
Maria Paradiso
Section of Geography, Department
of Law, Economics, Management
and Quantitative Methods (DEMM)
University of Sannio
Benevento
Italy

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paradiso@unisannio.it

Preface

This book intends to critically examine mobilities across the Mediterranean Basin and explore implications in terms of European changing relationships among European countries and neighbors. The explorations have been conducted in light of the intersectional formation and evolution of identities, behavior, ideas, and agency within the Mediterranean Basin.

If we look at the Mediterranean Basin as a space only, a dissonant geography is obvious, bringing about a mistaken view of its diversity. That is why the diversity of the Mediterranean Basin is mistakenly reduced through a cognitive and operational process based upon assumptions regarding the nature of things and modes of functionality rather than upon actual analysis. In fact, the study of contemporary flows and networks—i.e., the circulation of ideas, people, finances—challenges the continuous representation of the Mediterranean as a homogenous or *other* space for Europe.

Indeed, a dialectic of diaspora politics, circuits of funds, weapons, empowerments, and emotions, and sustainability issues challenge the traditional boundaries of political and economic communities which are under deep transformation. This also influences individual trajectories of identity formation and empowerment and imposes constraints, for example, in terms of engendered roles and prejudiced moral values.

Nowadays, the internet and people's spatial mobility underline a deep process of change for the Mediterranean and Europe, which can be seen as global mobile realities. Moreover, the geopolitical turmoil in the Mediterranean Basin delegitimizes the 'EUropean' spatial vision of the non-European Mediterranean as *another* space for Europe, or its malleable geostrategic courtyard. Theoretically, a classic *terrestrial* interpretation of geographic space emerges as being inadequate for understanding global *loci*, such as inner seas and surrounding lands.

This book includes a selection of findings from the FP7 Marie Curie IRSES project entitled 'Mediterranean changing relationships: Global change, networks and border openings' (MEDCHANGe grant no. 612639), coordinated by the editor of this book. It is based on a mobility perspective that conceives the Mediterranean Basin as both a post-colonial imbricate site of encounters and flows and a site of new hegemonic and counter-power discourse(s) and alliances. In MEDCHANGe's view, ultimately the Mediterranean is a global space of confrontation, emulation, opposition, dialectics, and change of which Europe is both a part and a stakeholder.

paradiso@unisannio.it

Places, flows, wires, and digital TV are the loci for this encounter and connection.

There is no assumption, in this book, of the ‘Mediterranean as a bridge of cultures,’ or as a bounded region. Instead, all are actors in networking communities and regionalization paths.

This approach is relevant and timely since today, in Europe and in the Mediterranean (overlapping EU and non-EU space), we are facing new migration and mobility practices (return, circulation, refugees, minors, women, tourism, lifestyle mobilities, and terror mobilities), new solidarities and encounters, as well as conflicts and crisis. The implications of diverse mobilities call for revised national and European policies and new knowledge for scholars and policy makers.

The studies presented in this volume attest to several cognitive advantages: a cross-reflection among, not only, European scholars but North African and Middle East ones, and the continuous interplay between theoretical and empirical observations from our fieldwork in Europe, North Africa, and Israel. Previous studies tended to focus on Western world observations and by European or US scholars. They are largely based on statistical data or are conceptual without empirical basis. This volume is based on fieldwork in European and non-European countries and on mutual learning and transfer of knowledge among scholars from nine universities in Morocco, Algeria, Israel, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, as well as stakeholders (political élites, NGOs, citizens) in Europe and North Africa. The project has been comprised of distinguished scholars and PhDs who conducted fieldwork in Europe, Morocco, Algeria, and Israel, generating original data and findings on fast changing realities. This book is linked to the intellectual locus of the International Geographical Commission ‘Mediterranean Basin’ chaired by the book editor.

I wish to express my most sincere gratitude to the contributors to this volume for their enthusiastic and persevering commitment, which followed continuous exchanges throughout the project work. They have been able to produce insightful chapters, despite numerous challenges and constraints, which we faced during the implementation of our project.

Naples/Benevento, Italy Maria Paradiso
January 2018

paradiso@unisannio.it

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paradiso@unisannio.it

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paradiso@unisannio.it

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paradiso@unisannio.it

Mediterranean Mobilities and Europe's Changing Relationships

Maria Paradiso

Abstract

Following a mobility approach, this chapter considers the complexity and variety of mobilities in the Basin to frame our group's research. The research is about the geographical complexities but also opportunities of multiple evolutions of the Mediterranean Basin flows, between Europe and non-European countries and beyond the North–South divide. Research adopted the non-élites perspectives provided by narratives of people in mobilities. This chapter has two main objectives. First, it provides an introductory reading of the characteristics of Mediterranean mobilities. Second, it introduces the frame of research which drove fieldwork and discussions of findings. In particular, we examine the concept of Mediterranean mobilities which provides insights on the topic of internal and external Europe relationships and challenges to usual concepts shaping regional views on the area and migration studies. Our findings identify important factors that have structured and will structure relationships with consequent needs of specific focus of policy arenas in Europe.

Keywords

Mediterranean · Mobilities · Europe
Changing relationship

1 Introduction. The Mobility Approach to Mediterranean Studies, not in Search of a Region

The book critically examines mobilities across the Mediterranean Basin and explores implications for European changing relationships. Explorations have been conducted in light of thick observations of the intersectional formation and evolution of identities, behavior, ideas, agency.

Following a mobility approach (Paradiso 2016), the volume aims to go beyond the 'border' vision in studies or the Mediterranean as an essentialist object or as a space (Giaccaria and Paradiso 2012). Border is indeed an extremely important concept and a method in the 'fabrication of the world' (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Celata and Coletti 2016). However, if studies continue to put attentions solely to borders, one cannot trace the emerging geographies of both cross-bordering and bridging action and consequent changes in societies and places.

M. Paradiso (✉)
Department DEMM, University of Sannio,
Benevento, Italy
e-mail: paradiso@unisannio.it

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paradiso@unisannio.it

Previous discussion of cross-border regions and macro-region initiatives (e.g., Jones 2006; Celata and Coletti 2017) devoted considerable attention to the making of 'European spaces' built on a shifting, tenuous economic and geopolitical balance between integration and exclusion practices. These studies disclosed that these practices are aimed at the redefinition of what is to be shared, how, and with whom, choosing to make selectively mobile certain categories of capital, goods, labor, and investment. Previous studies also showed the micro-geographies of the everyday life of actors in the EU and in partner countries of sub-national and non-governmental actors and lobbies (Jones 2006; Moisio et al. 2013).

Indeed, regarding 'the space' problématique, if we look at the Mediterranean only as a space, a dissonant geography is obvious (Farinelli 1998). This happens since its diversity is mistakenly reduced through a cognitive and operational process based upon assumptions (regarding the nature of things and modes of functionality) rather than upon actual analysis (Farinelli 1998; Paradiso 2016). Thus, the Mediterranean concept is 'imprisoned.' A recent study about the concept of the Mediterranean as an archipelago optic (Ferrer-Gallardo and Kramsch 2016)—as the sum of disseminated territorial segments and fragments—contributes to remove the Mediterranean from consolidated gaze of interpretations or instrumental policies too. Indeed, it paves the road to concepts of the Mediterranean as a space of (dis)encounters.

This chapter and book's approach—as well as the MEDCHANGe initial project proposal—go further. They are about our understanding of the Mediterranean as *a global mobile reality* which transcends both Eurocentric or Arab hegemonic ideas, or simply ideas of a rigid demarcation line North–South rich and poor countries. In this chapter's view, the Mediterranean is a global mobile reality, i.e., a globally transformative space precisely because of its variety of forces, actorness, resources, human mobilities, cultural, religious views, ambitions, struggles which encounter/oppose/ally/transform world regions dynamics. Thus, the Mediterranean cannot be grasped from a hegemonic single point of view (Europeanization; Islamization par exemple), and its nature is more marine than terrestrial. These considerations have implications on theoretical lens and approaches for grasping the geographical evolutions in the Basin. It is mobile, refracting, transformative, complex and escapes any traditional measurement in terms of topography or geometry. Its alternative nature (Giaccaria and Minca 2011), however, should be expressed in intellectual and operational terms which can striate our work with salient political as well as theoretical effects as it is discussed in the following lines.

In this chapter, the author wishes to problematize views of the Mediterranean as an 'Other' space of Europe and those geographical images based on European, national polices or organized socioeconomic actorness in the Mediterranean. We shift our focus from border to mobility geographies, since we wish to complicate easy distinctions between the visible hardening of EU internal bordering and the concurrent openness and closure, collaboration, securitization, and warfare within the Mediterranean Basin. In doing so, in light of FP7 MC MEDCHANGe objectives, MEDCHANGe team in the book explores people' narratives and critical insights for understanding views on changing 'Europe'–North Africa relationships, as they are driven by across shores mobile and immobile citizens in different countries.

Following two centuries of Mediterranean and Mediterraneanist investigations, research on the concept of the Mediterranean is a 'scientific expedition' that cannot be anchored to a structured, well known, research path, but rather is set on a route of progressive interpretation and knowledge of a *terra incognita*. Indeed, the Mediterranean initially escapes any ultimate definition and understanding, despite the fact that it has constituted a geographic reference and topos since Strabo (Giaccaria and Minca 2011; Giaccaria and Paradiso 2012) and that it constitutes along a millenary longitudinal path, a *chora* (on the concept for geography: Olsson 2012; Bonfiglioli 2016; Paradiso 2016 for an application to Mediterranean studies). For Derrida,

paradiso@unisannio.it

following Plato, a chora is where the subject establishes his/her own place. In Olsson's words, 'how do I grasp the formless that refuses to be categorized, how do I comprehend the incomprehensible?' (2012, p. 6). We thus can understand the Mediterranean in terms of a chora as a starting and stimulating departure point (Paradiso 2016).

Indeed, the scientific invention of the Mediterranean, mainly advocated by the French and German geographical traditions (Ben-Artzi 2004; Deprest 2002), beginning with Reclus and Vidal de la Blache, built a unified and unifying narrative of the Mediterranean. On the one hand, this allegedly coalesced Mediterranean has been firstly broken by the disruptions of 'genre de vie' stemming from drought land cultivation and nomadic herding and then gradually dissolved by (a lack of) 'modernization' (Claval 2010). Moreover, the myth of a unitary Mediterranean has been unveiled in post-colonial studies (Chamber 2008) and its vernacular origins are now discredited as Mediterraneanism, a peculiar form of Orientalism (Herzfeld 1984, 2005). Mediterranean common places have been harshly criticized because they entail a geographical imaginary sedimented in the visual and fictional culture of the (Northern) European Grand Tour (Howard 2007). Thus, the 'invention of the Mediterranean' has been contested because of its mythical essence, as a quasi-fiction, a geography of permanencies and longue durée which existed only in Northern and Western eyes. At the same time, the colonial imagination has not vanished; it continues to shape popular Mediterraneanism par exemple from Club Med to the Mediterranean diet revival (Giaccaria and Paradiso 2012), but it also influences the rhetoric for a Euro-Mediterranean partnership focused on the 'EU-ropeization' of the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East (Jones 2006; Clark and Jones 2008; Bialasiewicz et al. 2013). It is not a coincidence, indeed, that neoliberal discourse and practices run through Mediterranean urban and regional planning, simultaneously adopting Western models and adapting Mediterraneanist stereotypes: by affirming the interests of oligarchies and élites, including local ones, neoliberal planning disintegrates social, human tissue and thick locations, exacerbates economic inequality, and subsequently increases globalization by deterritorialization and dispossession (Cattedra et al. 2012). Making sense of the Mediterranean means confronting head-on a tangle of flows, networks, ideas, people, goods, and money, which challenges the continuous representation of the Mediterranean as existing somewhere between homogeneity and alterity (Paradiso 2016). It implies—but only—a post-colonial, imbricated site of encounters and currents (Chambers 2008). In fact, the missing point in the traditional literature on the Mediterranean lies in its 'iconographic characterization' (to use a Gottman's concept 1966) which neglects the complexity of the interplay of spatial fixity and countless circulation (Campione 1998; Paradiso 2016; Ferrer-Gallardo and Kramsch 2016). That is why the author proposes the notion of Mediterranean as a global mobile reality as it is further discussed in the following lines.

The Mediterraneanist and Orientalist iconography can but lead to a marginalization of the Mediterranean: an interpretation of a Mediterranean with no 'perspective' and without appreciation of changes or appreciable changes (Campione 1998 p. 7). As a consequence, our exploration must avoid the Scylla and Charybdis of both the fictitious Mediterranean unity and the impossibility of the Mediterranean as a hermeneutic category (Paradiso 2016). We cannot talk about the Mediterranean without taking the risk of stereotyping it, yet we need Mediterranean categories in order to make sense of modernity and its alternatives. Following Matvejevic (1999), we share that the sound way of talking about the Mediterranean is as breviary, hymnal, directory (Giaccaria and Paradiso 2012). As there is no such a thing as Mediterranean unity, our approach started to explore the Mediterranean pluriverse through a prism of 'Narratives' as a regime of truth. Jones and Paradiso discussed multiple readings of Mediterranean before proposing this approach to our Consortium (EUspace as an institutionalized space by EU rethoric and policy; political

paradiso@unisannio.it

international reading; geopolitics literature and voices from South revealing the contested of the Mediterranean). Then, later developments and fieldwork by this chapter's author refined a vision of the Mediterranean Basin as a global mobile reality (Fig. 1).

The view of Mediterranean as a global mobile reality (Paradiso 2016) draws upon study of flows, of networks—i.e., the circulation of ideas, people, finances. It challenges the continuous representation of the Mediterranean between homogeneity and otherness and reposits it as both a post-colonial imbricate site of encounters and currents and as a site of new hegemonic and counter-power discourse(s) and alliances. A previous FP7 MEDCHANGe paper (Paradiso 2016) explored the 'mobility' paradigm as an initial approach to contemporary geographies of the Mediterranean. The latter are being created not only by the media, powers, and ideologies, but also by everyday people's interethnic, intercultural, and emotional interactions in places and digital communication channels. Such interactions are often characterized by blockages of interethnic or intercultural exchanges, as well as by inequalities.

Mobilities present and discuss initial paths of new encounters structuring North–South relationships, and vice versa, but also circular and East–West ones: They are typified by a variety of personal and virtual mobilities in terms of gender, motivations, emotional geographies, impacts, circulation rather than origin/destination, and so on. They contradict the binary visions of here and there and of borders and bordering. It seems that the Internet and people's spatial mobility underline a deep process of change for the Mediterranean. Dialectic of diaspora politics, circuits of funds, weapons, empowerments, and emotions challenge the boundaries of political communities in transformation. The Mediterranean thus appears as a global space of confrontation, emulation, opposition, dialectics, and change. Places, flows, wires, and digital TV are the loci for all this. There is no 'essentialistic' assumption of 'Mediterranean as a bridge of cultures'; instead, all people can be actors in networking communities (Paradiso 2016 p. 151).

Essentially, the study of flows, of networks—i.e., the circulation of ideas, people, finances—challenges the continuous representation of the



Fig. 1 Theories and narratives bordering the Mediterranean. *Sources* adapted from (Paradiso 2016)

paradiso@unisannio.it

Mediterranean as homogenous or '*other*' (space) for Europe. Furthermore, the Internet and people's spatial mobility underline a deep process of change for the Mediterranean and Europe as global realities. Moreover, the geopolitical turmoil in the Mediterranean Basin delegitimizes the 'EUropean' spatial vision of non-European Mediterranean as an *other* space for Europe, or its malleable geostrategic courtyard.

In the author's view, the metaphor of mobilities and networks challenges the fixity of North–South schemes, the instrumental view of Mediterranean as a passive recipient for EU neighborhood policies, and the paradigm of clashes of civilizations. Mediterranean mobilities became a stronger factors shaping Euro-Mediterranean relationships and within Europe.

Drawing on a previous MEDCHANGe publication (Paradiso 2016), first, trends of emerging geographies of interconnections call for a geography which is more based on networks, intertwining practices (in good and dark ties) and mobilities. Geographies of interconnections span from all kind of flows: diasporas, Internet led communications, foreign direct investments—FDI included Arab sovereign funds and new tendencies of exchanges—large infrastructural projects and hegemonic attempts in foreign economic aid. These mobilities provide evidence of more complex intertwining practices than those which narrate a vision of response's and impacts in host countries propelled by mobilities toward Europe. They suggest a vision of mutual changes and stable relationships also of mundane character among people: These relationships affect territorial changes, people adaptation, behavior, impacts both here and there and vice versa. They suggest a delimitation of the Mediterranean region expanded to the Gulf with new trajectories to and from the Orient.

Second, mobilities across the Mediterranean Basin become a stronger factor shaping Euro-Mediterranean relationships since migrants are connected via the Internet. This factor drives to a reconceptualization of segregation/integration factors based on spatial concentration or dispersion. Digital linkages favor intertwined cooperation and communication, but also new form of self-exclusion with a special accent on emotional geographies of individuals' communications among shores. Does the Internet led communications ameliorate integration in Europe, reinsertion issues (return migration) in North Africa as well as a networked practice of citizenships across shores? These coalesced flows urge changes in relationships among Europe, the South, the East, and their understanding.

The rising phenomenon of women's mobility and agency adds complexity to changing relationships in the area. It calls for better articulated approaches to express gender views since they are configuring new circulations and impacts across shores.

The overlap between political power and migrant associations in the host countries seems to be an emerging trend shaping Euro-Mediterranean relationships particularly for Muslim countries' geopolitical competition on mosques control. Between 1996 and 2006, there were nearly 1600 associations of Moroccans abroad (Berriane 2014). Bilateral cooperation on issues of security and preference from a hosting country toward a certain non-European Mediterranean country are also set via the network or constellation of cultural associations managing mosques and communities. Actually, they do not suffice the whole phenomenon and trends in this regard.

The special laboratory, the case of Moroccan mobilities, has been discussed in our research group and book to highlight dramatic changes. They actually fit in a dual relationship with the territory, marked by both the nomadic mobility which seeks to provide the means of access to the resources of the territories here (Europe) and there (Southern shore), and the anchoring of sedentary people claiming citizenship while displaying his/her Moroccan identity (Berriane 2014). This weakens the category of territories defined by national boundaries, as a lot of migration studies still rely on and call for a more accentuated 'Mediterraneanized' view of Europe (Fig. 2).

Dialectic of diaspora politics, circuits of funds, weapons, empowerments, emotions, and sustainability issues challenge the traditional

paradiso@unisannio.it



Fig. 2 Example of Moroccan mobilities: reversing mobilities paradigms and stereotypes of the Euro-Mediterranean relationships and regionalism. *Sources* (Paradiso 2016)

boundaries of political and economic communities which are in under deep transformation. This also influences individual trajectories of identify formation, empowerment as well as imposing constraints par exemple in terms of engendered roles, moral values, moral prejudiced views. The Mediterranean is thus a global space of confrontation, emulation, opposition, dialectics, and change of which Europe is a part as a stake and has a stake in. Places, flows, wires, and digital TV are the loci for this encounter and connection.

There is no assumption of the 'Mediterranean as a bridge of cultures'; instead, we all are actors in networking communities and regionalization paths.

2 Objectives

This proposed book engages in critically assessing mobilities across the Basin and exploring consequent implications in terms of changing relationships in the Basin including Europe. Thus, our keywords are Mediterranean, Europe, mobilities, encounters, changing relationships, sustainability.

Mobilities are adopted as a thick concept including all material, symbolic, intangible flows of people, knowledge, emotions, and identities (Cresswell 2006), as a practice shaping the identity and political boundaries of the European

paradiso@unisannio.it

and the Middle East North African (MENA) world. From a theoretical point of view, the research approach conceives the concept of mobility in terms of networking (or constraints) among ethnic groups and countries since they move from one or to another (sometimes also again back or restart). Thus, we adopt an agency perspective to better understand regionalization processes between shores. The mobility concept is based on peoples' narratives at the intersection of the geopolitics of migration and geographies of encounters (Paradiso 2017). The approach intends to go beyond the classic discussions on integration, segregation, spatial, social patterns, and conventional studies on migration (see chapters by Diab, Paradiso, Schnell; Lamari, Oukarfi, Paradiso in the book). It encompasses the approach of migration/mobilities and subsequent impacts on changing relationships in Europe through the notion of 'moral and affective' encountering and networking. Notion of encountering and networking is affected by affection and moral geographies shaping people's behavior (Paradiso unpublished). Thus, narratives of moral values and affection are injected in regional analysis and intertwined with the observation of the Internet as a life realm and a fuzzy space across shores, crosscutting physical land borders (Paradiso 2013a, b).

The proposed topic and approach are relevant and timely since today in Europe and in the Mediterranean (overlapping EU and non-EU space) we are facing new migration and mobility practices (return, circulation, refugees, minors, women, tourism, lifestyle mobilities, terror mobilities). This diversity of mobilities calls for revised national and European policies and new knowledge for scholars and policy makers (Fig. 3).

The volume's approach presents several cognitive advantages: a cross-reflection among, not only, European scholars but North African and Middle East ones, and the continuous interplay between theoretical and empirical observations from our fieldwork in Europe, North Africa and Israel. Most books center on Western world observations and are led by European or US scholars. Moreover, a lot of books are based on statistical data or are conceptual without empirical basis. This volume, however, is based on fieldwork in European and non-European countries and on mutual transfer of knowledge among scholars from nine universities in Morocco, Algeria, Israel, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, as well as with stakeholders in Europe and North Africa.

Its proposed structure covers these issues from a conceptual and empirical perspective as it is elucidated in the following sections.

3 Structure

The volume aims to present, analyze, and interpret mobilities and narratives across shores, as a window on Europe and Mediterranean regionalization and relationships at a global scale. Mobilities have a profound impact on the Basin and on Europe. Thus, they turn the Mediterranean into a global reality, which is highly significant for contemporary and future Europe, as a part of Europe and not an instrumental 'Other.'

It explores the 'mobility' paradigm as an approach to contemporary geographies of the Mediterranean and implications for changing European relationships. The latter are being created not only by the media, powers, and ideologies, but also by people's everyday interethnic, intercultural, and emotional interactions in places and through digital communication channels. Such interactions are often characterized by inequalities and constraints to interethnic or intercultural exchanges.

The book presents and discusses paths of new encounters structuring North–South relationships, and vice versa, but also circular and East–West ones, since they are typified by a variety of personal and virtual mobilities in terms of gender, motivations, emotional geographies, impacts, and circulation rather than on origin/destination binaries, and so on.

Precisely, the book will be divided into three parts: (1) concepts of Europe and the Mediterranean and implications for mobility and relationships; (2) Mediterranean mobilities and implications for encounter, connectivity, and

paradiso@unisannio.it



Fig. 3 Theoretical aspects of the Mediterranean as a global mobile reality. *Sources* (Paradiso 2016)

sustainability in the area; and (3) conclusions on changing European relationships in light of mobility.

Thus, the volume first presents a conceptual focus on viewpoints on the Europe and Mediterranean. The first part highlights concepts, narratives, and practices of bordering the Mediterranean space (divisions and fractures) as well as cross-bordering it. Second, it presents alternative thinking and a spatial imagination of Europe and the Mediterranean, including voices from the 'South' and 'lived' experiences by people (narratives and panel sessions about Europe and the Mediterranean carried out during our fieldwork). The 'Mediterranean' concept, as well as the 'European' one, will be unpacked both by critically reviewing the literature and through narratives collected among Moroccans people in Morocco by our group of Marie Curie scholars (chapters by Durac, Jones; Paradiso, Favaro).

The book will then move onto present the Mediterranean and Europe as an action space defined and transformed mobile actors where difference is negotiated, resisted, and encountered (chapters by Umek, Minca, Santic on European Eastern frontier and camps as a geopolitical hub; by Accorinti, Demurtas, Vitiello on minors flows). The second part

challenges the state of the art about ideas about Euro-Mediterranean linkages and changes, which stem from our fieldwork in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East and from explorations of geographies of cyberspace and Web2. The second part consists of presentations and critical discussions of narratives on mobilities, differences, and encounters gathered through fieldwork with migrants and minorities in Europe, North Africa, and Israel.

It contains case studies in chapters: from Algeria (Alouat), comparative studies from Israel, Italy, Morocco (Diab, Paradiso, Schnell); Morocco, Italy (Paradiso, Favaro; Elaklaa, Tebbaa et al.; Lamari, Paradiso, Oukarfi; Diab, Paradiso, Schnell; Spotorno, Magiasepe; Tribak, Paradiso; Esteves, Schmitz; Chinarro, Fernandez, Sierra); Portugal (Fonseca, Mc Garrigle, Esteves); Hungary (Pap, Remedy); Italy (Paradiso); and a concluding third part on mobile people in terms of connectivity, integration, alienation, crisis, empowerment, and implications for relationships in Europe and in the Basin (Paradiso).

Altogether, the volume examines how place-making and spatial agency are cast and networked across borders and internally by the circulations of people and flows of ideas and behaviors. In the second part, analysis of original data from fieldwork on mobility, connectivity, and its implications for sustainability is presented and discussed (see chapters in second part 'Narratives' by all MEDCHANGe scholars and guest contributors Pap, Remedy again on Eastern Europe to complement the dimension of the Mediterranean as a global mobile reality and its impacts on transforming Europe from within; on sub-Saharan flows to Morocco by Chinarro, Fernandez, Sierra; on return migration from Europe by Elaklaa, Tebbaa et al.). The original conceptual and empirical observations and data provide unexplored knowledge about debordering, bridging, and cross-bordering relationships in the Euro-Mediterranean. It stems from our original comparable fieldwork across all banks which have been carried out by international teams. It turned out from our Marie Curie project, an extremely enriching mutual knowledge among Europeans, Middle Eastern, and North African scholars.

Finally, the book discusses implications of ethnic, interethnic interactions under structural power grids and identity building which are performed in real and virtual spaces across banks (final part and conclusions by Paradiso). They occur in networked spaces of different cultural–religious societies and affect people's identity, encounters, integration, constraints, empowerment, place attachment, and retention. Altogether, they affect identity formation and relationships along cleavages and between states and groups. In this concluding section, on the basis of previous findings, changing European relationships in light of mobilities is elucidated and discussed. Discussion of findings from narratives and practices of bordering, crossing, and bridging the Mediterranean space (including both EU and non-EU countries) will be structured around the following concluding questions: Can people live together easily in the two spaces—Europe and North Africa? What is the potential future of the two spaces as intertwined and interconnected? What is the horizon for future developments of human fulfillment and prosperity? What implications do these tendencies have for regionalization patterns and trends?

Our original research generates knowledge for policy issues in terms of migration policies, domestic integration, and empowerment.

4 Research Context and Rationale

Even though under protocols of the explorative cases but in light of extended and repeated scholars' mobilities in situ and intensive triangulation of data and participant observation, MEDCHANGe concept and research developed on the analysis of the relationships between global networks (Internet), flows (virtual and spatial mobilities of individuals, information, emotions, i.e., also in light of gender issues such those of Moroccan female migrants; climate change migrants; tourism and heritage valorization flows); and geographical localities in

paradiso@unisannio.it

terms of local development and marginalization/segregation.

These ingredients of a variety of people's mobilities, adaptation, change, multiple linkages across shores and scales shed lights on changing relationships at the spatial scales of some Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Israel, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Spain) due to the dialectics of global flows, borders crossing, and local structural changes. Our network of scholars worked in synergy and complementarities through joint field research, workshops, and seminars by investigating both the spatial and behavioral origins and development of our topics and their contemporary changing dynamics in selected territorial cases (Tel Aviv, Algier, Lisbon, Marrakesh, Casablanca, Naples-Caserta, Zaragoza, Genoa, and non-metropolitan areas in Portugal, Morocco, Italy, Israel, Algeria).

In order to achieve this goal, MEDCHANGe activities have been structured into three main levels: (1) a theoretical–methodological level; (2) an empirical analysis of case studies in different countries; (3) an operational level of networking and dissemination.

Theoretically, we contribute to the redefinition of the concepts that denote the field of investigation, 'Mediterranean changing relationships,' namely 'mobility,' 'connectivity,' spatial justice and entrepreneurship, inclusion, adaptation, climate migration, and the idea of the 'Mediterranean integration' in a frame of uneven development beyond the divide North–South but also in light of internal factors of crisis. Empirically, we aimed to exchange skills, knowledge, expertise, mobilities to document the different ways in which transformations of the Mediterranean cities and villages take place and grasp the implications of the so-called virtual spatial mobilities in terms of inclusion, citizenship, security, intercultural dialogue. At the operational level, we look forward for studying successful stories and practices of cooperation.

The research discovered new trends and proved them as it is outlined in the book's final part.

5 Methodology

It is a multidimensional model that investigates the sources of accumulation of economic, social, cultural, and emotional forms of capital from either intra-ethnic or interethnic sources as it has been developed by Schnell et al. (2015) based on the case of Arabs in Israel. Here, in MEDCHANGe project and the book paper by Diab, Paradiso, Schnell and Lamari, Oukafi, Paradiso, Settar, as it was proposed by Maria Paradiso, the focus is on subjectivities and emotional aspects of encountering with otherness as a realm to better understand agency and possibilities among approaches of locations, functional examination of everyday life activities, and morphologies of social networks. In the current study vis-à-vis original methodology by Schnell et al., we innovate by paying a special focus on emotional aspects and refer to embeddedness rather than integration or segregation. This attention to emotional factors—and non-representational theory at large (Thrift 2007) or emotional geography from feminist studies (Ahmed 2004; Bronwyn 2013; Davidson et al. 2005; Dunn 2010)—takes into account that migrants or mobile people in general negotiate integration, codes, spatialities not simply adhere or refuse; thus, a human-centered focus can better cope with new ways of restructuring spatialities in the globalization era.

Indeed, in the contemporary world, as MEDCHANGe concept in original submission evoked, individuals are exposed to relations at a distance thru new media and ways of being connected with origin countries like ever in the past. Thus, previous approaches or studies must evolve in our view in order to take into account the simultaneous presence, belonging, affectivity and emotional exposure and encountering of people in the digital and different worlds. Thus, spatialities or location refers to a continuum of host-origin places. The importance of individual exposure or active behavior being exposed to host-origin countries' constraints and influences cannot be underestimated. Constraints and influences, relations at distance, constant

paradiso@unisannio.it

exposure to here and there complicate the geography of encounters with otherness and thus the so-called integration–isolation geographies. The last decade debate on geography of encounters provides insights on how people negotiate difference in everyday lives (Leitner 2012; Valentine 2008; Wilson 2014, 2016; Gawlewicz 2015, 2016 an overall assessment on geography of encounters debate and further developments). Thus, success or failure of encounters can serve as basis to test embeddedness on the basis of encounters since encounter is a conceptually charged construct which is not limited to 'contact' but includes questions of meaning, power, temporality, ethics and scale (Wilson 2016) and morality (Paradiso, submitted).

We have developed a questionnaire distributed among about on average 40 subjects in each of the communities around the Mediterranean: Italians in Morocco; Moroccans in South Italy; and Arabs in Israel. Thirteen indicators were tested searching for validated criteria as they are approved by Alpha-Cronbach. The results were used in order to characterize patterns of integration versus segregation of the minorities in the majority society in three countries in the Mediterranean Basin. It is a multidimensional model that investigates the sources of developing economic, social, cultural, and emotional forms of human relationships either from intra-ethnic or from interethnic sources.

Subjects were chosen according to the logic of snowball sampling, but the small number of subjects enables only an exploratory study that suggests and tests the applicability of the methodology still calling to more comprehensive and systematic empirical tests. The questionnaires include detailed accounts of the subjects' social linkages in both origin and host or majority milieus, self-evaluation of their fluency in the languages of their origin and host or majority societies, the way they identify themselves, and their sense of attachment to origin and host or majority milieus. In addition, we asked about basic socio-demographic characteristics of the subjects. The filling of the questionnaires evoked open discussions between the interviewers and the interviewees, discussions that were stimulated by the researchers in order to expose the deeper worldviews that underlie their behaviors and attitudes.

In analyzing the data, we suggested to measure six indices—two for embedding oneself in each form of capital. We divided each subject's embeddedness in host or majority milieu by embeddedness in origin milieu in order to highlight the location of the zero point either in places of origin or in host or majority places. The six aspects measured are as elucidated in Diab, Paradiso, Schnell in this volume (Table 'Dimensions of mobile people embedding').

The evaluative indices were measured on five degree Likert scale leading to results that can be below one representing subjects who are embedded in their place of origin, results above one representing subjects that are embedded more in their host or majority places, and results around one (0.80 <P> 1.20) that represent subjects that balance between their orientations to origin and host or majority places.

At a second stage, scholars applied post hoc ANOVA in order to characterize differences among members of the three groups' styles of embedding themselves in their host or majority societies and we calculated component analysis in order to identify main strategies for embedding in host/majority societies.

Portuguese team (Fonseca, Esteves, Mc Garrigle) applied MEDCHANGe axis of interpretations in form of qualitative tools, interviews' methods, adding questions on motivations to leave or return (see Fonseca et al. in the volume). Spanish team used an interview protocol and participant observations for their study on sub-Saharans in Morocco.

Spotorno et al. build a quantitative methodology based on geolocalization methods to survey the Europeans' presence in Morocco as one of the tests about European mobility to South (see Spotorno's chapter).

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Return migration questionnaire has been developed by Elaklaa, Tebbaa et al. as they discussed in their chapter assessing geographies of Moroccans' return migration from Europe to some areas of Morocco.

6 Conclusion

The approach does not privilege neither territorial fixity in itself; neither institutional rhetoric deconstruction per se; neither Mediterranean as circulation space per se. MEDCHANGE opts for an alternative concept (original project draft submission by Paradiso 2013a, b): spatial relationships between global networks (Internet), and flows (virtual and spatial mobilities of individuals, information, and goods). MEDCHANGe's scientific option addresses an innovative theory of the Mediterranean: Geographical context includes Internet and virtual communications. Thus, Euro-Mediterranean relationships stem out from everyday people's narratives and mobilities and include digital crossings.

MEDCHANGe key concepts under scrutiny are 'Mediterranean etc,' 'Mediterranean changing relationships,' namely 'mobility,' 'connectivity,' gender, tangible and intangible 'heritage,' spatial justice and diversity, climate and environmental stress and related mobility, retired/returned people mobility, tourism and new entrepreneurialism and the idea of 'Euro-Mediterranean integration' in a framework of uneven development.

Research questions have been elaborated as it follows (Jones, Paradiso in MEDCHANGe WP1):

- What is the post-colonial geography of the Mediterranean?
- What are the ambiguities of this post-colonial geography?
- What are its manifestations in the everyday?
- The visible and invisible features of the everyday?
- The familiar and unfamiliar features of the everyday?
- How a 'Mediterranean gaze can unveil a set of non-topographic geographies that "actually" make this sea and the everyday lives of its inhabitants'? (Giaccaria and Minca 2011, 360)
- What is the role of migrants, women in this regard?
- What about our keywords for Mediterranean other than gaze?
- How the Mediterranean as chora(s) (The Mediterranean as a chora (Giaccaria and Paradiso 2012; Paradiso 2016) (for the concept of chora: Olsson 2012) can unveil paths of changes and drive paths of relationships? For Derrida, following Plato, a chora is where the subject establishes his/her own place.
- Is the Mediterranean becoming an un-hospitable chora (all blanks)? Or are people starting to set their chora?
- What are the main ideas on Mediterranean and EU from South or East?
- What do Southern citizens think of Europe, or Mediterranean? Or their neighbor (s)?

Key questions concern the effects of globalization on the Mediterranean reality, particularly in terms of the exposure of local systems and communities to the Internet and human migration flows.

This will cover inter alia information flows, tourism effects, return migration consequential power, and empowerment relations, as well as the transformative dynamics within ethnic minority communities.

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paradiso@unisannio.it

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paradiso@unisannio.it

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paradiso@unisannio.it

Part I

Viewpoints on the Mediterranean and Europe

paradiso@unisannio.it

EU Elite Representations of Mediterranean Space: Arab Student Perspectives

Vincent Durac and Alun Jones

Abstract

The chapter presents a discussion of political elite narratives and their significance before outlining the key features of European policy on the Mediterranean. It then explores critical perspectives on this before examining the views of Moroccan students. This chapter explores the dissonance between European political elite constructions of the Mediterranean, as expressed in a series of policy iterations on the region since the foundation of the European Economic Community in 1957 with the perspectives of a group of Moroccan graduate students as expressed in the context of a MEDCHANGe workshop in Casablanca.

Keywords

Europe · Mediterranean · Non-elites views Political elites constructions

1 Introduction

This chapter explores the dissonance between European political elite constructions of the Mediterranean, as expressed in a series of policy iterations on the region since the foundation of the European Economic Community in 1957 with the perspectives of a group of Moroccan graduate students as expressed in the context of a workshop conducted by the authors at the Université Hassan II in Casablanca in February 2015. The chapter begins with a discussion of political elite narratives and their significance before outlining the key features of European policy on the Mediterranean. It then explores critical perspectives on this before examining the views of Moroccan students.

What is particularly noteworthy is the extent to which graduate student perspectives both on the Mediterranean and on European engagement with the region mirror the tension between European self-image in its dealings with the region and critical perspectives on this. Crucially, student responses evince a clear shift from a more positive understanding of European engagement with the Mediterranean, typically seen in terms of a shared space, a common civilizational history and mutual dependence to a much less benign view of Europe. This is expressed in an unmasking of the degree to which relations between both sides of the Mediterranean are best understood, less in terms of partnership and shared objectives, and more in terms of an asymmetric power relationship in which European interests predominate. This shift from benign to less benign leads some to reflect on alternatives without Europe and on the

V. Durac · A. Jones (✉)
University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
e-mail: alun.jones@ucd.ie

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paradiso@unisannio.it

possible redundancy of the concept of the Mediterranean.

In sum, this chapter offers a preliminary exploration of the alternative, and often silenced and marginalised views on the Mediterranean 'formulated by/from other (often Southern) shores' (Giaccaria and Minca 2010, 348)

2 Political Elite Narratives—What Are They and What Do They Do?

Elite narratives for macroregion building have a long history, and as a political tool serve a number of purposes: as a politically orchestrated response to globalization and globalizing tendencies; as a means to further the interests of dominant capital through the construction of new economic architectures; as a tactic for the promulgation of core beliefs and values; and as a political–administrative convenience for the management and definition of regional constructions. Such narratives highlight a collective set of values, beliefs and goals that frame the scope and nature of political interventions. Elite narratives for region building are changeable and also historically contingent. They require strenuous efforts by political elites to stabilize and maintain their dominant rationales and meanings. Narratives, then, through their geographical specification of politics are an essential component of state agency in pursuit of particular interests and identities.

In the context of the European Union (EU), a mosaic of narrative-based relations exists between it and a diverse range of constructed political spaces across the globe. The political production of these geographical spaces for EU action is heavily bound up with the promotion of European ideas, norms and beliefs and the furtherance of dominant European political ideologies. Collectively, they offer a system of action to frame political issues and policy proposals, and furnish legitimacy for decision making and intervention. Narrative-based regional building by the EU thus involves the maintenance and construction of geopolitical, legal-institutional, transactional, and cultural boundaries in which relations are defined and institutionalized and the material frames of political action determined. Such is the case with EU policy on the Mediterranean where EU elite narratives are deployed to bolster the diffusion of distinctive forms of political organization and governance and the promotion of European 'solutions' outside of EU territorial space. In effect, elites narratives support the mobilization of the European project and its extension into politico-geographic spaces like the Mediterranean that are contingent, politically charged, and often highly unstable institutional creations.

3 EU Representations of the Mediterranean from the Global Mediterranean Policy to the Union for the Mediterranean

Since 1957, European elites have put forward and acted politically upon a number of elite representations of the Mediterranean. These have stressed alternatively its geostrategic significance premised on its conflictual nature, its homogeneity and imbrication with Europe, and its confrontational potential creating 'EU'ropean vulnerability. The Mediterranean has, since the late 1950s, become a site for an increasingly conscious, narrative-based project for European management. This project is underpinned by changing representations of Mediterranean space which were used by EU elites to justify a range of policy interventions to meet what they regarded initially as the 'Mediterranean challenge' but increasingly described as the 'southern challenge'. These representations have portrayed the Mediterranean in conflictual and contradictory ways from a *problematic space*, an *unsettled space*, a *space for Europeanization*, and a *shared space*. The aim of each of these Mediterraneanisms, as Giaccaria and Minca (2010, 348) rightly argue, is to sustain, through a set of diversified … representations, the belief in the existence of a geographical object called 'the Mediterranean'.

paradiso@unisannio.it

3.1 The Global Mediterranean Policy: The Mediterranean as a Problematic Space

The evolution of a formal policy on the part of the EU and, in its previous incarnations, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Community (EC) can be traced back to the late 1950s. However, the articulation of the Global Mediterranean Policy of 1972 constituted the first attempt to present a systematic approach to the then European Community's relations with Mediterranean countries. Links with Mediterranean countries and the Community dated back to its earliest years. In 1962, Greece signed an Association Agreement, followed by Turkey a year later. The same year, Morocco and Tunisia sought a similar agreement but it was another six years before preferential trade agreements were signed with these countries. In 1969, the Community signed controversial trade agreements with both Spain and Israel—Spain was still a dictatorship and the agreement with Israel was problematic due to its conflictual relationship with its Arab neighbours. As a result the Community expressed a willingness to enter into similar preferential trade agreements with other Mediterranean countries. The result was that by 1973 agreements had been concluded with seventeen states, including Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Malta, Cyprus and Yugoslavia (Lister 1997: 84). These consisted of a series of bilateral arrangements which lacked any coherent policy principles and which ranged from comprehensive and complicated association agreements to non-preferential trade deals. Growing dissatisfaction with the uncoordinated nature of previous policy combined with newer developments, in particular the accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain, prompted a rethink of the Community's engagement with Mediterranean countries. However, as Tsoulakis (1977) notes, from the outset, the EC's first attempt to devise a coherent set of principles for engagement with the Mediterranean was also underpinned by strategic considerations, including geographical contiguity, significant dependence on oil imports from the region, economic interests and the fact that, with the exception of the UK, almost all immigrant labour in the Community came from Mediterranean countries. These concerns—strategic interests, energy resources and the movement of people—have remained central to European policy responses to the Mediterranean in their various iterations ever since.

In September 1972, the Commission set out proposals for a Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) which focused on three areas—the creation of a free-trade area in industrial goods between the Community and each Mediterranean country, some reduction in customs duties on agricultural goods, and technical and industrial cooperation on both sides while the Community would give financial aid to less developed Mediterranean countries. It was also proposed that the Commission would explore a common approach to the problem of immigrant labour (Tsoulakis 1977: 429–430). However, despite the attempt to devise a coherent policy for the Community in its engagement with Mediterranean countries, the GMP was a disappointment and proved little different in impact to the set of piecemeal arrangements it was devised to replace. While the provision of aid was useful, the value of trade agreements was limited and most Mediterranean countries continued to import more from the Community than they were able to export to it. The position of Mediterranean countries worsened when Greece, Portugal and Spain joined the EEC as the relationship was reduced to 'a preferential share of nothing,' while North African countries were disillusioned with restrictions on workers' entry into the Community (Lister 1997: 86).

The late 1980s saw further attempts to devise a coherent approach to the Mediterranean. The New Mediterranean Policy (NMP) was adopted in December 1990 to 'consolidate activities already under way' while, in addition, 'introducing support for economic reform with a view to encouraging the process of liberalization and structural reform' (European Commission 1990). The NMP provided for over 4 million ecus (European Currency Units) in grants and loans over five years for eight Mediterranean countries to be spent in a range of areas, largely focused on

paradiso@unisannio.it

economic reform. Despite this, the NMP strongly resembled its predecessor (Lister 1997: 88).

3.2 The European Mediterranean Policy ('The Barcelona Process'): The Mediterranean as an Unsettled Space of Economic Vulnerability and Political Threat

The end of the Cold War, the expansion in membership of the new European Union (EU) and discussion of future membership for post-communist states combined with the increasing focus of the EU on the articulation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) provided the backdrop for a new attempt to set out a common policy on the Mediterranean. In the early 1990s, the Commission proposed that future relations with Mediterranean non-member countries should go beyond the economic sphere 'to include a political dialogue between the parties, the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area and social, economic and political cooperation' (Pace 2002: 197). This was followed at the Essen European Summit of 1994 by confirmation of the idea of a new European strategy towards the Mediterranean in the form of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). The summit agreed to hold a conference at Barcelona in November 1995, which marked the beginning of the Barcelona Process.

The Barcelona Conference of 1995 brought together the then 15 member states of the EU with 12 Mediterranean 'partners'.[1] The 27 states signed the Barcelona Declaration which set out to establish 'a comprehensive partnership … through strengthened political dialogue, the development of economic and financial cooperation and greater emphasis on the social, cultural and human dimension'. The Declaration comprised three chapters. The first dealt with political and security matters and the goal of establishing a common area of peace and stability; the second dealt with 'economic and financial partnership' and creating an area of shared prosperity; and the third dealt with partnership in social, cultural and human affairs and the development of intercultural and interreligious dialogue. Institutionally, the Barcelona Process provided for the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly to meet at least once a year. Presidency of the Assembly was to change each year in order to guarantee parity. The commitment to 'partnership' was also reflected in its composition with 120 of its members coming from the EU and 120 from the Mediterranean partner countries (Monjo Sánchez 2006). Cardwell (2011: 225) suggests that by structuring cooperation around the three 'baskets' of political, economic and cultural cooperation, the participants began a cooperation process that gradually resulted in the institutionalization of multilateral cooperation forums.

According to Volpi (2004: 147), at one level the EMP can be seen as little more than a technical exercise in rationalizing pre-existing treaties and agreements signed with Mediterranean countries as well as providing a single frame of reference for future agreements. However, it also proclaimed an ambitious set of political and cultural objectives. In particular, the Declaration stated its adherence to 'support for democratic institutions and the strengthening of the rule of law' and acknowledged the essential contribution that civil society can play in development. However, while clauses establishing respect for democracy and human rights are a feature of the Association Agreements entered into by the EU with a number of Mediterranean countries under the terms of the Barcelona Process, the EU has proved reluctant to invoke the sanctions provided for in those agreements when faced with democratic reversals or breach of human rights observance on the part of Mediterranean partner states.

[1]These were Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. The process included almost all states bordering or close to the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. The exception was Libya which was subject to a UN sanctions regime in 1995 (Cardwell 2011: 225).

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3.3 The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP): The Mediterranean as a Space for Europeanization

In May 2004, the EU acquired ten new member states. In the same month, the European Commission published a paper setting out a new policy framework for cooperation with all North African and Middle Eastern states as well as Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova in the east and the states of the Caucasus. The only partner state not covered by the new policy was Turkey which at that point had begun accession negotiations with the EU. The aim of the ENP was to create a 'ring of friends' around the entire eastern and southern periphery of the enlarged EU through the reduction of poverty and the creation of prosperity. To this end, a key element of the ENP was a set of bilateral ENP Action Plans mutually agreed between the EU and each partner country which set out an agenda for political and economic reforms with short- and medium-term priorities. Reform objectives covered a wide range of fields, including cooperation on political and security issues, economic and trade matters, common environmental concerns, integration of transport and energy networks, and scientific and cultural cooperation (Monjo Sánchez 2006).

3.4 The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) Mediterranean as a Shared Space Historically–Geographically–Culturally Bound with Europe

The third instrument for the EU's engagement with the Mediterranean had its origins in a French presidential campaign. In June 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy announced that he wished to create a 'Union de la Mediterranée' as the new basis for relations between the two sides of the Mediterranean Sea. This project was eventually reformulated as a relaunch of the EMP during the French presidency of the EU in the second half of 2008. The official title—the 'Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean' articulated the asserted continuity between the two policy initiatives. The Partnership includes the 27 member states of the EU together with 16 partners south and east of the Mediterranean. In an ostensible reflection of the underlying partnership, the activities of the UfM are supervised, coordinated and promoted by a co-presidency, composed of a state leader from an EU and non-EU country. The presidency on the EU side is rotated among the member states. However, this is not possible on the non-EU side since the principle of rotation could lead to an Israeli president representing the Arab states, something that is not acceptable. Thus, the non-EU president is chosen by consensus. The first such was Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. Besides the co-presidency, the UfM is served by a permanent Secretariat established with officials from both EU and non-EU states and based in Barcelona. At the Marseilles meeting in November 2008, a variety of areas for cooperation were identified, including solar power, maritime transport, civil protection, education and small businesses (Seeberg 2010).

4 Critical Perspectives on EU-Mediterranean Policy

While its policy on the Mediterranean is typically presented by the EU as motivated by the pursuit of the shared goals of social and economic development predicated on respect for democracy and human rights, more critical perspectives offer a very different interpretation of the behaviour of the Union with respect to the region. In the first instance, and since the very beginnings of the articulation of a coherent Mediterranean policy on the part of the then European Union, it has been observed that EU engagement with its Mediterranean neighbours is best understood less as partnership and more in terms of an asymmetric power relationship in which key European interests—economic, strategic and political—take priority over the largely rhetorical assertions of the EU to the contrary. As a result, the claims of the EU to act as a uniquely 'normative' international power in its foreign policy through

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the promotion of democracy and human rights have been repeatedly called into question. Furthermore, the diverse motivations and successive reinventions of policy towards the region raise fundamental questions about how the 'Mediterranean' is conceptualized in the first place.

Since the beginnings of the Barcelona Process, European policy on the Mediterranean has been presented in terms of 'partnership'. The EuroMed policy constituted an agreement between the then 15 member countries of the EU and 12 'partner' Mediterranean countries to pursue shared goals as identified in the policy. The ENP of 2004 expanded the category of partner countries to include those in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. However, as Cardwell notes, the substance of any partnership is undermined by the fact that the instruments deployed in pursuit of 'shared' goals consist of bilateral incentives and opportunities available to individual countries with the EU 'in charge of offering the incentives'. While the language of the ENP asserts that it is the subject of joint ownership and that both the EU and partner countries can hold the other accountable for living up to their commitments, it is difficult to see how this can really be the case when conditionality and the tying of progress to incentives are the prerogatives of the Union (2011: 227–228).

An alternative reading of EU policy proposes that it is, in fact, underpinned, by the pragmatic pursuit of its own interests. The first objective of the GMP in 1972 was the establishment of a free-trade zone in industrial goods between the EEC and each of the Mediterranean countries while the NMP which followed in the late 1980s was focused on the encouragement of structural adjustment in Mediterranean countries, private investment and market access. Economic motivations also characterized the EMP. As Schlumberger (2000: 255) points out, of the three 'baskets' (political and security cooperation; economic and financial cooperation; and, social, cultural and human cooperation), the most important policy objectives related to the economic and financial spheres. Most of the funds allocated under the MEDA Regulation (the principal instrument of financial and economic cooperation under EuroMed) were allotted to structural adjustment, in contrast to the funds granted to the promotion of democratic political reforms. Despite the asserted commitment to political reform objectives, the EU's economic strategies in the Mediterranean under EuroMed largely resembled those of the international financial institutions: 'liberalising markets and foreign trade, private sector development, deregulating capital markets, reforming tax systems, dismantling large parts of the loss-making public sectors and abolishing restrictive foreign currency regulations' (Schlumberger 2000: 256).

Economic concerns also assume a priority in the Union for the Mediterranean which Cardwell (2011: 229) characterizes as a Union 'loosely resembling that of the early European Economic Community and based around an economic free-trade area'. However, the interests at the heart of EU policy are not confined to the economic sphere. Strategic considerations also loom large as the link between European security, or security conceptualized from a European perspective, and policy articulation makes clear. Critics have long argued that EU concern to promote the norms of democracy and human rights in the Mediterranean has always taken second place to its preference for security and stability. In this context, stability takes the form of implicit, if not explicit, support for incumbent (and, typically, autocratic) regimes in the belief that this is the best guarantee of European interests: 'Calling a bluff on the EU's rhetorical commitment to democracy, the rule of law and human rights, most literature offers an interest-driven narrative of EU policies towards the region, in which security and economic concerns prevail' (Roccu and Voltolini 2017: 3).

From this realist perspective, the assessment of the EU is that stable regimes running their economies efficiently provide the best means of ensuring a zone of regional security and prosperity. Therefore, policy underscores the status quo, insofar as it strengthens, or at least, does not undermine, the interests of the EU (Volpi 2004: 151). The linkage between European security concerns and policy on the Mediterranean was also noted by Cardwell who observes the extent

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to which the language of the ENP mirrored that of the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003. The ENP had the stated aim of creating a 'ring of friends' around the EU, while the ESS linked European security to the promotion of a 'ring of well-governed countries' surrounding it (2011: 227). Kausch and Youngs go further in their claim that the EU has, in fact, moved away from seeking a ring of well-governed states, seeking instead a ring of '*firmly* governed states' (2009: 967).

The resulting depoliticization of EU policy is most clearly evident in the Union for the Mediterranean which has been described as 'void of much of the impetus towards political reform which both the EMP and the ENP implicitly and explicitly carried with them' (Schlumberger 2011: 137). In contrast, the UfM is expressly designed to push the focus of relations between Europe and North Africa away from the most sensitive political areas (Kausch and Youngs 2009: 964). This is reflected in the inter-governmental structure of the UfM which is characterized by institutions that, by definition, reflect their respective governments or, in the majority of Arab cases, their heads of state. This, as Schlumberger points out, is not a problem with regard to democratic European states. However, many Arab governments do not necessarily represent the will of their populations and in many cases rule over populations that are disenchanted with their autocratic leaderships. As a result, societal forces in the Arab world are likely to regard the UfM as another example of Europe taking the side of Arab regimes for strategic reasons while ignoring the aspirations of Arab peoples (2011: 140–141).

The predominance of European interests in policymaking towards the Mediterranean and the consequent depoliticization of policy call into question the often-asserted characterization of the EU as a uniquely 'normative' power in international politics. In 2002, Manners characterized the foreign policy of the EU in terms of its underlying commitment to 'a catalogue of norms' found in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that included the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The EU is therefore 'normatively different' from other international actors insofar as it promotes universal values rather than its own interests (Manners 2002: 241).

However, as has been seen, critics of the EU's policy on the Mediterranean are skeptical of the claim that the EU is a uniquely normative actor. In the priority accorded to its economic and strategic interests, the EU behaves rather as a realist actor like many others. Europe, in Bicchi's phrase, 'does not promote (neutral) norms but promotes 'Europe' (in the form of European norms)'.

Far from being a partnership of the EU and neighbouring states in pursuit of shared and normatively driven objectives, European policy in the Mediterranean is better understood in terms of an asymmetric relationship between the Union and states in the region in which policy is driven by the particular interests of the EU. However, the difficulties with EU policymaking on the Mediterranean extend further to embrace its conceptualization of the 'Mediterranean' in the first place. The incoherence of EU policy is reflected in the increasingly geographically diverse character of the Mediterranean as understood from the perspective of the EU. Notwithstanding the implicit assumption of a stable construct that is the Mediterranean, EU policy formulations have extended the category of Mediterranean states to a point that is, at best unworkable. While the original EMP embraced the member states of the EU and its southern partners, the ENP extended the range of states covered under its remit to include states to the east of the EU and in the Caucasus whose link to the Mediterranean is tenuous, to say the least. This continued under the terms of the UfM which includes Mauritania, countries in the Western Balkans and the League of Arab States. The Mediterranean is 'flexible according to the policy definitions of the EU' (Cardwell 2011: 230). Such flexibility and the polarization that characterizes relations between Arab countries of the Mediterranean and Israel, however, lead Bicchi (2006: 283) to concludes that it is difficult to

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justify the idea of a Mediterranean region on objective grounds, while Pace (2002: 195–203) links the 'determination' of the EU to deal with a multitude of countries as groups to its conceptualization of the Mediterranean as a site of insecurity and instability which requires management by the EU.

5 Moroccan Student Perspectives on the Mediterranean—Discordant Voices

In February 2015, an intensive three-hour workshop was held with approximately 35 graduate students (with approximately a 60–40% ratio of male–female) of political science specializing in EU-Mediterranean relations at the Université Hassan II in Casablanca, Morocco's largest University (created in 1975 by the merger of Université Hassan II Aïn Chock and Université Hassan II Mohammedia, with campuses located in Mohammedia et Casablanca). These students were invited to speak openly in French about their views on three principal issues: What does the Mediterranean mean as an everyday category; To what extent are EU elite representations of the Mediterranean recognized and shared by them; What alternative Mediterraneanisms would they propose? The workshop was recorded and then transcribed, and subsequently translated by the authors. Every student at the workshop made at least one verbal intervention on the three issues and, below, we [re] present, albeit briefly, some of these. Crucially, we observed that as the workshop progressed students became more prepared to cast the EU in a very critical light; questioning its motives, the effectiveness of particular policy interventions and deeply suspicious of the rhetoric deployed to frame EU-Moroccan relations.

The perception of Europe and of the Mediterranean by these students displayed remarkable assonances with much of the earlier discussion. In the first instance, workshop participants were keen to note the extent to which Morocco and Europe enjoyed a shared history while the Mediterranean was represented as a space '*rich in interaction and exchange between its two banks*'. However, throughout the discussion and, in particular, as it progressed, dissonant perspectives began to be revealed in which a very different set of perceptions of EU-Moroccan relations and of the Mediterranean began to emerge. From these perspectives, the view of the southern Mediterranean as a place of discord and conflict is prominent as is the perception that European policies towards the region and towards Morocco, in particular, are grounded in European interests (economic, strategic, and political) and are intrinsically asymmetric in character.

5.1 The Mediterranean as 'Shared Space'

A dominant theme that emerged in the workshop discussion centred on the notion of the Mediterranean as a shared space. Student participants stressed the common history of the Mediterranean for those on its northern and southern banks. Thus, students spoke of the Mediterranean as '*rich in historic, economic and cultural relations*'; both banks of the Mediterranean, north and south '*sharing the same history, the same sea*'; and the Mediterranean as representing '*the cradle of humanity*' and a space '*rich in interactions and exchange between the two banks*'. This positive theme was echoed in the view that the Mediterranean is characterized by '*interdependence between its two sides*'. As one student explained: '*the north is characterized by its modernity and technological advances, whilst the south by its human and natural resources such that the south cannot survive without the north and vice versa*'.

5.2 The Mediterranean as 'Space of Discord'

Despite such positive characterizations, participants were quick to comment on the political problems of the southern bank of the Mediterranean. Although the Mediterranean is the

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'*crossroads of civilizations*', they highlighted its conflictual nature '*marked by conflicts—for example, between Morocco and Algeria, the Palestinian issue and the question of the Kurds—which lead to divergence between its two sides*'. These political problems handicap closer relations '*making integration with the northern side difficult*'. One participant proposed three images of the Mediterranean—'*an old man representing its history; the sun, representing tourism, food, a good environment; but also conflict, again citing Moroccan-Algerian relations and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the other side of the Mediterranean*'. For another participant, '*while the objective of European policy is to create a zone of prosperity, security and peace, the reality in some countries of the southern Mediterranean is very different—in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, one cannot talk of peace*'. For another participant, the region is marked by conflict, diplomatic tensions and is '*at the centre of political greed in the world*'.

5.3 Europe and the Mediterranean: An Asymmetric Relationship

In spite of the repeated references to notions of partnership in EU discourse on the Mediterranean and the recurrent theme of shared ownership of the Mediterranean as expressed by several workshop participants, a very different characterisation of the relationship was also expressed by many. '*While the Mediterranean is rich in historic, economic and cultural relations there is a big difference and significant inequality at the economic level between the countries of the North and South*'. Other participants echoed this theme of economic inequality between Europe and the countries of the southern Mediterranean: '*The Mediterranean is rich in interaction between its two banks but this is an inequitable exchange in economic affairs. While a quarter of the world's wealth is created in Europe, Africa represents no more than 2–3% of the total*'. For another, despite a common history, the Mediterranean is characterized by 'economic disparities and very different political systems and cultures'. This view is summed up in a more critical tone by one participant: '*the southern side is always at the mercy of the northern side. They are partners but they are not the same size or of the same weight*'.

5.4 Uncovering European Interests

The superior strength and resources of Europe in its dealings with its southern neighbours is reflected in the repeated expression on the part of participants of the view that European policy-making and actions in the Mediterranean are primarily motivated by self-interest. In contrast to the EU's orthodox discourse of shared goals of peace and prosperity, based on mutual commitment to the protection of human rights and democracy, participants instead identified a range of strategic, economic and political interests as animating European responses to the region. To this end, the proceedings of the workshop vindicate the critical perspective on 'normative power Europe' alluded to earlier. One participant noted the complexity of the relationship between the EU and Morocco and likened it to '*a house of cards*'. As to what European interests are at stake, some identified economic interests but behind these lie '*political and geopolitical motivations*'. For others, EU cooperation and aid are motivated predominantly by '*security concerns*', while the UfM is '*simply about control of migration, which is in turn a security issue*'. For the EU, Morocco's '*value is a 'strategic partner' in managing migration*'.

6 Conclusions and Mediterranean Alternatives

The ambiguity of the responses of workshop participants towards orthodox constructions of the Mediterranean led some to propose very different alternative conceptualizations of the Moroccan-EU relationship. For some, the EU was a futile goal. '*The EU might give development aid to Morocco but because of religious,*

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political and geographic issues, Morocco could never be a member of the EU'. For another participant: '*The EU might offer opportunity but this is not good for Morocco—if Morocco continued to search for Europe, it could lose years of development. Instead, it should diversify its development portfolio, to wake up, to Africanise*'. The view that Morocco's future lay to the south rather than the north was echoed by others. One participant favoured 'south–south' cooperation rather than north–south cooperation because '*this would offer more opportunity to Morocco. To do so was to take a realistic, as opposed to optimistic, view of things*'. The same participant proposed integration between the Maghreb countries '*as a thousand times better than integration with the EU*'.

Finally, the very concept of the Mediterranean was subjected to critical questioning by these students. As one participant explained '*is France more Mediterranean than European? The answer is no. Similarly, Morocco is more African than Mediterranean*'. The advocacy by European elites of the Mediterranean as a physically and culturally unified homogenous space is questioned by these hitherto silenced, marginalized voices from the southern shores. With resounding agreement among the student participants one voice said '*it is time to let go of the dream of belonging to a Mediterranean. The concept of the Mediterranean related to a precise period and no longer possessed validity for the 21st century*'.

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paradiso@unisannio.it

The EU and the Symbolic, Territorial, and Institutional Organization of the Mediterranean as a Global Mobile Space: Moroccan Students' Perspectives

Maria Paradiso and Sabrina Favaro

Abstract

The projection of Europeanization beyond the EU's borders provides arenas through which the union strives to gain meaning, actorness and presence internationally. Actually it is a contested, fraught process with important discursive and instrumental dimensions. In this paper, we consider this process from "outside" the EU and specifically draw upon fieldwork conducted in Algeria, Italy, Morocco with civil society, specifically university students. In doing so, we provide alternative non-elite understandings of EU and Mediterranean spaces and offer critical insights into the changing "Europe"–North Africa relationship, as driven by mobile and immobile citizens across shores with a special emphasis on education, the experience of traveling across borders, and exposure to media.

Keywords

Non-elite understandings · Europe
Mediterranean · Narratives

M. Paradiso (✉)
University of Sannio, Benevento, Italy
e-mail: paradiso@unisannio.it

S. Favaro
Université Hassan II Casablanca, Casablanca, Morocco

1 Introduction: Not in Search of the Mediterranean as a Region

Following a mobility approach (Paradiso 2016), the current volume and chapter aim to go beyond the visions based on "border" approaches of EU-making or the Mediterranean as a space. Indeed, border is an important conceptual category and a *method* "in the fabrication of the world" (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). However, if studies continue to put some attention on borders, one probably will not be able to trace the emerging geographies of cross-bordering and bridging processes going "Beyond Fortress 'EU'rope" as a metaphor indicating closures, conflicts, detention camps.

Without a doubt, European neighborhood policies reflect the making of the "EU"ropean neighborhood as the EU's extended and extensive borderspace/scape (Jones 2006; Clark and Jones 2008; Celata and Coletti 2017); additionally an instrumental policy view per se neglects the geographical complexity and opportunities of multiple evolutions in the Mediterranean Basin, and between Europe and non-European Mediterranean countries, beyond the North–South divide (Bialasiewicz et al. 2013).

Previous discussion of cross-border regions and macro-region initiatives (e.g., Jones 2006; Celata and Coletti 2016, 2017) devoted considerable attention to the making of "European spaces" built on a shifting and tenuous economic

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paradiso@unisannio.it

and geopolitical balance between integration and exclusion practices. These studies disclosed that these practices are aimed at the redefinition of what is to be shared, how, and with whom, choosing to make selectively mobile certain categories of capital, goods, labor, and investment. They also showed the micro-geographies of the everyday life of actors in the EU and in partner countries of sub-national and non-governmental actors and lobbies (Jones 2006; Moisio et al. 2013).

In this chapter, we wish to problematize views of the Mediterranean as an other space of Europe and geographical images based on European or national policies or organized socioeconomic actors in the Mediterranean. We shift our focus from border to mobility geographies, since we wish to complicate easy distinctions between the visible hardening of EU internal bordering and the concurrent openness and closure, collaboration, securitization and warfare within the Mediterranean Basin. In doing so, in light of FP7 MC MEDCHANGe objectives, we explore people narratives and critical insights into changing "Europe"–North Africa relationships, as driven by across shores mobile and immobile citizens in different countries.

The view of Mediterranean as a global mobile reality (Paradiso 2016) draws upon study of flows, of networks—i.e., the circulation of ideas, people, finances, and so on. It challenges the continuous representation of the Mediterranean between homogeneity and otherness and reposits it as both a post-colonial imbricate site of encounters and currents and as a site of new hegemonic and counter-power discourse(s) and alliances. This paper (Paradiso 2016) explored the "mobility" paradigm as an initial approach to contemporary geographies of the Mediterranean. The latter are being created not only by the media, powers, and ideologies, but also by everyday people's inter-ethnic, inter-cultural, and emotional interactions in places and digital communication channels. Such interactions are often characterized by blockages of inter-ethnic or inter-cultural exchanges, as well as by inequalities. Mobilities present and discuss initial paths of new encounters structuring North–South relationships, and vice versa, but also circular and East–West ones. They contradict the binary visions of here and there, of borders and bordering. It seems that the Internet and people's spatial mobility underline a deep process of change for the Mediterranean. A dialectic of diaspora politics, circuits of funds, weapons, empowerments, and emotions challenges the boundaries of political communities in transformation. The Mediterranean thus appears as a global space of confrontation, emulation, opposition, dialectics, and change.

Such a mobile geographical perspective on the understanding of places by people, as the chapter in this volume adopts, highlights, rather, that what we are witnessing is not simply a spread of EU and the South post-colonial actorness across space and power geographies of fracturing wider spaces and individuals. Instead, it is a much more complex and fluid process of people cross-bordering, returning, circulating, which reworks the confines of what and where Europe and the South are. Mobile people who move across shores and borders experience, challenge legacies and recast territories being exposed to media and being filtered by education, knowledge, and traveling experiences. Thus, the mobility approach does not look to the Mediterranean as a space but a global mobile reality: it is global because actorness is not only regional and changes impact globally; it is mobile since the Euro-Mediterranean area is connoted by a variety of mobilities (people, ideas, money, power, weapons, information) as a series of constantly shifting, communicating articulations of place making which go beyond European economic, and regulatory spaces or a sense of the Mediterranean as an EU neighborhood region.

The projection of Europeanization beyond the EU's borders provides arenas through which the union strives to gain meaning, actorness and presence internationally; a contested, fraught process with important discursive and instrumental dimensions. In this paper, we consider this process from "outside" the EU and power networks and specifically draw upon fieldwork conducted in Algeria, Italy, Morocco with civil

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society, specifically university students. In doing so, we provide alternative non-elite understandings of EU and Mediterranean spaces and offer critical insights into the changing "Europe"–North Africa relationship, as driven by mobile and immobile citizens across shores with a special emphasis on education, the experience of traveling across borders and exposure to media. Our framework is not based on an understanding of political, diplomatic, or elite initiatives, neither do we adopt a Eurocentric view. Rather this chapter focuses on peoples' narratives and their emotional knowledge and lived experience as mobile people, or in relationships with mobile people across shores North–South. Narratives and related findings were provided during the workshop held by Maria Paradiso in February 2015, with undergraduate students of the Department of Italian Studies at the Faculty of Human Sciences, Ain Chock, University Hassan II in Casablanca, and hosted by Sabrina Favaro, Lecturer of Italian, and Redouan Nassih, Professor of Italian.

2 Objectives and Methodology

The workshop elaborated on a series of questions developed in MEDCHANGe by Alun Jones, with cooperation by Maria Paradiso, regarding representations of and critical insights on Mediterranean and Europe spaces (see Durac and Jones in this book) and additional questions about students' images of the fuzzy notions of Europe and the Mediterranean proposed by Paradiso. The approach does not look for regional boundaries or mental maps like in the previous studies on students' images of Europe (e.g., Didelon-Loiseau and Grasland 2014). Rather, it focuses on narratives about the idea of the Mediterranean and aims firstly at assessing if any notion of the Mediterranean exists for students; secondly, at critically discerning how the notions emerge in terms of recurring concepts and keywords, and what are the sources of any common understanding and associated meanings; thirdly, it scrutinizes nodes of symbolic representations, emotional reactions, and conflicting views. The second focus on Europe takes into consideration the complexity of interactions between the notions of Europe and the European Union (Clark and Jones 2008) vis à vis students' opinions. Researchers were aware that discourses and characteristics strongly depend on the location of the place of survey (Saarinen and MacCabe 1995). The main researcher's experience of the country was meaningfully complemented by interactions with local colleagues in assessing discussions of students' narratives and several months Marie Curie project seconded activities in Morocco by the main researcher.

The experiment proved particularly significant since it included a special population of students: students of Italian who have, in most cases, also lived in Italy or have strong connections with migrants or, in some cases, even have a double Italian–Moroccan citizenship. The research thus targets a special but interesting segment of people with experience in encountering difference in North Africa and Europe as cross-bordering and mobile people. Thus, it provides additional and different knowledge to that one by narratives in another MEDCHANGe workshop discussed by Jones, Durac in this book with students but not with migrants or return migrants' from Europe as this chapter scrutinizes. Specifically, it symbolizes a bridging shores experience while keeping non-European educational and cultural background. In this regard, it offers critical insights into the changing "Europe"–North Africa relationship, as driven by mobile and immobile citizens across shores with a special emphasis on education, traveling, experience of encountering different cultures, and exposure to media.

The methodology drew on narrative interpretations through lexical analysis of transcript records and iterative discussions among researchers and did not draw on maps. It was not oriented at searching for regional boundaries; rather, at assessing geographically constructed shared notions and understanding of geographical subjects in terms of emotional reactions shared consensus on concepts and words and everyday students' experiences with selected geographic areas. The main researcher asked for students' explanations and clarifications about

paradiso@unisannio.it

their narratives in order to discern their background, sociocultural explanations, local society knowledge filters (see Grasland et al. 2011; Didelon et al. 2011; Guérin-Pace et al. 2014 on factors shaping mental maps). Compared to the FP7 EUROBROAD MAP, MEDCHANGe did not use a large-scale survey, but rather a qualified one and of a special interest target group: university students with a migration background. It also elaborates on in presence interaction by researchers with students in deepening understanding and on recorded workshops' discussion. Other workshops were also held by Paradiso outside of this project in Slovenia and Turkey, and two other MEDCHANGe ones by Mohamed Alouat in Algeria and Maria Paradiso in Italy. They are not analyzed in the chapter, but they support interpretation of this chapter's workshop findings to assess different localities' filters and drivers of geographical imagination, knowledge, and critical insights.

3 Findings

Students were asked first to provide three images of Mediterranean space, if any image could be associated with a fuzzy space. In data analysis, researchers focused on the qualitative analysis of the words employed and concepts elaborated by undergraduates. The wording has been divided into two main categories to identify the students' views of a spatial object recognized as blurred, uneven and not always inclusive. Students gave positive and negative views, as reported in Table 1.

In the first category (negative attitude), students have drawn attention to a few symbolic representations, such as backwardness, ignorance, discrimination, racism, prejudice. Researchers interpreted them as a legacy of European snobbery and sense of inferiority as a legacy of a post-colonial space. Interestingly, they do not consider, at the discussion's

Table 1 Keywords and drivers of the Mediterranean as a space

Terminology	Category	
	Positive	Negative
Backwardness		x
Body language	X	
Business	X	
Common history	X	
Culture	X	x
Development	X	
Discrimination		x
Food	X	
Hope for change	X	
Mixed marriages	X	x
Mobility	X	
Physical–character traits	X	
Prejudice		x
Racism		x
Languages (shared)	X	

paradiso@unisannio.it

beginning, the Northern Mediterranean (part of Europe); the Mediterranean in this initial part of the discussion is the South, i.e., non-European. Students expressed in shared semantic fields their sense of exclusion or the result of a real political form of exclusion. In this case, the vision of the Mediterranean space and Europe is negative because they underline the gap in terms of underdeveloped and exploited North Africa ("*Europeans are better received here, in Morocco, than Arabs in Europe where they are considered as a problem*" says a student) against the rich, industrialized, or developed northern coast of the Mediterranean Sea.

The second category reveals the Mediterranean as a stratified geographical space inherited from long-lived shared traditions: history, culture, body language, common physical and character traits, languages, and food or ways of cooking. In this sense, narratives are relaxed, positive, and infused by human relations and shared feelings of commonalities among people.

The analysis of terminology confirms at this stage that the relation between Europe and North Africa is the product of a strategy of identification and exclusion (Didelon and Grasland 2014, p. 78), where the Mediterranean is at the same time perceived as a common and "bordering–othering" space. The benign version relies on a classic essentialist teaching of the Mediterranean (common; history, culture) but, significantly, also on traveling experiences (migration and encounters with different cultures). New meanings are indeed brought by mobilities experience of the Mediterranean: mixed marriages, hope for change, mobility in itself.

The analysis of students' vocabulary and narratives reveals that they have an ambivalent perception of Mediterranean space. It is positive when they adopt a historical or cultural approach to highlight the common points; but the approach turns critical or negative when a political-economic interpretation is considered. It is important to point out that the perception of Mediterranean space is blurred, and borders are neither clear nor identified, except when this space enters physically into contact with them: this is the case of Spanish or French communities living in Morocco or on the northern coast of the country that intrudes into Mediterranean Sea. From this angle, researchers point out that borders and bordering for immobile people are driven by mobile people entering or leaving the country and communicating with people in the home country. This point significantly highlights the importance of the conceptual category of mobility in addressing studies on Europe and the Mediterranean.

Except for those examples of direct connections with Europe (family members who migrated to Europe), the undergraduates privilege a vision of a main geopolitical space divided into two main zones, North and South, which are permeable and variable according to *communication corridors/paths* that permit them to interfere with each other; it is a permeable geography of borders or divides, re-casted and challenged by the mobility of people and networks of relations. They form the basis for developing, inside this space, different feelings like proximity or distance, sharing or excluding, affinities or differences. The Internet, media, exchanges, contacts, tourism, food, history, hope, similarities, business, and mixed marriages are useful terms to identify such a meta-geographical space. It is on this basis that the Mediterranean and Europe are negatively or positively defined.

Students shared a negative vision of Europe and Mediterranean spaces based on their life expectancies when they employed words like backwardness, discrimination, racism, and prejudice.

Students' life expectancies are built on knowledge filters from media, mobility across shores, educational and cultural systems, and their own schooling and the completion of a diploma which gives them access to European universities in order to take up more gainful employment in a solid welfare system. Sentences like "*we live in a personalized zoological showcase,*" "*we don't have money, healthcare, technology, science, organized trips*" are used by students to underline those things they lack in their life. They feature frontiers, visas, differences in the treatment of North African emigrants to Europe and European emigrants to North

paradiso@unisannio.it

Africa, poverty, ignorance, and underdevelopment as a consequence of an unbalanced system originating in the history of colonialism and the consequent post-colonial legacy, which can lead to restrictions on the possibilities for development. Their frustration is mounting in a world where the ancient concept *Mare Nostrum* is perceived as a political and military way of bordering and engaging in aggressive exclusion. In response to that, they have a strong need for reinforcing their collective cultural identity and for maintaining a passive-aggressive attitude (of those who get redress of grievance). In this way, they perceive Europe as a land to exploit in order to release their future.

Words like *food, physical–character traits, hope, shared languages, history* are all strictly related to our traditional cultures: history, body languages, gastronomy, and stereotyped southern physical and psychological characteristics. Discussion provided about Mediterranean highlights a shared sense of Mediterranean space which is defined as a whole of cultural exchanges, by immigrating or emigrating people, a strategic point from political and economic perspectives, but a not well managed space and, significantly, an opportunity for changing one's life. The proximity of the two geographical areas get closer if Internet usage is frequent: it is a highway of information flow and exchange. The Mediterranean becomes a liquid continent of opportunities for fulfilling human needs.

This interpretation permits the representation of Europe and Mediterranean space in a mainly positive way. Students tend to emphasize their perception of development and the good quality of life in the EU but they do not focus their attention on the way our common features are deeply intertwined and intersected. The result is that they do not enable themselves to see the opportunities offered by their developing nation, so they are always complaining: those positive images and mental attitudes can be explained by the national educational system, knowledge of the colonial inheritance from the past, migrations, trade flows and geopolitical strategies gained from media information and personal experiences.

As a result, they only underline the similarities in a broad sense and only recognize the European manners and ways of doing, of so-called southern traits, which bring to mind their manners and ways of doing: shouting while talking, frequent gesticulation, or friendly attitudes. They try to demonstrate the originality of their cultural heritage without considering historical links among cultural developments or deep explanations.

Among the used expressions, "mixed marriage" is a very interesting one. It is employed by undergraduates with a dual meaning. Mixed marriages can be a way of strengthening, stabilizing, and improving social–cultural exchanges because they represent a special kind of mobility inside the Mediterranean space and Europe, in this case open and permeable. On the other side, students consider mixed marriages as a critical item because probable they are sources of cultural, social, and legal problems: education of children, freedom of belief, social bias codifying opposition against mixed unions.

4 Conclusions

The qualitative analysis, at a first glance, shows that the students' wording reproduces an ambiguous representation of Mediterranean space and Europe, positive and negative at the same time. They move in this space with contrasting feelings, the Mediterranean can be common and shared but also conflicting and incompatible. The semi-peripheral model elaborated by Didelon-Loiseau and Gransland (2014, p. 88), and the role played by small geographical distance in the relationship between Europe and non-Europe Mediterranean countries are largely confirmed here: "a positive perception that emphasizes the notions of development of Europe, its technology and wealth levels, and it refers to human rights. This vision is balanced by many occurrences of words like racism, colonialism, and imperialism."

If stereotypes such as snobbery, colonial legacy, and inferiority complex bring a negative conception of the Mediterranean space, other

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words such as history, food, shared languages, business, and mixed marriages and, above all, personal lived experience of mobilities across shores offer a positive image of a common and sharable space.

When students are asked to explain what how the Mediterranean area is, they try to find similarities and differences in order to orient themselves within an unknown map, but they are not able to make out a common geographical, political, economic, and cultural space because they do not recognize borders. A lack of clear and established limits prevents them from imagining a different geography from the one in which they move. The result is curiosity and interest among some students and mistrust or chauvinism for other ones who feel like "animals in a zoological showcase."

In fact, the denial of that space confirms its existence; it seems like they do not recognize the Mediterranean as a space, as a common background, but only some of its details without understanding it as a whole, made up of affinities, shared roots and power. Such fragmentation is also a result of forms of subregionalization inside the country where students live: the semi-periphery is divided not only into "core" and "periphery" but also into *communication corridors/paths* connecting bringers of different realities and values: Spanish or French communities living among or close to native people improve interplay and information sharing, as well as the geographical proximity to Mediterranean Sea on the Moroccan northern coast does. Only in this case, are the undergraduates able to draw their Mediterranean mental map, but without nearness or some kind of direct interaction, the Mediterranean space and Europe are what's left by schooling, media, stereotypes, political choices, or dramatic events like the death of migrants who crossed the sea, and it is clear that the actual process of "bordering and othering" isn't fruitful in creating a sense of common space. It is in the liquid geographies of mobilities that they find commonalities and benign views of a geographical entity which can be conceptualized more in terms of mobility, networks and encounters, disrupting the continuity of borders between lands.

Therefore, beyond the dichotomic pendulum of North/South, a third datum is emerging and sheds light on a possible new geographical significance and relationships between Europe and the South. An alternative point of view is offered by the undergraduates in the MEDCHANGe experiment: mobility and *communication corridors/paths/flows* permit the overcoming of traditional European cultural heritage, such as colonialism, languages, migrations, and trades and create a common space where contacts are tangible and experienced by people: northern seashore or European enclaves create connections, better mutual understanding and personal elaborations of attachment, meanings of space which challenge, for those with an open mind, bordering narratives of victimization and inferiority, but also Arabic bordering education in terms of its non-recognition of mutually intertwined cultures. Indeed, to European researchers with Italian transmission of knowledge of the past, students show that sometimes their educational system does not enable them to recognize the multiple cultural roots for people which are not excluding reciprocally and provide multilayers genealogies of all sorts of cultural tangible and intangible legacies. For example, students think of many artifacts or concepts as being Arab only products, when instead they are inherited and transformed by the past through more complex reciprocal influences and heritage among countries and cultures. Other biases were found involving the use of the adjective Arab referred to cultures, countries, and people in the Muslim world who are indeed not Arab. Thus, bordering attitudes and closures to other cultures are visible in non-European education and popular knowledge as well. Sometimes heavily distorted filtered knowledge and arguments (but they were confuted by other students too) were expressed by a strictly religious sectary person in the workshop. Thus, it was evident that in the contemporary age, the interpretation and observance of religion may be a heavy burden for human dialogue and conviviality in the Mediterranean.

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In conclusion, a real improvement of living conditions in the Mediterranean and the perception of Europe is not clearly going to be the result of economic relationships and it can be limited when religion is misled and misunderstood religion can drive intellect and conduct. Conversely improved images of Europe and relationships with "South" might be possible through the support "in dignity" of mobilities of good will people and their trajectories of encounters with difference. Policies supporting the welfare of mobile and sedentary people across shores and borders may disclose positive avenues of dialogue for Europe and the world and the de-tensioning of the Mediterranean.

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paradiso@unisannio.it

Part II

Narratives. The Mediterranean as an Action Space in the Transformation of European Identity and Changing Relationships: Chapters on Mobilities: Crisis, Encounter, Change

paradiso@unisannio.it

The Refugee Camp as Geopolitics: The Case of Preševo (Serbia)

Dragan Umek, Claudio Minca and Danica Šantić

Abstract

The emergence of the Balkan Route in 2015 and its development in 2016 has temporarily shifted the geographical axis of the refugee-related migrations, complementing the existing maritime routes in the Mediterranean with new overland itineraries. This shift has caught unprepared not only the main 'transit countries' and 'arrival countries' but also the EU institutions that until that moment had a system of control (and reception) in place which was almost exclusively focused on the Mediterranean borders. After having been taken by about one million unregistered migrants in 2015, in March 2016 the Balkan Route was officially closed; however, a significant number of people is entering the Serbian territory despite the official impossibility to continue North via Hungary or Croatia. This has led to a high number of stranded migrants in the country that counted for more than 7000 individuals by the end of May 2017. In this paper, by presenting a few key geographical issues related to the creation of some urban makeshift camp, several 'jungles' at the border crossings, the distribution of official asylum and reception centres, we focus the attention on the case of *Preševo One Step Centre* in the southern Serbia. It is not only a fundamental dowel within the European border regime but also represents a strategic knot of the Serbia's internal political geography. The present research is part of the collaborative project led by the authors, started in mid-2016, as part of a broader project entitled 'Camps in Europe'.

Keywords

Balkan migration route · Refugee camps Serbia · Preševo · Geopolitics

1 Introduction

The emergence of the 'Balkan Route' in 2015 has temporarily modified the geographical axes of the refugee-related migrations in Europe, complementing the existing maritime routes in the Mediterranean with new overland itineraries. This shift has caught unprepared not only the main 'transit countries' and 'arrival countries', but also the EU institutions that until that

D. Umek (✉)
University of Trieste, Trieste, Italy
e-mail: dragan.umek@dsgs.units.it

C. Minca
Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
e-mail: claudio.minca@mq.edu.au

D. Šantić
University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia
e-mail: danicam@gef.bg.ac.rs

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paradiso@unisannio.it

moment had a system of control (and reception) in place, which was almost exclusively focused on the Mediterranean borders. Since the spring 2015, in fact, Serbia, together with a group of other Western Balkan countries, has been confronted with an extraordinary humanitarian crisis associated to the massive flow of refugees and asylum seekers arriving from the Middle East war zones, mainly Syria and Iraq, but also Afghanistan and Pakistan. These flows have given shape to what is normally defined as the 'Western Balkan Route', which originates in Turkey and, after having crossed Greece, FYR Macedonia and/or Bulgaria reaches Belgrade, to then continue towards Western and Northern Europe via Hungary and Croatia. The Balkan region, in fact, does not represent a destination for most of these irregular mobilities, but rather a bridge towards the countries selected by the refugees as their desired final destination, mainly but not exclusively Germany. According to the Serbian institution in charge of supporting and organising the assistance for the refugees, the *Commissariat for Refugees and Migration*[1] (hereafter Commissariat), over a million individuals seeking asylum in Europe have entered the Serbian territory since the beginning of the above-mentioned crisis. Already in 2015, the Serbian Government has thus put in place an articulated network made of hospitality centres (in Serbian *centar za azil*, literally *asylum centres*), reception centres and transit centres (described in Serbian as *prihvatini centar*, but translated in English by the same authorities as *one stop centres*). While the first category of camps was established, at least theoretically, to offer long-term hospitality to those who have formally expressed the intention to apply for asylum in Serbia,[2] the others were conceived as a strategic tool to respond to urgent situations of emergency associated to growing and unexpected arrival of migrants across the southern borders.[3]

After having allowed the passage of a largely uncontrolled flow of unregistered migrants in 2015, in March 2016 most of the countries that were involved in the Western Balkan Route have decided to close their borders to these informal passages, collectively announcing that the Route was officially shut down. Serbia, unlike bordering Hungary, FYR Macedonia and Croatia, did not adhere to such initiative. This has meant that a significant number of people has continued entering the Serbian territory from the southern borders even after that date, despite the official impossibility to continue North via Hungary or Croatia; this explains why in the remainder of 2016 and in 2017 thousands of asylum seekers were stranded, literally 'trapped' in the country (about 7000 in May 2017, according to the Serbian authorities).

The infamous erection of numerous walls and fences along the borders of most Balkan countries (Minca and Rijke 2017)—together with the agreement signed in about the same period between the European Union and Turkey[4] aimed at limiting and controlling such movements of unregistered individuals—has indeed drastically reduced the number of passages along the Route, and consequently in Serbia. However, despite the formal closure of the route and the reduction in arrivals, the emergency situation has not disappeared in Serbia, since ever-new arrivals have continued to join the already stranded people, with the concomitant appearance of several urban and rural makeshift camps and 'jungles' nearby the border crossings, but also with the related re-organisation of the official asylum and reception centres in Serbia, a country that has become, since the opening and especially after the closure

[1]See http://www.kirs.gov.rs.

[2]*For more details see Asylum Law* (2007), *Law on Foreigners* (2008) and Law on Migration (2012).

[3]During the time in which the Balkan Route was 'open', they operated as 'short-term accommodation centres' for migrants who were waiting for transportation in order to continue their journey. Thanks to a 72-h permit, the migrants were allowed to reach another reception centre in the country or, alternatively, leave the country within that time limit.

[4]See full text in: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement.

paradiso@unisannio.it

of the Balkan route, a sort of buffer zone between the incumbent flows of migrants from central Asia and the Middle East and the EU countries that have literally sealed off their borders (Santić et al. 2017).

The material discussed in this chapter has been collected in the context of a collaborative project on the Serbian camp system led by the authors, that has started in 2016, and that is part of a broader project entitled 'Camps in Europe'. Here, we wish to focus our attention on the case of the *Preševo—One Step Centre* in the southern Serbia. Our interest for this specific 'camp' is related to the fact that, while the centre was initially created near the FYR Macedonian border in the Fall 2015 to provide temporary relief to the thousands of migrants entering the country, mainly on foot, during those months, it now has become a sort of 'model camp', a showcase hospitality centre to be shown to the international organisations supporting the humanitarian effort of the government. The pages to follow intend to offer, within the limited space here available, a glance on how the overall refugee crisis and the evolution of the related Balkan Route have affected the realisation of a refugee camp a few steps away from Kosovo and FYR Macedonia. This camp, despite having been originally created and remaining today a sort of showcase centre for the hospitality of migrants arriving from south—or transferred here from other parts of the country—has also become much more, that is, a node in a broader territorial strategy implicated in the future integration of Serbia in the European Union and, perhaps most importantly, in the control of territories that, while official part of the country's map, are traversed and significantly affected by the presence of visible and invisible borders, the product of the difficult and still unresolved relationship between Serbia and Kosovo[5] (Fig. 1).

[5]Kosovo has declared its independence in 2008, but Serbia formerly still considers Kosovo its southern province. According to the official interpretation of the Serbian authorities, the existing administrative border cannot be converted in a state border (see International Crisis Group 2007).

2 The Refugee Camp System in Serbia

This chapter is one of the results of a project on the Serbian camp system and the Balkan Route that the authors have developed in 2016–2017 with extensive fieldwork that has included intensive participant observation during the numerous visits to institutional camps, but also to several makeshift camps, and a series of structured and semi-structured interviews with refugees, Commissariat and government representatives, staff and volunteers working for the NGOs involved in the humanitarian support to the refugees. We have also carefully monitored the official documents on the refugee situation released by the Serbian authorities, and the academic and semi-academic publications produced by other research projects and a few European think tanks. The present contribution, due to the limited space available, will engage only indirectly with these materials, which nonetheless represent the source of the materials here discussed.

As noted above, in order to face the dramatic humanitarian crisis generated in 2015 by the sudden emergence of a Balkan Route for irregular migrants, largely related to the war situation in Syria and Iraq, the Serbian authorities have open a series of camps in various key locations. According to the information provided by the *Commissariat*, in 2017, the following 'centres' were now part of the system of (partially) connected refugee camps, often extremely diversified in their role and in the ways in which they operate: the *asylum centres* of Krnjača, Banja Koviljača, Bogovađa, Sjenica and Tutin (the last two considered only temporary); the *one stop centres* (or *first aid reception centres*) located in Preševo, Bujanovac, Divljana, Pirot, Bosilegrad, Dimitrovgrad, Obrenovac, Adaševci, Šid stanica, Principovac, Subotica, Kikinda and Sombor[6] (Commissariat 2017).

[6]Some if these camps were previously used as refugee camps for internally displaced people, in particular to host part of the Serbians who, as a result of the Yugoslavian civil wars, moved to the present Serbian territories. Other camps consist of converted military barracks, dismissed factories, colonies for children, or even dismissed motels.

paradiso@unisannio.it

Fig. 1 Map of Serbia with the area of the Preševo Valley in evidence. *Source* Cartographic Section of the United Nations (CSUN), Map No. 4268, Rev. 1, April 2007, modified by the authors

However, in addition to these institutional camps, in the past two years Serbia has witnessed the formation of several informal camps—often described as jungles or makeshift camps in the academic literature (see, among others, Altin and Minca 2017), but also by the refugees themselves—in some strategic point along the Balkan Route, and in particular near the borders with

paradiso@unisannio.it

Hungary (Horgoš and Kelebija) and Croatia (in the fields around Šid). Most of these makeshift camps have appeared in correspondence to the official closure of the borders in question and of the related Balkan Route (again, in March 2016). In fact, a significant contingent of irregular migrants, who initially intended to reach Germany and other European destinations, found themselves suddenly stuck in Serbia with no options available to legally continue their journey. The fear of being formally incorporated by the Serbian hospitality system, and accordingly being transferred to some institutional camps away from the borders, or constrained by the related limited mobility imposed by some camps, have in fact induced a growing number of individuals to decide to stay out of the hospitality centres, in this way giving life to a proliferation of informal encampments—which are constitutively fluid spaces, marked by a sense of precariousness and temporaneity typical of these forms of dwellings that have appeared in many cities in Europe of late for the same reasons here described (Katz 2016).

The most significant of these makeshift camps, both in terms of duration and dimension, was the one that has materialised in the centre of Belgrade, near the bus and train stations. The strategic position of the capital, as a point of convergence of the two main ramifications of the Balkan Route—that crossing FYR Macedonia, and the more recent one, crossing Bulgaria—has made its transportation hubs a key strategic passage point for anyone trying to move from south to north along the Balkan Route in 2015. However, the centre of Belgrade has maintained this central role as a transit hub for those who wished to cross the northern borders—both regular and irregular—especially after those same borders were officially closed to the migrants. If in 2015, and part of 2016, Belgrade has played a pivot role in the provision of transportation to the refugees directed towards the rest of Europe—regular buses, trains and taxis—after March 2016, according to many of our interviewees, it has also become a sort of informal meeting point for those who intend to get in contact with the border smugglers and try to move north by illegal means (often failing to do so, and thus returning to Belgrade to wait for a new opportunity).

According to the figures provided by International Organization for Migration (IOM),[7] at the beginning of October (2017), there were about 70,000 stranded migrants along the Balkan Route. The majority of these (over 60,000) was located in Greece; however, Serbia was second in this list with almost 4000 migrants stranded in its institutional camps, while little is known about those who were either on the move or in improvised dwellings in the fields along the borders, or in Belgrade—although according to some NGOs unofficial report they were at least 300. For the Serbian authorities, the number of individuals hosted in the country's hospitality and asylum centres in October 2017 was over 4000 (Commissariat 2017), with a relative decline of the registered arrivals possibly due to the formal impossibility of 'heading north' via the Balkan Route—although this did not mean that new migrants did not enter the country, since many of these passages remained unrecorded.[8]

In the first stage of the so-called refugee crisis along the Balkan Route, Serbia has fundamentally played the role of a 'transit zone' for these passages directed towards the rest of Europe, since the migrants, largely entering from the FYR Macedonian border, were provisionally offered some support in the 'one stop centres' and the hospitality centres, and often used the transportation provided by the authorities or even private companies. However, after March 2016 the role of this country has become that of a 'buffer zone' of sorts. With the closure of the Balkan Route, in fact, Serbia has begun to play a humanitarian role in a context largely determined by the erection of border walls and the refusal on the part of Hungary first, and Croatia in a second moment, to accept new refugees (European Parliament 2016; European Commission 2017). The role of Serbia as a buffer zone between the areas

[7] http://migration.iom.int/europe/.

[8] While we are writing, official sources report around 1000 guests in the Asylum Centres and around 3000 in the Reception Centres. About 200 individuals were informally identified in the remaining makeshift camp of Belgrade, known as Afghan Park.

paradiso@unisannio.it

of provenience of the refugees and the EU has become increasingly significant in 2017, not only for the stranded individuals and for those who try to illegally cross the above-mentioned borders and are sent back (often badly injured) to Serbia; this role remains key also for how the country is representing itself as 'humanitarian' and hospitable, especially when compared to the tough policies adopted the neighbouring countries. However, this new position has also other important geopolitical implications in the context of the European future role of Serbia, on which we will return in the next section. For now, it may suffice to say that what started in 2015 as an impetuous and almost 'biblical exodus' (in the description of some of tabloids at least), after March 2016 has become an irregular but nonetheless continuous flow of people entering Serbia along the same route, a flow influenced by a series of elements, from the changing political situation in the broader region (often subjected to diverse forms of tension due to past conflicts or present disputes, not exclusively related to the management of the migrants), to the weather conditions, or even to the ways in which the smugglers constantly tend to re-organise their geographies aimed at keeping, on their own terms, the Balkan Route secretly open.

The result of these entirely new geographies made of irregular mobility—and of the related hospitality camps supporting formally and informally the migrants along the route—is a sort of archipelago of camps/centres de facto organised as clusters, that is, a system of somehow connected hospitality structures strategic located in distinct areas of the country in order to manage the presence of refugees in need of support.[9] Broadly speaking, this system is based on six main cluster zones:

1. The *Belgrade District Cluster*, including, in addition to the above-mentioned 'old railway station warehouses' makeshift camps (with more than 2000 individuals at a certain point in time), the now (virtually) dismantled Afghan Park located in a square nearby the station, and the government's hospitality centres of Krnjača and Obrenovac, strictly linked to the management of the new arrivals, but also of the related makeshift camps;
2. The *Northern Cluster*, along the Hungarian border, with multiple reception centres in the Subotica area (Subotica, Sombor, Kikinda), border transit zone centres in Kelebija and Horgoš, and several border makeshift camps (including that in the 'old brick factory');
3. The *Western Cluster*, along the Croatian border, including the reception centres in the Šid area (Šid Stanica, Adaševci Motel, Principovac), the *border transit zone centres* in Berkasovo–Bapska, and several border makeshift camps (including the old '*Grafosrem* factory');
4. The *Eastern Cluster*, along the Bulgarian border, a cluster in the making while we are writing, since linked to the consolidation of a new branch of the Balkan Route, the one coming from Bulgaria. This cluster consists of several reception centres in the Pirot–Dimitrovgrad area (Divljana, Pirot, Dimitrovgrad, Bosilegrad), with more planned to become operational in 2018.
5. The *Southern Cluster*, along the FYR Macedonian border, but crucially close to Kosovo, which consists of the reception centres in Preševo area (Preševo, Bujanovac, the former border transit zone centre in Miratovac).
6. Finally, the spread clusters of permanent *Asylum Centres* (Banja Koviljača, Bogovađa, Sjenica, Tutin) that have been strategically positioned away from the Balkan Route, in order to avoid being involved in its complex and always changing dynamics, since these centres should host individuals and families who are putatively in Serbia to stay, having applied for asylum in that country.

With this context in mind, we now move to the analysis of the former 'one stop centre' in Preševo, a camp that has become a sort of model camp in the hospitality network/system put together by the Serbia authorities, but also a key geopolitical presence of the Serbia state in a

[9]For a more detailed analysis of these clustering and their geographical implications see Minca, Santić, and Umek, forthcoming.

paradiso@unisannio.it

Fig. 2 *One Stop Centre* in Preševo, outside the camp—May 2016. Photo by the authors

border region that is contested and relatively fragile. What we would like to argue here is that the Preševo showcase camp is not only a pivot site for the entire system of hospitality established by the government, but it has become a strategic hub in the geopolitical role that Serbia tends to play in Europe but also in relation to the complicate presence of Kosovo population and activities in its immediate surroundings (Fig. 2).

3 Preševo and the Camp

BOX 1 *On the road to Idomeni: first visit to Preševo (May 3rd, 2016)*

Since the beginning of our long tour of the Balkan Route in the spring 2016, the name of Preševo has been evoked in the accounts of many of our interviewees as a sort of collective mantra associated to memories, experiences, sensations, fear and long waiting times, but also warm meals and blankets, the bureaucracy, the chaos and the uncertainty about where to go next…

When we arrive in the town of Preševo for the first time, we are immediately struck by a quite unique urban landscape. There is a clear feeling of being in a border city, whose visible and invisible economy is driven by things happening 'elsewhere', but also by an extraordinary vitality considering its size and location. Preševo emanates a sense of temporaneity, of constant mobility, typical of a passage point where many routes intersect and come together in complex and ever-changing formations. But if one takes a closer look, may start noticing more in detail the overlapping geographies of this unique semi-urban setting: expensive cars with Western European plates zooming in its streets, the signs of a city bordering with Kosovo and part of its commercial traffics, a true twenty-first-century bazar atmosphere, some 'byzantine' spatial arrangements, great apparent disorder, *Ghega* voices in the air (the Albanian dialect spoken in that region), total absence of Serbian authorities; the distance from the capital Belgrade from where our road map has started could not be more evident.

In the spring 2016, the *One Stop Centre* established a few kilometres away from the

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town centre is not very active. We encounter only a few roaming migrants in its interior, and a few staff. We are not allowed to visit the centre, despite being treated very kindly by the authorities. The Balkan Route has been closed a few months earlier, and the large part of the migrants blocked by the fence erected by the FYR Macedonian authorities on the border with Greece is now in Idomeni, our next destination. The private buses that in the intense months of late 2015 have taken thousands of migrants to their next destination in Serbia, normally Belgrade or the Hungarian border, are now parked just outside the camp, waiting for new developments. However, we notice the intense passage of private taxis, a mark, we guess, of a clandestine activity capitalising on those who still manage to enter illegally FYR Macedonia and reach Preševo on foot after almost two weeks of perilous journey (we are told by volunteers that about 200 individuals arrive—and depart—every day). The camp is under radical restructuring, after having faced in precarious conditions the emergency of the previous months, when thousands of individuals used to arrive in a single day. The few staff and temporary guests are mixed up with numerous construction workers busy in what appears as an ambitious upgrade of the whole structure, clearly planned for new arrivals, but especially for a new role for this one camp envisaged by the government. Inside the iron fences of the camp, we can still see the prefabricated 'boxes' installed in order to provide some shelter to the refugees during the period of the peak arrivals, but also the ticket office of *Lasta*—the national bus company that was the first involved in the transportation of the refugees towards their northern destinations—a small shop with food and other small items, the booth for the distribution of clothes. Outside the compound, along the main road, aligned with the bus stop and the taxi stand, is a series of informal and in some cases entirely improvised stands selling foods and all sorts of goods to the refugees. A chaotic but lively commercial strip at the margins of Preševo to respond to the demands of people in transit and of the staff hired to assist them. However, something is missing from the picture. We are not sure what. We leave with the sensation that something else is going on in Preševo, something bigger than just a provisional refugee camp and the informal economies of a border city in southern Serbia. We simply cannot figure out what.

Preševo (*Preshevë*) is a small town on the border with FYR Macedonia, with about 13,000 residents, of which almost 90%, according to the 2002 census, ethnically Albanian, with less than 10% of the residents having defined themselves as ethnically Serbian.[10] Preševo is located along the southern Serbian segment of the European transportation corridor E-10 that connects Belgrade, Skopje, Thessaloniki and Athens. Its municipal territory borders with Kosovo and with FYR Macedonia and, together with the contiguous municipality of Bujanovac (*Bujanoc*), is part of what is described at times by international organisations as the 'Preševo Valley', a region in which 'ethnic Albanians' have represented for long and still represent the absolute majority of the population (Del Re 2008; Pettifer and Vickers 2009; Sejdiu-Rugova 2015).[11]

[10]More specifically—according to the 2002 census—the resident population of the town of Preševo was partitioned in the following way: Albanians 11,746 (87.48%); Serbians 1231 (9.16%); Roma 321 (2.39%). Since the ethnic Albanians have refused to participate in the 2011 census, we have no more recent data available concerning the actual demographics of this region (Popis 2003).

[11]The *Preševska Dolina* in Serbian, or *Lugina e Preshevës* in Albanian, is an area that until 1948 was administratively part of Kosovo, from which it was later separated because of its strategic role as railway and road transportation hub; this territorial arrangement has not allowed its residents to benefit from the autonomy awarded to Kosovo by the Yugoslavian Federation after 1974 (Loi 2013).

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Fig. 3 *One Stop Centre* in Preševo, inside the iron fences of the camp: the prefabricated 'boxes' of the '*Lasta*' ticket office and the small shop—May 2016. Photo by the authors

The *One stop centre* in Preševo was inaugurated on 8 July 2015 and soon became the pivot of what we have described as the *Southern Cluster* in the archipelago of camps established by the Serbian authorities. Located a few kilometres away from the FYR Macedonian border, it has occupied the space that once belonged to the administration office of a dismissed tobacco factory (*Preduzeće za obradu duvana u Preševu*). Initially, the Preševo one stop centre represented the first point of humanitarian assistance for the migrants entering Serbia from south, largely arriving from Greece via Idomeni and FYR Macedonia via Tabanovce. During this phase, the camp was offering humanitarian aid and a temporary shelter to the refugees extenuated after weeks of travel in difficult conditions. After a day or two, most of the migrants simply left to continue their journey with a 72-h permit across the Serbian territory. The centre was also a first attempt of identification of the hosts, largely based on their own unverified declarations. The centre was connected, in the 'Southern Cluster', to the nearby camp of Bujanovac, located a bit further north, and with the *border transit zone* of Miratovac, which was dismissed after the official closure of the Balkan Route. Since its inception, the *One stop centre* in Preševo has modified its role and function in relation to the Serbian camp system on several moments in time, normally to respond to the changes affecting the migration flow along the route, but also to specific national migration policies. At the apex of the refugee crisis, in the second part of 2015, Preševo has registered (and accommodated) up to 9300 refugees in one single day,[12] being involved in about 95% of the total arrivals in Serbia, in this way playing a key role in the government's politics of humanitarian aid activated during those months (Fig. 3).

After having played a key role in assisting thousands of refugees in transit along the Balkan Route, the Preševo centre since March 2016, with the closure of the route and of the border with FYR Macedonia, has been largely reconceived to make of this camp the largest and

[12]The registration merely consisted in finger prints and facial photos.

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arguably best organised 'hospitality centre' of the country[13] and one of the nodes of the support network organised along the Balkan Route. The changed political situation in the region concerning the refugees was in fact reflected in a series of interventions along the southern European border that have had a crucial impact on this camp located in the Preševo Valley. In particular, the proliferation of ever-new walls and fences along the national border of many countries in the region, the intensified border controls and the coordinated international interventions to manage—but also limit and 'push back'—the flows of migrants along the route have rendered the border between Serbia and FYR Macedonian virtually impermeable. A partial exception to the otherwise total closure to new arrivals concerned the families coming from Greece with regularly registered minors, for whom a preferential route was kept partially open. As far as the Preševo centre was concerned, despite the persistence of some sporadic passages, the closure of the route has had the immediate consequence of moving elsewhere the main entry point for the residual, at this point largely illegal, arrivals of migrants, who have begun to bypass the FYR Macedonian block by entering Serbia from the Bulgarian border, less controlled and therefore privileged by the smugglers who apparently have been particularly quick in adapting their geographies to the mutated political conditions. Nevertheless, the *one stop centre* in Preševo has been chosen by the Serbian government as a major asset in the network of hospitality camps, officially also for the large amount of people that it was able to accommodate, and for the quality of its services more in general. Preševo in fact is now where many stranded refugees have been recently transferred from other regions. What is more, after deciding to dismantle some of the above-mentioned *jungles* (Šid) and *makeshift camps* (the *railway warehouses* in Belgrade) many of the residents of those informal dwellings were 'relocated' to Preševo (which is the most distant possible point from the northern borders with Hungary and Croatia). That of Preševo is arguably the only 'closed' camp of the Serbian archipelago, which means that the guests are allowed to leave only with special permits and accompanied by a staff member. All the other camps in Serbia in fact are 'open camps', in the sense that the guests may enter and exit with no restrictions or limitations. This mixed of hospitality and detention functions is not the only element of distinction of the Preševo camp compared to the rest of the network. Preševo is in fact the only camp directly controlled by the Minister of Labour, Employment and Social Welfare and even if it is managed by the *Commissariat for Refugees and Migration* (Fig. 4).

BOX 2 *A model camp to exhibit: our second visit to the Preševo camp (August 23rd, 2016)*

A few months later we are here in Preševo again, in this bizarre but fascinating corner of southern Serbia. The situation along the Balkan Route has in the meantime entirely changed. Idomeni, the largest makeshift camp in Europe, has been recently dismantled by the Greek authorities, with about two thirds of its residents evaporated a few hours before the arrival of the police and the bulldozers. The long lines of migrants walking across the fields of the Balkan region have also vanished, or made themselves invisible. The pressure on the southern borders of Serbia is accordingly diminished. What was previously perceived and presented as a humanitarian emergence, the so-called refugee crisis, is now treated by the media as a question concerning the migrants stranded in Serbia and their long-term management. In this entirely different context, we enter for the second time the Preševo camp; however,

[13]On 16 February 2016, the second phase of the restructuration of this edifice was completed, thanks to the funding provided by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs. This resulted in two new large spaces able to contain up to 350 individuals (normally families), new playgrounds for children, a new ambulatory, a 900 m^2 storage space, a vast laundry room, the office for the registration of the new arrivals and a bus stop for those who are allowed to leave.

paradiso@unisannio.it

Fig. 4 *One Stop Centre* in Preševo, information panels inside the registration office—August 2016. Photo by the authors

this time our visit has been planned ahead and we are allowed to enter.

After having obtained the authorisation for an official visit in Belgrade, we are welcomed by the government representative Mr. Milenko Nikić, who is in charge of the camp. The centre looks very different compared to the first time, with more beds available and with largely improved provisions for the guests. Everything seems perfectly organised and in control. We perceive the pride of the staff of the camp in showing to an international 'delegation' (us) the most impressive result of the Serbian state's effort in organising the hospitality of a large contingent of refugees, also—we are told—thanks to the fruitful collaboration with several international aid organisations and to the financial support of the EU. From being an overpopulated one stop centre in the months of the refugee emergency, the camp is now converted into a formidable machinery for the management of migrants: a model camp in the national hospitality system that the Serbian government is ready to expose to the national and international institutions and public opinion. Most of the 20 staff members have been recruited among the local residents—perhaps a way to engage with the potentially hostile surroundings?—while no ethnic distinction and spatial separation is implemented inside the camp (contrary to what happens in many other camps, in Serbia and elsewhere), a deliberate attempt—according to Mr. Nikić—to underline the overall humanitarian vocation of the centre and the intention to emphasise the equal treatment of all the guests, regardless of their provenience, language, religion or ethnic affiliation. The only priority in the provision of the available services is aimed at protecting the integrity of the family units and the safety and well-being of the most vulnerable individuals, *in primis* women and children.

We are shown the camp in detail. Here, we find the first proper 'kindergarten' in a Serbian refugee camp, the 'shopping zone' based on the use of a specific card assigned to each guest, but also spaces reserved to women only, or others dedicated to the education of the children and to playgrounds. In each and every element of the

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camp, the collaboration between the government and the EU is on display: the EU flag is visible on the staff uniforms, while the plaques listing the organisations involved in the direct humanitarian aid and/or the funding are clearly visible: Caritas, Danish Refugee Council, Start Network UK, Mercy Corps, Save the Children, UNICEF, UNHCR, German Humanitarian Assistance, etc.

Our visit, we are made aware, happens in a moment of great relevance for the camp, since that same day they are expecting the visit of the Minister of Labour, Employment and Social Welfare, to inaugurate the new dormitories (which, again, we are shown in great detail). Here, unlike all the other camps that we have visited during our fieldwork, the presence of the police and even of the army is clearly visible, inside and outside of the camp. This model camp, sanitised and perfectly organised, is there to host a large number of well-protected refugees (who, however, are paradoxically not free to leave if they wish to); however, we leave Preševo again with the feeling that its function, and the related emphasis given to the role of the government in its management, are not limited to the assistance of the asylum seekers. Something more, and perhaps even equally important, seems to be at stake (Fig. 5).

The relevance of Preševo indeed goes far beyond the mere management of the refugee there hosted. The Preševo camp is also a sort of police/military post in a silently contested territory where the central authorities seem to have de facto only limited sovereignty. We would like to suggest that the camp in Preševo has surged to strategic geopolitical relevance for the Serbian authorities for a number of reasons. First, it represents in many ways a flagship case of the humanitarian effort put together by the country, a case that shows at one time the competence, the efficiency and the humanitarian political culture of Serbia. In other words, it presents and represents Serbia as a reliable European partner for the EU and its members. With the perspective of Serbia becoming in the future a member of the EU, the Serbian authorities have also initiated a process of substantial revision of the national

Fig. 5 *One Stop Centre* in Preševo, inside the camp—August 2016. Photo by the authors

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legislation concerning migrations and the hospitality of asylum seekers, in order to harmonise it with EU directives on the same matter (Law on Migration 2012). The 2015 refugee crisis has thus given Serbia the opportunity to propose itself to the rest of Europe in line with a new specific geopolitical strategy, by offering to become a key partner in the control and, to some extent, the externalisation of the humanitarian aid given to the growing number of irregular migrants trying to enter the EU territories. Thanks to its relatively 'soft' politics of containment and humanitarian support Serbia has not only received significant amount of funding from the EU countries and multiple aid organisations, but has managed to play a key and recognised role in the early management of the Balkan Route first, and in the present-day system of hospitality centres along the same route after it was officially closed by the neighbouring countries. Preševo is in many ways the central pivot of that very system (Beznec et al. 2016).

However, we believe that the presence of the Preševo camp in that southern region is no less important in terms of domestic geopolitics. As noted before, the Preševo Valley is historical populated by a majority of ethnic Albanians, while Preševo itself is dominated by the Albanian language and the border trade with Kosovo. We have experienced the absence of the Serbian authorities during our visits to the town, while the presence of the military and of a police post was clearly visible in the proximity and even inside the camp. The international recognition of the role played by Serbia and by the Preševo hospitality centre in the management of the refugee crisis in the Balkan region has in fact fully legitimised the Serbian authorities to intensify and consolidate, around the camp, but also in the Preševo region more broadly, the presence of state authorities, military forces and police, in a territory that has been contended for decades and that has witnessed many moments of conflict between the Serbia authorities and the local Kosovarians (Fig. 6).

During the so-called 'Kosovo crisis' (1998–1999), the level of conflict between Serbia and the local population of the Preševo Valley has reached perhaps unprecedented levels. During those years the Valley was interested by the presence and the operation of the UÇPMB (*Liberation Army of Preshevë, Medvegjë and Bujanoc*) that aimed at the secession of those territories from Serbia and at their incorporation in the newly constituted and self-proclaimed Kosovo state entity. Only in 2001, thanks to the mediation of the USA and the EU, a peace agreement was reached (the *Konculj Agreement*) that included full amnesty for the former members of the UÇPMB, the return of the Serbian military forces on that territory and the launch on the so-called 'Čović Plan'.[14] This plan envisaged a more active involvement of the ethnic Albanian majority in the political and institutional life of the region, together with significant investments to help the economic recovery on the Preševo Valley. However, the plan was never actually launched, possibly for the interest on the part of the central government to maintain full control over the Southern European Corridor that connects Belgrade to Athens, with the result that the region is now the poorest of the entire country (International Crisis Group 2007; Brozović 2012; Loi 2013; Institut za razvoj malih i srednjih preduzeća 2005/2006). A town like Preševo has thus developed its own informal economies associated to the circulation of all sorts of goods across the border with Kosovo a few kilometres away, while the Serbian authorities seem to have progressively lost ground, or deliberately neglected Preševo as if controlling the region would have been too costly and political controversial.

The Preševo camp thus, with the increasing involvement and presence of international agencies, has in this sense represented a great opportunity to restate, in the name of the humanitarian aid provided to the refugees, and with the involvement and implicit endorsement of the international agencies, the right of the Serbian authorities to be in full control of the region. This is happening in a moment in which the 'Preševo question' has become an integral of the current

[14]The most recent situation of high tension was in January 2013, when the Serbian authorities have ordered (and executed) the demolition of a monument dedicated to the UÇPMB in a major square in Preševo.

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Fig. 6 *One Stop Centre* in Preševo, entrance to the clinic and other facilities—August 2016. Photo by the authors

negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo over the definition of the new territorial partitions and the related borders, with some politicians advocating a territorial exchange between a northern region now in Kosovo predominantly inhabited by ‘ethnic Serbs’ and the Preševo Valley, which in that case would become part of Kosovo. The geopolitical relevance of the Preševo camp is therefore played at the most diverse scales, and the refugee question has become an opportunity for the central government to silently but visibly remind everyone that Preševo is still, formally, Serbian territory (Fig. 7).

4 Concluding Remarks

One key point that this chapter has tried to make is that, as it happens in other European regions, in the southern part of Serbia the developments along the Balkan Route associated to the refugee crisis are very often linked to other geopolitical factors. We believe the example here discussed to be somewhat emblematic of the complexities and the multiple geopolitical implications that may be intersecting the realisation of a refugee camp like the one in Preševo, localised in a

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Fig. 7 *One Stop Centre* in Preševo, the children's corner—August 2016. Photo by the authors

contested region along a strategic corridor for both the commercial relationships among the Balkan countries, but also the informal route constituted by the practices of the refugees from 2015 onwards.

Suddenly surged to national and international relevance in the light of its position along the Balkan Route, Preševo has appeared since the beginning of the crisis also a terrain for the confrontation of multiple political actors, from the local to the national and to the international level. The realisation of a refugee camp with such characteristics in a part of Serbia populated by a vast majority of ethnic Albanians, and the subsequent investment on the part of the government with the objective of making it a showcase refugee camp, reveal how camps, even camps born out of emergency situations, may play an important strategic role in developing specific geopolitical agendas (Fig. 8).

While we are fully aware of the limitations of such a brief analysis, we would like however to add that what emerges from this specific case is the role that a refugee camp may have in producing a specific set of geographies at the most diverse scales, including its most immediate surroundings. What we have here is a camp used as an instrument to illustrate the reliability of the Serbian state before the international community concerned with humanitarian issues and the question of the refugees in Europe. But we have also a national system of camps, of which Preševo represents a sort of undeclared capital, and the site where some of the stranded or even displaced refugees are relocated, with all the related considerations about their limited mobility once they enter the regime of the camp imposed by the authorities (no chance of going north, simply because this is a 'closed camp'). Finally, this camp plays a key role in justifying the presence of the police and of the military in a contested and contended region formally under Serbian control, but de facto largely dominated by the Albanian minority and by this latter's relationship with nearby Kosovo. Interestingly, despite this increased Serbian presence in Preševo, the camp has represented at the same time an opportunity to employ members of the local community and for some of the local residents to see their business flourished because of the presence of the refugees and of the national and international humanitarian operators. In many ways, and this is perhaps the

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Fig. 8 *One Stop Centre* in Preševo, Serbian and EU flags on staff uniforms—August 2016. Photo by the authors

main argument of this chapter, this camp is not simply an extraterritorial enclave imposed for specific reasons and for a specific period of time on the Preševo Valley. The Preševo camp is also the engine of new political and economic geographies, and has contributed, and continues to contribute, to a fundamental redefinition of the border between Serbia and FYR Macedonia, but also between Serbia and Kosovo, an invisible border never formally recognised by the Serbian authorities.

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paradiso@unisannio.it

Two Faces of the Migration Crisis in Hungary

Norbert Pap, Viktor Glied and Péter Reményi

Abstract
Since 2014, hundred thousands of migrants from the Middle East have arrived at the Hungarian–Serbian and Hungarian–Croatian borders. This paper discusses the unique phenomenon of what role the political debate about Islam, the construction of the temporary border barrier protecting the Hungarian national borders, played in the competitive communication of the national-radical Jobbik party and the centre-right governing parties Fidesz-KDNP which typically emphasize their Christian character. Furthermore, this essay follows up the elements of political campaign related to the international migration, Islam and the referendum on relocation quota between the end of 2014 and November 2016.

Keywords
Migration · Border fence · Islam · Hungary
Party competition

N. Pap (✉) · V. Glied · P. Reményi
University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary
e-mail: pnorbert@gamma.ttk.pte.hu

V. Glied
e-mail: glied.viktor@gmail.com

P. Reményi
e-mail: remko@gamma.ttk.pte.hu

1 Introduction

The major routes of migration from Asia and Africa towards Europe lead through the Mediterranean. An overwhelming majority of migrants chooses the short but dangerous maritime route to get to Spain, Italy and Greece, while crossing the sea involves very high costs and also the risk of losing their lives. The Balkans is an alternative, mostly land route, and it has already served as a migration route for centuries (Kitanics and Pap 2014).

The main route of the migrants (Fig. 1) followed the old military route until 2015, thus reaching the Hungarian–Serbian border, entering the Schengen Zone of the European Union, enabling them to continue their journey to their coveted destination countries, Austria, Germany, Sweden and other welcoming welfare states (Kitanics and Pap 2014).

The approach of states in the Balkans and Central Europe to migration and the issue of refugees was entirely different from the public opinion in certain Southern and Western European countries. This difference is not only (or primarily) attributable to a different interpretation of European values or the burdensome social and political heritage of the decades of Socialism—as many have presumed—, but it has more deeply rooted causes, because of the specific ways of creating the national identities of peoples in the region, including Hungarians (Pap et al. 2014).

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paradiso@unisannio.it



Fig. 1 Migration routes through the Balkans

The Hungarian perception of the southern border, the memory of three centuries of fighting with the Ottoman Empire, has appeared in Hungarian public discourse during the migration crisis of 2015, and it has become one of the cornerstones of interpreting events in the world. Right-wing parties, especially the governing party, have chosen from two of the main narratives of the anti-Turk wars (Pap and Glied 2017). The memory of the anti-Turk struggles in the sixteenth–seventeenth centuries has returned to the communication clichés of domestic policy disputes, and it has also appeared in political arguments related to the fence on the southern border (Glied and Pap 2016; Pap and Glied 2017). At the same time, the situation of Muslims living in Hungary is in order, their co-existence with the majority population is peaceful, there is no violence in the streets of Hungary, and there are no known acts of violence against them. This is very unique among the countries of Europe.

2 Border and Barrier

Borders are essential formations for both individuals and societies. This argument is also supported by the quantitative and qualitative expansion of the relevant scientific literature of the last three decades (including O'Dowd 2002; van Houtum and van Naerssen 2002; Kolossov 2005; Newman 2006a, b, 2011; Scott and van Houtum 2009; Paasi 2011; van Houtum 2011). There are, however, communities that are more "sensitive" to border-related issues based on their historical experiences and collective notions. Such communities include Hungarians, on the one hand, because they had to survive as the sole Finno-Ugric people in Central Europe among Slavic, Germanic, Neo-Latin communities, which absolutely relied on separating/filtering borders and the distinctions between "us and them". On the other hand, even so, because of its

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twentieth-century history, causing rapid border changes in Hungary, shrinking the country from each direction, banishing millions of ethnic Hungarians to beyond the new borders. The territorial consequences of the peace treaty ending the First World War have become one of the major traumas of the entire society and its history, with borders being one of the central elements, through personal experiences, institutions, state and private rituals (Krasznai 2012). Therefore, messages related to the borders and communication focusing on this issue are both fertile grounds in Hungary, attracting attention from the wide society, encouraging vivid public discourse.

During the twentieth century, in addition to the above, several different—and often contradictory—policies and efforts were put on the agenda which highlighted issues related to the borders. The interbellum period was known for unilateral debordering[1] efforts, both on the level of official politics (top–down) and the wide public (bottom–up). The ultimate goal of the effort covering almost all segments of society (domestic policy, education, public administration, culture, economy, military, foreign affairs, etc.) was to change the existing borders, which could ultimately be achieved during the Second World War for a brief period.

In the period of state socialism, openly unilateral debordering was typical for politics and public discourse as well, focusing on the iron curtain(s) and strict border control. Isolation from the West and enclosing the population both took place with the utilisation of borders. At times when the system was shaken (1956, 1989), opening the borders and cutting the barbed wire had symbolic and practical importance as well, with a similar theme as the fall of the Berlin Wall. Simultaneously—although covert—debordering was also kept alive (especially among the diaspora), in order to provide continuity with the preceding period.

After the transition to democracy—with one of the main symbolic acts of Hungarian foreign minister Gyula Horn and his Austrian counterpart Alois Mock jointly dismantling the border in June 1989—the Hungarian position moved towards reducing the barrier role of borders (for reasons including responsibility for Hungarians living beyond the border), in accordance with the neighbouring countries; i.e. multilateral debordering was carried out. This was also known for the opening of new border-crossing stations, the establishment of missing infrastructural links, creation of cross-border cooperation, at each level, from the state to private individuals. Obviously, there were numerous downturns as well in this period, e.g. the southern border during the Yugoslav Wars. The freedom of travel, the optimism of the seemingly borderless world and the establishment of the Schengen system are important features of this period.

After 2010, the new right-wing government in Hungary articulated a more radical and committed national policy than its Socialist predecessor, focusing on a more intensive relationship with Hungarian communities living in the neighbouring countries. This inevitably affected the issue of borders, which can mostly be labelled as top–down unilateral debordering. The system of dual citizenship, thinking in the framework of the Carpathian Basin (in national, economic, cultural issues) both meant the—at least theoretical—relativisation and virtualisation of the state borders.[2] The new government destined this new policy to play an important role in building identity, and the related controversies created serious fault lines in society. Tensions also increased with some neighbouring countries—

[1]In this paper, bordering (re- and debordering) is used to refer to efforts aiming to change the significance of borders, which are not exclusively performed by those in power and do not officially exclusively mean official policies. Recently, the concept of "bordering" has gained a wider meaning; the creation of borders based on territorial social characteristics has become its most important aspect, in which the media, economy, (official and unofficial) ideologies, different identities, typical sets of values and individual decisions have also been included. However in Central Europe, elites in power remain the most important actors in 'bordering'.

[2]Pursuant to Section 3 of Act XLV of 2010: *"all members and communities of the Hungarian nation, subjected to the jurisdiction of other states, belong to the single Hungarian nation whose cross-border cohesion is a reality and, at the same time, a defining element of the personal and collective identity of Hungarians."*

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Slovakia, Romania—not contributing to the improvement of cross-border relationships.

One of the most important responses to the refugee crisis in 2015 also affected borders, especially the southern border, where both the official narrative and practical steps lead to increasing border control and closure against illegal movements. From the summer of 2015, the border barrier was gradually constructed, first as tripwire, then as a more sophisticated and massive fence, primarily at the Hungarian–Serbian border, at certain sections of the Hungarian–Croatian border and potentially at the southern part of the Hungarian–Romanian border. In the summer of 2017, the second line is being constructed. Simultaneously, legislative changes have also been rapidly adopted (e.g. strict sanctions on illegal border-crossing) without meaningful political[3] or popular resistance.

Popular support for the construction of the border fence in the summer of 2015 gradually increased, and the resourceful government propaganda is merely one of the multiple reasons for that. It is also important to highlight the historical fact that the "southern border" has always been different for Hungarians, involving different values than other border sections. Each border section had some kind of military/defence significance during certain periods in history, but the southern section is the one whose main characteristic significance is given by this source.[4] In the first few centuries of the young state, this was the direction of conquest (Balkans) and regional power struggle (Byzantine Empire). The Ottoman threat rendered the southern border a conflicting frontier from the late fourteenth century (regardless of its current geographic location). From the fifteenth century, the historic form of the "border barrier"—border forts—was established, moving towards the north as the Ottomans proceeded with their conquest, and it produced the most popular and well-known heroes of Hungarian history. Thus, the self-sacrificing heroes of the southern border gradually became significant figures in Hungarian identity, as well as the works of arts related to the southern border and the protection thereof (novels, poems, paintings, films) which are known to and liked by all groups of the Hungarian society—the very first compulsory reading in elementary school, Eclipse of the Crescent Moon (Egri csillagok), is also about this period, and it is the most popular Hungarian novel according to a 2005 survey.

What is more, according to the Hungarian perception, the heroes of the border fortresses did not merely protect Hungary in the Carpathian Basin, but the entire Western/Christian civilisation against an Asian/Muslim conqueror. Against an entity that has a different culture and set of values than the community where Hungarians belong. This leads us to another important particularity about the southern border, namely the fact that from the viewpoint of the majority of Hungarians, this is a civilisation fault line, the border of Western and Eastern Christianity, the border between Central Europe—which is linked to the West—and the Balkans—linked to the East—as well as the external border of the European Union nowadays. Similarly to other European nations, the perception of the Balkans is also negative in Hungary, associating the region with backwardness, violence, underdevelopment and disorder.

Based on the above, it is no surprise that the Hungarian public proved to be fertile ground for the statements of the prime minister and members of his cabinet during 2015, when they talked about the protection of the southern border. Statements related to the militarisation of the southern border and the establishment of the technical barrier caused no major uproar in the

[3]One of the leading politicians of a significant opposition party said about the border barrier: I don't like it, but I cannot propose a better solution.

[4]The West carries development, innovation; this is the direction we intend to hard towards. At the same time, the East is backwardness which we look down on. To the north (e.g. the Visegrad Four), we see partners who we often compete with.

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society,[5] because the traditional function of the spaces impacted is defence. At the same time, because of the national policy of the Hungarian government since 2010, a significant number of Hungarians living across the southern border also possess a Hungarian passport; therefore, the separation character of the southern border barrier is rather selective.

3 Characteristics of the Communication Campaigns Throughout 2015/2016

In Hungary, the public did not pay attention to issues related to immigration until spring 2015, because two-thirds of the migrants entering the country were ethnic Hungarians from the neighbouring countries, and most of the migrants from outside of Europe settled in the culturally diverse areas of Budapest and the major cities. This situation changed radically with the emergence of the migrant crisis, but—with the exception of those living along the Serbian–Hungarian and Croatian–Hungarian border—the majority of the Hungarian population only received information about the crisis through the media. The governing Fidesz-KDNP coalition realised the political opportunity in the situation and gradually—using increasingly radical rhetoric—began its communication campaign focusing on statements about immigrants and (later) "illegal migrants", as well as the NGOs and their supporters—primarily George Soros, an American billionaire of Hungarian origin.

The communication campaign had three major focal points:

- First, to enable the government propaganda to convey *true or presumably true, half-real and half-fictitious* information to the citizens about an area that is unknown to the majority of the public (migration and migrants).
- Second, to enable the Fidesz party to regain its leading position in the political arena, which lost after the parliamentary elections in 2014 and the subsequent political and corruption scandals, and also to halt the increase of the popularity of opposition parties, especially the radical right-wing Jobbik, as well as to reduce it.
- Third, to make sure that the government communication about migration and migrants prevails over news and public discourse, superseding all other topics on the political agenda.

The Hungarian cabinet was extremely successful in putting concerns of European societies, as well as the issues of terrorism and security on the agenda, articulating statements (so far almost unheard of in Hungary and considered taboo in Western Europe) that gave birth to vocal debates about co-existence with Muslims, the relationship of Islam and Christianity, the compatibility of different cultures, as well as the framework and future of co-existence in Hungary. The main semantic element of the discourse was the need to protect Hungary and its residents from the impacts of the migrant wave. The word "protection" utilises the people's need for safety, their instinctive fear (apparent in Hungary in the high levels of xenophobia as well), and it also highlights the importance of preventive action, thus legitimising the measures taken by the acting party. As regards the fence and protecting the borders, the government communication strongly built upon the historic concepts of "Hungary the bastion protecting Christianity" and "the bastion of Europe" which are still present in Hungarian political thinking. Additionally, the official narratives intentionally rely upon the aforementioned social experiences when the prime minister calls himself a "border fortress captain" who is not only protecting Hungary, but Germany as well, from the Muslim invasion.

The government's political communication succeeded in deliberately confusing refugees

[5] Although we have to note that several civil organizations, some politicians, minor parties and a significant number of individuals expressed their different opinions, some by speeches, some by guerilla actions against anti-migrant billboards and some by direct help to migrants/refugees, their narratives were overwhelmed by the official discourse of the government.

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with immigrants (who take Hungarians' jobs) and illegal migration with legal. By appropriating the word "protection", the cabinet strengthened the coherence of its own communication, since obviously political, legal and policing means were available to control the wave of migrants. The same was not available to opposition parties, and in addition to this, they were hesitant at the beginning of the crisis, they did not have adequate information on how to assess the process realistically, and since Fidesz was extremely successful in constructing its own communication, the opposition could merely follow governmental communication after the summer of 2015. During the refugee crisis, Fidesz gradually took away space from the other political actors (successfully defaming them and their narratives) and expanded its communication and communication means to cover the extremist sides, thus ruling over both the centre and the radical sides of the central sphere of influence (Glied and Pap 2016).

The first step of communication was raising awareness with three distinctive elements:

- As regards to increasing volume of migration in March–April 2015, the Hungarian citizens needed to be explained why hundreds of thousands of migrants with a different culture and religion cross Hungary to Western Europe. The main message was *"If you come to Hungary, you have to respect…"*. The billboards and the television commercials launched in the early summer raised awareness in the Hungarian public through messages addressed to migrants that the situation was severe, since the public had (and could not have had) any personal experience related to the phenomenon.
- The government launched several instances of mail-in and online national consultation about immigration and terrorism. The two terms have thus been linked.
- The government's communication and politicians of the governing party attacked the cumbersome and slow decision-making of the European Union, the indulgent and liberal migration policy of Brussels, as well as its politically correct communication, as well as Berlin's Wilkommenskultur approach, relying on unconditional acceptance.
- From late 2016, another element has been added to the communications arsenal: simultaneously with Brussels, the NGOs and "background powers" behind the migration waves shall also be stopped.

The communication superiority was also reflected in support data, showing that Fidesz gradually recovered the political superiority it had before the autumn of 2014, although this was mostly achieved by partially replacing its supporter base (Fig. 2).

The named enemies in the communication campaigns are typically virtualised opponents who ordinary Hungarians do not even meet. The image of Muslim migrants threatening and illegally entering the country is not necessarily linked to drastically deteriorating the situation of Muslims legally residing in the country. In the following section, we are going to provide an overview of the situation and circumstances of Muslims in Hungary, to see how different it is from the practice of other European states.

4 "Real Migrants"—The Number, Status, Integration, as Well as Political Role and Significance of Muslims in Hungary

Hungarian Muslims are one of the communities living in Hungary and created mostly through international migration. Nowadays, the number of followers of Islam in Hungary is disputed. According to the 2011 census, 3600 people considered themselves Muslims. However, neither researchers nor Muslim religious organisations accept this number as authentic. Pew Institute estimates that 25,000 (Pew 2011) Muslims live in Hungary, while the study based on the survey conducted by the head of the Organisation of Muslims in Hungary gives the number 32,618, considering followers of any type of Islam branches in the territory of the country (Sulok 2010). This can partially explain the

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

Fig. 2 Change of party preferences during 2015 in Hungary. *Source* Medián 2015, ed. by Reményi P

differences, since this survey does not only take into account Hungarian citizens, but also persons coming from Muslim countries, even if they do not have a connection to the Muslim community.

Such persons and communities linked to Islam are typically settled in urban areas. Their concentration is the highest in Budapest and its vicinity, while secondary concentrations are found in major university cities: in Pécs, Szeged, Debrecen and Miskolc.

Muslims remember their fellow believers in Hungarian history. Hungarian Muslim authors, especially including religious leaders, always emphasise the positively interpreted role Islam plays in Hungarian history (Mihálffy 1991; Bolek 2002; Ferenci 2010). Professional historians do not dispute the Muslim presence in the Carpathian Basin during the times of the conquest of Hungary and the age of the Árpád dynasty, but they add that their social role has always been minor and the presence of Islam was interrupted for long periods numerous times (Kristó 2003; Pap et al. 2014). It is a fact that the Muslims currently living in Hungary (as well as their communities) only have a continuous history since the 1980s when their organisations started to develop (Udvarvölgyi 2010). The small Muslim community has started to organise among students coming to Hungary, and its creation is mostly explained by international and intercontinental migration phenomena.[6] The current Hungarian society faces a new situation, considering the fact that during the Middle Ages and the Modern Age, the followers of Islam comprised different Turkish language peoples and representatives of Slavic ethnicities from the Balkans, converted to Islam. This area of origin is currently absolutely subordinate considering the Muslims currently living in Hungary, and there is a low number of Bosnians and Albanians.

During the wars around the dissolution of Yugoslavia (1991–2001), tens of thousands of people who fled their home found refuge in Hungary. This period saw several waves of Muslims appearing in Hungary, and most of them went to refugee camps. Many Bosniaks opted not to stay in refugee camps, but found individual solutions for finding a place of abode. The last Bosniak refugees left Hungary in an organised manner in 2002. But many of them had a family as Hungarian citizens and did not return to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and they still practice their Muslim faith as members of the Hungarian Muslim community in Croatian-speaking villages of Baranya County. Their spiritual centre is the Malkoch Bey mosque in the town of Siklós. During the early 2000s, only partially

[6]Based on a 2010 survey, their largest group speaks an Arabic dialect, more than 10% of them is student at a university and there are approximately 2500 Hungarians who converted to Islam, e.g. by marriage.

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because of the violent Kosovo crisis, an increasing number of (mostly Muslim) bakery professionals came to Hungary from Kosovo and Macedonia (and only to a very small extent from Albania).

This tendency increased around 2008 and 2009. Today, approximately 400 of all the 1600 bakeries in Hungary operate under Albanian ownership. The suddenly emerging bakeries and confectioneries attracting rapid popularity have fallen into the focus of the tax authority and sparked opposition from their Hungarian competitors because of their Albanian business culture (tax avoidance, violation of food safety regulations, employment irregularities) and not their Muslim faith. The immigration of Muslims from the Balkans did not play a major role in the reorganisation of Islam in Hungary at the end of the twentieth century. The main reason is that Austria and Germany, as migration targets, played a much larger role than Hungary in the recent period, and thus, Hungary (for the time being) lost its attractiveness among Bosnian Muslims. At the same time, because of the vicinity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the traditional relationships, Sarajevo could remain a major factor in official church politics.

Muslims have created an articulate, multi-level system of organisations in Hungary (Csicsmann and Vékony 2011). The two most important church-like organisations are Magyar Iszlám Közösség (MIK, Hungarian Islamic Community) and Magyarországi Muszlimok Egyháza (MME, Organisation of Muslims in Hungary). Advocacy for Muslims is provided by Magyarországi Iszlám Tanács (Hungarian Muslim Council), established jointly by the two religious organisations. Additionally, several non-governmental organisations have also been established, performing cultural, social, church organisation and education functions.[7]

Religious life is centred around a dozen mosques. For example, in the town of Pécs, believers assemble in a seventeenth-century historic Ottoman building. In other cities, Muslims assemble for prayer in functional mosques converted from apartments, offices and warehouses. There is no obstacle to the daily practice of religious life; however, no new mosque has been built since the transition to democracy. Local communities and city governments have blocked such efforts (Pap 2013a).

Since the transition to democracy, the school system has also developed. Mosques provide basic religious education, and higher level religious studies are typically taken by Hungarian students at Al-Azhar University in Cairo and the Chateau-Chinon University in France. The opportunity is also provided in Hungary to apply to higher level Islam courses at state universities, but these programmes do not have a religious approach.

Hungarian law does not recognise Muslim weddings, but some mosques provide the opportunity to take Muslim marriage preparation course and weddings concluded according to the Sharia Law can be accredited according to the law and practice of certain Muslim countries, although not according to Hungarian law and practice. Most Muslims in Budapest are buried in the First World War cemetery for Turks. In other cities (Pécs, Szeged and Debrecen), a separate part of the public cemetery is used for this purpose. Muslim style for living can primarily be practised in Budapest. For example, halal food is mostly available in Budapest, but appropriate organisation enables finding meals that comply with religious rules in other cities as well.

In Hungary, the level of xenophobia is traditionally high compared to the neighbouring countries. The majority population as well as certain minority groups also feel resentment towards the Roma (Romani, Gypsy) population living in the country. The Roma community constitutes 5–10% of the population, and they are

[7]The one with the longest history is the *Iszlám Diákok Egyesülete* (Association of Islamic Students), founded in 1987 mostly by persons connected with the MME. The *Dialógus Platform Egyesület* (Dialogue Platform Association), which is related to the Gülenist movement, was established in 2005 and has Hungarian and Turkish members. The *Magyarországi Iszlám Kulturális Egyesület* (Hungarian Islamic Cultural Association) was founded in 2008 by Turkish and Hungarian private individuals. The *Aluakf Alapítvány* (Aluakf Foundation) operates in Miskolc and maintains a prayer house there as well.

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the traditional targets of racism in Hungary. “Gypsy crime” has been the buzzword used since the 1980s to mobilise radical groups within the society. During the last decades, violent crimes also took place against the Roma: such examples include the case of the so-called gypsy murders[8] which shook the public. The organised far-right mostly used uniformed marches to frighten the Roma and to call attention to such issues.

Anti-Semitism is also present in Hungary, and it is one of the main ideologies Hungarian far-right groups subscribe to. Because of the Holocaust, large numbers of Jews are mostly only present in Budapest, but there are several Jewish cemeteries and synagogues in other cities as well. Vandalism and anti-Semitic graffiti are discovered from time to time, but violent actions are very rare and almost unknown.

Islamophobia used to be untypical in Hungary (Pap 2013b), but it has certainly manifested since 2015. Due to the migrant crisis and the related campaign, Arabs/Muslims have become one of the most resented social groups. Still, however, no anti-Muslim actions have surfaced. Muslim leaders only report verbal aggression and online acts of abuse. The situation of Muslims in Hungary has deteriorated during the last two years, but compared to the problems of much larger Muslim communities in Western European countries, the Hungarian situation is still considered satisfying.

5 Conclusion

The character and content of the migration crisis are entirely different in Hungary than in Western and Southern European states. Hungarian national identity greatly relies on anti-Turk and anti-Muslim fights in the fifteenth–seventeenth centuries. The image of Muslims threatening the country from the south (the Balkans) is deeply rooted in culture, and it is suitable to mobilise the population. The defence of the southern border has strong historical legitimacy, upon which political campaigns can be built.

The most important driving force behind the domestic events in 2015–16 has been the competition between the opposition Jobbik party and the governing Fidesz-KDNP coalition for voters’ support, while in the campaign, the enemies were selected to be (Muslim) migrants living outside the borders, only virtually present to most Hungarians, and their alleged supporters. The campaign has been successful and the centre-right Fidesz-KDNP regained the support it had lost in 2014.

Meanwhile, the legally settled Muslim community in the country (although facing an increasing level of Islamophobia and verbal threats) lives free from the violence apparent in Western countries, practically in peace. This might change in the future, but racist acts of violence have predominantly targeted the Roma community in Hungary.

[8]On 21 July 2008 in Galgagyörk, on 8 August in Piricse, on 5 September in Nyíradony, on 29 September in Tarnabod, on 3 November in Nagycsécs, on 15 December in Alsózsolca, then on 23 February 2009 on Tatárszentgyörgy, on 22 April in Tiszalök, and on 3 August in Kisléta, weapons and firebombs were used to attack and kill Roma people due to racist causes.

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paradiso@unisannio.it

Unaccompanied Minors in Italy and Arrivals by Sea. Migration Data, Patterns, and Pathways

M. Accorinti, P. Demurtas and M. Vitiello

Abstract

In Italy, "Unaccompanied Foreign Minor" (UAM) refers to a minor who does not have Italian or other EU citizenship and is, for any reason, within the territory of the State without care or representation by their parents or other adults who are legally responsible for them under existing Italian laws. This provision was defined as the solution to a social phenomenon that became particularly significant in the country number-wise in the 1990s. Despite the attention of the government, the actual number of UAMs within the territory of the State is difficult to define, since most of them do not fulfil residence regulations and move considerably within Italian territory. Over the past seven years, the number of UAMs has remained stable with an average of 7/8000 per year, and a peak of 8461 in 2013. This figure will be greatly exceeded in 2014, 2015, and 2016. This paper analyzes the evolution of the presence of UAMs Italy, their characteristics, their migratory projects, and some aspects of the procedures to accommodate UAMs in Italy. This article is a part of a qualitative study completed by the Institute for Research on Population and Social Policies of National Research Council (CNR-IRPPS), carried out in 2016 on behalf of the Italian Committee of UNICEF—United Nation Children's Fund.

Keywords

Minors · Migrant · Italy · Social procedures

1 Introduction

Images of arrivals by sea of people fleeing conflicts or extreme poverty have become familiar. Moreover, it is well known that this phenomenon does not concern adult males only. According to UNHCR data, 181,436 people arrived in Italy in 2016, of whom 28,223 were minors. To make a comparison with 2014, the year of the humanitarian operation *Mare Nostrum*, 26,122 minors arrived on Italian coasts, while there were 16,478 in 2015. Among them, there were many minors who faced their journey without an adult of reference: 49.9% of the total in 2014, 75% (12,360) in 2015, and 92% (25,846) in 2016. Over the past ten years, in fact, the presence of unaccompanied minors (hereafter UAMs) among migrants has

M. Accorinti (✉) · P. Demurtas · M. Vitiello
National Council of Research of Italy (CNR),
IRPPS-Institute on Population and Social Policies,
Rome, Italy
e-mail: m.accorinti@irpps.cnr.it

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paradiso@unisannio.it

become a common factor worldwide. Their number has increased dramatically, and they make up an important proportion of the asylum-seeking population in many countries of destination. “Minors on their own” and “young people on the move” have become the new leading players of human movements globally, constituting a true migration entity.

A key specificity of the migration of minors is that their rights are recognised at an international level. In the case of adults, reference is made to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This includes the freedom to cross-borders, which, to some extent, may be intended as the right to migrate, to leave a country, but not the right to immigrate, to enter a country. The Declaration does not require any country to guarantee access to immigrants or to grant citizenship to foreign residents. By contrast, the universal recognition of the rights of children has led to a legal instrument whereby to a certain extent unaccompanied children have better protection and greater expectations compared to children who are abroad with their families. They could be encouraged to separate from their family members for this very reason (Adroher Biosca 2002).

Historically, the migration of underage people who set out on a journey on their own appeared on the Italian scene in the 1990s, at the same time as the intensification of migration movements at a global level. The stories of the lives of UAMs have been analysed in some qualitative research studies, carried out by many Authors, like Melossi and Giovannetti (2002; Giovannetti 2008, 2016), Campani et al. (2002), Bosisio (2011) and Vacchiano (2012), aimed at exploring the reasons that drive minors to migrate and the pathways and evolution of such migration. They suggest the profiles of adolescents and very young people, mostly male, who arrive in our country without their parents or other relatives, spurred on by the hope of finding a job and a better future.

Similarly, some literature highlights that studies on UAMs are based on their condition of being immigrants in Europe, which may result in a biased analysis, ethnocentric prejudices, and misunderstandings (Suàrez Navas 2008). The terms “child” or “young immigrant” may, for instance, carry a stigma on what may be just a sociological aspect: being different in a context in which other children live in families (Gimenez Romero 2006).

The condition of UAMs is a “special case” linked to a specific historic environment, with its epistemological autonomy in the sociology of migration, even though its numbers and multiple variables make this phenomenon particularly dynamic. This text is intended to investigate socio-demographic aspects as well as the social implications of the assistance given to UAMs, with reference to the Italian framework. In this paper, we will analyse the picture of UAMs in Italy (Sect. 1) based on an original elaboration of national data. We will tackle two topics that are closely related with their increased number, namely the reasons for and the mechanisms of the emigration of UAMs and of their arrival in Italy (Sect. 2). We will also discuss how the reception system has changed as a consequence of these increased figures, and the changes that have taken place in terms of UAMs’ countries of origin and aims of their migration projects (Sect. 3). Sections 2 and 3 are based on an original qualitative research on field, carried out by CNR-IRPPS in 2016 in which 21 stories of life of UAM’s were collected. Recently (2017), a work was published on behalf of the Italian Committee of UNICEF and CNR-IRPPS, entitled “Sperduti,” available online.

Using the reference framework of sociology of migration, this way of studying migration is particularly apt for understanding the presence of UAMs, overcoming a linear pattern in which minors who leave behind their past lives to move elsewhere permanently should be considered as a new phenomenon. Instead, it is necessary to consider the journey, which establishes a communication between two worlds and creates a link between two places, as well as the intercultural dialogue that links these worlds in the lives of these children. This reading of the migration of UAMs in a circular fashion means understanding and appreciating their worlds of

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origin, and not treating the reception of minors in way that is too patronising. In a second reading of sociology of migration, we refer here to statistical and descriptive studies, in which common characteristics are used to identify a group. Many studies on UAMs present variable data (such as age, sex, origin) without analyses aimed at a deeper understanding. There is the risk of forgetting that each immigrant is also an emigrant, a man or a woman, or in this case a child or an adolescent, with his/her wealth of emotions, characteristics, memories, and hopes that have been left behind; their aggregation does not represent an ideal type, but it is just a pretence for heuristic purposes.

2 The Presence and Arrival of Unaccompanied Minors in Italy: Numbers, Characteristics, and Typologies

Following the sudden increase in arrivals by sea recorded in 2014, the presence of unaccompanied minors (hereafter UAMs) has attracted great attention in Italy and Europe, due to both their high number and the challenges that they represent for the reception system.

In recent years, both Italy's position in the centre of the Mediterranean and political instability in Libya have helped create a specific situation in Italy. Whereas overall European statistics have showed a considerable presence of Afghanis and Syrians, there has been a progressive increase in the number of minors from the African continent in Italy. In this respect, Fig. 1 describes the main nationalities of UAMs who arrived in Italy in 2016, comparing data with the two previous years. It highlights the prevalence of Eritreans on the one hand, and the progressive growth of UAMs from West Africa, Gambia, and Nigeria, in particular, on the other hand.

Once they have arrived on European territory, these minors are distinguished depending on whether they have applied for international protection or not. It should be noted, however, that, unlike in other member states, in Italy it is prohibited to reject minors under 18 years of age (prohibition recently reaffirmed by Law No. 47/2017). This distinction has an impact on data availability and completeness. Statistics on minors who have applied for protection are compiled from the records of asylum applications kept by the Ministry of the Interior. Data on non-asylum-seeking UAMs is collected and published by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies. The latter data is not a complete survey of the phenomenon, but rather an approximation on the low side of what is known by the authorities.

2.1 Asylum-Seeking Unaccompanied Minors

According to EUROSTAT, which publishes data collected by member states on a yearly basis, in 2016, Italy received 6020 asylum applications by UAMs, ranking second among European countries after Germany, which received 35,935 asylum applications from unaccompanied minors. Consistently with data on arrivals by sea, Fig. 2 (main nationalities of asylum-seeking UAMs in Italy in 2014, 2015, and 2016) confirms the increase in the number of applications made by minors from Gambia and Nigeria, but also from Guinea and the Ivory Coast. Of these young people, the majority are boys (95%) and are aged 16 and 17 (93%).

In Italy, a System for the Protection of Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR) has been put in place 12 years ago to accommodate in many reception facilities asylum-seeking UAMs and those who are beneficiaries of international and humanitarian protection. The number of UAMs hosted was 2062 in 2016, 1640 in 2015, and 1142 in 2017 (ANCI, Caritas Italiana, Cittalia, Fondazione Migrantes, Servizio Centrale dello SPRAR, 2017; ANCI, Caritas Italiana, Cittalia, Fondazione Migrantes, Servizio Centrale dello SPRAR 2016). Most of them are asylum seekers, even though a downward trend has been recorded. In 2014, UAMs with an asylum seeker's residence permit accounted for 85% of all UAMs, whereas in 2016 there were only 46.8%. Meanwhile, the number of UAMs

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

Fig. 1 Sea arrivals of unaccompanied minors by nationality. Years 2014–2016



Fig. 2 Total number of asylum applications submitted by unaccompanied minors in Italy. Years 2014–2016

with a residence permit issued on the ground of humanitarian reasons has increased (from 10% in 2014, to 34% in 2015, and 25% in 2016). Moreover, in 2016, the proportion of non-asylum-seeking UAMs increased as well. In fact, with the implementation of Law 190/2014, non-asylum-seeking UAMs, who account for the largest number in Italy, can access SPRAR

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facilities. Previously, they could only be hosted in ad hoc reception facilities, which are still available.

This new trend has been confirmed by Law 47/2017, which identifies the SPRAR as a potential single reception system to remove the distinction between asylum-seeking and non-asylum-seeking UAMs.

2.2 Non-asylum-Seeking Unaccompanied Minors

A distinction is made between non-asylum-seeking UAMs who are hosted in reception facilities and those who have gone missing. In December 2016, there were 17,373 of the former, and 6571 of the latter, who might have left the country in the meanwhile. From 2012, an increase was observed in the number of both minors hosted in reception facilities and those who went missing. The number of the former continued to increase, while the growth of the latter was more striking between 2013 and 2015, and remained reasonably stable in 2016.

More than 90% of those who are currently hosted in reception facilities are male, and more than 80% are aged between 16 and 17. Even though the female component is a minority, it deserves attention as they are exposed to the risk of being sexually exploited. This is particularly true for Nigerian girls, who, according to the latest figures, constitute the top nationality among the girls hosted in reception centres.

As shown in Fig. 3, over the past few years, Egyptian boys ranked first. This changed during the first four months of 2017, with boys from Gambia becoming the largest group (2200 vs. 2187). Boys from Albania rank third, followed by other young men from West Africa and Bangladesh.

Of the minors that have been reported missing, Egyptians continue to be the first nationality, followed by Eritreans, Somalis, and Afghanis. Afghanis account for a large proportion of asylum seekers in other European countries (Fig. 4). Unlike Egyptians, who are most often economic migrants, we cannot rule out that minors from these three countries did not apply for international protection in Italy and went missing because they intended to continue their journey and seek asylum in other EU member states. This would be a way to shun Dublin procedures, under which asylum applications should be submitted in the first country of arrival.

3 Why and How UAMs Leave Their Countries of Origin and Their Arrival in Italy

The choice to emigrate, that is to say, to leave one's family and social context, and to forsake the emotional and social relationships that have accompanied one's emotional and physical development, is not an easy one. Minors do not make this choice on their own, but after exchanging views with their peers and family members. Most often, this is the first step in a family plan for tackling new needs, overcoming a crisis, or improving their situation. However, this choice is not only rational, based on a cost/benefit analysis. There is always an emotional component. People become emotionally overwhelmed by their life experiences and decide to leave. This complex set of factors at the basis of emigration becomes even more intricate in the case of unaccompanied minors. It makes sense to think that their families play a role not only in taking the decision to leave, but also in preparation for their journey and choosing their destinations. However, in many circumstances, families may play a minimal or even a negative role, meaning that they may represent the environment that minors want to escape from or a may be a leading factor for their leaving.

An analysis of 21 interviews collected during a field survey carried out in 2016 by CNR-IRPPS on behalf of the Italian Committee of UNICEF suggests that the very complicated reasons that led the responding minors to leave revealed a polarisation between emigration as a search for better opportunities and emigration as leaving behind broken families or harsh social contexts. All respondents came from a social and economic context in transition, in which change due

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

Fig. 3 Non-asylum-seeking UAMs in the care of the Italian public authorities. Top ten nationalities, years 2014–2017*

to unequal and ungoverned economic development tends to break traditional social relations and build new ones. Against this backdrop, low- and middle-class families who had found their balance in the previous situation were struggling to cope and find their place. In these contexts, the strength of ties with their families and with the outside played a fundamental role in the emigration of the minors who responded to the interviews. In the case of families that managed to cope, the departure of one of the child was one of the strategies pursued to survive the transition. In such cases, the migration of a child is an investment, and success in the migration project is a success and social promotion for the whole family. The choice to leave usually falls on the oldest male child who has completed compulsory education, and whose further education can no longer be afforded. This is the case of respondents from Egypt and of one respondent from Albania.

The similarity between the situations of the respondents and the events they have experienced is so striking that we can outline a common migration model for these unaccompanied minors. First, their migration project is strongly characterised by their desire to work. For these respondents, having a job means earning money, being autonomous, and helping their families. Parents have been found to agree with their children's migration project. In fact, they agree as a sort of financial and emotional "investment," as a hope for the entire family. This does not mean that the family will necessarily follow the child (even though we cannot rule out a later reunion with the siblings and/or the parents, which has often been the case in the past). The point is that the migration of a family member is a way to relieve an economic and emotional burden for the family (one less worry). It is not by chance that all respondents took the decision to leave in agreement with their parents and at

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

Fig. 4 Non-asylum-seeking UAMS that are reported as missing from the care of public authorities by nationality. April 30, 2017

around 16 years of age, that is to say, when they were close to the age of the end of compulsory education. With reference to the family of origin, another common feature is their social and economic background. We are confronted with middle-class families that are facing processes of social and economic change. They manage to cope and remain united with strategies that may include the emigration of one of their family members. In other words, the family invests in the migration of one of their family members to escape a process of impoverishment and family breakdown.

Finally, for all the respondents, the choice of the destination seemed to be linked to the geography and past history of our country. Italy is in the Mediterranean, the middle *sea,* amidst three continents (Europe, Africa, and Asia). Italy is a bridge allowing the passage from one side to the other. Moreover, Italy has historically been at the centre of exchanges between the civilisations that have lived on this Middle Sea, as defined by Braudel. There is a tried and tested know-how to reach Italy, as there are many routes to get there. There is a quite broad offering of passages to Italy for those who leave from other Mediterranean countries, and this keeps passage prices rather low. Moreover, those who arrive by sea cannot be refused entry directly, nor can they be denied rescue. For these reasons, Italy is an appealing destination: it can be reached easily and for a relative low cost. We are confronted with a rational choice, based on the relationships between means and ends, a calculation of costs and opportunities. Considering that all respondents come from countries with a long history of migration to Italy, we cannot exclude that their choice of this country as their migration destination was influenced by positive experiences of fellow nationals. However, the interviews suggested quite clearly that the attraction for Italy was mostly due to the fact that it was easy to reach, rather than to the stories told by their fellow nationals. The journey was another common characteristic. Leaving from Egypt for Egyptians, and from Albania for Albanians,

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implied little danger and a relatively short journey, even though the means and costs were different. In fact, Albania is now part of a network of stable and preferential relations with the EU.

At the other end of the scale, we find a group of respondents whose departure was more an *escape from* than a *search for*. In some cases, such as that of an Afghani minor, fleeing was also a search for better opportunities, but the strategic dimension of the migration of a minor as an investment for the future is not present in this group. There is no rational choice underlying the migration pathway, but there is an escape from a situation of family distress or even of life danger (as in the case of the Afghani respondent). Their arrival in Italy was the result of circumstances more than of real choices. In these life stories, the migration project, that is to say, the migrant's aspirations and goals, is vague and looks more like forced migration. In fact, the situations of the respondents were borderline between migration for work reasons and migration of people needing international protection. Both elements were present at the same time, and only external circumstances determined which one of the two prevailed.

Within this group, migrants from sub-Saharan Africa share similarities that, like in the previous case, allow for the identification of a common migration pattern. In this group, the family structure of the respondents was already very weak at the time when the respondents were born, as in the case of the respondents from Senegal and Mali. In a context marked by difficult relationships and economic deprivation, the birth of a child marked a break in family relationships. The parents and their families of origin started having frequent arguments concerning the child's religion and educational choices, and everything that had to do with how to raise that child. Following these breaks, the child was often taken care of by the family of the mother, but this entailed further worsening of their living situation. At this point, leaving became a viable and also preferable option, and as such it became implicitly accepted by the whole family. For the child, this is the lesser evil, and it is an escape from an unbearable situation. For the family, it is a one less worry, if anything, or a solution that is a relief for everyone. It should be pointed out, however, that this was an escaping from, and not a leaving for, as the destination was always the bordering country. The choice of Italy as the destination of actual migration became increasingly clear during the journey. In this group of respondents, the very journey was key in determining their migration project and building their migration pattern, that is to say, how to actually pursue migration to Italy.

3.1 How UAMs Arrive in Italy: The Journey

The journey made by migrants to reach their destination may seem the least important link in the chain of the migration process, but it is not. It has a key role in determining what will happen after their arrival in the country.

Of the multiple factors that play a role in the configuration of the journey, the number of border crossings has perhaps the greatest impact. The higher the number of borders to cross, the higher the risk of being intercepted and the higher the number of mediators or smugglers needed to facilitate that crossing. Therefore, both the cost and the dangers of the journey increase, also depending on which countries the migrants have to cross during their journey.

The length of the journey and the number of border crossings mark the way migrants experience their journey and make them more vulnerable and exposed to risks, such as those of suffering violence and abuse, or of being targeted by organisations engaged in trafficking and exploitation. From this standpoint, the journey is a factor of vulnerability in itself, and for some categories of migrants, such as minors and women, it further increases their fragility vis-à-vis the people and events that they encounter during their migration pathway.

Interviews made during a field survey in 2016 strongly suggest that the journey may be a painful experience for minors, especially if unaccompanied, and that it will deeply affect the rest of their migration experience. The stories

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told by the respondents from sub-Saharan African countries such as Senegal, Gambia, and Mali—and also in the case of a minor from Afghanistan—reveal that the events and experiences of their journey led them to identify Italy as their destination, without them having a specific intention to do so. In fact, they did not even know Italy at all.

The long journey of minors from West Africa was fragmented into many stages. They walked from one city to another, and in each city, they passed from one smuggler to another. The names of these cities recurred in their stories. They identify routes that had already been taken by other travellers in both a more distant and a more recent past. The beginning of the journey is easy and cheap, since it takes place within the ECOWAS area (Economic Community of West African States, regional economic union of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo). There, nationals from countries that are part of this community may move freely, and international connections are available at modest prices. Problems arise after the last leg of the journey in West Africa, after Niger. From this point onwards, crossing borders becomes very dangerous.

The minors interviewed reported that, when crossing the border between Niger and Libya, they were totally at the mercy of border guards and their propensity to corruption. This was the moment of the journey in which they took the longest break: the length of these breaks depends on factors that are completely independent of them, those who accompany them, and smugglers. The respondents said that during these breaks they worked in farms or in construction sites. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why migrants remain in Libya for an increasingly long time: this serves the economy of that country.

These long breaks between one stage of the journey and another in a country like Libya, in which the rule of law is suspended and the law of the strongest rules, expose minors to violence and bullying on a daily basis. For children, a few months in a precarious situation existentially and emotionally is not just a short period of their lives. These months have a strong bearing on them at their young age.

There were events that represented a turning point in the path of the interviewed minors. A boy lost his father in Libya during a robbery, and so he became an accompanied minor. Another never saw his brother again, after they had separated to travel in different cars, as there was not enough room for them both in the same vehicle.

The experience of respondents from Egypt and Albania was different. Their journey to arrive in Italy is shorter, but is also more straightforward, with only one border crossing and just one intermediation by smugglers. For the Egyptian responders, for instance, the journey did not have an "educational" character, but was a simple a short period of their lives. It consisted, in fact, of a crossing to Italy, which was interrupted—after a day and a night at sea—by rescue by the Italian Navy. The Albanian responder, on the other hand, arrived in Italy by getting on a coach in Vlora, and after landing at Brindisi, he went straight to Rome. His story suggests that over the course of a little more than two decades, the journey of Albanian minors to Italy has lost its dramatic character and has become a simple passage between two situations that are very close to each other. At the other end of the scale, there is the story told by a Senegalese boy who said that, once he arrived in Italy, he was born again.

4 After Arrival in Italy: Reception Policies, Pathways, Challenges for Policy-Making

Once the journey has been made, safe and stable living conditions in Italy are still an aspiration for many UAMs boys and girls keep struggling during the stages of landing, identification, and placement in a community home, as well as in the attempt to build their lives and plan what to do as adults in Italy.

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At the time of landing, one of the initial challenges for UAMs is to decide whether to let themselves be recognised as underage children or not. This choice usually depends on the reasons that led the boy or the girl to embark on the journey.

They may have agreed not to admit that they are minors in order take part in a project linked to trafficking. Or their intention might be to reach other destinations. To do that they need freedom of movement and action, which they would not have were they admitted within the protection system in place for minors in Italy. Conversely, "adults" (family members or most likely smugglers) may have decided to extend the period during which boys or girls are treated as minors by the system for as long as possible. In this case, they are made to state they are younger than they actually are, so they (and those who manage their stay in Italy) will benefit from one or two additional years of regular stay. Besides, not all foreign consular authorities manage to respond quickly to a request for identification of a minor. The fact that trafficking organisations tell people to say that they are minors, even if they are not, has created a number of problems, with children having to live with adults in some community homes.

Respondents on the field survey carried out in 2016 by CNR-IRPPS have also said that on arrival in Italy they felt completely lost; seeking the protection of the police seemed to be the best option. This is what often happens at Tiburtina Railway Station in Rome or at Milan's Central Station. There, it is easy to spot children who arrive on their own and seek information about what to do or where to go. In these cases, the first contact they have is key. A person, a peer, or a fellow traveller they have met on a train or on a coach who seems trustworthy and reliable may give them information that will help them find their way for integration. Conversely, if they are intercepted by organisations engaged in human trafficking before or during their journey, their lives will take a very different turn.

Over the past two years, faced with an increased number of unaccompanied minors who have entered the country, Italy has made a big effort to increase its accommodation capacity. It has extended the SPRAR system, created governmental reception centres financed by the AMIF fund, and involved prefects, with "Extraordinary Reception Centres" for Minors. Moreover, support has been given to mayors, who are the legal guardians of unaccompanied underage children who are within their municipality. This support concerns both reception-related costs and inclusion measures. (Furthermore, it should be recalled that Legislative Decree No 142/2015 eliminated the distinction between asylum-seeking and non-asylum-seeking minors when it comes to their reception. Moreover, Law 47/2017 assigned a stronger responsibility to the Ministry of the Interior in the area of UAMs-related issues.)

If municipalities do not have enough resources or experience for implementing the necessary social interventions, the challenge of integration should be dealt with at the level of the national reception system.

In reception facilities, minors are guaranteed all forms of protection in their best interest. They receive accommodation and food, and an assistant project is designed for them, covering four aspects: language teaching, education and vocational training, healthcare, and primary socialisation. Those who are placed in a reception centre or in a group home for children may access education and training, and the State Health Service. They may be helped with the definition of their legal status (minor-age residence permit, definition of the asylum application, recognition of educational qualifications, etc). Moreover, they may benefit from work guidance and social and occupational integration measures, such as "individual endowments" and "work bursaries," set up by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies. These types of intervention are usually managed by the staff of the facilities in which the minors are hosted; they are coordinated by local social services, which usually have legal guardianship of the minors. However, education projects may often clash with the expectations of minors and with their desire to send money back home as soon as possible, to repay the debts incurred for their

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journey. This is also the expectation of their families, with whom the children remain in regular contact through the new media and internet-based applications (chats, blogs, *Facebook*, *WhatsApp*, *Skype*, *Viber,* etc.).

So, children may leave school or abandon their work bursary to "work" as handymen in restaurant kitchens or in car washes, unloading boxes in markets, or picking fruit in the countryside, without being aware of being exploited by their employer, who may happen to be a fellow national or a distant relative.

The minors interviewed told of their constant search for quick money to repay the debt incurred by their families or to try to ensure a future for themselves in Europe. This is especially true for unaccompanied minors who are not under the care of social services. However, even those who have been placed in reception facilities are often attracted by proposals of irregular or even illegal "work activities," such as drug pushing, prostitution, and theft.

Moreover, field research suggests that the types of hospitality offered do not necessarily meet the needs of these young people, as is proven by their often leaving the facilities in which they are placed. Minors who are defined as "gone missing" in Sect. 1 are those who escape the care of the Italian Government. They lose the opportunity to proceed with an integration or regularisation process when they come of age. Finally, there are boys and girls who have never had access to reception facilities because they have never been identified as minors or because they have shunned all checks at the border.

Their main risk is to be exploited, and they are often subject to abuse and trafficking (especially girls). For them, the rule of law is suspended, and they are subject to the law of the jungle. They soon have to learn how to cope with violence and abuse on a daily basis.

To some extent, a pathway of personalised reception in a facility, support between peers, assistance by social services, and local support networks are all forms of damage control and of educational guidance.

All the situations experienced by UAMs once in Italy shape their immediate well-being. They can be supported only through careful and continual social and educational interventions. There is a lack of alternatives in responding to the needs of minors, as the only option is to place them in a facility. As a result, even more skilled organisations are failing fail to consider innovative and/or experimental solutions and/or the search for different living arrangements.

A comparison at a European level has recently stimulated the search for new forms of "placement within the same culture" (i.e., within a network of fellow nationals in Italy), as well as measures to prevent escape from reception facilities, peer education, assisted return, and police training, especially in the identification of victims of trafficking (Valtolina 2014). These solutions have already been implemented, though with some difficulties. They could reverse a standardisation trend, which has already given rise to problems (coordinating different types of facilities and services offered, and ensuring initial reception and age confirmation in a short period of time).

A discussion should be held involving the system of regions and NGO. The aim would be to keep the care of UAMs within local welfare universal services on the one hand and identify reception schemes that cater for the specific needs of this group of people on the other (Giovannetti and Accorinti 2017). Moreover, special attention should be paid to understand opportunities and constraints of the different reception schemes and to enhance personalised interventions that take into account additional vulnerabilities, such as psychological distress, exploitation, and trafficking.

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paradiso@unisannio.it

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paradiso@unisannio.it

Ethnic Minorities' Embeddedness in Host Versus Origin Places

Ahmed Baker Diab, Maria Paradiso and Izhak Schnell

Abstract
The study is an exploratory test of ethnic minorities and ethnic migrants success in embedding themselves in host societies either in destination country or their majority space. It is based on a cross-cultural comparison of three cultural groups in three Mediterranean countries (Morocco, Italy, Israel). Methodology consists of a multidimensional model that investigates the sources of social, cultural, and emotional forms of capital either from intra-ethnic or inter-ethnic sources as it has been developed by Schnell et al (2015). We have developed a questionnaire distributed among 40 subjects in each of the three communities around the Mediterranean (120 in total): Italians in Morocco; Moroccans in South Italy, and Christian Arabs in Israel. Six indicators were tested. The results were used in order to characterize patterns of embeddedness either in places of origin or in host/majority places. The results show that minorities either tend to isolate themselves from host/majority milieus or to integrate by embedding themselves in both host/majority and origin places. The assimilationist strategy is rejected in almost all cases. The main level for embedding in host/majority milieus is the emotional aspect that is followed by learning host/majority language and socializing in host milieus.

Keywords
Minorities · Migrants · Mobilities · Adaptation · Embeddedness · Christian Arabs Italians · Moroccans

1 Introduction

The goal of this paper is to suggest a methodology to measure the degree to which ethnic minorities and ethnic migrants move their existential 'zero point' into their destination country or their majority places and milieus. We operationally define the location of a person's existential zero point in terms of a person's social, cultural, and emotional embeddedness in either host/majority or origin place. We test our measurement on exploratory groups of subjects from three different ethnicities: Italians in Morocco; Moroccans in Italy, and Christian Arabs in Israel. Two groups are of immigrants and one of a native ethnic minority. Such a choice enables the comparison between immigrants who have

A. B. Diab · I. Schnell (✉)
Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
e-mail: schnell@post.tau.ac.il

A. B. Diab · M. Paradiso
University of Sannio, Benevento, Italy
e-mail: paradiso@unisannio.it

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paradiso@unisannio.it

experienced spatial mobility and transition in residential space and an ethnic native minority that experiences mobility and transition in commuting space.

In the theoretical section, we set the foundation for the operationalization of embeddedness in sets of social, cultural, and emotional linkages. In the next section, we describe the research methods leading to preliminary results based on the three examples of a small number of representatives of the different ethnicities.

2 Theoretical Background

The experience of transition or moving ones zero point into a new milieu is characterized by psychologists in terms of adaptation or acculturation. We use zero point as a metaphor since individuals cannot be viewed in 'engineering' terms of resetting to *tabula rasa* subjectivities. Most generally, the concept of adaptation is defined as a set of changes that occur in individuals or groups in response to the request of the social context (Ward and Kennedy 1993). Acculturation is defined by psychologists as the behavioral and psychological changes that are the result of cultural transition (Sam and Berry 2006). Berry (2005) attempt to free the concept of acculturation from assimilationist perspective brings the concepts of acculturation and adaptation together.

Both definitions focus on personal changes in individuals and groups in response to exposure to changes in their milieus. Personal responses may vary from mental health, stress, self-esteem, to self-awareness, feeling of acceptance and culturally skilled behavior (Sam and Berry 2006). Berry (2006) measures adaptation or acculturation in terms of three indicators: social linkages to members of host society; fluency in host language; and identification with host society identity. The three indicators represent in our view the relevancy of social and cultural capital and emotional aspects in adaptation (Putnam 2000). Granovetter (1983) distinguished between social and cultural forms of capital directed toward bonding networks as segregating ones and bridging networks as integrating ones.

In both cases of commuting to majority spaces or immigrating to host places adaptation means first of all the creation of bridging or integrating networks and linkages. However, as Valentine (2008) and Leitner (2012) show us, unlike the assumption of Allports (1954) contact theory, increasing bridging linkages may also increase the racialization of intergroup relations. Therefore, we join (Berry 2006) in adding the emotional aspect as a major form of capital as it is articulated in the idea of the human zero point of orientation in the world first recognized by Heidegger (1962) and Bolnow (1967). Adding the emotional aspects may clarify to what extent intensifications of bridging linkages and personal reactions shaped by emotions are associated with adaptation and increase in sense of belonging to the majority controlled spaces or with increase in racialization and sense of detachment from the majority controlled spaces: We refer to the possibility of multiple identity (Sen 2016; Malouf 2010) not the disrupting choice of self-ghettoized communities or assimilationist attitudes of host places.

This attention to emotional factors and non-representational theory at large (Thrift 2007) or emotional geography from feminist studies (Ahmed 2004; Bronwyn 2013; Davidson et al. 2005; Dunn 2010) take into account that migrants or mobile people in general negotiate integration, codes, spatialities not simply adhere or refuse; thus a human-centered focus can better cope with new ways of restructuring spatialities in the globalization era. Indeed, in the contemporary world, individuals are exposed to relations at a distance thru new media and ways of being connected with origin countries like ever in the past. Thus, previous approaches or studies must evolve in our view in order to take into account the simultaneous presence, belonging, affectivity and emotional exposure and encountering of people in the digital and different worlds. Thus, spatialities or location refers to a continuum of host-origin places and the importance of individual exposure or fluency in active behavior being exposed to

paradiso@unisannio.it

host-origin countries constraints and influences cannot be underestimated. Constraints and influences, relations at distance, constant exposure to here and there complicate the geography of encounters with otherness and thus the so-called integration–isolation geographies.

The last decade debate on geography of encounters provides insights on how people negotiate difference in everyday life (Wilson 2014; Gawlewicz 2015, 2016; Wilson 2016 for an overall assessment on geography of encounters debate and further developments).

Thus, success or failure of encounters can serve as basis to test embeddness on the basis of encounters since encounter is a conceptually charged construct which is not limited to 'contact' but includes questions of meaning, power, temporality, ethics and scale, and morality (Paradiso submitted).

As Wilson (2016) charged construct of 'encounters' as a theoretical realm to grasp instances where difference is particularly noteworthy or of analytical interest and encounters *make* difference. In the mobile global realities, the instances of integration as a way to depict a harmonized difference are more difficult to tackle with changes in individual agencies and spatialities.

Here in this paper, the focus is subjectivities and emotional aspects of encountering with otherness as a realm to better understand agency and possibilities between static approach of locations, functional examination of everyday life activities, and morphologies of social networks. In the current study, we pay a special focus on emotional aspects and refer to embeddedness rather than integration or segregation.

An operational manifestation of these ideas have been suggested by Schnell et al. (2015) when they suggest to analyze socio-spatial integration and segregation in terms of the forms of accumulating social, cultural, and emotional capitals from either bonding and segregating milieus or bridging and integrating milieus in their everyday life spaces including mass and telecommunication ones. In accordance, we suggest measuring the degree to which ethnic immigrants and minorities embed their daily lives in host/majority places or in ethnic and origin places in the fields of social, cultural, and emotional aspects of everyday life.

3 Research Methods

The study is based on interviews and questionnaires presented to about 40 interviewees from each of the ethnicities: Italians in Morocco; Moroccans in South Italy, and Christian Arabs in Israel. Subjects were chosen according to the logic of snowball sampling, but the small number of subjects enables only an exploratory study that suggests and tests the applicability of the methodology still calling to more comprehensive and systematic empirical tests.

The subjects from all three groups are of diverse ages with two-thirds of them between 30 and 60. The majority of the subjects are married with children, and about one-third is singles. In terms of gender and education, there are significant differences between the groups. While only about quarter of the Moroccan and Italian subjects were female, about half of the Christian Arabs in Israel were female. In addition, while two-thirds of the Italian and the Christian Arabs have post high school education, only 14% of the Moroccans have post high school education. While all the Moroccans and the Italians are first-generation immigrants, all the Arabs were born in Israel to a native minority group.

The questionnaires include detailed accounts of the subjects' social linkages in both origin and host or majority milieus, self-evaluation of their fluency in the languages of their origin and host or majority societies, the way they identify themselves and their sense of attachment to origin and host or majority milieus. In addition, we asked about basic socio-demographic characteristics of the subjects. The filling of the questionnaires evoked open discussions between the interviewers and the interviewees, discussions that were stimulated by the researchers in order to expose the deeper worldviews that underlie their behaviors and attitudes.

In analyzing the data, we suggested to measure six indices—two for embedding oneself in

paradiso@unisannio.it



Fig. 1 Measures of embeddedness aspects

each form of capital. We divided each subject's embeddedness in host or majority milieu by embeddedness in origin milieu in order to highlight the location of the zero point either in places of origin or in host or majority places. The six aspects measured are as follows (Fig. 1).

Social capital

Proportion of friends at host or majority place/friends in place of origin.

Proportion of support from others from host or majority place/support from others in place of origin.

Cultural capital

Proportion of fluency in language of host or majority place/fluency in language of place of origin.

Proportion of exposure to cultural media program originated in host or majority societies/cultural media originated in place of origin.

Emotional capital

Proportion of attachment to host or majority society/attachment to society in origin place.

Proportion of the salience of identification with identity of host or majority society/salience of identification with identity of place of origin.

The evaluative indices were measured on five degree Likert scale leading to results that can be below one representing subjects who are embedded in their place of origin, results above one representing subjects that are embedded more in their host or majority places and results around one ($0.80 < P > 1.20$) that represent subjects that balance between their orientations to origin and host or majority places.

At a second stage, we apply Post Hoc ANOVA in order to characterize differences among members of the three groups' styles of embedding themselves in their host or majority societies and we calculated component analysis in order to identify main strategies for embedding in host/majority societies.

4 Results

We analyze the embeddedness of the three groups in host/majority places versus place of origin in each of the three forms of acculturation into host society: social, cultural, and emotional. We calculate also the variances between the distributions of the ethnic groups in each of the six indices based on Post Hoc ANOVA.

The analysis of embeddedness in social networks reveals that Arabs and Italians are extremely isolated from social networks that connect them to people from the majority or host society (Table 1). Unlike them, more than half of the Moroccans in South Italy develop linkages with members of the host society with close to one-third of them largely embedding themselves in host society. The distribution of requests for support shows the same tendency of Arabs in Israel and Italians in Morocco to isolate themselves from the host/majority society relative to the strong tendency of Moroccans in Italy to develop effective bridging networks that have the potential to support them in their attempt for

paradiso@unisannio.it

Table 1 Social embeddedness in host/majority places versus places of origin

Ethnicity	Social linkages are embedded in			Total (%) 120
	Place of origin	Neutral	Host/majority places	
No. of friends in host/majority place/No. of friends in place of origin				
Arabs in Israel	90	4	6	100
Italians in Morocco	96	0	4	100
Moroccans in Italy	40	30	30	100
No. of potential supporters from host/majority place/No. of potential supporters from place of origin				
Arabs in Israel	70	7	23	100
Italians in Morocco	78	3	19	100
Moroccans in Italy	46	46	8	100

Table 2 Cultural embeddedness in host/majority places versus places of origin

Ethnicity	Cultural traits are embedded in			Total (%) 120
	Place of origin	Neutral	Host/majority places	
Proportion between fluency in host/majority Language versus language of place of origin				
Arabs in Israel	33	32	35	100
Italians in Morocco	45	26	29	100
Moroccans in Italy	58	16	26	100
Proportion between exposure to host/majority mass media versus exposure to mass media in place of origin				
Arabs in Israel	20	80	0	100
Italians in Morocco	66	34	0	100
Moroccans in Italy	33	67	0	100

social mobility. Interestingly enough, about 20% of the Arabs in Israel and the Italians in Morocco develop for themselves supportive networks among partners whom they do not consider friends. The search for potential supporters from members of the majority may be understood as a survival strategy typical to members of minority or immigrants communities.

The Post Hoc ANOVA shows that there are no significant differences in the distribution of friends between the Arabs in Israel and the Italians in Morocco with Mean Difference = M.D. = 2.2; Sig. = 0.870, but there are significant differences between them and the distribution of friends among the Moroccans in Italy (Moroccans vs. Israeli M.D. = 82; Sig. = 0.0001 and Moroccans versus Italians mean difference = 80; Sig. = 0.0001). Once we analyze differences among the ethnicities in search for bridging support networks, much less significant differences are recorded. Mean differences between Moroccans and either Italians or Arabs in Israel are only marginally significant (M.D. = 15.4; Sig. = 0.05 for Italian versus Moroccans and M.D. = 13.2; Sig. = 0.06 for Arabs in Israel versus Moroccans). At the same time, differences between Italians and Arabs in Israel search for bridging support groups remains insignificant.

The analysis of cultural embeddedness shows that more than half of the Arabs in Israel and the Italians in Morocco tend to either embed themselves in the host/majority language or to master the two languages (Table 2). These trends are weaker among Moroccans who tend more to maintain Arabic as their main language. It is interesting that one-third of the Arabs in Israel who are residents of mixed cities are more fluent in Hebrew than in Arabic due to the fact that they

paradiso@unisannio.it

work and to some extent socially mingle with Jews. The same trend is demonstrated also among more than one quarter of the Italian and the Moroccan immigrants.

In terms of exposure to entertainment mass media, the Italians deeply differ from members of the two other groups with two third of them remaining embedded in their culture in their place of origin meaning Italy. In comparison, less than one-third of the Arabs in Israel and the Moroccans isolate themselves in their place of origin culture. The majority of the rest tend to balance between their exposure to their place of origin culture and their host/majority culture with no one giving up once culture of place of origin.

Post Hoc ANOVA of the cultural embeddedness shows that only the differences in fluency in languages between Arabs in Israel and Moroccans in Italy are significant with M.D. = 11.22 and Sig. = 0.002. Differences in languages fluency between Arabs in Israel and Moroccans in Italy are close to significant with M.D. = 8.0 and Sig. = 0.07. Differences in languages fluency between Moroccans and Italians are insignificant. In terms of exposure to mass media, only the differences between Arabs in Israel and Italians in Morocco are significant with M.D. = 10.5 and Sig. = 0.015.

The analysis of the emotional embeddedness shows that the members of all three ethnic groups are split between those who are attached to their ethnic place of origin and those that are attached to both places of origin and host/majority places (Table 3). Only few demonstrate willingness to give up their attachment to their place of origin. However, the results concerning the relative salience of their identities as belonging to their place of origin or hos/majority they differ from each other more significantly. Arabs in Israel have stronger tendency to maintain their ethnic identity as Arabs or Palestinians more than the two other groups tendency to maintain their identification with their places of origin. Moroccans demonstrate the lowest tendency to maintain the dominant status of their Moroccan identity when more than 80% of them attach similar level of salience to their identities as Moroccans and Italians. Also, more than half of the Italians in Morocco attach similar level of salience to their Moroccan and Italian identities. Unlike the two groups of immigrants, a significant minority of Arabs in Israel attach higher salience to their Israeli identity than to their Arab or Palestinian identities.

Post Hoc ANOVA of the emotional embeddedness shows that the differences between the groups are much less significant than for the former aspects of embeddedness. In terms of attachment to the places of origin and host/majority, there are no significant differences, while in terms of identity, the distributions of the Moroccans were almost significantly differently from the other two groups (M.D. = 1.2; Sig. = 0.06 in respect to the Italians. M.D. = 1.4; Sig. = 0.05 in respect to Arabs in Israel).

Table 3 Emotional embeddedness in host/majority places versus places of origin

Ethnicity	Cultural traits are embedded in			Total (%) 120
	Place of origin	Neutral	Host/majority places	
Proportion between attachment to host/majority places versus attachment to places of origin				
Arabs in Israel	42	43	15	100
Italians in Morocco	45	45	10	100
Moroccans in Italy	40	43	17	100
Proportion between salience of identification with host/majority places versus identifier				
Arabs in Israel	55	28	17	100
Italians in Morocco	39	58	3	100
Moroccans in Italy	19	81	0	100

paradiso@unisannio.it

Table 4 Overall embeddedness in host/majority places versus places of origin

Ethnicity	Cultural traits are embedded in			Total (%) 120
	Place of origin	Neutral	Host/majority places	
Arabs in Israel	79	5	16	100
Italians in Morocco	63	27	10	100
Moroccans in Italy	23	70	7	100

Table 5 Components metrix

Variables	Component 1 Emotional	Component 2 Socio-cultural	Component 3 Language
Help	−0.68	0.25	0.34
Friends	−0.43	0.59	−0.47
Entertainment	0.23	0.83	−0.11
Language	0.33	0.39	0.78
Identity	0.85	0.13	−0.20
Attachment	0.79	−0.01	−0.04

Overall, the Moroccans seem to show the highest tendency to embed themselves in their host milieus while the Arabs in Israel show the highest tendency to embed themselves in their ethnic milieu. Among all three groups, the tendency to assimilate in host/majority societies remains marginal (Table 4).

In an attempt to identify the main strategies ethnic minorities use in embedding themselves in society, we ran a component analysis of the eight aspects analyzed in this study (Table 5). The analysis reveals that three components explain 74% of the variability. The first one that focuses on emotional embeddedness explains 34% of the variability. In both terms of attachment and identity, the members of this group tend to open their hearts to the host/majority milieus despite the fact that they do not develop social networks with members of host/majority milieus (negative coefficients in terms of friends and support). The second group that focuses on making friends and exposure to hos/majority culture explains 20% of the variability. Members of this group expose themselves to entertainment programs of the host/majority culture, and they make friends from the host/majority milieus. In addition, they make some effort to learn the host/majority language. The third group that focuses on learning the host/majority language explains another 20% of the variability. To some extent, they search for support groups among members of the host/majority milieus, but they do not define them necessarily as their friends.

5 Discussion

The model of ethnic minorities' and immigrants' embeddedness in host/majority milieus is rooted in a multidimensional model of socio-spatial lifestyle (Schnell et al. 2015) in which human activities are analyzed in terms of the double dialectics of agency and structure as suggested by Giddens (1984, 1991). It suggests a particular index of rooting ones everyday life either in place of origin or in host/majority places. The model distinguishes between three orientations toward places of origin, host/majority places, or balancing between the two. The results demonstrate the possibility of adopting either one of the three options at least by a minority of the subjects under investigation.

The analysis demonstrates a deep difference between Italians and Arabs on the one hand and

paradiso@unisannio.it

Moroccans on the other hand. While Italians and Arabs tend to segregate from their host/majority places embedding themselves to large extent in their intra-ethnic milieus, Moroccans tend to integrate in their host society in South Italy. However, the role of agency and structure in explaining the tendency of most Italians and Arabs to segregate requires further study. It seems that Arabs in Israel suffer from structured discrimination in Israeli society in a way that deters them from embedding themselves in Jewish milieus (Smooha 2002). In contrast, it may be that Italian immigrants in Morocco bring with them Eurocentric worldviews that deter them from embedding themselves in Moroccans' milieus (Paradiso submitted).

Among the immigrants (Italians and Moroccans), the majority of those that show tendencies to embed themselves in host milieus do not chose the assimilationist strategy, meaning the replacement of orientation to place of origin by orientation to host place.

Instead, most immigrants maintained their embeddedness in places of origin in addition to embedding themselves in their host milieu. This strategy was extremely strong among the Moroccans that 70% of them adopted the intermediate position of embedding themselves in both milieus. Despite the small and unrepresentative sample, this result hints at the possibility that many of the Muslim immigrants to Europe make efforts to integrate in European society by embedding themselves in their host milieus without giving up their Muslim and Moroccan identities.

This result is supported by several studies unlike their prejudiced popular images (Lamari, Oukarfi, Paradiso, and Sattar) in this book; (IDOS and UNAR 2015).

Arabs in Israel are exceptional in this sense. Most of those who tend to reach out to majority milieus tend to embed themselves in the majority milieus while weakening their embeddedness in their Christian Arab milieu. These are highly educated people who live in mixed cities as a minority within the Muslim Arab minority who work in Jewish milieus. With the rise of Islam among Arabs in Israel, they find themselves in identity crisis with some of them trying to reframe their identities as Eremites seeking to draft into the Israeli Army and integrate in Jewish society. The analysis identifies three main strategies to integrate into host/majority milieus. One strategy is focused on learning the host/majority language as a mean to integrate into the labor market while maintaining the social networks and attachments to their places of origin.

Another strategy is to identify with the host/majority places leading to some level of acculturation but without relying on supportive social networks at the host/majority society.

Lastly, some tend to socialize into the host/majority milieu by making friends and adopt entertainment styles from the host/majority milieu.

The study opens up routes for the measurement of ethnic integration in majority societies. However, further studies based on more systematic measurements are required in order to expose typical styles of integration as they are measured by embeddedess, in order to identify the leading factors of integration and in order to analyze differences among ethnic groups in styles of integration. In addition, the intermediate group that maintain balance between embeddedness in place of origin and host/majority milieus must be subdivided into two groups—one that has only minimal linkages in both host and origin places and second that has rich linkages to both origin and host places. Furthermore, the conceptual framework must be widened based on the dialectics of agency and structure in order to expose main structural constraints for integration and the resources agents need in order to succeed in the integration process.

6 Concluding Remarks

Questionnaires disclosed salience of different possible behaviors and at a large refusal of assimilationist attitudes. Responses made clear that multiple identity formation and evolution (balanced attachment to two worlds of origin–destination and embedding) should be investigate

paradiso@unisannio.it

further in future research. In particular, it emerged promising for new knowledge creation, the fuzzy area between belonging and identification with the host/welcome country mindset. Indeed, apparent dichotomies can arise in terms of feeling of attachments to the country but refusal of main traits of dominant mindset: Embedding is indeed a process of belonging, identification, *and* transformation on a social and territorial *continuum*. Zero point does not exist indeed since individuals' subjectivities in places continue partially to be shaped by mindset of origin and emotions of encounters in new realities or with majorities. We found some dimensions of emotional geographies, particularly grasped by interviews accompanying questionnaires that need to be elucidated further and deeply included in future refinement of the method and embeddedness model: They should include aspects of emancipation (par example engendered dimension and patriarchal systems which can impede subjective embedding and encountering); identification with local main culture (moral reactions both sides and not only in Europe to values, taboos; certain transmitted attitudes of religious belongings can create ultimately diffidence or sense of superiority; prejudiced views in all groups; human rights); critical assessment of provided welfare access; clear defining of spaces and dynamics of encountering and integration which *make a difference* (family or domestic space? Public space? Encountering with neighbors? Schools? Traditional markets).

After assessing contours and strategies of embedding and revealing a relevant notion of territorial continuum for minorities embeddedness, we want to scrutinize further what impedes encountering which makes a difference for healthy personal fulfillment and peaceful multiple identity mutual respect in countries and among shores.

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paradiso@unisannio.it

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paradiso@unisannio.it

Part III

Narratives. The Mediterranean as an Action Space in the Transformation of European Identity and Changing Relationships: Chapters on Connectivities: Cross-bordering, Bridging, Changing

paradiso@unisannio.it

Virtual Mobilities Italy—Morocco and Mediterranean Connections

Siham Lamari, Samira Oukarfi, Maria Paradiso and Hicham Sattar

Abstract

Our study aims to understand the relationship between the use of the Internet and migrants' interpersonal relations in their host environments with natives, with persons of the same ethnic group, and with their places of origin. Specifically, this study firstly attempts to discern the influence of Moroccan migrants' virtual mobilities—coupled with their spatial mobilities as migrants in Italy—on individuals' patterns of encountering and integration locally while keeping instant connection with their home country. Secondly, we attempt to realize a first appreciation of connected spaces through individuals' communication patterns across the sea in order to initially assess the contours of the digitally connected Mediterranean Basin, on the basis of personal mobilities from Italy to Morocco and vice versa.

Keywords

Personal mobilities · Digital connections Migration · Encountering · Dis-encountering

S. Lamari (✉) · S. Oukarfi · M. Paradiso · H. Sattar
University of Casablanca Hassan II,
Casablanca, Morocco
e-mail: siham.lamari@gmail.com

S. Lamari · S. Oukarfi · M. Paradiso · H. Sattar
University of Sannio, Benevento, Italy

1 Introduction: From Migration to Personal Mobilities

New technologies of communication and information attenuate and reshape the significance of distance between individuals, leading to changes in social links and geographical presence and relationships. Real space is embedded in a virtually interconnected and globalized one and characterized by the instantaneity of the interpersonal contacts, if digital gaps do not occur. The adoption and appropriation of technology is still a predominant question; serious challenges stem from any numeric fractures capable of hindering the process of individuals' integration and countries' openness to a global information society for all (Paradiso 2015). Digital communications have been understood in terms of virtual mobilities. In case of migrants as well as tourists and other mobilities, virtual communications are coupled with spatial mobilities. The interconnections of both categories of mobilities have been suggested and conceptualized in terms of personal mobilities as a way to understand agency and geographical processes (Kellerman 2006, 2012).

Our study aims to understand the relationship between the use of the Internet and migrants' interpersonal relations in their host environments with natives, with persons of the same ethnic group, and with their places of origin. Specifically, firstly, this study attempts to discern the

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paradiso@unisannio.it

influence of Moroccan migrants' virtual mobilities—coupled with their spatial mobilities as migrants in Italy as their destination country—on individuals' patterns of encountering and integrating locally while keeping instant connection with their home country.

Secondly, we attempt to realize a first appreciation of connected spaces through individuals' communication patterns across the sea to initially assess the contours of the digitally connected Mediterranean Basin, on the basis of personal mobilities from Italy to Morocco and vice versa. We try to provide an understanding of those two dimensions empirically and to suggest an initial way of thinking about a third one: the impact of the information and communication technologies (ICTs) on the integration of Moroccan immigrants in the host country—in this case, Italy—in terms of a first assessment of the potential role of the ICTs in the reduction of geographical and social gaps between the migrant and the migrant's family and friends in the home and host country.

Thirdly, virtual mobilities could represent an additional realm of connections among shores in terms of information, ideas, and emotional flows, thus contributing to regional connections and spatialities.

Our starting point is that the ambiguity of ICTs in host countries as a measure favoring integration remains unresolved so far. Moreover, we would like to explore if the use of ICT-led communications (mobile phone communications, social networks) with the home country can contribute to maintaining the migrant's social ties with his/her family and friends and/or can also turn into means of isolation and self-exclusion from the destination country while keeping daily communications with home.

This study, as an exploratory case, provides initial answers through our original survey of the Moroccan migrants in (Southern) Italy and of Moroccan families living in Morocco with at least one of their family's members who migrated to Italy. Matching usages and behavior in the two countries, these phenomena are initially understood in this paper as basic statistics in terms of personal exposure and use of digital resources in Morocco and Italy. It cannot be taken for granted that the two population groups in Morocco and Italy have same characteristics and behavior.

2 Theoretical Background

Theoretically, migrants' agency has been discussed in spatially bounded terms, or transnationally in the recognition of the agency of multiple actors "from below" (Appadurai 2000; Portes 1998). Studies introduced a kind of discovery of "diasporic civil society" (Anheier and Themudo 2002; Sassen 2002) which had the merit of disrupting the static view of integration processes in light of an outdated dialectic of migrant and hosting place. With no doubt, studies on the circulation and highly complex trajectories of migrants (Tarrius 1989) innovated approaches and meanings of situated concepts of integration and segregation. Transnational approaches in linking people and locations, however, provided an overemphasis and romanticized view of migrants' agency where their countries of origin were concerned (Mercer et al. 2009), disclosing the realities of a set of linkages which are in reality loose and transient, not robust or ordered ones as studies had supposed. Studies also overemphasized the diasporic connection as finalized to development or a broader agenda of change in home countries in a case of multiscaled citizenship (Hickey and Mohan 2005; Featherstone et al. 2007; Berriane 2014). Moreover, later studies have criticized the spatial framework of tightly connected branches radiating from the home place like a spider (Datta et al. 2007); it has been observed that social relations in networks are often studied but their spatiality has received less attention (Cumbers et al. 2008). In our view, the wave of transnational studies overemphasized in many ways the impact and spatial framework of agency of associations and structures and the political aspects. Indeed, the same political notions are challenged by the Web, for example in terms of the "provocative" idea of citizenships without a community (Balibar 2012) under the idea that one cannot shift

paradiso@unisannio.it

from a national to a transnational concept of citizenship or the idea of a preconstituted subject who carries particular rights or obligations (Closs Stephens and Squire 2012). This scheme is problematic since spatial imagination and changes call for complexities of goals, links, and behavior acted by people in association or outside associations, not by black box–like associations which indeed are built on social ties and relations of obligation and trust (Horst 2004; McGregor 2007; Simone 2003; Riccio 2001).

Secondly, communications and connections imply a series of more mundane and emotional events in which it can happen that political or economic themes can be found, but many others should be considered in terms of people's everyday narratives and connections.

From a geographical–scientific point of view, it should not be forgotten that social relations and their constituent parts are not spread across an isotropic plane of nation-states, but rather they are located—as individuals and venues—in different localities with uneven socio-spatial contexts (geographical location), constantly remade and shaped by (and shaping) individuals.

The rise of the networked society and the dramatic changes induced by cyberspace and cybergeography have made for a new wave of studies regarding migrants. Efforts made in the pivotal research by Diminescu (2008) on "connected migrants" were a first brilliant achievement in mapping the "connected migrant," a new phenomenon that relates to the growing interconnection between human mobility and new technologies. The E-Atlas "Diasporas" dates back to 2003, when the sociologist Dana Diminescu developed her research program on the basis of the new concept of the connected migrant. On the epistemological level, the focus is the paradigm of e-diaspora, through online community practices triggered by the interactive Web, including all the sites run by and for immigrants, both in the home country and abroad. Geographically dispersed and heterogeneous in terms of socioeconomic conditions, the "diaspora" is not a static entity, but a dynamic rooted in the fluidity of the Internet and reinventing itself from time to time. The first phase of migrants' presence on the Web was filtered online through sites managed by professionals on behalf of associations or institutions. In the last ten years, the spread of Web 2.0 and 3.0 users has fueled a proliferation of migrant virtual communities structured around traditional sites, blogs, and forums.

However, this wave of studies became outdated in light of recently developed social networks and sharing platforms. In our view, the necessary turn, now, is about a more individualized scale of connection and memberships where the dichotomy of a passive or active Internet user is becoming obsolete; this happens since the instant personal communications gain momentum or hybridize connected places rather than narratives and agency by associational or political entities.

Moreover, the few studies on ICTs and migration experience have focused on people's social interaction (Oiarzabal and Alonso 2010; Oiarzabal and Reips 2012; Lim and Pham 2016), but the consequences of new media on encounters of migrants with locals have received far less attention in scholarly work.

With Web 2.0, social networks now bring a greater sense of intimacy and trust and fuel emotions more readily, as argued in regional as well humanistic studies (Castells et al. 2007; see Paradiso 2013 on North African mass mobilization; Paradiso and Tabusi on activism in the Mediterranean, 2012). They call for abandoning the homo economicus approach in social sciences and for injecting emotion and affection as well as politics in regional studies and topics like mobilities, integration, and embedding (Paradiso 2013; Bondi 2005; Davidson et al. 2005; Bronwyn 2013).

Thus, research shifts away from migrants as industrial workers and from the transnational networks approach, to a view of migrants as mobile people who move (and struggle) from one place to another. This angle provides an alternative view to those of scholars of integration or assimilation, beyond the mere *homo economicus* who look for job opportunities in various places.

Thus, the migration paradigm is increasingly abandoned by researchers and reconceptualized

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as "mobility" (Cresswell 2001; Urry 2007). This view suggests that we cannot conceive agency and related spatiality as something that takes place and is achieved within a common unit (either a bounded area or a network); rather, the approach to connections and connectivity relates to modes of humanly being and to change which is enacted through encounters with other human beings.

In the following passages, we explain our approach to the easing of integration, problematized by constant ICT communications as a channel for encounters, their transformative character in individual life, operationalized by emotional geographies stemming from encounters and communications.

Firstly, encounters can inhabit as well as exceed the traditional geographic delimitations and involve a complex of capabilities (Nussbaum 2011); secondly we consider, at the core of geographies of encounters, the emotional geographies as a way to perceive and shape our environments and places, and particularly in encounters with "otherness." What is it about the digital realm that affects the emotional geographies of migrants' behavior of integration, dis-embedding, or isolation?

Recent work in geography about the geography of encounters argues that encounters are fundamentally about difference and central to understanding the embodied (as subjective, even filtrated by intersectionality, à la Valentine 2008) nature of social distinction and the contingency of identity and belonging. Actually, encountering can make the difference (Wilson 2016), making surprise, rupture, or remission of difference, often causing prejudice rather than annulling it (Gawlewicz 2016). Through encounters, individuals negotiate differences with people in their everyday life (Leitner 2012; Valentine 2008; Wilson 2014). Encounters are unpredictable and inherently political, as Wilson (2016) maintains while reviewing the recent debate of geography of encounters. What is new about the implications of the use of ICTs? We need to consider that emotional geographies of encounters are inherently linked to subjectivities and mediated by the complex co-presences *here* and *there*, *I* and *we*, *I* and *the other*, and all circumstances situated in between. The co-presence in contemporary life has ontological effects affecting people's behavior, well-being, and connectivity (Paradiso 2017).

The literature on Internet geography shows the ontological effect of living "at the screen" as embodied emotional experience (Paradiso 2017; Warf 2013; Kellerman 2014), making appear problematic the discussion in geography of encounters of a sharp distinction between "meaningful" and fleeting encounters, thus also the sharp impacts of their potentially transformative character for integration in new societies (Valentine and Sadgrove 2012).

Internet geographies scrutinize the co-presence of individuals in the new and the former locations and their experience of life in the interplay of a continuum between cyber and traditional places (Kwan 2001; Kellerman and Paradiso 2007; Castells et al. 2007; Kellerman 2016). These studies show the increasing dimension and meaningfulness of so-called weak ties (e.g., ties with families and friends through the Internet) for individuals' lives. Therefore, the sharp difference between fleeting and meaningful encounter is blurred in the spatiotemporality of individuals, their sense of self, and their ties in digital communications. This idea can indeed be even more significant for digital mobilities of migrants in their ontological situations of *here* and *there*, origin and host country, and their idea of feeling at home and well-being beyond all kinds of traditional factors.

Thus for us the focus of attention is the realm of the personal, the mundane, and the emotional to make better sense of relations at a distance and to capture the sense in which different people with different spatial experience and imagination are located, stretched across places and lines of communications in the uneasy condition of mobile people. Indeed, the conceptually dichotomous approach and debate between traditional areal studies and transnational ones proved ineffective because geographically locations and individuals are indeed embedded in flows originated by encounters both in physical places and in "digital" social networks.

paradiso@unisannio.it

3 Research Methods

3.1 Data Model, Research Tools, and Studied Population

For a structuring analysis and survey tool, a conceptual model was implemented to measure and represent daily routines of encounters in host places and digital encounters between host places and native places, for different realms (spaces) between mobile people. It is based on selected questions from the MEDCHANGe questionnaire, developed with some changes and additions on the basis of Schnell et al. (2015).

The data model refers to the "geography of encounters" idea of meaningful and fleeting encounters, thus making a distinction among migrants' habits of: (1) making contacts with other people (contact space) in the *here* and *there* places which are considered fleeting, and (2) meeting locally with people in shared places for non-instant communication, making personal relationships or common endeavors with native people and/or fellow migrants (spaces of encounters). The study also examines meaningful (3) emotional geographies for encountering otherness and encouragement to diversity (emotional geographies of "mixité"); (4) resources for embedding or not embedding in the host country, such as exposure to local news or news from the country of origin; language skills (space of exposure to resources); and statistics and profiles of Internet use for embedding and for keeping ties at home (see Table 1).

The study has an exploratory nature (Yin 2013). A selection of questions from the MEDCHANGe questionnaire was administered face-to-face with a sample of 45 individuals living in three localities in Southern Italy: Benevento, Caserta, and Naples (which were the cities exemplified in the FP7 MEDCHANGe project). Their relevance stemmed from the unexplored reality of Southern Italy and the different model of migration as non-industrial workers under precarious conditions in urban areas, compared to the case of Northern Italy and the more common ones in Western Europe with older waves of migration. The three cities represent one metropolitan center (Naples) and two smaller- and medium-sized cities surrounded by rural municipalities affecting migrants' livelihood and occupation. This methodological choice is justified by the complexity and vulnerability of the population that we want to survey, both affected by crisis and living in areas that lag behind other parts of Europe. Some interviews had to be done in Arabic, since some people could not express themselves in Italian or in French.

The survey has been carried out from February 2014 to March 2015. Researchers were very attentive that the structure of the questionnaire enabled to verify the quality and consistency of the answers collected. Indeed, the most important questions were asked several times in different ways and formulations. Responses were triangulated with practitioners and key experts in the field of migration (NGOs and MEDCHANGe conferences and presentations by MEDCHANGe scholars).

The questionnaire includes three main blocks of qualitative and quantitative information:

1. **The socioeconomic profile of the respondent**: Background information like gender, age, country of origin, marital status, educational attainment, socio-occupational category, household demographics, place of residence, and workplace.
2. **Daily practices and feelings of integration in the host country/city**: Daily use of time during a weekday but also during free time. We can group these variables into four blocks: meeting space, contact space, exposure to resources, and perception of integration (see Table 1: Variables).
3. **Mediterraneanism**: The feeling of belonging or not to the Mediterranean region.

3.2 Indices and Quantitative Analysis Technique

We have chosen to apply a multiple correspondences analysis (MCA) in an aim to simplify our

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Table 1 Blocks of coded questions

	Variable	Description of the variable
Meeting space	INTG1	With whom do you spend your working time?
	INTG2	What is the origin of people you know at work?
	INTG3	How many people do you know at work?
	INTG4	Where do you spend your leisure time?
	INTG5	With whom do you spend your leisure time?
	INTG6	What is the origin of the people you know at leisure?
	INTG7	How many people do you know at leisure?
	INTG8	Where do you spend your time on voluntary work/civil participation?
	INTG9	With whom do you spend your time on voluntary work/civil participation?
	INTG10	The origin of the people you know through voluntary work/civil participation
Contact space	INTG11	How many people do you know in the locality where you lived? (in Morocco)
	INTG12	How many people do you know in the workplace?
	INTG13	How many people do you know in cyberspace?
	INTG14	How many people do you know in your ethnicity?
	INTG15	How many friends do you have in cities where you have lived?
	INTG16	How many friends do you have in workplaces?
	INTG17	How many friends do you have at cyberspace?
	INTG18	How many people did you meet yesterday?
	INTG19	How many people did you meet virtually yesterday from other sources?
	INTG20	How many people have you contacted by phone or mobile phone Internet, e-mail, etc., yesterday?
	INTG21	How many people of your country of origin have you contacted by phone or mobile phone, Internet, e-mail, etc., yesterday?
	INTG22	To what extent are you exposed to Internet news: in your ethnic language of your country of origin/country of origin?
	INTG23	To what extent are you exposed to news on the Internet: in your ethnic language of the country where you live?
	INTG24	To what extent are you exposed to news on the Internet: in the language of the country where you live?
Exposure to resources	INTG25	To what extent are you exposed to news on the Internet: in your ethnic language of another country?
	INTG26	How many hours a day do you watch entertainment programs or use entertainment facilities through the Internet with your ethnic language?
	INTG27	How many hours a day do you watch entertainment programs or use entertainment facilities through the Internet with other ethnic languages?
	INTG29	Are you fluent in the majority language?
	INTG28	Do you read newspapers?
Emotion	INTGEMO1	To what extent do you feel you belong to your ethnic identity?
	INTGEMO2	How strongly do you feel you belong to the common national identity?
	INTGEMO3	How strongly do you feel to belong to your religious identity?
	INTGEMO4	How often have you been confronted with communication problems with people of the majority?
	INTGEMO5	Do you feel part of the culture of the majority?

(continued)

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Table 1 (continued)

	Variable	Description of the variable
	INTGEMO6	How much do you feel attached while you spend time in places dominated by people of the majority?
	INTGEMO7	How much do you feel attached while you spend time in places dominated by people from your ethnic group?
	INTGEMO8	To what extent do you think the Mediterranean is the region to which you belong?
ICT	TIC1	How many hours per day do you spend at virtual/Internet?
	TIC2	Where do you spend your virtual/Internet time?
	TIC3	With whom do you spend your virtual/Internet time?
	TIC4	The origin of the people you know "in cyberspace"?
	TIC6	How many people did you meet yesterday virtually from your origin?
	TIC9	Do you participate in blogs?
	TIC10	Have you created a personal profile?
	TIC11	Have you created a blog?
	TIC12	Have you created a blog or a community to promote your ethnic culture in the locality?
	TIC13	Do you actively contribute to blogs/Web spaces produced in your home country?

multidimensional data set. By means of the MCA, variables that explain the integration will be extracted from the set of existing ones and will be gathered in blocks of variables.

This analysis is a preliminary assessment of the topic to identify our focuses of analysis. It will be supported by a later study using the model of structural equations. For this, we will use the discriminant variables identified by the MCA. We will assume that they are correlated by causal links that we will identify through the structural equations.

A first discriminant analysis was performed taking into account all of the integration and ICT variables provided by MCA analysis, in an aim to measure the discriminant power of a variable relative to a dimension. The latter is defined as the percentage of the dimension variance explained by this variable. The later step is the definition of our dimensions, where we will characterize the relations between the modalities of the same variable, but also between those of distinct variables, locating each modality on the same graph by means of their factorial coordinates according to each dimension.

For our aim to determine the influence of ICTs on the integration of migrants, we conducted two parallel multidimensional analyses:

– A global MCA containing all the variables corresponding to "Integration" and the use of "ICTs";
– Four MCAs measuring the impact of ICTs on the integration of migrants by distinguishing between four blocks of variables measuring integration: meeting space, contact space, exposure to resources, and emotions. Note that these variables were determined by a study of the theoretical and empirical literature.

The processing performed using the SPSS.21 software led to the results presented below.

4 Results

In this section, we present the main results from the statistical exploitation of the questionnaire data.

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The statistical treatment of these answers was carried out by the SPSS survey processing software. The presumption of a selection bias should be noted, due to a high response rate for men (up to 95.5%) versus only 4.5% for women. This can be explained by the patriarchal nature of immigrant families in Italy. Indeed, the man is the head of the household and the only one able to answer the questions.

Nevertheless, some variables are still unusable due to a very high rate of non-response. Difficulties of answers have been noted for questions with a quantitative predominance.

4.1 Studied Population in Italy: Profile and Descriptive Statistics

Almost half of the respondents are located in Benevento (49%), and the rest are distributed between Caserta and Napoli, with rates of 20 and 31%, respectively.

Men represent the majority of the respondents (82%), with only 18% being women. This can be partially explained by the location of the interviews—some of them were in male-dominated places of worship—and by the patriarchal nature of the migrant family. The immigrant woman in Italy remains dependent on the man to answer even a questionnaire. However, there is a location bias linked to the migration model in Southern Italy: Cities like Naples represent a transit point, and thus, the population is mainly men, and the interviewing of people at help desks for migrants mirrors this condition.

The average age of the respondents (men and women) is 37.68, with a predominance of young people from 20 to 40 years of age (60%). The level of education depends on the age of the respondents. Among the 13.3% of the illiterate interviewees, 67% are over 40 years old. Similarly, of the 22.2% of respondents whose education does not exceed 6 years of study, 70% are over the age of 40. On the other hand, we find that educated people are predominantly young: 17.8% of respondents have a relatively high level of education, and 63% of those in that category are under 40 years old.

Also, 60% of respondents are single, and 40% married. The household size of the survey participants is between 1 and 10 members. The average size is 5.15 people with an average of 2.93 of men and 2.07 of women. This can be explained by the composition of the family, which may be nuclear in nature but also enlarged. The latter may contain several generations, namely the presence of grandparents, parents-in-law, grandchildren, and others in the same household. In this respect, our survey reveals that 38% of people live alone, 33% are in couples with children, and the last 31% share their homes with one or more members of their family or friends. Regarding the use of the Internet, 46% of respondents have never been connected to the Internet, and the remaining 54% are equally distributed among people who are rarely connected (1–2 h a day) and other people who have a relatively high connection frequency (more than 3 h per day).

Those who never use the Internet are mostly aged 41 and over (57%), illiterate (24%) or with a low level of education that does not exceed the primary level (43%). Twenty-nine percent are unemployed, and 43% work in agriculture. People with an average connection frequency (1–2 h per day) are relatively well educated with a level of education equal to or above 9 years (83%). Of this set, 83% get connected to the Internet from their homes.

Among those who are connected to the Internet, the vast majority are aged between 20 and 40 years. They are all educated. Indeed, 75% of them have a level of education greater than or equal to 12 years. They are mainly students or persons who work in commerce. They connect either from home (50%) or from another Internet access point in the city of residence.

Regarding technology uses, 53% of the Internet users say they have already produced digital content (mostly in terms of Facebook and more rarely WhatsApp). But, they seem to be limited to the creation of personal profiles on social networks. More advanced uses such as

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blogs remain very low. Indeed, only 17% of users say that they have created a blog or a community to promote ethnic culture in the locality of residence, and only 4% claim that they actively contribute to blogs or Web spaces produced in the country of residence.

4.2 Studied Population in Morocco: Profile and Descriptive Statistics

In January, February, and March of 2017, a survey questionnaire was administered to 155 Moroccans residing in Morocco, of whom at least one family member or friend had emigrated to Italy. It aimed to compare profiles of users and use in the two countries and to get an initial assessment of communications across shores in terms of descriptive findings of outreach communications (geographical reach and cultural geography of communications in terms of ethnicities, languages, and digital realms). Thus, the purpose was to find out their different uses of ICT and to check whether they maintain virtual links with their friend/family via social networks.

A total of 155 copies of the questionnaire were administered through direct and online contacts. Our sample comprised 44% women and 56% men. Young people under 25 were relatively overrepresented, with a rate of 41% compared to 37% of those between the ages of 25 and 45, those under the age of 46 only represent 22%.

As youths constitute the largest proportion of the sample, a high rate (61%) of single people was recorded, compared to 33% married and 10% widowed or divorced. The average household size is lower than the one in Italy. It is 4.25 people with a standard deviation of 1.84.

In addition, respondents to this survey had a slightly higher level of education than the sample of Moroccan migrants in Italy. We noticed a shoestring proportion (2%) of illiterate or semi-illiterate people, and 9% who had completed the high school level. On the other hand, almost half of our respondents reported having a high level of education at 28% for the bachelor's or master's degree and 27% for the master's, doctorate.

For the socio-professional category, 33% of our sample were non-managerial employees, versus 5% senior managers. Twenty-six percent were students, and 21% were in the liberal professions. The unemployed and farmers respectively represented 8 and 3% of respondents.

The interviewed people do not seem to suffer from a first-degree digital gap. They all have Internet connection, and 98% of them spend at least one hour a day on the Web. We have indeed been able to assert that at least 65% of those interviewed spend 3 h a day on the Web. Only 2% stated that they never go online. This result reveals a striking contrast with the Moroccan immigrants in Italy, whose connectivity frequency is extremely low. This gap may be the result of immigrants' Web-literacy rate, which is considerably lower compared to Moroccans living in Morocco, or could even be a result of the difference in connectivity price.

Regarding the usage of technology, we found with no surprise that social networks hold the lead with a 77% rate in technology uses, followed by information research on Web sites with 45%. Online gaming takes the third place with a staggering 33%, which may be explained by the presence of the youth generation in our sample. However, only 12.5% declared having a personal profile on the Web or a blog. Of the same interviewed sample, only 20% stated having bought products or services online. This weak percentage is justified by the weak position E-commerce holds in the local culture.

As far as virtual links that interviewees hold with their families or friends on social networks, we have been able to distinguish five types of virtual links:

- Friends—same ethnic origin Moroccan families residing in morocco.
- Friends—same ethnic origin Moroccan families residing abroad.
- Friends—different ethnic families (European).
- Friends—different ethnic families (other Arab countries).
- Friends—different ethnic families (American, others …).

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The social networks of our interviewees are extremely large, with an average of 402 friends. But a relatively wide dispersion has also been observed, with a standard deviation of 637. This is due to the strong variation of the number of friends per interviewee: from 3 friends (lowest value) to 4500 friends (highest value).

In this regard, we have ascertained that 25% of the interviewees have a relatively limited social network with a friend/family count under 100, especially for people older than 46, while 55% of those interviewed hold a somewhat impressive number of friends/family that falls between 100 and 500. It seems that the number of friends is directly correlated with the age of the interviewed, the older you get, the fewer virtual friends you have. The study also shows that 17% of people older than 45 years, 33% of people between the ages of 26 and 46, and finally 33% of people under 26 years have a rather extended social network (between 100 and 500 friends).

This same pattern is observed in people with an extremely large social network (over 500 friends), with a strong predominance of young people under 26 (52%) and only 7% for people over 46.

Speaking of social networks composition, the foremost virtual exchanges are between Moroccans who live in Morocco and those in the rest of the world. We have recorded that Moroccans' social networks are essentially made up of Moroccan residents (69%), with the average number of friends and family members reaching 297, followed by Moroccans living abroad (13%) with an average of 43 friends. The third place is taken by the European friends and families (10%) with an average of 35 friends, closely followed by friends in other Arab countries (5%) with an average of 30 friends. The last place is for the rest of the world family and friends category (3%), with an average of 11 friends.

As far as languages of virtual exchanges are concerned, Arab takes first place at 85%, followed by French with a 14% rate, and lastly English, with only 1% using it.

4.3 ICT Use and Profiles of Attachment and Connection Here and There

Encountering space

Our findings revealed that 62% of respondents work alone and their entourage is essentially made up of the same ethnic group (71%) (see cross-tabulations in Appendix). Thirty-two percent report working with friends or colleagues, 27% belong to the same ethnic group, 36% are Italian, and 36% are immigrants from other ethnic groups.

Nearly 47% of the migrants spend their free time at home with people from the same ethnic group. The majority (71%) prefer to spend it alone, while 29% of them like being with a family member. Unfortunately, the interviewed migrants are not very active in their leisure time. Indeed, nearly half of them (47%) stay at home or in the neighborhood (33%). As for free time, the vast majority (83%) of the migrants prefer to spend their leisure time with members of their community, or with immigrants from other ethnic groups (11%); only 12.5% report spending their leisure time with Italians.

Contact space

For each space of contact l (in the locality, at work, or on social networks), we calculated an R_l ratio between the number of people of the same ethnicity as the respondent and the total number of his or her acquaintances.

$$\left(R_l = \frac{\text{Number of pepole from the same ethnicity}}{\text{Total Number of acquaintances}} \right)$$

We aim to analyze the integration rate by evaluating the importance of the respondent's social links with foreign ethnic people.

We have set three levels of integration:

– **Strong integration**: For this level, the ratio is less than or equal to 0.3; the respondent's

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entourage is essentially composed of people of other nationalities.

- **Medium integration**: When the ratio is between 0.3 and 0.7, the respondent's entourage includes both compatriots and people of other nationalities.
- **No integration**: When the ratio is greater than 0.7, the individual is essentially with people in his/her community.

Whether in the residence or at work, we found that migrants are mostly not integrated (with ratios reaching 54 and 32%, respectively). But some of them, 28%, are in fact fully integrated in their workplace, compared with only 18% in the place of residence. This can be explained by the fact that migrants are obliged to rub shoulders with Italians in their workplace.

In terms of cyberspace, it seems that migrants are more virtually integrated compared to the other two physical locations. We found that 42% of respondents are highly integrated because their social network contains a mix of people from diverse nationalities, 33% are moderately virtually integrated, and 25% are not integrated at all. This may be explained by the potential difficulties faced by those migrants in adopting and using new technologies.

Exposure to Resources

It seems that mastering the language of the host country does not hinder the integration of migrants. Our survey revealed that 68% of respondents speak Italian perfectly and only 3% do not. Over two-thirds of the interviewed migrants only rarely consult the news on the Internet, whatever the language is: in the ethnic dialect (62%), in the language of the mother country (66%), and in the language of the host country (64%). Nevertheless, a minority (6%) very often consult online news in the mother country's language, and 16.5% exclusively in Italian.

We made the same observation concerning radio and television shows, whether for newscasts or entertainment programs: 78% say they never watch TV/radio in Arabic and 49% in Italian. In addition, 60.5% of respondents say they hardly ever read newspapers, 10% do so in the language of their country of origin, and 23% in Italian.

Emotional geography

Ninety-five percent of respondents say they feel a sense of belonging to their ethnic identity, compared to only 2% who deny it. Likewise for the religious affiliation: Up to 97.5% of the interviewed have an "belonging" feeling, and for the national identity at a rate of 94%.

Identity rejections nevertheless represent an insignificant proportion in our sample: 2% for ethnic identity, 6% for national affiliation, and 2.5% for religious affiliation.

While almost half (46%) of the migrants in our sample show that they are in perfect harmony with the common culture, 17% reject it. In this context, a very small minority (7%) seems to have to deal with communication issues and language barriers with Italians. Similarly, only 10% report feeling bad in places with majority dominance.

Also, 78% of respondents showed strong attachment to places with original ethnic domination, compared to 10% who do not feel any attachment to such spaces.

Regarding diversity encouragement, 14% of respondents do not endorse interracial marriage. 22% are opposed to or slightly support it. The last 63.4% were divided between those who fully supported and those who remained indifferent.

When it comes to mixed friendships, most respondents (72%) underscored their support for such relationships, while a minority (only 12%) opposed them. Similarly, 83% supported the arrival of a foreign-origin neighbor and only 3% rejected it outright.

Concerning Mediterraneanism, 40% say they feel a sense of belonging to the Mediterranean. Yet, this space means nothing for almost 33% of the migrants.

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4.4 Analysis of Multiple Correspondences of Integration and ICT Variables

The diagram of the measures of discrimination indicates that dimension 1 is established by a synthesis of the variables of integration: The set of these variables (in particular, variables affecting the emotions) presents significant levels on the discrimination index in dimension 1 and lower for the dimension 2. So, the categories of these variables are well dispersed according to dimension 1 and less dispersed in dimension 2. This reflects a distinction according to dimension 1, on the diagram of the individuals, between the most the integrated immigrants (located in the right part of the diagram $D1 > 0$) and all other individuals (located in the left part of the diagram, $D1 < 0$) (Fig. 1).

Conversely, variables affecting the use of ICT present high values of the discrimination index according to dimension 2, and low values for dimension 1. Accordingly, we have a small angle between the vectors corresponding to these variables and dimension 2. This indexcan be assimilated to the square of a correlation.

Coefficient (R^2) expresses the similarity between the said directions. It reflects the distinction observed in dimension 2, in the diagram of individuals, between those who use ICT (located in the upper part of the diagram, D2 > 0) and all other individuals (located in the lower part, D2 < 0).

A further point to note is that the variables INTG22, INTG24, INTG28, and TIC9 (see Table 1) present quite-high values on the discrimination index according to the two dimensions. However, the variables near to the origin of the graph do not appear discriminating on this



Fig. 1 Global MCA—analysis of multiple correspondences of all integration and ICT variables

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two-dimensional plane. Moreover, variables INTG13 and INTG17 cannot be linked to dimension 1, since they discriminate individuals only beside dimension 2 (related to the use of ICTs). In other words, knowing people or having friends in cyberspace (using ICTs) does not necessarily mean integration.

This result is confirmed by the distinct ACMs on the other three blocks (meeting space, contact space, and exposure to resources) (respectively, Annexes 1–3), which were not statistically significant.

We therefore present only the ACM that explains the link between the variables "emotions" and the use of "ICTs." Moreover, it is the only ACM that was significant.

Our MCA based on the variables of the "Emotion" block gives us the diagram of the discrimination which reveals that dimension 1 (Fig. 2) is mainly composed of the variables INTGEMO and TIC9. Their levels on the discrimination index are important for this dimension, while dimension 2 is characterized by ICT variables (ICT2, ICT3, and ICT10), indicating discrimination of other variables in relation to this dimension, and therefore between ICT use and integration (Annex 4).

Let us begin by remarking on the state of the cloud. We watch (Fig. 3) an expansive convergence of points in the left portion of the chart for dimension 1 (there is no reconciliation), which appears differently in relation to a little scattering of points on the right (an incorporation).

While investigating the cloud of individuals in light of their reactions situated on the ends of the axis, we notice the individuals (41,39,30) in the straight end of the graph (Fig. 3) dependably concerning D1. These people are two men and one lady of Moroccan root, mature in the vicinity of 20 and 40, respectively, living in Benevento and Napoli, who have a larger amount of training, are employed in the liberal professions, are thought to be exceedingly incorporated in their work environments and spots where they live and widely use ICTs, spend an average of over four hours per day on the Internet, and report that they watch entertainment programs or use entertainment facilities through the Internet on average for 3–4 h per day.

Conversely, we ascertain the people (20,22,23) on the left side of the diagram (Fig. 3) dependably regarding D1. These people are Moroccan men, in the vicinity of 20 and 40, living in Benevento, who have an entire grade school training, working in the fields of agriculture and trade, integrated either mildly or not at all into the work environments and the territories where they live, who spend under 1 h a day watching entertainment programs or using entertainment facilities through the Internet. They do not get access to online news, do not take part in Web journals, do not deliver digital content, and remain very attached to their country and identity of origin.

At the top (Fig. 3), we find individual 3. He is a Tunisian man over 51 years old, living in Caserta. He is not educated and works as a salesman. He is not integrated either in his place of work or in the locality where he lives. He remains very attached to his country and his original identity. He is often confronted with communication problems with people of the majority. His use of Internet and other virtual channels remains moderate, and most of his virtual encounters are with people of the same origin.

Below, individuals 1 and 36 are men aged between 30 and 50, living in Caserta and Napoli, respectively, working in commerce, who have a higher education level, who do not show any signs of integration in their workplaces or the localities where they live and feel distant from the culture of the majority. These individuals declare that their use of ICTs is rudimentary because they do not produce digital content or participate in blogs.

Figure 4 shows the diagram which joins the modality points of the "Emotion" block variables. The latter displays the associated weight of each of the modalities of the variables according to the two dimensions. The modalities in the left part of the diagram behind dimension 1 generally refer to immigrants who do not feel emotionally integrated in Italy and live confined in their

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

Fig. 2 MCA emotion block—analysis of multiple correspondences of all integration and ICT variables



Fig. 3 Point cloud in the surface 1–2

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

Fig. 4 Diagram of the modality points

community. Conversely, those on the right are associated with individuals who feel a sense of belonging in the culture of the majority. The latter have common characteristics, in this case a high use of ICT.

5 Findings and Discussion

Our methodology and set of data had an exploratory nature of case study (Yin 2013) and aimed to set questions for future research about what factors matter and how. Indeed a certain significance of individuals and behavioral variables in terms of hypothetical support to integration via ICTs has been revealed only for a few individuals who show stronger emotional attachment and identification in host places and are also ICTs' heavier users. ICTs for integration are not related to cultural exposure and interaction (resources space) or to encountering and contact spaces.

Actually, the descriptive statistics explain why, and for future research it can exist for another privileged dimension in our study: can our research questions be tested again but only in a wealthier population having more free time and cultural resources for this? Age and education proved significant for very low Internet use among other conditions. The use of home, loneliness, or fleeting intra-ethnic relations suggest the lack of encounters and meaningful ones. Our exploratory test may suggest that the Moroccan population in Italy is somehow too precarious and employed and self-employed in precarious sectors (agriculture, unemployed, small ambulant commerce), thus impeding the chances of encounters linked to friendship networks and public spaces.

This leads one to start to assume the following statements for future research: Overall use of ICTs does not appear to help integration in the destination country. Specifically, we can split initial findings to be tested and deepened further on several considerations. Firstly, ICTs' impact on mobilities cannot be considered under a deterministic technological fix. A problematic issue is posed by the persistence of digital gaps of the second or third type, thus affecting per se the significance of ICTs as a way of supporting mobilities in hosting places as a gap in access to digital resources. The divide is also in age and in educational and occupation status. Thus, results can change in the future.

paradiso@unisannio.it

6 Concluding Remarks

Moroccan statistics in Morocco and ethnic composition of networks and communications of Italian Moroccan in our study confirm that ICTs are used for keeping ties with the country of origin, thus influencing the existential polarity of *here* and *there*, and possibly attenuating the integration classic idea in destination/host countries. Our exploratory sample also showed effectively, consistent with our conceptual standpoint, that transnational ties do not occur in isotropic spaces, and, even more in the case of Moroccan mobility in Italy, the socioeconomic conditions of those staying in the country of origin are far better than conditions of those who expatriated. Therefore, the use of ICTs for keeping ties is double-sided: specifically in place and, in a certain measure, abroad. Thus, digital connections—in a framework consisting basically of the use of social networks—are for more mundane use, specifically for communicating at home or with the same ethnicity. Thus, the quality and impacts of communications among shores do exist, but their dimensions deserve further qualitative research via people's narratives. Finally, in testing the methodology per se, i.e., questions extrapolated by MEDCHANGe questionnaire based on Schnell et al.'s (2015) methodology, we find some uneasiness by responders while responding on their metrics of use of cyberspace (number of hours, contacts, etc.), quantity of networks (in the home country, in Italy, on the job, and in private spaces).

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Appendices

Annex 1: Meeting space

The two dimensions explain 67% of the phenomenon studied with a Cronbach Alpha index of 69%

Summary of models				
Dimension	Alpha of Cronbach	Explained variance		
		Total (eigenvalue)	Inertia	Percentage of variance explained
1	0.698	6.717	0.354	35.351
2	0.680	6.009	0.316	31.624
Total		12.725	0.670	
Average	0.690[a]	6.363	0.335	33.488

[a]The average Cronbach Alpha value is based on the average eigenvalue

Annex 2: Contact Space

The two dimensions explain 67.8% of the phenomenon studied with a Cronbach Alpha index of 61.9%

Summary of models				
Dimension	Alpha of Cronbach	Explained variance		
		Total (eigenvalue)	Inertia	Percentage of variance explained
1	0.621	8.630	0.345	34.522
2	0.616	8.320	0.333	33.280
Total		16.950	0.678	
Average	0.619[a]	8.475	0.339	33.901

[a]The average Cronbach Alpha value is based on the average eigenvalue

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Annex 3: Exposure to Resources

The two dimensions explain 78% of the phenomenon studied with a Cronbach Alpha index of 68.8%

Summary of models

Dimension	Alpha of Cronbach	Explained variance		
		Total (eigenvalue)	Inertia	Percentage of variance explained
1	0.700	6.240	0.416	41.600
2	0.675	5.457	0.364	36.377
Total		11.697	0.780	
Average	0.688[a]	5.848	0.390	38.989

[a]The average Cronbach Alpha value is based on the average eigenvalue

Annex 4: Emotion

The two dimensions account for 78.6% of the phenomenon studied with a Cronbach Alpha index of 91.4%

Summary of models

Dimension	Alpha of Cronbach	Explained variance		
		Total (eigenvalue)	Inertia	Percentage of variance explained
1	0.942	9.288	0.489	48.883
2	0.869	5.646	0.297	29.716
Total		14.934	0.786	
Average	0.914[a]	7.467	0.393	39.299

[a]The average Cronbach Alpha value is based on the average eigenvalue

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paradiso@unisannio.it

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paradiso@unisannio.it

Moroccans in Portugal: The Role of Networks with the Home Country in Migration and Integration Processes

Maria Lucinda Fonseca, Alina Esteves and Jennifer McGarrigle

Abstract

Moroccans are a recent and small migrant group in Portugal, yet they are significantly represented in the agricultural sector. Over 30% are concentrated in Algarve, the most southern region of the country with a more recent presence in Lisbon. Given their recent presence in Portugal, little is known about their process of integration or their migration experiences. This chapter has two main objectives. First, we provide a reading of the characteristics of Moroccan migrants in the Algarve and their integration. Second, we explore the role that network ties have in perpetuating migration to Portugal. In particular, we examine the role of current migrants in providing feedback and assistance to new/potential migrants considering migrating to Portugal. According to migration theory, migration increases over time as networks and social structures are established to sustain it (Massey et al. 1998). Such ties link migrants and non-migrants between origin and destination countries and may be helpful for organizing the process of migration and integration. To examine these processes, we draw on a survey conducted with 207 Moroccan migrants in the Algarve and 51 semi-structured interviews with Moroccan migrants and key informants conducted in the Algarve and Lisbon regions in the scope of the THEMIS (2011) and MEDCHANGe projects (2014/2015). Our findings identify important factors that have structured Moroccan migration including collective hiring schemes in agriculture and social networks. However, the effects of the economic and financial crisis seem to be resulting in stabilization or even decline of the migratory flow.

Keywords

Mobilities · Morocco · Portugal · Algarve

1 Introduction

While one of the main motivations for migration is economic, geographic proximity and economic disparities do not always prompt huge migratory flows. The Moroccan community in Portugal is a good example of how the migration process is influenced by a myriad of factors other than propinquity or wage differentials alone. Being a small foreign group in Portugal, with less than 1600 citizens, the Moroccans show a predominantly family-assisted chain migration based on

M. L. Fonseca (✉) · A. Esteves · J. McGarrigle
Center for Geographical Studies (CEG), Institute of Geography and Spatial Planning (IGOT), Universidade de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal
e-mail: fonseca-maria@campus.ul.pt

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paradiso@unisannio.it

networks in which people are linked by considerable amounts of mutual trust (Tilly 2007). The (positive) feedback sent home by pioneer fishermen who settled in the eighties, by the women actively recruited by farming enterprises (Faria 2007; Sampaio and Carvalho 2017), and also by salesmen has maintained a small but continuous inflow to Portugal. The extraordinary regularization processes of the 1990s and 2000s, based on valid labour contracts and up-to-date tax payments, also attracted Moroccans both from neighbouring Spain and directly from Morocco (Faria 2008) many of whom already had contacts in Portugal (Sampaio and Carvalho 2017). Moreover, cooperation agreements between Portuguese and Moroccan universities have attracted Moroccan students to Portugal, thus contributing to diversify this small community. Settling in both urban and rural areas, significant differences in the composition (and density) of social networks can be found between Moroccans living in Lisbon and Porto, and those residing in low-density areas in the Algarve, with the former demonstrating more contacts with natives and other migrants comparative to the latter. Due to labour-related constraints and lack of fluency in Portuguese, Moroccans residing in rural areas socialize more often with co-ethnics, while simultaneously maintaining frequent contacts with family and friends in Morocco.

The case study presented in this chapter contributes to our understanding of how networks work within migration and integration processes. As such, we build upon the large body of literature that has highlighted the relevance of migrants' social networks in facilitating the migration venture by creating social structures that sustain the process over time (de Haas 2010; Massey et al. 1998; Bakewell 2014). Migration networks are a form of social capital, composed by people directly or indirectly involved in the migration experience, bounded by social ties based on kinship or community belonging. Such social capital helps to reduce the economic and psychological costs of migration, especially at its initial stage, by providing assistance through material and immaterial resources (Tilly 1990; Massey et al. 1998; Faist 1998). As Tilly so clearly states "…reliance on established interpersonal networks for information minimizes and spreads the risks." (1990: 84). After the initial factor(s) that triggers the flow of pioneers from a particular origin to a specific destination, the movement of people can be more easily maintained due to the support provided by relatives, compatriots and friends either in the sending or/and in the receiving end.

In a context of migration, feedback, that is, information about migrants' incorporation and migration experience transmitted home and fed back into the 'system', influences the characteristics and evolution of subsequent migration patterns (Bakewell et al. 2011; Bakewell 2014). If feedback is positive, it fosters further migration; however, it can be negative and result in migration decline (Fonseca et al. 2016).

Tilly goes even further in his analysis of the relevance of networks for migration by stressing the role of interpersonal trust in the migration process. In a network context, "… trust as an attitude or as a relationship with practices attached" (2007: 6) implies expecting other members to comply with their obligations and duties towards the group. Long-distance migration, child upbringing and religious commitment are given as examples of endeavours in which people rely on an "interpersonal trust network" (idem). Moreover, trust networks may favour segmented incorporation of migrants in diverse areas of the receiving society (labour market, housing, for example) due to the social reproduction of structures already dominant in the network (Lin 1999). Thus, as the empirical data presented in this chapter demonstrate, in very closely knitted communities trust plays a central role in network-mediated recruitment practices shaping job search paths and access to information (Tinajero 2014).

The goal of this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, we aim to provide a reading of the profile of Moroccan migrants in Portugal and unpack the role of migrant networks in the migration process. In addition, we explore how individual and contextual factors, in origin and destination areas, are reflected in different migration motivations and different modes of social integration

paradiso@unisannio.it

in Portugal. Adopting a mixed-methods approach, the chapter draws on: (i) secondary data from the 2011 Census, to provide a basic characterization of Moroccan immigrants in Portugal; (ii) data from a survey with 207 Moroccan migrants conducted in the Algarve region in 2012, within the ambit of the THEMIS project, and 51 semi-structured interviews with Moroccan migrants and key informants conducted in the Algarve and Lisbon regions in the scope of the THEMIS (2011) and MED-CHANGe projects (2014/2015). In the following section, we draw on secondary data to provide a characterization of Moroccans in Portugal. We then move to present empirical results from survey and interview data, first, on migration motivations and the role of networks in the migration process, and second on integration outcomes.

2 The Moroccan Community in Portugal

Despite the ancient historical links and geographic proximity between the two countries, the Moroccan community living in Portugal is quite small. According to Faria (2007), Moroccan migration to Portugal began in a context of dispersion and diversification of destinations for Moroccan emigrants, who have established major diasporas in France, The Netherlands, Belgium and Germany as a result of labour recruitment campaigns in the 1950s and 1960s (Berriane et al. 2015; Jolivet 2015). In the case of Portugal, the Moroccan pioneers were essentially fishermen from the Doukhala region who remained after the non-renewal of the 1980s fisheries agreements between the two countries. Later on, in the 1990s, in the context of the internationalization of the Portuguese economy through the investments of transnational agri-food corporations and the modernization of Portuguese fruit and vegetable production, collective contracts for farming labour brought single women from the Kenitra region[1] (Faria 2007). These migrants later sponsored family reunification processes leading to an expansion of the community (Sampaio and Carvalho 2017). The perception of easier regularization in Portugal, in comparison with other European countries, also attracted Moroccans from neighbouring Spain, who found jobs in retail, hotels, restaurants, cafés and farms.[2] According to data from the Aliens and Borders Office, between 2006 and 2016, Moroccan citizens never reached more than 0.5% of the total amount of documented foreigners in Portugal. Despite the diminutive size of the community, in a context of internationalization and growth of the Portuguese economy since adhesion to the EU in 1986 (Fonseca and McGarrigle 2014; Peixoto 2002), the Moroccan group increased in absolute terms following the trend observed among other nationalities. From a small group of 443 people in 2000, Moroccans in Portugal reached their highest figure in 2009 (1933 individuals) and have since been dwindling (1576 in 2016).[3] Although in reality, according to some key informants, this number could be much higher, due to the fact that some Moroccans are occasional immigrants, mostly peddlers that come to Portugal from Spain or Italy (or other EU countries) during the summer months. Besides some citizenship acquisitions,[4] there has been a considerable reduction in the annual

[1]The coastal region of Kenitra is home to several foreign and domestic investments in intensive farming of citrus fruits and early vegetables. Thus, local agricultural labourers with experience in this activity are recruited by entrepreneurs with farms in southern Spain and Portugal in a context of business expansion and international low-wage labour recruitment (Sampaio and Carvalho 2017).

[2]A permanent residence permit for subordinated labour can be obtained through article no. 88, (2) of the immigration law (Law 23/2007, 4th July) if foreign citizens comply with certain conditions. It has been widely used by labour migrants as an "always available" way of regularization.

[3]http://sefstat.sef.pt/relatorios.aspx.

[4]Since the publication of the citizenship law in 2006 (Organic law no. 2/2006, 17 April) that facilitated the acquisition of Portuguese citizenship, there has been a remarkable growth in the number of acquisitions. Between 2006 and 2015, there were 1457 acquisitions of Portuguese citizenship among native Moroccans representing 0.8% of the total of acquisitions in that period (Source: Eurostat). These acquisitions represent, on

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

Fig. 1 Stocks and inflows of Moroccan citizens to Portugal, 2006–2016 *Source* Aliens and Borders Office (http://sefstat.sef.pt/relatorios.aspx)

inflows to Portugal (Fig. 1). Unemployment and (even) lower wages after the onset of the global economic crisis are partly responsible for the decreasing inflows of migrants to Portugal (Esteves et al. 2017). Family reunification and labour contracts have changed the gender balance of this community. Indeed, after several years of predominantly male migration, since 2008 the inflow of female migrants has overtaken that of males. As a result, for the first time, the sex ratio in 2016 was more favourable for women (98.7).

Being a labour-motivated migration, most Moroccans living in Portugal are of working age (61.9% in the 24–44 age bracket[5]) and obtain their income from work (59.8%)[6] in the areas of wholesale and retail trade (32%), agriculture and fisheries (17.8%), hotels, restaurants and cafés (13.8%), and construction (13.4%). Close to one-third (32.5%) perform non-skilled jobs as peddlers, cleaners, agricultural labourers and fishermen, whereas 22.9% of the jobs fit into the category of personal services and sales people mostly as shop assistants, cooks and waiters. More than one quarter (27.0%) of Moroccans counted in the 2011 Census stated they held no formal schooling and 48.9% had between four and nine years of education. As explored later in this chapter, the low levels of formal education combined with specificities of some forms of employment constrain the diversity of friendship networks.

According to the Aliens and Borders Office, in 2016 the main geographic concentrations corresponded to the principal regions of economic activity, i.e. the Algarve (33.2%), the Lisbon metropolitan area (19.3%) and the Porto metropolitan area (10.6%). This spatial distribution is closely related to labour market incorporation due to the economic specialization of Portuguese regions (Reis et al. 2010) and shows the relevance of pioneer migrants and labour recruiters in establishing routes for future flows (de Haas 2010). The geographical patterns of settlement have been redesigned and/or reinforced by migrant networks whose members “ease the path” for potential migrants by reducing the costs of future migration (Massey et al. 1998; de Haas 2010; Garip and Asad 2013).

The future evolution of the community size is quite uncertain, not only due to the economic crisis in Portugal, but also to better prospects in Morocco and the acknowledgement of better opportunities in other European countries. The effect, on the Moroccan community, of the recent change in the Portuguese migration law (Law no. 59/2017 and Law no. 102/2017), facilitating the regularization and import of migrant workers, remains to be seen. One could envisage two contradictory trends: (i) a progressive maintenance or even a decline in the number of new

average, 10% of the stock of the community between 2008 and 2015.

[5]The source of information in this paragraph is the 2011 Census, conducted by Statistics Portugal.

[6]26% live with the family’s support.

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arrivals of Moroccans to work in agriculture; (ii) however, despite low wages, the growing demand of agricultural labourers in Portugal, where the community already has a significant presence, together with growing islamophobia in other European countries, may also attract more individuals, from different social backgrounds, to Portugal.

Before moving on to explore the fieldwork results, we will briefly outline the characteristics of the sample. The Algarve sample is quite balanced in terms of gender (50.2% male and 49.8% female) with most of the interviewees of working age (45.9% aged between 30 and 39, and only 7.2% aged 60 or older). The main activity of the respondents is agriculture (56%), followed by those who are inactive (13%), unemployed (12%) and those who work in semi-skilled or unskilled manual positions (9.7%). This is largely a reflection of the respondents' education level, given that almost 44% had no formal schooling or had failed to complete primary education, a quarter of the sample completed primary education and around one-fifth lower secondary. In contrast, almost half of those interviewed in Lisbon have completed post-graduate education and around one-third of the interviewees work in a semi-skilled or skilled job and a quarter in a skilled manual position.

The data collected in the Algarve helps to shed light on the role of networks in Moroccan migration to Portugal. In addition, the cross-comparative analysis between Lisbon and the Algarve illustrates different modes of social integration in Portugal as explored in the following sections.

3 Understanding Migration Motivations and Networks in the Migration Process

As we have stated previously, the overriding impetus for Moroccans migrating to Portugal is economic, seen clearly in the large proportion of the sample who were attracted to Portugal for work opportunities (67.1%). It is interesting to note though that 27% moved to be with family or others they cared about. In particular, the importance of family networks is accentuated by the fact that some of the migratory flows to Portugal took place in the context of family reunification, with a spouse sponsoring the coming of his/her partner or parents sending for their children. Indeed, 63.2% of the Moroccans interviewed in the Algarve had at least one relative already living in Portugal among the people who provided them with information prior to their move. Furthermore, 91.5% mention at least one family member among the people they came to live with or be close to.

When reflecting on the decision to emigrate economic motivations is clearly predominant, 56% stated that their main motivation was to earn money to send back home and 39% felt compelled due to a lack of opportunities for work or professional development in Morocco. In this context, networks constituted an important part in assisting migrants in the process of migrating to and settling in Portugal.

An important network mechanism is the information that migrants offer to potential or new migrants. As can be observed in Table 1, over two-thirds of the respondents provided information on visas and immigration rules in

Table 1 Have you ever given information to people in Morocco (whether positive or negative) about …, %

	Yes	No	Total
Visas and immigration rules in Portugal	66.2	33.8	100.0
Studying in Portugal	7.2	92.8	100.0
How to find housing in Portugal	54.1	45.9	100.0
How to find a job in Portugal	75.8	24.2	100.0
How Moroccans are treated in Portugal	76.8	23.2	100.0

Source THEMIS survey

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Portugal and over three quarters on entry into the labour market and on the treatment of Moroccans in Portugal. In terms of the composition of network support, 52.7% of the respondents surveyed in Algarve provided information concerning the migration process to relatives. Family clearly comes before friends (31.4%) or neighbours (0.5%) when providing explanations of how the visa and immigration laws work, or the "ins and outs" of finding a job or a dwelling in Portugal.

Beyond providing information, is the actual assistance or support provided by networks to facilitate the migration process. Over half of the respondents in Algarve had been asked for help with aspects such as documents, travel costs, employment or housing. Of this 55% who had been asked for assistance, 61% had accommodated someone at their place, 50% had helped with finding a job, 49% with obtaining papers and 39% with travel costs. Interestingly, as with the provision of information, providing actual assistance was extremely selective and principally restricted to close rather than extended family, with only a small proportion helping friends.

Labour market incorporation was frequently assured though network contacts already working in Algarve, who acted as a bridge between employers and new migrants. This is an aspect that employers also capitalize upon to attract new workers. According to Sampaio and Carvalho (2017), one of the recruitment strategies of major agricultural farms is to import trusted relatives of current employees. Using the employment centres in Morocco, especially those located in specialized agricultural regions, where potential migrants enrol first, Portuguese employers hire those who have already been "selected" by their relatives and friends in Portugal. The recruitment takes place within the bounds of the social networks of migrants, thus granting particular power to those on the receiving end and granting the labour needs of their Portuguese employers.

Working as facilitators, migrants' willingness to help their compatriots may change if the perceived receiving context and competition for jobs becomes tougher or when changing family dynamics in Portugal, such as reunification, increase expenses. With the 2008 global economic crisis that hit Southern European economies particularly hard, migrant families often struggled to make ends meet (Ponzo et al. 2015; Domínguez-Mujica et al. 2014; Maroukis 2013). Some migrants readjusted their readiness to help, restricting it to closer family members or very good friends. In this context of economic downturn, feedback became more critical centred on declining economic opportunities in Portugal, which is likely to have had a negative impact on migration flows by undermining aspirations (Engbersen et al. 2016; Carling 2016; Jolivet 2015). It is in this sense that migrants can operate as gatekeepers or gate closers (Engbersen et al. 2016).

Younès is an example of how negative messages about the Portuguese labour market are reaching Morocco. He says:

> When friends asked me about work here, I said to many of them 'Look, I haven't been working for almost a year now. I'm enrolled in the unemployment centre'. [male, aged 47, living in Portugal since 2000, acquired Portuguese citizenship in 2010]

Similarly, when visiting his homeland (Chichaoua, in the region of Marrakech-Tensift-Al Haouz), Oussama is peremptory about the situation in Portugal:

> I tell them all, I tell to all my friends, to my family 'look, it's really bad'. … I tell it all, the life of Portuguese, how they live, but I also tell the bad things … work is scarce, sometimes you can't find a job, there's no one to help. If you don't have documents, it's even worse …(male, aged 28, unemployed, living in Portugal since 2007).

Among the Algarve sample, feedback seems to be direct though more traditional mechanisms of communication, as only 11% of respondents had ever broadcast information about life in Portugal online in blogs, forums or on social networks such as Facebook. This may well be related with the digital exclusion of the rural Algarve Moroccan population. With regard to contacting home in general, 72% did this on a weekly basis, compared to over 50% of the Lisbon sample who contacted Morocco on a daily basis.

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Despite the negative feedback noted previously, only a small proportion of the survey sample (23%) stated that they had actively discouraged anyone from migrating to Portugal, while 35% had actively encouraged someone to migrate. In the case of Moroccans, there appears to be a clear process of selection regarding information and assistance as family members are the most likely reciprocates. For example, for Aisha (born in the region of Kenitra, aged 41, living in Portugal since 2008), after being referred to her present employer by her sister-in-law, bringing her husband and their five children to Portugal, through family reunification, comes first before helping others. So when visiting Morocco and being asked to help non-relatives, she first and foremost tells them: "*I cannot bring people. If you want to go to Portugal, you need someone to draft you a contract because there is a border*". Resorting to family reunification procedures in her own case, Aisha warns others that migration control is tight, and an employer is essential.

Despite the crisis, helping close relatives is a moral duty acknowledged by Moroccan migrants and thus family-based networks are central for this group. The consequence of this network migration is not only strengthening the links between families and friends on both ends but also establishing migratory flows between specific Moroccan and Portuguese regions. In fact, interview data in Lisbon indicates that over half of Moroccan immigrants came from urban areas (Casablanca, Rabat, Fez and Kénitra), whereas most of the immigrants settled in the Algarve came from rural areas in northern Morocco (Gharb-Chrarda-Béni Hssen, but not Kénitra city), Marrakech-Tensift-Al Haouz (excluding Marakech city) in the central part of the country, and Souss-Massa-Daraâ, in the south.

4 Integration Outcomes

Acknowledging that integration is a multidirectional, longitudinal and nonlinear process across time and involving migrants and the hosting society (McGarrigle and Ascensão 2017; Erdal and Oeppen 2013; Papademetriou 2003), interaction among individuals from different groups is important in building the nuanced feeling of belonging (Orton 2012). However, for fruitful or meaningful contacts to occur there must be a combination of "facilitating and essential conditions", and a "time dimension" (Pettigrew 1998). Research has shown that, among other variables, sharing a common language and interethnic contact during leisure time are both relevant for ensuring positive effects in optimal contact (Wagner and Machleit 1986; Fonseca et al. 2012; Esteves and Sampaio 2013).

In the case of Moroccans interviewed in the Algarve, whose first language is either Moroccan Arabic (85.0%) or Amazigh/Berber (15.0%), their free time is mostly spent with compatriots (69.1%) or with people where there is no dominant group (21.3%). Only 8.2% stated they spend free time mostly with Portuguese (8.2%) or with people from other countries (1.4%). Job-related features concerning the geographical origin of co-workers (very often from the same region in Morocco) and location and type of accommodation[7] impose constraints as far as communication with Portuguese natives and other migrants goes. The community living in Lisbon, holding more formal education, a better command of the Portuguese language, more diversified jobs and greater residential mix[8] shows a higher level of interethnic interaction. In fact, the majority of interviewees admitted having Portuguese friends.

Another aspect of integration relates to the quality of life that migrants manage to achieve in their chosen destination. This broad multidimensional concept includes objective factors, measured by indicators and variables, and the individuals' subjective perception. According to Bălţătescu (2007: 69), "Subjective quality of life is defined as the way people evaluate the significant domains of their life as a whole". Considering that Moroccan migration to Portugal is

[7]For 51% of the respondents there is a lot of people from Morocco in the neighbourhood of residence. It is not rare to find agricultural workers living in facilities provided by employers in the farming estates, where contact with Portuguese speakers seldom happens.

[8]80% of the respondents admitted living in neighbourhoods with few Moroccans.

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Table 2 Quality of life and economic situation compared to what it would have been in Morocco (%)

How do you think …	Much better	Somehow better	About the same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Total
Your economic situation is today, as a result of moving to Portugal?	8.7	42.5	30.9	13.0	4.8	100.0
Your quality of life is today, apart from economic issues?	24.2	49.3	21.3	4.8	0.5	100.0

Source THEMIS survey

Table 3 Views on the future place of living (%)

If you think about where you might want to live in the future, would you prefer to …	Moroccan natives with Moroccan citizenship	Moroccan natives with Portuguese citizenship	All Moroccans
Continue living in Portugal?	67.4	55.0	66.2
Move back to Morocco?	9.6	0.0	8.7
Live partly in Morocco and partly in Portugal?	11.8	25.0	13.0
Live elsewhere?	9.6	20.0	10.6
Don't know	1.6	0.0	1.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source THEMIS survey

heavily labour motivated, one of the significant domains is material well-being. When asked to assess their economic situation as a result of moving to Portugal, 51.2% of the interviewees in the Algarve said they were "much better" or "somewhat better", despite the low wages often earned (Table 2). Their opinion regarding their quality of life in Portugal, aside from economic issues, in comparison to what it would have been in Morocco if they had stayed, is even more positive showing the relevance of other non-economic issues. Indeed, 57.5% of the respondents said that Portugal is a better country to raise children, whereas 16.4% thought Morocco was better and 25.6% believed it is equally good in both countries.

The acquisition of citizenship is regarded by several authors as a condition for migrants' integration (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010; Dronkers and Vink 2012). As stated by Bauböck et al. (2013: 40) "National citizenship is the highest standard of equal treatment because immigrants become citizens with all the same rights, same responsibilities and same voice in a democracy". In the case of Moroccans, as previously mentioned, the acquisitions of Portuguese citizenship between 2008 and 2015 represent, on average, 10% of the community's stock in Portugal, a proportion higher than that observed for larger groups like Brazilians or Ukrainians, but similar to Cape Verdeans. Among the interviewees, 9.7% had already obtained Portuguese citizenship. Besides the costs associated with the legal process of acquisition,[9] the language exam is certainly one of the most challenging obstacles for Moroccans.[10] If we interpret aspirations to live in Portugal in the future as being indicative of satisfaction with life in the country, then Moroccan migrants appear to be well adapted (Table 3). Even among those with citizenship, who have the potential for higher mobility, over half say they would like to continue living in Portugal and 25% would like to live between Portugal and Morocco. Overall, a very small percentage would prefer to move back to Morocco.

[9]The fee to be paid to the Portuguese state can reach €250, besides all the documents needed.

[10]An Arabic translation of the questionnaire was used to survey the Moroccan community and a translator was present during some of the in-depth interviews.

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5 Conclusion

Despite its small size, the Moroccan community living in Portugal shows increasing internal variation with regard to labour profiles and educational levels according to patterns of settlement. From a relatively homogenous group composed of fishermen and agricultural labourers in the 1980s, the community's piecemeal growth in the 2000s, mostly based on labour recruitment in agricultural and unskilled services, led to its diversification due to processes of family reunification and network migration. More recently, a comparatively higher skilled presence is seen in the city of Lisbon, which is evidence of new flows between urban areas in Morocco in comparison with the rural–rural migration trajectory of the Algarve community. Indeed, the contrast between the individuals settled in the rural and urban areas is marked by different labour market incorporation and integration outcomes.

In this chapter, we demonstrated the role that intrapersonal networks play within the migration process between Morocco and Portugal. First, the selectiveness of information and actual assistance provided to very close family demonstrates the limited relational reach of network mechanisms in structuring the migration experience to the Algarve. This may be related to the economic limitations and small dimension of the group in the Algarve. It is this selectivity based on high levels of interpersonal trust that employers use to their advantage in ensuring labour when they need it (Sampaio and Carvalho 2017). Second, the economic context in Portugal has served to reinforce this selectivity as migrants' capacity to help was further reduced by increasing financial constraints. In this context, migrants acted as 'gate closers' through the negative feedback that they sent home to their origin country, which may have changed perceptions of opportunities in Portugal.

Despite being a secondary destination for Moroccans, interviewees in the Algarve evaluate their migration experience and its outcomes in terms of quality of life very positively and a substantial proportion wishes to remain in Portugal. It is, nonetheless, interesting to note that a significant proportion, slightly under half, feel their economic situation has stayed the same or worsened suggesting other reasons for remaining in Portugal. More research is needed to explore future migration aspirations, namely the practice of transnational living across two countries, return and onward migration.

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Return Migration in Morocco. Integration, Territorial Recomposition, and Development Issues in Marrakech, Kelaa of the Sraghnas, and Khouribga

Mohammed El Aklaa, Abdeljalil Lokrifa, Ouidad Tebbaa, Said Boujrouf, Nabil Ayachi and Ahmed Abdollah

Abstract

In Morocco, just a few studies have considered the issue of return migration due to the complex nature of this phenomenon. Therefore, in the context of the MEDCHANGE project and in view of the paucity of data and the partial nature of the actual information, investigations were conducted by the UCA team with a view to delving into this phenomenon, mainly in areas known to be the largest centers of emigration in Morocco: the provinces of Marrakech, El Kelaa of the Sraghnas, and Khouribga.

Keywords

Return migration · Morocco · Europe

1 Introduction

Return migration remains an important issue that raises several questions regarding the conditions of resettlement (Cesari 1997) and on the effects that such returns have on the environment in its micro and macroeconomic sense, as well as its spatial dimension and territorial rearrangement (Gonin 2005).

According to the existing scholarship on migration, the latter has at least three lever effects on the economies of the native countries (Fernandez 1993; Ageron 2005; Schuman 2007; Khachani 2008):

- It is an element that produces labor market equilibrium.
- It contributes both to macroeconomic equilibrium and to the financing for development.
- It contributes to the training and qualification of human resources, who, in case of return to their native country (Nair 1997; Charef 2003), could extend the know-how acquired in the host country to their fellow citizens and participate in the development effort.

In Morocco, few studies have considered the issue of return migration due to the complex nature of this phenomenon. Therefore, in the context of the MEDCHANGE project and in view of the paucity of data and the partial nature of the information gathered, investigations were conducted by the UCA team with a view to delving into this phenomenon, mainly in areas known to be the largest centers of emigration in Morocco: the provinces of Marrakech, El Kelaa of the Sraghnas, and Khouribga.

M. El Aklaa (✉) · A. Lokrifa · O. Tebbaa
S. Boujrouf · N. Ayachi · A. Abdollah
Cadi Ayyad University, Marrakech, Morocco
e-mail: melaklaa@gmail.com

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paradiso@unisannio.it



Fig. 1 Geographical distribution of returning migrants by region of Morocco

Surveys conducted in these territories have several objectives: identifying the profiles of returning migrants who transfer funds and invest, assessing their economic situation from the information collected, and requesting them to indicate the degree of their satisfaction and if they intend to come back to their country.

But before analyzing the survey results, we felt it would be appropriate to first refer to two studies on MRA (Moroccan Residents Abroad). These studies enable us to assess in a broader framework, the specificities of the migration issue, including return migration issues as they arise in Morocco (Fig. 1).

2 Generating a Situational Awareness of Return Migration and Investment in Morocco

We based our assessment of this state of affairs on the results of two surveys that help determine, at the macroeconomic level, the level of investment in Morocco made by Moroccans living abroad. The results of these studies figure in the reports titled *Morocco in the race-Investment Overview* and *Moroccan residents abroad: the use of remittances*.

We observe that Moroccan migration is essentially economic and that the economic behavior of the immigrant is pretty typical: Revenues are primarily allotted to the satisfaction of his/her basic needs and those of the family living with him/her abroad or staying at home. Parts of these revenues are also earmarked for savings and assigned to investment in order to pave the way for possible reintegration. These investments are therefore to be construed at two levels: the host country and the native country.

a. **Investments in the countries of immigration**

Almost one immigrant out of five has made more than one investment in the host country (18.6% among those who have opted for a voluntary return). This relatively high rate can be explained in two ways: a better level of integration in the host country, and the will of immigrants to further their migration project in the

paradiso@unisannio.it

host country, despite the difficulties and constraints stemming from their vulnerable legal status.

b. **Investments in the countries of origin: main areas, activities and investment constraints**

A little more than half of the immigrants that returned to Morocco have made at least one investment in this country. This can be accounted for by the migrant's strong propensity to save—a decreasing tendency due to their legal status and the difficulties of integration in the host country.

The immigrant's choice of location for a project is mainly engendered by convenience or attachment to places of residence before emigrating. This finding may be explained by the migrant's desire to display his/her social success to his/her family and acquaintances. But to a lesser degree, the choice may relate to the importance that the selected city has compared to their city or village of origin, because it represents a geographical and social promotion for the migrant.

The main sectors of investment are as follows, in order of importance: real estate, trade, and agriculture. The last two sectors (trade and agriculture) are preferred by returning migrants. So, buying a coffee shop or a bakery/pastry shop seems to better suit returning migrants because of the cost and also because of the fact that it does not require particular expertise.

The fact that there are very few investments made in the industrial sector can be ascribed to various factors:

- Industry requires large sums of money that the immigrant in general cannot mobilize. Thus, the immigrant, to avoid harassment from the bank, falls back upon projects that require limited funding.
- The immigrant lacks the adequate entrepreneurial profile, especially in case of the first wave of migrants, who usually lack the technical skills that might enable them to venture into spheres over which they have little or no mastery.
- Institutional mechanisms of assistance. It is not clear why this happened despite the efforts made.

Finally, around one returning migrant in ten invests in agriculture. We can infer that return migrants with rural origins are more interested in agriculture than their urban counterparts.

The main sources of funding are self-financing or bank credit. The importance of the former can be explained in two ways:

- The money comes from the savings made in the country where they have emigrated.
- Some returning migrants are unwilling to use bank credit for religious reasons, regarding a loan with interest as illicit. While others, despite their expressed need, are faced with a reluctant banking system.

c. **Investment constraints**

The various constraints confronted by returning migrants are administrative impediments, followed by market problems and lack of experience. These limitations reveal a lack of entrepreneurial vocation among some returning migrants.

The level of education also has a positive effect on investment, for returning migrants with higher education and, to a lesser degree, those with secondary-level education, are unlikely to face investment constraints.

A number of returning migrants did not avail themselves of some advantages in the realization of their projects. This is basically due to the nature of the projects. Since real estate projects and microprojects are being deemed incompatible with the requirements for the small and medium enterprise for obtaining benefits. Similarly, it is likely that in many cases, these returning migrants are unaware of the support opportunities granted by the state.

Regarding the economic contributions of Moroccan residents abroad (MRA), it should be noted that Morocco is a country with scarce

paradiso@unisannio.it

natural resources, but it does have a source of considerable wealth on which its economy is based, i.e., Moroccans residing abroad (MRA), which proves once again that they are essential to the development of the country. There are three million Moroccans living abroad, constituting 10% of the population; they have been continuously gaining more and more economic clout for almost a decade.

These contributions should be looked at from two angles: money transfers and funding allocations.

Today, official financial transfers coming from returning migrants represent for developing countries more than the double the total amount of assistance allotted to development. Money transfers made by MRA thus constitute a decisive contribution to the Moroccan economy.

Money remittance made by Moroccans residing abroad is tremendously important for the Moroccan economy, not only as a support to the income of households, but also as an extra input intubated into savings and a critical resource in terms of currencies.

Indeed, migration here is to be conceived of as an economic project based on the collection of maximum savings for the returning migrant and not as a subsidiary residue left from their income and consumption.

The MRA send money on a monthly basis, which denotes a strong propensity to save and transfer funds.

The importance of these transfers resides in the use intended for them, so they should be regarded as "social safety nets" against potential "twists of fate" that Moroccan families may run up against.

These transfers are assigned to different uses: first, to benefit from transfers is the family back home, for the money is sent to meet the needs of the family and to cover the schooling costs of their children. Secondly, some transfers are used for the acquisition or construction of a dwelling, while, thirdly, others are used as social or religious donations.

The economic implications of these transfers are well recognized. They actually contribute to the increase of the liquidity of the economy, boost investment, and develop the regions return migrants come from.

Most of these transfers are made through banks. Thus, the banking system is boosted by remittances made by Moroccan immigrants.

Finally, the impact of this investment is certain: It improves the living conditions of many families by promoting a better reproduction of the labor force; it animates the property and real estate market. It speeds up the process of urbanization and undoubtedly has a multiplier effect with respect to the regional economy.

Once these objectives are attained, the cost-effectiveness criterion impacts other areas of investment choices. Thus, even if it remains predominant, investment in real estate is relatively receding, much to the advantage of other diversified investments. This diversification is warranted by the advent of new generations and new profiles of immigrants.

It is difficult to anticipate if investments made by Moroccan nationals living abroad in their country of origin may evolve. However, the Moroccan administrative system has undergone some positive changes, that spurs us to consider that in the future the investments will increase. Indeed, Morocco currently seems to be beginning a new period marked by the commitment of the highest authorities of the state to the fight against corruption and bureaucracy and in favor of truly independent justice.

Indeed, these guidelines should objectively and strongly allow a significant increase in foreign investment in Morocco. In the case of Moroccan immigrants, investment in the country of origin would not be only an imperative of economic profitability but also a natural inclination underpinned by cultural and emotional considerations.

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3 Results of Surveys Conducted on Return Migration in Marrakech, Kelaa of the Sraghnas, and Khouribga

The first survey, which took place in 2014, involved the cities of Marrakech and Kelaa of the Sraghnas and focused on a sample of 213 people. The second investigation concerned the hinterland of Marrakech: Ourika, Tamsloht, Amizmiz, Tahnaout, and included a sample of 53 people. The third investigation, which targeted Marrakech and the province of Khouribga, and was carried out as part of a Ph.D. thesis by Nabil Ayachi, focused on a sample of 180 people.

The sampling was based on the use of a technique called "snowball" because of the lack of statistics and information at the level of the supervisory authority. The territorial units chosen for these surveys (Khouribga, Kelaa of the Sraghnas, and Marrakech) were an important starting point of migratory movements: areas of Marrakech–Safi and Beni Mellal-Khenifra contribute to 38.7% of migration to Italy.

The same holds true for the level of the return of immigrants to their territorial spaces of origin, since these regions register a return of 10% of Moroccan immigrants. The analysis considered the behavioral characteristics of these immigrants before their departure and upon their return from the host country.

3.1 The Socio-demographic Profile of Returning Migrants

The analysis of socio-demographic characteristics and trajectories has enabled us to draw up the returning migrant's profile.

Birthplace. The birthplace of the returning migrants surveyed is almost perfectly balanced between urban areas and rural ones: 52% were born in urban areas and 48% in rural areas. The proportion of those born in rural areas is weaker for younger generations but gradually increases with age, reaching a maximum among older generations (60% for those aged 55 years and older).

Actually, this is due to the fact that early immigration in the study areas was at the outset confined to a few poor rural areas, generally arid or semi-arid ones, whose population engages in an old sedentary lifestyle and is subject to a very strong demographic pressure.

Community of residence. Once back home, the majority of surveyed immigrants (95%) resettle and reintegrate in urban areas (70% lived in urban areas before their departure) to enjoy the basic infrastructure and public goods that they provide.

Gender structure. While considering the Moroccan population structure by sex for those residing abroad, we observe that this sex structure has tended in recent years toward parity between men and women, and this is mainly due to the marked feminization of the immigrant population because of the large-scale arrival of women with children in the context of family reunification and independent female immigration. The sex structure of respondents surveyed (returning migrants) in the study areas shows a clear predominance of men, thus reflecting the classical inequality between men and women as far as the old generation of immigrants is concerned, but it also reveals women's opposition to the project of going back home. Thus, this survey reveals that only 4% of returning migrants surveyed were women compared to 96% of men (Fig. 2).

Age Structure. About 60% of returning migrants surveyed are retired or pre-retirees. It should be noted, however, that a significant proportion of returning migrants are much younger (22% of them are aged between 25 and 44, while 18% are aged between 45 and 54).

Fig. 2 Migration by gender

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This shows that if in the past those who came back home were basically those who reached retirement age (so as to spend the final years of their lives in their country of origin), today, returning migrants include young people of working age who intend to contribute to the economic and social activity in their region of origin (Fig. 3).

Educational level. Almost 50% of returning migrants are illiterate. Among them, nearly 20% are without school education and 25% have attended just pre-school. People who acquired primary-level education make up 30% of the total and about 10% have secondary-level education. The proportion of those returning with a higher level of instruction is only 5%. For comparison purposes, this higher level of education among returning migrants is relatively low (Fig. 4).

Professional training. Before going abroad, 10% of all returning migrants had been involved in professional training in the study areas. This training has proved more beneficial to returning migrants.

The country of origin of returning migrants. Returning migrants come from 16 countries. Most of them come from Italy (45%). Spain and France come in second place with 30%, while the other countries have smaller percentages.

Periods of immigration. The close scrutiny of immigration in terms of periods and the nature of the return of immigrants show that the earliest waves of immigration, in particular, those before 1970, were especially made up of immigrants whose return was voluntary.



Fig. 3 Age of returning migrants



Fig. 4 Academic level of returnees

4 Reasons Underlying the Return to the Country of Origin

Return migration can occur for various reasons: constraints related to employment, integration, family problems, health problems, etc. Among the reasons given by immigrants to justify their return, retirement is the most common (60%). The realization of the project of investment and management of affairs in the country of origin and the precariousness of employment in the host country come in second position with 10%. Nostalgia for the native country comes in third position with a percentage close to 5%. Finally, the problems of integration in the host country are advanced by 4% of the sample, family problems by 6%, and health problems by 5% (Figs. 5 and 6).

Professional situations. The survey distinguished between professional situations before departure abroad, just before leaving the host country and at the time of conducting the investigation, that is, right after the return to the country of origin.

a. *Professional situation in the host country on the eve of the return*



Fig. 5 Causes of return migration

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

Fig. 6 Nature of return

In order to assess the situation of the migrant before returning home, and to come to grips with one aspect of the return decision, we have referred to the statements made by respondents about their employment condition just before their return home.

The data indicate that the majority of those returning migrants are mainly professionally integrated people: 80% of individuals have a stable job. 20% are unemployed, and 5% of the jobless are on the dole. This low rate of unemployment is probably due to a high rate of employment in undeclared work that meets the needs of a parallel market characterized by precarious and/or socially undesirable jobs (almost around 15% is undeclared work).

b. *Employment status at the time of the investigation*

The professional status of returning migrants from their departure to their return to study areas underwent a significant evolution. Among the signs of this evolution, we can mention, on the one hand, the decline in the number of persons working as employees on fixed-contract or suffering unemployment, and on the other hand, a substantial increase in entrepreneurs/employers. Also, it is clear that immigrants who have decided to go back home on their own are more entrepreneurial than those who were forced to return.

The evolution of the situation of returning migrants can be explained by the experience acquired by immigrants during their stay abroad and the financial resources that they have managed to accumulate. Among the unemployed, retirees have also registered a significant increase between the two stages. They are relatively more common among the ranks of immigrants who have decided to return home voluntarily.

Perception of the current standard of living. Comparing the standard of living while being an immigrant, the majority of immigrants (85%) admit that they live better after returning to their country. Conversely, those who perceive no change represent almost a fifth of the percentage (10%). Only 5% said that they live worse than before their return to the country. Returning migrants from rural areas are more satisfied than those of urban origin. Those whose return was forced as a result of the euro crisis are more likely to report that their standard of living has increased.

Difficulties encountered by returning migrants during their resettlement. Almost all returning migrants feel they have encountered difficulties upon their return home. The difficulties mentioned are mainly, in order of importance:

- The “red tape” cited by almost 50% of returning migrants.
- The difficulties related to the failure of the health care system highlighted by 46% of respondents.
- The difficulties of adaptation to the new environment cited by 35% of returning migrants.
- The difficulties of access to housing cited by 10% of returning migrants.
- The inadequacy of wages in 5% of cases.
- And finally, the lack of job opportunities raised by 5% of returning migrants.

The intention of re-emigrating again. Regardless of the nature of their return and their motivation, the returning migrants’ dissatisfaction is linked to the difficulties that they face once back home. As regards their intention to re-emigrate again abroad, more than a quarter of all returning migrants are positive about it, while 60% have no intention whatsoever of re-emigrating again.

paradiso@unisannio.it

5 Analysis of Investment of the Migrant in Their Country of Origin

This section deals more specifically with the productive investment of Moroccans residing abroad in their country of origin. In the region of Marrakech, Kelaa of Sraghnas, and Khouribga, only a small proportion of remittances are channeled into productive investment. The total investment represents about 10%, while 20% is put away in savings accounts. The remaining amount (70%) goes to consumption. Among the 10% invested, 70% goes to real estate and 20% to investment in tourism and industry.

Therefore, about 2% of the total transfers of MRA (Moroccan residing abroad) are assigned to productive investment. To this share, investments financed by money transfers using unofficial channels must be added.

Whether they are looking to invest in the city or in the countryside, the immigrant will often make an investment of a small or medium size. They are likely to establish their project in their region of origin (or that of their parents) because maximum information and personal relationships are within their reach. For this type of investment, the territory is the key factor determining the decision of the investor as well as of their economic and institutional partners.

Some MRA wishes to invest part of their savings accumulated in the host country in Morocco but lack information on what kind of activity to engage in: very often, they buy an existing business (such as a food store, boutique, cafeteria or restaurant) or fall back upon a piece of real estate.

Others wish to implement a project corresponding to the knowledge acquired in the host country but lack funds, knowledge of the local market and the intermediaries on the spot. In most cases, the MRA proceed by trial and error.

The motivations to invest vary from one returning migrant to another. The study of the characteristics of the investment of immigrants in the territories of Marrakech, Kelaa of Sraghnas, and Khouribga shows that the motivations of immigrant investors in rural areas are multiple. The survey highlights that the return on investment is not always the primary motivation: There are other reasons for investment, such as a returning migrant's links to their territory of departure that are often cited.

Furthermore, access to information is crucial. For any Moroccan residing abroad and intending to invest, the distance that separates them from the territory where they plan to invest raises the question of access to information: information in the economic and financial fields.

Inadequate information is often akin to taking too much risk for the potential investor. It leads to a lack of confidence in using savings, which limits the amount of investment made by immigrants, and directs them to less productive activities (land, housing).

The difficulties in gathering the necessary information by a MRA are likely to spark off doubt and a lack of confidence in them. These hindrances lead to a reduction of the quantity and the quality of the investments made in terms of creating wealth and jobs in the territory of origin. The objective is therefore to seek to overcome the prior trial and error approach of a would-be returning migrant willing to invest, so as to provide them with information that will enlighten their choices and therefore reduce the risks they may encounter.

To support the investment of immigrants, it is thus important to increase and strengthen information about the territory where they are planning to invest, to support during the inception phase of the project.

To these key elements must be added the importance of the local intermediary of the investor immigrant: a member of their family more often, or a friend and partner who will be on-site to compensate for the absence of the immigrant.

6 Conclusion

Broadly speaking, a returning migrant faces many difficulties when it comes to their activities in Morocco. We can mention a few: Informal activities are a major obstacle to business creation because the returning migrant who intends to invest needs more than ever and an investor

paradiso@unisannio.it

living in the country a formal framework to secure their economic project. Access to land beyond the existing legal requirements it also needs massive financial investment from these immigrants. They also mention relations with the administration as a major factor responsible for their sluggish productive investment.

However, despite all the constraints identified, investigations conducted on the ground reveal that the returning migrant plays a key role in the restructuring of his/her territory. Not only they do encourage the settlement of some rural areas but they also stimulate activity that creates jobs, thus improving the living conditions of many families, by promoting a better reproduction of the labor force, by animating the property and real estate market, and by speeding up the urbanization process, thus creating a multiplier effect in the regional economy.

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paradiso@unisannio.it

Where the Past Meets the Future: Migration and Socio-spatial Segregation in a Divided City. The Case of Marrakech

Aline Schiltz and Ana Estevens

Abstract
Marrakech is an example of the urban processes currently taking place as well in Morocco as in many cities of the world: gentrification, socio-economic polarization, deregulation in housing market or tourism activities. The recent economic crises have led to a North–South migration of European citizens looking for new opportunities in Marrakech. These immigrants contribute to the development of new socio-economic and artistic activities and their presence has an important impact on the transformation of the city. Indeed, both the Medina and Gueliz are evolving in response to these new actions, modifying the urban dynamic as well as the image of the Red City.

Keywords
Migration · Europeans · Gentrification
Socio-spatial segregation

A. Schiltz (✉) · A. Estevens
CEG-IGOT, Universidade de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal
e-mail: anaestevens@campus.ul.pt

1 Introduction

This chapter departs from the idea that the process of immigration is an important vehicle of social transformation that can trigger critical questioning and substantial changes in the city and in society. We propose that North–South immigration can be a key element in such processes, particularly when we talk about the complexity of the social relations in Marrakech.

The strong presence of the European community in Marrakech (Sebti et al. 2009; Faiz 2002; Wilbaux 2001) is felt in the social and urban dynamics of the city. The privileged location of the "Red City", as it is commonly known, (just 3 h by plane from Paris and 2 h from Lisbon) at the gateway to the desert, along with a general global foreign interest, has led in recent years to an urban dynamic seen in the construction of luxury real estate and golf courses and in the regeneration of some areas of the Medina.

The recent economic crises have led to a North–South migration of European citizens looking for new opportunities in Marrakech. These immigrants contribute to the development of new socio-economic and artistic activities, and their presence has an important impact on the transformation of the city. Indeed, both the Medina (the historical centre) and the Gueliz district (the European district) are evolving in response to these new actions, modifying the urban dynamic as well as the image of the Red City.

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paradiso@unisannio.it

The methodology crosses several methods, focusing essentially on interviews during the period of stay. Data used in this analysis include, semi-structured interviews (see Table 1 with the main topics) conducted with European residents in Marrakech and the analysis of diverse material from ethnographic fieldwork conducted on the field: semi-structured interviews with different private and public actors and observation of the quotidian practices of local people. In this context, we wanted, through fifteen in-depth interviews and one focus group in the spring of 2015, to look at the discourse of some of the main social and cultural actors in Marrakesh (museum and school directors, merchants, booksellers and foreign owners of Riads and restaurants), to understand and explore how individual experiences have implications for the process of transformation of the city. They are micro-stories where gender, identity and colonial issues arise (Cheikh and Péraldi 2009), linked to a more general context of North–South migrations and urban transformation. The obtained testimonies contribute to understand the North–South migration flows but also the "segregation process" (Castells 1972) which takes place in Marrakech and goes far beyond the question of housing. Indeed, it is evident in the daily life of every individual as well as in the reproduction of social relations (Harvey 1973) and urban space. However, we point out that this is an exploratory approach to this case.

This chapter proposes two main arguments in regard to this issue: (i) the North–South migration to Marrakech motivated by the expectation of new opportunities in socio-economic and cultural activities; (ii) how these activities can change urban dynamics. Both arguments serve to highlight the idea that North–South migration to Marrakech and urban transformation are closely related.

2 North–South Migrations to Marrakech

Morocco is largely known as a country of emigration or of transitory migration. Indeed due to its strategic localization between Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe, Morocco has always been and continues to be a crossroad of the many cultures. The refugee crises have contributed to accentuate the country's image as a place of transit for people struggling to reach Europe and tend to show a predominance of south–north migration in the Mediterranean region. However, Morocco is also an immigration country where different kinds of migration (permanent, temporary, south–north and North–South) especially of African and European citizen converge (Khrouz and Lanza 2015). The vast professional and investment opportunities combined with the economic and financial crisis in Europe since 2009 seem to attract large numbers of young graduated students from Africa and French-speaking or southern Europe countries (Zeino-Mahmalat 2015, p. 178). The different profiles of foreigners living in Morocco reflect the variety of migration projects (retirement, studies, business, asylum) and the type of interactions and impacts that the country can expect from these incoming flows. The contemporary immigration of European citizens is also very important in Marrakech. In 2014, the authorities listed 12,856 foreign residents.[1] European migrants are not always legalized and may stay in Morocco as tourists on a 3–6 month rhythm (especially retired people seem to use this migratory strategy and Le Bigot (2015) calls them *les hivernants*). Therefore, it is difficult to know the exact number of European residents in Morocco (Le Bigot 2015).

People we met and interviewed in the "Red City" presented very singular migration backgrounds, hence evidencing the individuality of each history on the one hand and the complexity of Morocco's migration reality on the other hand. Indeed, we spoke to several descendants of former Moroccan emigrants that grew up in France or Belgium and to "come back" later to their parent's home country. In some cases, the individual trajectories were complex and included several coming and goings (studies, family, work, normally between Morocco and the country where they grew up) before settling down in Marrakech. The personal link

[1]Haut-Comissariat au Plan, Royaume de Maroc.

paradiso@unisannio.it

Table 1 Main topics of the interviews in Marrakech

Main topics
1. Characterization of the individual (gender, age, nationality, level of education, profession, place of residence)
2. Social integration in the country/city of residence
3. Migration history
4. Work
5. Housing
6. Transnational contacts before migration
7. Motivations for moving
8. Migrant community and views on migration

(antecedents and/or partner) to Morocco presented in these cases the dominant motivation for the migration. In one case, the interviewed was a native of Casablanca but his parents were the descendants of Italian immigrants and he had lived most of his adult life in France and the UK. But when he settled down in Marrakech, it had been like 'coming home'. As the director of the cinema school, he is an important figure for the city's cultural promotion. Another interviewed (occupying also a high position), whose French grandparents immigrated to Morocco at the beginning of the XX century, was born and raised in Morocco in a French-speaking environment. After having spent some years in France, he came back to Morocco and settled down in Marrakech. Thus, we met Moroccan people raised in France and French people having spent their entire childhood in Morocco.

The other European we interviewed in 2015 was mainly French. In most of the cases, they already knew Marrakech from former visits. They had been attracted by the business opportunities, the climate and the geographical and cultural proximity to Europe. Especially, the Spanish people argued that Morocco had been the best alternative to escape the financial crisis in Spain and to guarantee their economic survival. But one Frenchman also claimed that his professional life had become very difficult in France due to high taxes and unmotivated working craft. Since 2005, he had visited Marrakech as a tourist on short-term trips up to five times a year. Then, in 2010 he and his associate came to Marrakech with their families to open their own hairdressing salon in Gueliz. Today they enjoy the quality of life and the exclusivity of their salon (their clients are mainly expats and upper society Moroccan) they acquired by emigrating.

Except for three women, all the people we interviewed were economically active and contributed in one or another way towards the creation and transformation processes of the city.

The people living in the Medina they were mostly linked to tourism (*Riads* and restaurants), but one French person was the co-associate of the *Maison de la Photographie*. Since 2009, this place hosts photograph exhibitions (about past and recent) showing the diversity and richness of Moroccan people and landscapes. It also supports social programs for education and the *éco-musée berbère de l'Ourika.*[2] For the owners of the *Maison de la Photographie,* the place should be considered as an archive or a memory of Moroccan culture. However, almost only tourists and foreign residents visit the place. Our interviewee came to Marrakech to help a friend and to realize together the project of the *Maison de la Photographie*. He also had decided that it was time to give his life a change. Hence, Morocco had been an easy choice, as he didn't "feel like arriving in a foreign country because he has more affinities with Morocco and Moroccans [than with people from other European countries] (…)

[2]http://museeberbere.com.

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and even if personal liberties' codes might differ from the European ones he still feels at home in Morocco".[3]

The French-speaking people with children were all connected more or less strongly through the *Lycée Français*. So, even if they tent to avoid the "expat community", the similarities of their daily live, their social status Bourdieu (1989) and behaviour, in short their condition as European immigrants brings them all together in one or another way.

In general, all the interviewees felt "at home" in Marrakech. Those who felt less integrated and/or frustrated with the local social rules did nevertheless not plan to leave Morocco. They all had succeeded professionally and were enjoying a quality of life (house with garden, climate,) that their home country could not provide. Even if most of them claimed to avoid the 'French community', they agreed on the fact that it was difficult to create strong friendships with local people. Apparently social contact was easier during the month of Ramadan, when Moroccans are happy to invite anyone to their copious dinners. One French interviewee divided the "European Community" in two main groups: those who stay during the Ramadan and those who leave Marrakech at that moment of the year. The latter, he said, were mainly owners of the *Riads* or of any other local tourism activity and often lived in the city only for a short time (leaving the management of their business to local people or resigning quickly from the *Riad* project). In his opinion, they were not interested in taking an active part in the host society. The former were people like himself, living in Marrakech for several years, investing in business and social relations. However, even those people seem to have difficulties to get fully integrated into the local life, especially because of the cultural and linguistic differences. Indeed, the Arabic language seems to be the main barrier to ethnic mixing. Whereas the foreigners without Moroccan origins accept more easily this social segregation, people with a Moroccan background feel frustrated for being pointed out as "immigrants" or sometimes as "*Rebeu*". Indeed, the real or perceived tension between local Moroccan and people descended from Moroccan emigration seem to root in the latter not being fluent in Arabic. They continue to "suffer" from the typical double cultural background of emigrant's descendants and cannot share the poetic statement of one of our French interviewees: "here I am a foreigner, but I am at home, as a foreigner[4]".

Some of the people we interviewed claimed that the relationship between European residents and Moroccan could suffer from postcolonial resentment. For example, they say that Moroccan people often prefer to work for European businessmen because they reckon that a foreigner will offer better work conditions in terms of salary, working hours and safety. This also holds true for the transformation process of the city of Marrakech. Indeed, the restoration of the Riads of the Medina was at the beginning the exclusive business of Western foreigners. They bought the houses for an undervalued prize and the whole process forced local people to retreat to the more peripheral neighbourhoods. The economic exploitation of the historic centre thus reflects the former domination hierarchy, provokes social segregation and affects the relationship between the different communities in the long term. After the 2011 bombing at Jemaa el-Fnaa Square, Moroccan acquired many of the sold Riads and tried their chance in an already saturated economic sector (1000 Riads and 100 Hotels in the Medina).

3 The Urban Transformations in the City

Marrakech's geographical context is complex, imbued with constructed images, stereotypes and symbols. Escher et al. (2001) describe the Medina based on the following four elements: "Site,

[3]Interview translated from French to English by the authors.

[4]Interview translated from French to English by the authors.

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Fig. 1 Map of Marrakech (image elaborated by Leandro Gabriel, 2015)

Magic, Myth and Lifestyle (*site, magie, mythe et style de vie*)". It is a place of imagined romanticism associated with a certain exoticism and colourful oriental charm (Said 1978; Cooper 2016) that already attracted writers and painters when the city was still under the French Protectorate. However, poverty and precarious housing also exist in the narrow streets of the Medina, hidden behind the walls of the Riads. Gueliz, the former European district, has also changed profoundly during the last years. Traditional housing (mainly two stores villas) and markets (souks) are disappearing to make place for high buildings and shops of Western multinational chains. Over the last years, social representations had been projected on an imagined environment that created the character of the city: "Marrakech became a prestigious destination and a gathering point for the international "jet-set" of the day, hosting many important events" since the opening of the Mamounia Hotel in 1921 (Pons et al. 2009: 28; Fig. 1).

This exotic environment is also fostered by the government: "Marrakech is a pearl polished by the history and taste of hospitality, knowing how to welcome its guests with open arms for centuries (…). It is easy to imagine the caravanners who loaded their dromedaries with goods, tools and handicrafts. The souks offer everything the traveller expects: colours, atmospheres, perfumes, smiling and welcoming faces".[5] It is in this context that Marrakech has developed as a tourist destination and spurred the development of other social and cultural activities. Tourism is an important resource for the city and created the Office Chérifieu du Tourisme in 1937. This Office[6] continued to exist after independence and is still active today. "With the end

[5] https://www.officetourismemaroc.com/ville/tourisme-maroc-ville-Marrakech.html.

[6] "The Office was shut down with the outbreak of the Second World War, but reopened in 1946 with a new name—the *Office National Marocain du Tourisme*" (Pons et al. 2009: 29).

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of the Protectorate in 1956, Morocco inherited both the facilities and the "cultures" of the tourism created by the French colonial project" (Pons et al. 2009: 29) and it took advantage of the dynamic of lifestyle created. The memory of its colonial past has left its mark on the region, which is now becoming more widely known with the growing importance of tourism (Boujrouf 1996, 2001). Marrakech enjoys a strong imaginary dimension among Westerners, maintained by the media, the Internet and films whose images and places re-transcribed support the promise of a change of scenery. This exotic image of the city cherished over decades allowed the Moroccan authorities and the economic actors to benefit from increased tourism, which has been reinforced in recent years (Kurzac-Soual 2011: 123). According to the *Ministère du Tourisme du Maroc* (2016), between 2000 and 2016, the number of tourist arrivals grew about 211% (in the total of Morocco the variation in the same period is 142%). During this period, in Marrakech, the year with the highest number of tourists was 2014, which corresponded to 23% of the total of tourist arrivals in the country.

For Ormond (2001, p. 21), the "Moroccan cities were effectively dual cities, with an indigenous Medina and a European planned city right next to one another. This historical duality remains today—physically, socially and psychologically—in all Moroccan cities and profoundly affects their inhabitants". In Marrakech, these two neighbourhoods are the Medina and Gueliz. In both places, everyday life is very different.

The co-existing of traditional and new forms of economic and social exploitation of the urban space by different social and ethnic groups tends to deepen social and spatial segregation. "The Medina charmed us. It was very nice [to live there] during the first 5 years, it was very nice. To say that there was—well the only problem is promiscuity—because everyone sees what you are doing. Who you receive, at what time you go out or go home at night, if you buy a lot of things—all that everyone sees. But it was good. It was nice. There were old *Marrakchis* who had known the protectorate. Who watched over our children. Our children could go out into the street. They were watching. There was no problem. And then, it gradually deteriorated (…) perhaps because there were more and more Europeans in the Medina. More and more *maisons d'hôtes*. Hence, more and more foreigners. And then prices increased a lot. Moroccans no longer had the means to stay"[7] (Le Bigot 2015).[8] Indeed, in the Medina, the total number of inhabitants in 2014, compared to 2004, has decreased about 38%.[9] During the same period, however, the number of foreign inhabitants increased by 6% (Haut-Commissariat Au Plan 2009, Royaume du Maroc).

Nowadays, the city's economic wealth and growth is mainly based on tourism and Marrakech. In both the Medina and Gueliz, Western foreigners contribute to the gentrification process of these neighbourhoods by introducing new economic activities (local tourism, 'boutiques', 'cafés') and generating new dynamics. In recent years, the transformation of the city was considerable (Fig. 2).

Bigio (2010) explains that part of the more recent tourism boom is due to "the adoption of an open sky policy about 10 years ago" which had turned Marrakech to a "popular destination for many European tourists, for whom the city is just a short flight from the main European capitals". The same author affirms, "Marrakech, one of Morocco's imperial cities, is a tourist phenomenon, both on a national and international level. It is a magnet for large numbers of international visitors and symbolizes the allure of Morocco in all ways" (Bigio 2010: 4). Along with the short-term visitors, the expansion of the tourism sector incited Western foreigners to move to the Red City. To all appearances the emission *Capital* on French television channel *M6* in 1998 was determinant for the settlement of

[7]Interview translated from French to English by the authors.

[8]Meanwhile this Frenchman lives with his family in a peripheral neighbourhood of Marrakech, works in Gueliz, almost never goes back to the Medina, but plans to stay in Morroco.

[9]From 167.233 to 120.643 inhabitants.

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Fig. 2 Where the past meets the future: Medina (images from Aline Schiltz, 2015)

European citizens in Marrakech. Kurzac-Souali (2011) shares this statement and refers to more French media reports (France 3, Tf1) that presented Marrakech as the "Eldorado for investments" and consequently initiated mass investments and the transformation process of the Medina. For Bigio (2010: 23) "Marrakesh has long been the focal point of most European real estate investment in Morocco, and properties in the Medina are at the top of the list. No information is available on the number dwellings now held by new residents or by non-residents (including foreign residents), though 396 foreign residents were recorded in the 2004 census. While the number of units that have been turned into boutique hotels, restaurants, bars, and cultural or recreational centres is not known, it is clear that the number of boutique hotels is growing quickly, with over 700 units to date". However, it is necessary to differentiate the main real estate investors from the emigrants who are entrepreneurs, such as those we interviewed (Fig. 3).

The French people we interviewed that had arrived in Marrakech at the end of the 1990 all claimed that at that time Marrakech was still a city "where the sun would shine brightly" and "where the desert could still be felt and the Atlas seen from a veranda"[10] before pollution and mass construction would change the city's urban character. Moreover, they also claimed that Marrakech society and the social tights had lost their traditional character while the European way of live became stronger and prevailing. The unanimous opinion was that these changes were related to the "mass arrival" of Western people involved in local tourism activities in addition to the general globalization process. During the last ten years, Marrakech's highway network has been extremely developed. Nowadays, big peripheral avenues connect the different neighbourhoods of the city. Several people we interviewed affirmed that these new urban infrastructures brought better life conditions. The

[10]Interview translated from French to English by the authors.

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Fig. 3 Where the past meets the future: Gueliz (images from Aline Schiltz, 2015)

city's accesses are better; there are more hospitals and the health services improved generally. Even the restoration of the Medina by foreigners incited the city's authorities to modernize the canalization system of the historic centre. However, people deplore the loss of social cohesion and local identity due to this accelerated urban and social transformation process. "Some years ago you would arrive from Europe overloaded with things you couldn't find here. Nowadays, Western people come to Marrakech to buy here because it is cheaper. There are too many cars, too many shops … For the last ten years the development of new activities went to fast. We are loosing our values. There have never been beggars in the streets before".[11]

On support of these testimonies, we can argue that Marrakech changed indeed during the last decades. The different social and urban changes co-existing in the city (intensification of tourism, gentrification, displacement) do not only condition the shape but also the dynamic of the urban space. Local people are moving to peripheral neighbourhoods because they cannot respond to the growing housing prizes or simply because they feel alien to the "new urban spaces" created by the intensive requalification and gentrification of the historic centres. The Western foreign residents, partly responsible for these changes, may feel more comfortable in these "modernized" city and society but also regret the loss of tradition and social values (Fig. 4).

[11]Interview translated from French to English by the authors.

4 Conclusions

Morocco is a melting point of diverse people, cultures, social behaviours and beliefs. The personal stories of the European residents we interviewed in Marrakech are extremely multifarious and reflect the complexity of past and recent migration in the Mediterranean. Marrakech is a crossroad of many people and the city is build up on this miscellany.

Marrakech is an example of the urban processes currently taking place as well in Morocco as in many cities of the world: gentrification, socio-economic polarization, deregulation in housing market or tourism activities. In Marrakech, all these processes converge and risk to reconfiguring the city according to the interests of real estate investors or promoters. But the presence of a multicultural population and the resulting intercultural life are also significant in regard to the changes of urban dynamics. In this perspective, immigration of European is an important element, as they are the key actors for social, economic, urban and cultural transformation in the city of Marrakech.

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Fig. 4 Gentrification and multinational shops in Guéliz (images from Ana Estevens, 2015)

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paradiso@unisannio.it

Part IV

Narratives. The Mediterranean as an Action Space in the Transformation of European Identity and Changing Relationships: Chapters on Mobilities' Sustainability, Gaps and Changes

paradiso@unisannio.it

Climate Refugees, Housing in Risk Areas, and Vulnerability of the Built Environment in the Fez Urban Area of Morocco (Case of the Medina and Outlying Districts)

Abdellatif Tribak, Maria Paradiso and Kawtar Azagouagh

Abstract

The environmental crises linked to the recurrent droughts that have characterized the Moroccan countryside from the 1980s onward have been disastrous for the stability of rural populations in Morocco. Recurring droughts have resulted in an absolute scarcity of water resources in rural areas. This has had dramatic consequences, not only on the herding/ farming system, but also on the whole physical and human environment. The scarcity of water is thus a fundamental factor in the crisis that has characterized the rural world at all levels during this period, leaving as a direct consequence the massive migration of people toward cities. This article attempts to delve into the nature of the exceptionally recurrent droughts that have affected the hinterland of the city of Fez since the beginning of the 1980s, and to assess the consequences on the stability of rural populations or its mobility, and, as a result, on the major expansion of the of the urban area of Fez, especially in the outlying areas that are periodically exposed to natural disasters.

Keywords

Climate refugees · Migration · Risks Vulnerability · Substandard · Fez · Morocco

1 Introduction

The recurring droughts that have affected Morocco since the 1980s have driven people in rural areas to massively migrate to nearby cities. In the last three decades, the urban area of Fez has expanded extensively, mainly as a result of the inflow of large numbers of migrants from the surrounding rural countryside (Rif, pre-Rif, and Middle Atlas). This drought-driven movement of rural people has significantly contributed to disrupting the traditional urban fabric of Fez and its surrounding area. The medina and some outlying districts are presently taking the full negative impact of overcrowding and of urban sprawl in risk areas unsuitable for housing. As a result, wide stretches of substandard housing units have mushroomed in the outskirts of the city in response to the massive inflows of rural migrants and the shortage of suitable housing. In these districts, the lack of basic facilities and infrastructure, such as liquid waste disposal, and construction on terrain highly exposed to natural

A. Tribak (✉) · K. Azagouagh
University of Fès, Fes, Morocco
e-mail: tribakabdellatif@yahoo.fr

M. Paradiso · K. Azagouagh
University of Sannio, Benevento, Italy

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paradiso@unisannio.it

hazards, as well as the non-compliance with current building standards are some of the factors that expose the urban environment to ever-mounting risks. These districts, in total disarray, have completely marred the citywide urban landscape and have profoundly destabilized the core of a civilization going back over twelve centuries. This state of affairs is so calamitous that corrective actions currently in place have been woefully inadequate to solve these problems. In spite of the State's numerous interventions, non-standard housing built in neighborhoods stricken by poverty and urban blight represents a major hurdle to be overcome, so that the city and its outlying areas can be properly rehabilitated. Persistent, unhealthy living conditions and an unsuitable urban environment call for a profound review of the dimensions of this issue and of the mechanisms that have set it in motion and caused it to develop. The root causes of the failures that have been inflicted on these cities and beyond to their outlying areas and of the problems they face must be urgently attended to as a matter of priority. The rehabilitation of the impoverished and desolate rural areas around Fez is more than ever essential.

Droughts triggering severe shortages of water in rural areas have prompted the implementation of measures that have disrupted territorial continuity. These have had disastrous consequences, not only on herding and farming systems, but also on the whole physical and human environment. The scarcity of water is thus considered to have been a fundamental factor in the crisis that has affected rural areas at all levels of society during periods of droughts, and its direct consequences have led to massive flows of people toward the nearest cities.

This article seeks to understand the nature of the exceptionally recurrent droughts that have devastated the countryside around the city of Fez since the early 1980s, and to examine their impact on the stability/mobility of rural populations, and, their correlation with the great urban sprawl of Fez and, more especially, of its outlying areas that are periodically subject to natural disasters.

2 The Setting: A Description of the Urban Area

The urban area of Fez is located in the Fes-Meknes region of northern Morocco (per the administrative divisions of 2015). At an average altitude of 450 m, it extends toward a depression in the NNE corner of the plain of Sais, and it is bordered on the north by the pre-Rif foothills, the highest point of which is Jbel Zalagh at 903 m, and on the south by the Tabular Middle Atlas culminating at 1400 m. To the east, it is bounded by the Sebou river basin, whereas to the West, the Sais of Fez extends up to the plateau of Meknes. The city of Fez thus is situated in a geographically central location at the crossroads of trade routes that have made it become an economic hub and an attractive regional center for business.

In the region, there are several distinct geological structural units. North of the Fez urban area, the pre-Rif foothills, basically composed of marl dating back to the Cretaceous and Tertiary periods, predominate. The plain of Fez is a subsiding region filled with Plio-Quaternary soils composed of lacustrine limestone, clay-limestone tuffs and conglomerates, overlying neogeneous deposits and their substratum (SDAU 1991; Amraoui 2005). Toward the south, outcroppings of limestone and Jurassic dolomites of the Tabular Middle Atlas are exposed.

The local climate is of a Mediterranean type influenced by continental features. It is marked by strong seasonal variations and very irregular precipitation. The average annual rainfall is 500 mm/year (from 1971 to 2010 at the Fez meteorological station). Despite this, rains are generally very heavy and fall during a limited period of a few days in the wet season. Exceptional bouts of rainfall in close succession during

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

Fig. 1 Diagram of the Fez-Meknes region and aerial photograph of the Fez urban area

wet years are considered to be an environmental hazard. The annual average temperature is 17.8° as measured over this same period of time. However, maximum temperatures in the summer can reach above 45 °C (Fig. 1).

In terms of hydrogeological features, the water table of the plain of Sais is characterized by the existence of two distinctly separate aquifers. The water table beneath the superficial Plio-Quaternary soils is easily exploitable by wells. Aside from this, Liassic soils reaching great depth contain a confined aquifer that can be tapped by artesian wells (Taltasse 1953; Margat 1960; Amraoui 2005). Moreover, the Fez urban area benefits from a dense hydrographic network of surface channels, one of which, Wadi Fez, being the main river dissecting the city in a SW–NE direction. At times, these channels unleash torrential amounts of water that may cause flooding during exceptionally wet seasons.

Historically, the early medina of Fez, set in a basin cut by the Wadi Fez, was founded at the end of the eighth century by the Idrisid Dynasty. It became the first kingdom of Islamic Morocco. In the years around 808, the city began to grow. Two settlements, the first built on the western bank, and the second on the opposite eastern bank of Wadi Fez, developed over the centuries (Agoumy and Benchrifa 1987). In the first half of the twentieth century, a new adjoining city was built during the French protectorate. After the country's independence, Fez started to expand to outlying districts at the edge of the city, and, in 1970, as it grew, it spread beyond manageable limits and spilled over its confines. Fez currently covers an area of about 11,000 ha. Its population rose from 325,000 inhabitants in 1960 to 796,000 inhabitants in 1994, and in 2014 reached 1,150,000 inhabitants (HCP-RGPH 2014).

3 Methodology

Our approach in this study is based on annual meteorological data taken from a series of measurements at the Taza weather stations (1935–2010) located in the pre-Rif foothills and in Fez (1971–2010). Other meteorological data has been obtained from bibliographic references cited in

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previous studies (Tribak 2000, 2002; Tribak 2007; Nejjari 2005). Weather maps from the Wetter3 Web site were consulted to describe weather conditions (Wetter3–January 1992 and October 1995).

The data collected at different stations was used to examine rainfall patterns, to focus on the variations that would indicate a distinct tendency for droughts since the 1970s, and especially to study in greater detail the extreme rainfall events that are the determining factors in the onset of flooding. The results of prior studies reporting on the hazards and on the urban dynamics of the Fez urban area, cited here in the bibliography, have been immensely important for us to compare them with our own study and to provide our commentary. The use of aerial photography during our exploratory missions enabled us to map out and capture the development of built-up areas during the last few decades (1962–1990). The archives and administrative reports from the Urban Agency for the Safeguarding of Fez, the offices of the Ministry of Housing, the High Commissioner for Planning (HCP), and the Agency for the De-Densification and Rehabilitation of the Fez Medina, have been valuable resources for us to back up our findings gathered in the field. Field surveys are essential to determine the origin of population groups, to evaluate the impact of recurrent droughts on the movement of people, to identify the factors that affect the settlement of migrants in hazardous outlying areas, and to assess the degree of pressure on the built environment.

4 Recurring Droughts and the Movement of Population Groups

The prolonged droughts of the 1980s and 1990s accelerated the migration process that had already been underway in the preceding decades in the greater part of the Moroccan countryside. Data on population shifts in the rural countryside from 1982 onward reveal downward trends in many of the country's municipalities. At that time, rural populations displaced themselves within the country's borders. Urban areas and administrative centers attracted flows of rural people coming from surrounding districts (Rif Mountains and the Atlas). In this context, the urban area of Fez has undergone a very significant demographic transition, resulting concurrently from natural growth, and from the arrival of large numbers of migrants from the backcountry. As a corollary to this, the outcome has been an extension of built-up housing districts in hazardous areas on the outskirts of the city and overcrowding in the old urban quarters.

4.1 Recurring Droughts and the Scarcity of Water

Figure 2, derived from reduced variations of annual cumulative rainfall measured over a sixty-year period at the Taza station in the pre-Rif foothills, shows the trend of extreme rainfall events, and clearly alternating dry and wet periods.

Early in the series of measurements taken between 1936 and 1942, annual rainfalls were markedly wet, with an index level fluctuating between 1.41 in 1936 and 0.74 in 1942. Only the years 1935 and 1938 stand out with negative indices that represent a deficit in total rainfall. The subsequent period between 1943 and 1950 is characterized by a succession of dry years. The reduced centered indices are all negative and even exceed −0.50 over a five-year period.

Beginning in 1951, the return of more favorable climatic conditions in the region was noted, despite clear evidence of high interannual variability. This new period lasted until 1979. There were no fewer than 17 years with a positive index, of which four exceeded +1: 1960, 1963, 1977, and 1978, the last one reaching a record-breaking index of +2.44. Dry years intervened between the wetter periods and thus interrupted this trend. We thus noted two very dry years, 1961 and 1966, with indices of −1.20 and −1.16, respectively.

A very significant downward trend began in 1980, announcing an exceptional drought that lasted until 1995. Reduced centered deviations

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

Fig. 2 Variations in the reduced annual rainfall recorded at the Taza Station (1935–2010). *Source* Tribak et al. (2012)

showed negative values greater than −0.50 over a ten-year period and greater than −1 in 1981 and 1985. During this long drought, only two years showed a positive index (1978 and 1989, with +0.39 and +0.56, respectively). The last phase (1996–2010) is a break from the dry conditions observed between 1980 and 1995. Wet climatic conditions prevailed again as early as 1996 with indices exceeding +1 in five years (1996, 1997, 2003, 2009, and 2010). It is also notable that the year 1996 broke the measurement record with an index of +3.47 (Tribak et al. 2012).

The study of annual rainfall since 1935 has revealed the very irregular patterns of rainfall in the pre-Rif foothill region that are typical of Mediterranean climates (Fig. 2). Wet periods often occur between dry years, some of which may be extremely dry, as in 1961, 1998, and 2007 with negative indices of −1.3, −1.2 and −1.5, respectively. The periods of drought are more consistent and are marked by a quasi-uninterrupted succession of years of rain deficit (dry periods from 1943 to 1950 and from 1980 to 1995). The meteorological station of Fez reported the same trend, as evidenced by a great drop in the amount of rainfall during the period between 1980 and 1995.

In terms of the analysis of dry periods that have very negatively impacted the physical and human environment, it seems quite clear that the recent drought (1980−1995), having been especially severe, was indicative of the cumulative and recurring effect of the lack of rainfall in the years of serious shortage. Studies on the climate of the Atlas hinterland around Fez, for the period between 1971 and 1995, show that extreme droughts were recurrent, but yet had no cyclical patterns (Nejjari 2005). All the weather stations of the upper Sebou were thus closer to arid lands as a consequence of the very dry weather conditions during this period. The rain deficit was at approximately 25% compared to the reference period (Nejjari 2005). The drought from 1981 to 1985 was exceptionally severe. According to the 30 weather stations located in northern Morocco, the deficit between 1980 and 1985 varied from 20 to 45% and reached 85% in some regions (Belkhiri et al. 1987; Nejjari 2005). Likewise, the 1994–1995 season was also unusual: The climatic situation was especially harsh, as recorded by all weather stations in the country. The rainfall deficit as compared to normal levels exceeded the threshold of 40%, with 42% reported at the weather stations of Fez, Sefrou, and Ifrane, and 46.6% at the Taza station. Recorded annual amounts were among the lowest, with 190 mm in Fez and 241 mm at Taza.

Meteorologically, this pattern of recurrent and extensive droughts is linked to summer anticyclonic conditions that can appear as early as

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

Fig. 3 Anticyclonic weather condition (02-01-1992 at 00 UTC). *Source* Wetter3



Fig. 4 Anticyclonic conditions in summer extending to autumn (19-10-1995 à 06 UTC) *Source* Wetter3

spring and extend into autumn. Such is the case of the Azores anticyclone that is centered on or near Morocco (Figs. 3 and 4). However, in winter, a continental polar flux from the northeast can also provoke dry and cold weather conditions that increase the likelihood of having a dry-year deficit (Nejjari 2005).

This period of successive, severe droughts has devastatingly impacted the rural areas of Morocco. The pre-Rif foothills, which shape the countryside north of Fes, experienced such a sizable water deficit that the amounts of stored water were extremely low and practically nil, even in areas where aquifers are fairly prevalent. Absolute droughts intervening during the agricultural season, and occurring rather frequently, are indicative of disturbed seasonal patterns during this overall period. They have had serious

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environmental consequences, resulting in a total lack of water during the wet season and in markedly reduced farming and herding activities. The example of 1992 is a good illustration. An absolute drought lasting 63 days occurred from December 18, 1991 to February 18, 1992 in the pre-Rif area north of Taza. The depletion of water supplies then reached a peak in the summer of 1995 due to the shortage of rainfall that year when a total 143-day drought occurred from June 21, 1995 to November 10, 1995. This depletion resulted in the total disappearance of a large number of water sampling points. Many other instances that reflect the extent of water supply shortages throughout the region during this drought period have recurred, especially around the marl basin of Wadi Larbâa near Taza, where the people living in the many douars (tent settlements) have had little access to water, mainly from very low-running springs (less than 1 L/s) or from wells drawing mediocre quality or briny water near the river banks. Similarly, field surveys during this period confirm that villages in the region were delivered with water on several occasions by truck from the town of Taza.

This exceptional drought caused the land to turn arid, consequently leading to an inevitable economic and social crisis. The sheer scarcity of water throughout the region, aggravated by droughts, has had negative repercussions on the physical and human environment. This outcome, combined with socioeconomic factors, helps explain the reasons for the deep economic and social crisis that was triggered when the rural countryside was abandoned and migrant flows began to swell in the early 1980s.

4.2 Migrants Moving and Settling in High-Risk Zones

In the wake of these hardship situations caused by the shortcomings of the herding/farming system and by people's precarious living conditions, peasants were forced to seek solutions outside of their milieu. This led to migratory flows that varied from one period to another in their form and in their scope. Large numbers of people left their forbidding mountain environment in the hope of finding ways to live more securely elsewhere. Thus, the mass departures toward the neighboring cities that began in the aftermath of independence have continued to increase up to the present day. The prolonged drought from 1980 to 1995 stepped up the migratory process that had already been underway in the rural areas of Morocco in the prior decades.

Nationwide, between 1982 and 1994, the urban population grew by nearly 5 million people, i.e., an annual increase of nearly 390,000 souls, as compared to just over 265,000 between 1971 and 1982 (HCP 2005). As for migratory movements responsible for nearly 40% of this increase, an estimated 1.9 million rural people left the countryside for the city, equivalent to an annual net inflow of some 156,000 rural inhabitants (HCP 2005). The urbanization of Morocco is typified by very powerful modern-day dynamics. Between 1982 and 1994, the country's annual growth rate was 3.6%, and the percentage of the urban population now exceeds that of the rural population: 51% in 1994, whereas it was only 43% in 1982, and 35% in 1971 (Joumady 1999).

On a regional scale, data on population growth between 1982 and 1994 indicates that the abandonment and the neglect of the rural countryside have affected a vast number of districts, which can no longer provide a sufficient quantity of resources to sustain its inhabitants. In the province of Taza, for example, the most stricken municipalities are Taïfa and Traïba, which have had negative growth rates of −12.1 and −5.3%, respectively. As for people living in douar tent communities, these figures reveal an even more distressing situation. Two douars, El Kochna and Ouled Abdeslam in the town of Taïfa, show negative population growth rates of −62.8 and −53.1%, respectively. A real demographic decline is in process (Tribak 2002).

Also in Hyayna (Taounate province), several rural towns had negative annual growth rates between 1994 and 2004: Aïn Guedah (−0.2%), Outa Bouaban (−0.3%), Ras el Ouad (−0.2%). In the pre-Rif region, 30% of Hyayna's douars also

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had negative rates, of which 5.4% had rates below 5, and 10.8% had rates between −5 and −2%. At the same time, between 1994 and 2004, the rural communities of the Taounate subdivision, where rural depopulation is still ongoing, experienced low or negative annual growth rates. Among the 11 rural towns, five recorded negative growth rates varying between −0.1 and −1.4%, while others had rates that varied between 0.2 and 1.7% (ONDH 2010). These rates, albeit slight, can be explained by the massive departure of the rural population from the pre-Rif foothills.

In this context, during the last three decades, the city of Fez, the main regional economic hub, has undergone a major demographic transition, resulting concurrently from natural growth and from the inflow of large numbers of migrants from the countryside. Its population has grown considerably from 584,000 inhabitants in 1982 to 772,000 in 1994, and to 1,150,000 in 2014, with an annual growth rate ranging from 3.94% in 1994 to 1.63% in 2004 (Table 1). Likewise, at the town level, there has been very significant growth, especially in towns in outlying areas. The municipality of Jnan El Ward grew from 83,142 inhabitants in 1982 to 154,691 inhabitants in 1994, and the municipality of Mérinides from 113,213 inhabitants in 1982 to 177,400 inhabitants in 1994 (AUSF 2004).

Surrounded by an extensive area of migratory routes that extends from the Fez-Boulemane region to other nearby provinces, Fez acts a magnet that attracts settlers (HCP 2005). Its geographical proximity to the provinces of Taounate and Taza, and the strong presence of a migrant population having arrived from these same provinces are all factors that explain its great attractiveness (HCP 2005). Compared to Kenitra, for example, it draws three times the number of migrants, nearly half of whom come from neighboring localities: 31% from Taounate, 8% from Zouagha Moulay Yacoub, 5.5% from Taza. Beyond its own regional area, Fez attracts a relatively large proportion of migrants from the Wilaya of Rabat-Salé (10%), Berkane-Taourirt (10%), Casablanca (4%), and Errachidia (3.4%) (HCP 2005).

Surveys carried out in the Quettanine district of the old quarter show that 75% of the migrants come from the backcountry of the pre-Rif foothills, mainly from Taounate and Taza, and this accounts for 61.5% of the number of migrants (Ennasry 2011). Similarly, surveys conducted in the outlying neighborhoods of north and northeast Fez confirm that 80% of the migrants originate from these provinces, compared with 63% of those in the outskirts that lie southeast of the urban area, and 35% of those in the medina (Errafik 2012). Recent studies also confirm that the countryside of the province of Taounate alone accounted for about 50% of the city's population shifts between 1994 and 2004 (El Malki 2004).

Previous studies on the urban dynamics of Fez report that most migrant flows arrived in Fez during the 1980s and 1990s following the severe drought mentioned earlier (Hazoui 2006; El Bouaichi 2004a, b; Gartet 2007; Hnia 2009; Errafik 2012). Hnia (2009), in his study on interventional approaches to the management of housing located in hazardous areas, concludes that, "construction began in the Jnanate quarter in the 1950s. It reached its peak in the 1980s, at a time when the climate was very dry and when the rate of rural migration to the city was recorded at its highest." The ANHI (2000) report illustrates this point as well, i.e., 75% of the construction between 1981 and 1985 in the Hay Hassani quarter of the northern zone was unauthorized at

Table 1 Population growth in the city of Fez (1960–2014)

Years	1960	1971	1982	1994	2004	2014
No. of inhabitants	325,327	335,050	484,654	772,184	946,815	1,150,131
Annual growth rate (%)	2.4	3.7	3.6	3.94	1.84	1.63

Source RGPH (2014) and AUSF (2004)

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a time, just at the time when all of Morocco was in the grips of a severe drought. The field observations and surveys that we carried out in 1985 and 1995 indicate that the feeble supply of water arising in the marshy pre-Rif area north of Taza had almost totally dried up. These surveys also show that these milieus were being severely depopulated during the summer of 1985 and the summer of 1995. Population data between 1982 and 1994 confirm these findings. The douar, El Khochna, located in the pre-Rif rural town of Taïfa, recorded a negative population shift of −62.8% (Tribak 2002). Even in the town of Taza, there was no supply of water. From 1980 to 1985, in the medina of Taza, water was very frequently cut for 2–3 days. Also, during the summer of 1995, records show that water was cut in some of the poorer neighborhoods of the upper Taza medina for three weeks. This problem persisted until the Bab Louta dam was built. The dam is located in the Middle Atlas and, since 2002, has been supplying water to the outlying districts of Taza.

These migrant flows were composed mainly of poor people who were seeking housing in outlying areas or in the medina's old dwellings that could be shared with other households (Sawab 2001; SDAU 1991). During this drought, 63% of migrant families settled in the outskirts of the city, compared with 26% in the old quarter of the medina, and 11% in scattered pockets of slums lying outside the city limits (Fejjal 1995). The negative growth rates of the rural towns in the pre-Rif foothills, contrasting with the sharp population increase in the metropolitan area of Fez (especially in the outlying areas) between 1982 and 1994, confirm these findings. The gradual urban consolidation of the city of Fez, a reflection of the impact of its urban dynamics in recent decades, has been detrimental to surrounding rural areas that have been experiencing a steadily declining growth rate dating back to as far as the 1980s. According to the High Commission for Planning, the city of Fez took in, during this period, 22% of the total number of migrants, i.e., an annual average of more than 13,000 people choosing to relocate to a big city. The inflow of migrants accounted for more than 55% of the growth of the city. The remainder of the city's population growth came from a natural increase at a rate close to 44% (HCP 2005).

This demographic shift that has prevailed in the last few decades has been tied to a wild, chaotic, and mostly uncontrollable expansion of built-up areas. This explains the considerable number of interventions that have been adopted to recover the areas exposed to risk. Substandard housing generally sits on poorly valued land or on parcels that have an ambiguous legal status, such as old quarries, wadi beds, land with steep inclines, and terrain adjacent to steep cliffs (IRHUAE 2009; Gartet 2007). Indeed, in the last few decades, the city of Fez has entered into a process of rapid growth. It currently covers a land area of about 11,000 ha (Fig. 5). In 1991, according to the SDAU in 1991 (the urban planning authority), the metropolitan surface area of Fez grew from 3878 ha in 1960 to 6550 ha in the 1980s, during which time non-regulatory neighborhoods were built or were expanded in the northern outskirts, such as Hay El Hassani, Hay Al Wifak, and Jnanate (SDAU 1991). Likewise, in the northeastern part of Fez, which had a high number of migrants, 80% of the buildings were built in the 1980s and early 1990s in response to the large flows of migrants during that time. In addition, a great number of property speculators took advantage of the migrants' critical housing problem (Errafik 2012). In the same vein, Tlemçani points out that, besides rural migration, other socioeconomic factors came into play. "These factors have to do directly with the huge impact of urban growth, the severity of the housing shortage, the inadequate supply of available land for housing, and the demand characteristics of low-income households in particular". Hazoui 2010 also shows that the construction of illegal housing dates back to the fifties just after independence, and that the northern outlying areas were experiencing at that time a dizzying growth rate that started in the seventies mainly due to rural migration, a natural population increase, and intra-urban migration. According to the ANHI report (2000), the period between 1981 and 1985 was conducive to the construction of housing in two districts in the

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

Fig. 5 Diachronic development of the Fez urban area between 1965 and 2002 as seen from aerial photographs. *Source* Benriah (2016)

Table 2 Dates construction began (Northern zone)

Start of construction	Quarter	
	Hay Wifaq (%)	Hay Hassani (%)
1977–1980	23	3
1981–1985	69	73
1986–1992	8	23

Source ANHI (2000) and Gartet (2007)

northern zone: 73% in Hay El Hassani and 69% in Hay Al Wifaq. Only four years were needed to construct three quarters of Hay Hassani's buildings (Table. 2).

Rural migrant flows, of greater magnitude during droughts, contributed greatly to expose the vulnerability of outlying areas, as most of the new construction was built on non-regulated land and was generally open to multiple hazards. The result of this illegal construction was the proliferation of anarchic and uncontrolled spatial expansions within the urban area. New urban structures arose as the result of misguided urban planning policies, and they were built outside of

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a regulatory framework to compensate for the shortage of housing that prevailed during the urban crisis (Hazoui 2006; El Bouaichi 2004a, b; Gartet 2007). In this way too, this disorderly construction responded to the needs of one part of the population that was unable to afford a preexisting home, and it provided a means of shelter for the most disadvantaged. The attractive prices for land on the outskirts of the city encouraged new arrivals to seek an opportunity to settle in the greater urban area, even when areas were severely exposed to natural hazards. Surveys conducted in the northeastern zone (Jnanate) in 2011 show that 15% of families had chosen to settle in that zone, because the low price of land to purchase housing was affordable, and 22% because rents were cheap. In addition, 25% of the residents said that they had opted for less expensive neighborhoods, and finally 19% because of family ties with migrants who had already arrived, a factor that made it easier for them to settle there (Ennasry 2011). It is also worth pointing out the risk of having property values increase due to land and real estate speculation, one of the fundamental mechanisms for creating spatial segregation, a disjointed urban fabric, and an expansion of the non-regulated housing sector in the Fez urban area. Illegal housing districts provided fertile ground for up-and-coming speculators and real estate contractors during this period, and for the structuring of the housing construction market that would match the socioeconomic status of new arrivals (Ameur 1993; Gartet 2007).

5 Vulnerability and Substandard Construction in Non-regulated Districts

In Morocco, substandard housing, a major share of the country's available lodging, comes in many forms: slums, illegal housing, non-regulated housing, and unlawful accommodation in the old medinas lacking proper facilities. These types of housing take on the typical characteristics of those found other cities in the countries of the South, i.e., an indeterminate legal status, unstable construction, lack of basic infrastructure. In addition to this, it is the social pathology of the people involved who feel marginalized or excluded. There are multiple interrelated factors that explain the reasons for the construction and development of these forms of habitat that are exposed to risk, due to interweaving physical factors and human settlement issues.

5.1 Risk Factors

The outlying districts constructed with non-regulated housing were mostly developed during the 1980s on geographically exposed land, on no-construction zones, on geotechnically unstable terrain, or near cliffs or streams where there is a risk of frequent flooding and landslides (Hnia 2009). Moreover, this intrinsically fragile environment has been buffeted by substantial human development following the chaotic and uncontrolled urbanization of the outlying districts. The lack of basic infrastructure, overcrowding, the excessive height of buildings on very small surface areas, the failure to comply with building standards, and the lack of maintenance are all factors that have contributed to exposing these sites to ever greater risks. Such is the case of the Jnanate district situated in northeast Fez and the Hay el Hassani district in the north.

On the geotechnological level, neighborhoods in the outlying areas of the city that were built up with non-regulated housing stand on vulnerable ground. This physical instability is primarily due to the presence of unconsolidated formations that, once having been impregnated with water, have altered mechanical properties. These formations are prone to cause ground disturbances that are even more likely to occur by the presence of overhanging cliffs. In the case of the Jnanate district in the northeastern sector of Fez, for example, the report of the study carried out by the Public Laboratory for Testing and Studies (LPEE 1991), showed the presence of soil primarily composed of sandy marls with shifting channels. This predominating layer runs over all

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the cliffs and even underneath building substructures and carries on its surface the runoff from rainfall or sanitary sewers. This contributes to weighing down geological formations to thus cause ground shifting that can disturb the rocky cliffs (Photograph 1). Moreover, the risk of hazards in these neighborhoods is also due to the fact that these buildup areas are directly adjacent to cliffs that are cut into marly or travertine formations a few meters in height, thus producing cliff overhangs. Such is the case in the Jnanate and the Hay Hassani districts in the northern zone of Fez (Photograph 2).

Photograph 1 Constructions in the form of staircases, backed up and raised in height, built on marly lands on steep slopes, near the stream (Oued Fès). They are threatened with collapse due to landslides on these cliffs (Northeast zone of Fez)

Photograph 2 Chaotic landscape of high-rise constructions that directly joins travertine cliffs a few meters deep. They remain susceptible to collapse (North zone of Fès)

Apart from these intrinsically unstable features, the accelerated and uncontrolled influx of people into these hazardous areas is another aspect of the problem. Indeed, this instability is progressively worsened by urbanization over inherently unstable terrain. A tight housing situation forced new arrivals, driven by harsh living conditions in the countryside, to build on land where risks are potentially high. Neighborhoods built in these settings are generally characterized as high-density environments with high-rise constructions. In fact, due to the large inflows of migrants during the 1980s and 1990s, and due to the difficulty of expanding horizontally (scarcity of available land, rugged topography), buildings that were constructed in the late 80s were generally extended vertically without taking into any account the amount of weight that the supporting frame could withstand. Our field surveys, conducted in April 2016, indicate that foundations initially designed for one ground floor currently bear an additional five to six floors and are built near the cliff of Hafat Moulay Idriss, which formerly served as a quarry. Most of the buildings in the north and northeast outlying districts are predominantly constructions with a ground floor plus 3 floors, or plus 4 floors, or even sometimes plus 5 and 6 floors. Buildings with a ground floor plus one floor represent only a small fraction, that is, not more than 15% of the total housing inventory (IRHUAE 2009).

These high-rise constructions are built on small surface areas offering a poor foothold to the ground, 85% of the area being less than or equal to 100 m^2; 66% are less than 60 m^2 in the northern zone. On the other hand, in the northeast zone, 50% of these buildings have a surface area of between 60 and 80 m^2, and 41% cover surfaces that measure less than 60 m^2 (Errafik 2012). These constructions create a jumbled landscape, where buildings generally lean against each other over rugged terrain or directly against the cliffs (Photographs 1 and 2). They thus bear significant weight on the underground geological formations (marly), where over-densification of buildings can translate to as many as 22 households on a ground surface area of 40 m^2 (IRHUAE 2009).

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These population densities are therefore alarming. Based on the R.G.P.H. (general census) of 1994, the Jnanate sector covers approximately 95 ha and includes 1120 buildings. The most extreme densities are estimated at 1600 dwellings per ha (Alomrane 2010). Surveys conducted in these outlying districts indicate that families with more than 6 members represent 60% of the families in the northern zone, 33% of families in Jnanate (Errafik 2012), and 52% in the old quarter of the medina (Tribak et al. 2013). The upshot is strong demographic pressure on these types of construction that, in turn, hastens their dilapidation. It is also important to emphasize that inadequate basic infrastructure and the failure to comply with technical building standards augment the vulnerability of buildings and weaken their resistance to degradation or even collapse. Before being integrated within the urban limits, these urban districts remained under-equipped for a considerable period of time, notably in terms of roads, in liquid and solid sanitation networks, and in social infrastructures. Prior studies on the urban dynamics in these districts (ANHI 2000; Alomrane 2010; El Bouaichi 2004a, b; Gartet 2007; Errafik 2012) agree that the majority of these dwellings were built without having complied with current standards, namely those that deal with the pace of construction, the height of buildings on small surface areas, the poor quality of construction, and the malfunction of the sewer network. From this angle, it can be seen that this type of urban planning, generally unsuited to address the issues relative to this type of terrain, exacerbates the fragility of the terrain and of the housing that has been erected on it without having applied the current building standards. This causes these dwellings to gradually deteriorate, and even collapse to the point of causing significant human and material damage.

5.2 Risk Aspects

Studies carried out in the outskirts of the urban area point to the magnitude of risk generated from ever accelerating human settlement of these areas and, consequently, from the natural hazards that threaten these overcrowded spaces (Errafik 2012; Gartet 2007; Hnia 2009; El Bouaichi 2004a, b). Indeed, these impoverished neighborhoods, the end products of chaotic urbanization, are the most vulnerable to the impact of natural disasters and are the least equipped to cope with these events. Landslides and subsidence, travertine cliff collapse, and flooding are examples of natural hazards that can have a significant impact on the built-up areas and on the people who live in there.

Thus, in these neighborhoods, due to the weak supporting substrate under the foundations of most of the buildings that generally tend to lean one against one another, vertical and crisscrossing cracks appear both on the facade and on the inside walls of the buildings. The survey carried out by the AREA-TESCO Study Group (ANHI 2000; Gartet 2007; Errafik 2012) revealed the existence of cracks in the various parts of the building structure (floors, load-bearing beams, posts, floors coverings). Surveys and field observations report that 57% of the buildings in the northern zone are affected by cracks and dampness, compared to 46% in the northeast zone (Errafik 2012). Similarly, at Hay Hassani, 25% of buildings are affected by cracks in the floor covering and 24% are affected by cracks in the floor (Gartet 2007).

The magnitude of the network of cracks affecting many of the buildings in these districts predominantly reflects the interplay between the soft and unstable substrate and the mediocre quality of construction. These characteristics increase the risk of building collapse in the short and medium term. Buildings on the verge of crumbling are a constant headache for the city's authorities and are a threat to the lives of thousands of residents. In the Jnanate district (northeast zone), with its very high population density, the mid-term expertise carried out by the LPEE laboratory mapped out, at hierarchical degrees of severity, the built-up areas near the cliffs that threaten to disintegrate, including one zone that was declared as high risk for two reasons: the unstableness of the cliff and the specific faults in the construction of the buildings themselves.

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According to estimates by this same laboratory, this threat of collapse, for geotechnical reasons, now affects 1200 households in the non-regulated neighborhoods of Jnanate, one-third of whom live near the cliffs and two-thirds against the cliffs (IRHUAE 2009).

In these neighborhoods, the recent spectacular collapse of buildings has been documented. The magazine, *L'Economiste* (Issue No. 4015 dated April 22, 2013) reports that "on April 19, 2013, the residents of Jnane El Araqui, in the Sidi Boujida neighborhood, were violently awakened by the collapse of three 3-floor buildings (25, 26, and 27) that successively crumbled down like castles of cards." It is apparent that the collapse of cliffs that support 5-story buildings housing more than 10 households—not counting their individual guests—is a hazard that translates into a form of social construction of risk, whereby it becomes one of the fatal consequences of human settlement on geographically unstable terrain.

Moreover, in the medina, the extent to which the built-up areas are threatened to collapse no longer needs to be demonstrated. The situation is of such magnitude that it is, by a long shot, the most spectacular indicator of the degree to which built-up areas are falling into ruin. Referring to the work carried out by the ADER, it appears that this situation affects 4000 of the 11,000 buildings in the medina, including 1850 in a state of advanced decay (ADER 2004). The qualitative field results in the Qalqliyne district (Karaouyin river bank) report that 66% of the buildings that were surveyed threatened to fall into ruin. They are affected by dampness, high occupancy density, degraded indoor facilities, cracking, and sloping walls (Ennasry 2011).

The above examples show that the complex blend of intrinsic factors contributing to instable conditions in these physically preordained vulnerable environments, and urban planning policies rendered inadequate by the high anthropic pressure are at the root of the utter disarray that affects buildings and the people of some of the outlying districts of the urban area. In addition to the total absence of sanitary conditions due to dampness, cracked walls, cramped quarters, and the lack of ventilation affecting a high proportion of dwellings, local people are threatened by a potentially looming natural disaster that can cause the collapse of the building that provides them shelter.

6 Discussion and Conclusions

From this analysis, it appears certain that the prolonged drought during the decades of the 80s and 90s throughout Morocco reinforced the migratory process that had already been underway in the previous decades in most of the Moroccan countryside. From the early 1980s onward, the habitat in the mountains of the eastern Rif changed from overcrowded conditions with pressure on the environment to a situation, in which the countryside was depopulated in the context of an economic crisis and social malaise (Gauché 2005). The demographic abandonment of the countryside in certain mountain environments and the tendency to concentrate people in urban centers thus responded to the failure of the herding and farming system to withstand the effects of recurrent and persistent droughts in a context of a generalized economic crisis. Our field surveys, in certain rural areas of the pre-Rif, confirm this well. The extremely high degree of mobility of rural populations is related to the availability of water in the desolate countryside of the pre-Rif hinterland. Water is a limiting factor that forges the relationship between population groups and their environment.

The absolute lack of this precious resource, caused by recurrent droughts throughout the region, has had a negative impact on the physical and human environment. It was at the root of the disconnection between the existing links that tied the environment and its inhabitants, who found, by migrating to neighboring cities, their chance for salvation. In this context, the urban area of Fez has undergone a very significant demographic transition, resulting, at the same time, not

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only from natural growth and intra-urban mobility, but especially from the flows of migrants from the hinterland. This situation has led to an expansion of the illegal and chaotic habitable zones toward hazardous areas in the outskirts, and to the over-densification of the old quarters. In fact, recently arrived households from the rural countryside were forced either to cohabit with other households in the old quarter of the medina, or to relocate to the outlying districts where the purchase of housing was then still affordable (Fejjal 1995). Under these conditions, unsanitary non-regulated housing took shape therefore as an outlet to relieve the regulated housing market. Unhealthy living conditions were evidenced as much by the disastrous physical setting of the housing units as by the scarcity and even the lack of infrastructures and city services (Benlahcen Tlemçani and Missamou 2000). In fact, due to an acute housing crisis and the inability of the State to cope with it, chaotic housing units, generally with unhealthy living conditions, make up for a large part of the existing housing deficit. This situation explains the reasons for the apathy that housing services had in the 1980s and 1990s with regard to the considerable expansion of substandard housing toward potentially hazardous areas heavily threatened by various natural disasters (Hazoui 2006).

The unhealthy housing conditions and the shortage of social and community facilities and basic infrastructure in these neighborhoods have fueled feelings of exclusion and marginalization among local people. Physical risks tied to natural hazards and their consequences on the built environment are unfortunately linked to other social problems such as poverty, delinquency, extremism, and urban crime. These problems represent yet another category of urban risk, which requires all-encompassing and prioritized interventions equivalent to those needed to fight against unsanitary living conditions and the threat of buildings to collapse. So, we are faced with an urban situation in a state of disorder and of socioeconomic dysfunction that adds to the vulnerability of the environment. This disorder has completely fragmented and disfigured the urban landscape at the city's level and has profoundly destabilized the core of a civilization going back over twelve centuries.

After numerous disasters in these neighborhoods, the attitude of the public authorities toward the growth of the chaotic neighborhoods and substandard housing has evolved into a choice between, first, political action based on the acceptance of the actual situation and on policy measures designed at restructuring and rehabilitating poor neighborhoods so that they can better integrate into the official urban fabric, and, second, a technical approach aimed at redefining legal and regulatory tools to diminish the surface areas of non-regulated sectors (El Bouaaichi 2004a, b).

Since 1988, emergency measures have been indeed taken and actions on the ground have been carried out in all the neighborhoods at risk. Likewise, an urban program has been set up to survey urban planning policies and to manage malfunctions caused by the blatant expansion of uncontrolled construction of the habitat (Gartet 2007). This is particularly true of the 1991 SDAU and many of the sectoral development plans. New administrative bodies were created (e.g., the Urban Agency for the Safeguarding of Fez, the Agency for De-Densification and Rehabilitation) in order to coordinate the city's urban planning and solve the problems linked to population explosion and resulting chaotic urbanization. Despite these measures, urban disruptions, linked to natural disasters, to the multiple failures of the built environment, and to the dysfunction of the socioeconomic base of the outlying areas of the urban, continue to March on relentlessly.

Persistent, unhealthy living conditions and an unsuitable urban environment call for a profound review on the dimensions of this issue, and of the mechanisms that have set it in motion and caused it to develop. An innovative approach must be found and adopted that can address the city's social and legal concerns, not only from a technical, regulatory, and procedural point of view, but one that broadens the scope of intervention (Benlahcen Tlemçani and Missamou 2000). The causes of the shortcomings and the problems of

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the cities—and more urgently, of the outlying areas—must also be determined. The rehabilitation of the impoverished and deserted countryside that makes up the hinterland of Fez is more than ever necessary. This fragile landscape needs improved access to basic infrastructure in the areas of transport, health, education, and agriculture. By the same token, water management, which is a determining factor for stabilizing the countryside, remains a national priority. A rural development policy must take it into account in order to ward off the severe consequences of any potential recurring droughts. Watershed management and conservation management of natural resources can also contribute to the sustainable local redevelopment of these areas. These measures may well rehabilitate the rural countryside and meet the expectations of local people, thus reducing the flows of migrants toward the cities.

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paradiso@unisannio.it

Tourism Mobilities, Climate and Cultural Change

Mauro Spotorno, Stefania Mangano and Paolo Parciasepe

Abstract

This chapter illustrates some of the main findings of the research that was conducted by the WP6 (Genoa Unit) within the European 7th F.P.—Project "MEDCHANGe" in Marrakesh between the Spring of 2014 and the Winter of 2015. We assumed that Morocco was an interesting fieldwork to investigate the relationships between tourism, culture, subjective expectations and climate. Those relationships have been mostly investigated from the perspective of their contribution in the tourist supply. The aim of the research is to deepen the understanding of the relationship between the perception on the weather conditions and psychological and cultural factors. The methodology of our study is based on: (a) a survey that was carried out by the administration of a questionnaire to a sample of European tourists in Marrakech; (b) the calculation of both the standard "objective" indices normally used in the literature resorting to the specific programme "RayMan" and new subjective indices. The research could help to verify how the subjective perception of the weather conditions may depend on cultural factors, the country of origin, the motivations for travelling, the "climatic" image of the locality in which the tourist stays and its responsiveness to the actual weather conditions encountered at different times of the year, in turn probably correlated with individual and social habits and previous experiences.

M. Spotorno (✉) · S. Mangano · P. Parciasepe
Department of Political Science—DISPO, University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy
e-mail: spot@unige.it

Keywords

Tourism mobilities · Climate and cultural change

"Nullus locus sine genio"
Servius Marius Honoratus
Commentarii in Vergilii
Aeneidos libros"

1 Theoretical and Initial Assumptions

Among the numerous challenges that Global Climatic Change (GCC) presents to contemporary society, and especially to the Mediterranean region, there are also those arising from the interrelationship between climate and tourism. In order to overcome them, suitable political responses are needed, also in terms of design and

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paradiso@unisannio.it

management of the image of passive tourism Mediterranean resorts. As regards geography, interrelationships between tourism and climate were examined according to three main investigation lines: contribution of tourism activities to GCC; changes in tourism supply following GCC; changes in tourism flows following changes in climate comfort conditions perceived by tourists. As regards the latter, the majority of research tends to "objectively" evaluate tourism comfort levels corresponding to specific climate conditions by means of special indexes, thus identifying the levels of the latter to which optimum comfort levels correspond given the physical characteristics of tourists (weight, height, gender, age …), clothes and type of activity carried out (Belén Gomez Martin 2005; De Freitas Scott and Mc Boyle 2008). Among these indexes, due to its widespread use, a key role is played by the "Tourism Climate Index" (TCI), suggested by Mieczkowski (1985)[1] and revised by other authors. By using this index, the IPCC3 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Third Assessment Report, Climate Change 2001) estimated the impact on tourism of changes in climate comfort conditions caused by GCC on a world scale (Scott and Mc Boyle 2001; Amelung and Viner 2006). These scenarios lead us to believe that, especially during summer months, the Mediterranean area might become less attractive for tourists due to rising temperatures. However, this approach avoids the problem of the environmental sensitivity of tourists to psychological and cultural factors (Morgan et al. 2000; De Freitas et al. 2008), with significant impacts on intervention policies and strategies based on the scenarios assumed by it.

Sometimes, meteorological and weather conditions can play a key role while planning tourism travel and during travel (Lohmann and Aderhold 2009), affecting the level of attractiveness and the choice of destination, travel planning, activities planned, satisfaction achieved during holidays and intention to return (Becken 2010; Becken et al. 2010; Lohmann and Kaim 1999).

The initial assumption for this article is that the well-being experienced by a tourist during his/her holiday is related to two sets of factors: objective (physical and physiological) and subjective (psychological, cultural and sociological), and not only to interrelationships between weather conditions and the physical characteristics of tourists, their clothes and type of activity carried out when said interaction is observed[2] (Belén Gomez Martin 2005; De Freitas et al. 2008).

Therefore, this survey aims at determining if, to what extent and in what way the quality of tourism experienced by foreign visitors in Marrakesh can be related to weather conditions. This survey is based on the assumption that under equal weather conditions and physical and physiological conditions of tourists, the well-being perception depends on cultural factors related to the country of origin, travel motivations, expectations based on the "climatic" image of the resort and on their correspondence to actual weather conditions (Spotorno 2016). In this perspective, the Purcell's model is useful when the individual's tourism experience takes place within categories and environmental situations that are already known, or which do not differ too much from them as they are implicit in the expectation, thus in the individual motivation influencing the individual's decision, choice and action. On the other hand, Kaplan and Kaplan's environmental preferences model (1989) is based on the concept of pleasantness of directly encountered environments, without relying on representations and memorized perceptions. Therefore, the preference for an environment is mainly determined by the *hic et nunc* experience of the physical features of the environment itself —mostly natural—and by the emotionally positive intersection between immediate and inferred

[1]This index summarizes the effect of seven climatic variables in order to provide an objective evaluation of their influence on tourism activities. Based on said index, standard optimum conditions are obtained with a maximum day temperature of 20–27 °C, a relative humidity of 30–70%, less than 15 mm of average monthly rainfall, 10 h or more of day sunshine and a wind speed lower than 3 km/h.

[2]Said vision gave rise to the creation of indexes that provide an objective evaluation of tourism comfort levels.

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information and some needs (such as the need to explore, understand and learn) outlined within the so-called environmental preference matrix.

2 Survey Methodology

To that end, subjective and objective indicators were used. The former derives from a special questionnaire administered to a random sample of international tourists who spent at least part of their holidays in Marrakesh between May 2014 and December 2015. Said questionnaire focused on travel motivations, type of expectations and perception of time during the holiday. The latter consists of a series of bioclimatic indexes, i.e. Physiological Stress (PS)[3] index and Physiologically Equivalent Temperature (PET)[4] index.

Said questionnaire is divided into three parts, besides personal data,[5] related to:

1. holiday features (duration, type of accommodation) evaluated through multiple choice questions;
2. travel motivations, identified through a multiple choice question (with nine constrained answers and one multiple choice question, with consequent unlimited choice) graduated according to a satisfaction index ranging from 0 to 10;
3. climate perception and its influence on travel quality, evaluated through five answers based on a 7-point Likert scale.

After having filled in each questionnaire, the interviewer had to take note of place, day and time of the interview, as well as provide an estimate of the interviewees' weight, height and clothes (type of fabric, weight, fabric breathability, etc.). During the processing phase, the geographical coordinates of the place of the interview (longitude and latitude) and the weather conditions during the interview were added to each questionnaire: temperature, humidity, wind speed, atmospheric pressure, sunshine duration, solar radiation.[6] Lastly, the latter set of data allowed us to calculate the PS and PET indexes using the "RayMan Program©".[7]

Any possible interrelationship between the series of (subjective and objective) variables taken into account was assessed by ordinary statistical methodologies, also referring to—in order to explain different behaviours of individuals with different social and cultural backgrounds compared to weather conditions during their stay in Morocco—cognitive psychology explanatory models to explain different behaviours of individuals with different social and cultural backgrounds compared to weather conditions during their stay in Morocco.

3 Results

Almost all the 238 questionnaires were filled in inside the *medina* of Marrakesh: 48.8% (116) during the spring-summer 2014 and summer of 2015 and the remaining 51.2% (122) between the late autumn and winter of the same year (31.9 and 19.3%, respectively).

The interviewees, who were mainly women (62%), show a diversification in the distribution by age group: the female component is more concentrated, amounting to 66.9%, in the first two groups, compared to 60.3% of males (Table 1), and the average age of women—approximately 36—is one year lower than that of men.

Considering the geographical areas of origin, it must be noted that the majority of interviewees

[3]It provides an objective evaluation of the body's response to a stress factor such as, for instance, weather conditions (Jendritzky et al. 1990; Matzarakis et al. 1999).

[4]A thermal index deriving from human energy balance (Matzarakis and Mayer 2009; Matzarakis and Rutz 2005; Matzarakis et al. 1999).

[5]Including information such as country and region of origin, age and gender of the person interviewed.

[6]All said information can be found at the following Websites: https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cdo-web/, http://www.eurometeo.com/english/home.

[7]A programme developed by the Meteorological Institute of the Albert-Ludwigs University of Freiburg.

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Table 1 Distribution of interviewees per gender and age group

Class age	Males		Females	
	a.v.	%	a.v.	%
20–29	34	36.6	64	44.1
30–39	22	23.7	33	22.8
40–49	14	15.1	24	16.6
50–59	13	14	15	10.3
≥ 60	10	10.8	8	5.5
Missing	–	–	1	0.7
Total	93	100	145	100

came from Europe[8]—slightly less than 90%—approximately 8% from the Americas and the remaining 3% from Australia, Canada, South-East Asia and other countries (Fig. 1). Said percentages reflect the composition by origin of international tourists visiting Morocco, excluding Moroccans residing abroad (World Tourism Organization 2017).

Travel motivations were investigated through a multiple choice question providing interviewees with the possibility to choose up to a maximum of 10 motivations (9 guided and 1 free), rating them by a level of satisfaction ranging from 0 to 10. The motivation[9] selected by the majority of the interviewees (96.2%)[10] was the "historical" one (Fig. 2). Other significant attraction elements were the possibility to take excursions in the desert (64.7% of the interviewees) and in nature parks (60.1% of the interviewees). At the other extreme of the scale are business trips, noted by 10.1% of the interviewees.

From an investigation of the answers relating to the perception of weather conditions, a positive relationship with the tourism experience lived by the interviewees emerges. In order to investigate this aspect, interviewees were asked to evaluate, through a 7-point Likert scale, the comfort experienced during their holiday compared to weather conditions, the relevance of weather conditions for the quality of their holiday, weather conditions during their holiday and their positive or negative influence on the holiday itself, as well as the correspondence between expected and actual weather conditions. Most of the persons interviewed gave rather positive evaluations (Table 2), with scores in the two upper quartiles of frequency distributions.

The most frequent score was 6, with a maximum frequency of 38.7% related to the impact of weather conditions on their holiday, and with a minimum frequency of 27.7% for the evaluation of comfort compared to weather conditions.

4 Discussion

As a matter of fact, frequency distributions of climate and weather perception evaluations show a rather similar trend concentrated around the last two classes; therefore, we thought it would have been interesting to investigate interrelations between some of the variables examined: gender, age, motivations, Physiologically Equivalent Temperature (PET), comfort compared to weather conditions, positive or negative influence of weather during their holidays. As regards gender, we noticed that the averages of the scores

[8]Europe was divided into three sub-areas according to their latitude:

- Northern-European interviewees: latitude >52° 00′
- Central European interviewees: 45° 00′ < latitude ≤ 52° 00′
- Mediterranean-European interviewees: latitude ≤ 45° 00′.

[9]The incidence percentage of each motivation resulted from the calculation of the ratio between the number of answers compared to each item and the number of interviewees (238).

[10]This choice was consistent with the decision to visit Marrakesh, which is one of the classical destinations for historical and cultural tourism in Morocco.

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

Fig. 1 Interviewees per geographical area of origin



Fig. 2 Main travel motivation

awarded to travel and tourism motivations do not vary significantly from males to females (t-student and Wilcoxon rank sum test; p-value > 0.05). Likewise, we noticed that frequency distribution of travel and tourism motivations is independent of gender and age group (χ^2 for independence; p-value > 0.05) (Tables 3 and 4).

However, frequency distribution of travel motivations and actual holidays do not seem to be independent of the geographical origin of tourists (Table 5).

Considering only the 213 European interviewees (89.5%), we obtain a distribution of 868 motivations as illustrated in Table 5. Said distribution is dependent on the geographical area of origin of the interviewees ($\chi^2_{df=18}$ for independence = 39.08; p-value = 0.0028 < 0.05). In this case, the H_0 null hypothesis of independence with a 5‰ minor error is rejected. Therefore, if

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Table 2 Perception of weather–climatic conditions

Value	Comfort compared to weather conditions		Relevance of weather conditions for the quality of their holiday		Weather conditions during their holiday		Positive or negative influence of weather conditions during their holiday		Correspondence between expected and actual weather conditions	
	a.v.	%	a.v.	%	a.v.	%	a.v.	%	a.v.	%
1	–	–	9	3.8	1	0.4	1	0.4	5	2.1
2	6	2.5	4	1.7	2	0.8	2	0.8	7	2.9
3	14	5.9	14	5.9	11	4.6	15	6.3	18	7.6
4	29	12.2	16	6.7	32	13.4	20	8.4	28	11.8
5	63	26.5	63	26.5	56	23.5	28	11.8	44	18.5
6	66	27.7	76	31.9	77	32.4	92	38.7	84	35.3
7	60	25.2	56	23.5	57	23.9	80	33.6	49	20.6
Missing					2	0.8			3	1.3
Total	238	100.0	238	100.0	238	100.0	238	100.0	238	100.0

we wanted to reduce the unreliability of the result due to the presence of cells including very low numerical values, for example, by combining *business* and *other,* thus maintaining the meaning of the choice of the other categories unchanged, we would obtain a contingency table with 9 categories instead of 10, and an observed value of χ^2 slightly lower than the critical one, with a p-value = 0.054, perhaps sufficient to retain the null hypothesis. When considering all the interviewees (238), including the merged macro-areas of origin Canada–USA and Latin America–Australia in the calculation, the null hypothesis could be rejected, though at a higher α significance level (0.10). By applying the Bresnahan and Shapiro method to study the incidence of contingency table partitions, and the related general equation $\chi^2_{(r-1)(c-1)} = \sum^r \sum^c (nil - eij)^2/eij - \sum^r (oi - ei.)^2/ei. - \sum^c (o.j - e.j)^2/e.j + (O - E)^2/E$, (in Cristante 1992), we observe that the main contribution to total chi-square significance is due to the Mediterranean Europe/Northern Europe subtable, for all ten motivational categories ($\chi^2_{df=9} = 27.45$; p-value = 0.001),[11] i.e. to the distribution of the motivations of interviewees and somehow reflecting both the differences between the two areas of origin, at opposite ends (both geographically and culturally) of the strip deemed to belong to Central Europe, and the respective differences and similarities between them and the Morocco region chosen as tourism destination.

It is not easy to show that tourism motivations are related to the perception and expectation of similarities or dissimilarities to be found in the destination chosen compared with what is usually experienced by a tourist in his/her country of origin. However, two cognitive models both

[11]The cell frequency that contributes more to the total chi-square is frequency 13 (business/Mediterranean Europe), with a value of $(f_o - f_a)^2/f_a = 6771$. It shows a discrepancy value between expected and observed frequency, in favour of the latter; this indicates unexpected, though predictable, (economic) contacts between people coming from Mediterranean countries, as does likewise frequency 22 of the intersection friends/Mediterranean Europe. On the contrary, frequency 4 of the intersection friends/Northern Europe shows an overestimated expectation; therefore, it is equally significant $[(f_o - f_a)^2/f_a = 5.078]$.

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Table 3 Gender, number of answers relating to travel motivations, average scores awarded and standard deviations

	Males			Females		
	Number of answers per motivation	Average score	st.d.	Number of answers per motivation	Average score	st.d.
Friends	18	6.44	2.75	31	6.52	2.71
Seaside	35	5.31	2.77	55	5.49	3.08
Desert	61	6.30	2.79	93	6.05	2.58
Nature park	53	6.09	2.22	90	6.38	2.52
Historical	91	8.25	1.8	138	8.28	2.06
Local festivity	39	5.05	2.39	58	5.41	2.71
Health	37	4.76	2.67	66	4.88	2.85
Boating	20	3.60	2.14	25	4.16	2.91
Business	15	4.07	2.58	9	3.67	3.00
Other	9	8.60	2.12	18	8.95	2.39
Total	378			583		

Table 4 Age groups and number of answers relating to travel motivations

	Age group					
	20–29	30–39	40–49	50–59	≥ 60	Missing
Friends	24	11	8	3	3	
Seaside	40	26	13	7	4	
Desert	68	40	22	17	7	1
Nature parks	67	37	18	14	7	
Historical	93	55	36	26	17	1
Local festivities	42	23	14	12	6	
Health	42	29	16	9	7	
Boating	18	17	3	5	2	
Business	9	5	5	2	3	
Other	13	7	2	4	1	

support the hypothesis: Purcell's model (or *schema-discrepancy model*) and Kaplan and Kaplan's environmental preferences model (1989)[12]: the former is hierarchically organized according to the environmental scheme concept based on the individual's past experience (Purcel 1986, 1987). Said schemes follow an inclusive

[12]Therefore, Purcell's model is explanatory when the individual's tourism experience takes place within categories and environmental situations that are already known, or which do not differ too much from them as they are implicit in the expectation, thus in the individual motivation influencing the individual's decision, choice and action. On the other hand, Kaplan and Kaplan's environmental preferences model (1989) is based on the concept of pleasantness of directly encountered environments, without relying on representations and memorized perceptions. Therefore, the preference for an environment is mainly determined by the *hic et nunc* experience of the physical features of the environment itself—mostly natural—and by the emotionally positive intersection between immediate and inferred information and some needs (such as the need to explore, understand and learn) outlined within the so-called environmental preference matrix.

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Table 5 Distribution of travel motivations per country of origin (213 European interviewees)

Motivation	Central Europe	Mediterranean Europe	Northern Europe
Friends	20	22	4
Seaside	40	17	26
Desert	56	47	35
Nature parks	60	35	34
Historical	98	58	51
Local festivities	35	28	21
Health	46	26	24
Boating	16	16	9
Business	3	13	5
Other	8	3	12

order, from the most specific to the most general one, and each environmental scheme is based on comparison and on the distance from a prototype, observed by the individual during his/her experience. Therefore, the preference for a specific environment depends on the degree of discrepancy between the latter and the more general environmental schema in which it is included. A moderate discrepancy implies first pleasant sensations, and then perceptions, but if discrepancy increases too much, sensations become unpleasant due to an unduly high arousal. However, both models reasonably explain in what way and how much tourism motivations can depend on the origin of an individual, which is partly reflected in their climatic perception, i.e. what mainly determines the comfort factor and a tourist's physical well-being at the chosen destination. In general, the climatic comfort perceived by Mediterranean tourists in Morocco (average comfort perceived 5.21) is significantly lower compared to the one perceived by Northern Europeans and Central Europeans (average comfort perceived amounting to 5.70 and 5.6, respectively; *t*-test and Wilcoxon rank sum test; p-value < 0.05), while there are no significant differences as regards the age group variable (one-way ANOVA), except for the fact that the average comfort perceived by the 30–39 age group is significantly lower than the one perceived by the 50–59 age group (p-value < 0.05). Moreover, still considering the different European regions of origin, we observed a significant difference between the averages of evaluation scores for weather–climatic conditions during their holiday in relation with their tourism objectives (one-way ANOVA; $F > F_{crit}$; p-value = 7.1E05). In this case, the average score for Central Europe is significantly higher than those for Mediterranean Europe (p-value = 7.277E06) and Northern Europe (p-value = 0.00061), while the average score awarded by females is significantly higher than that awarded by males (p-value < 0.05). Likewise, there is also a significant difference between the averages of scores for climatic influence on their holiday as such (one-way ANOVA; $F > F_{crit}$; p-value = 0.004173); chiefly, the average of Central European scores is significantly higher than that of Mediterranean tourists (p-value < 0.0015), North European tourists (p-value = 0.021) and Canadian and American tourists (p-value = 0.018). As regards the relevance of weather conditions in relation to the correspondence between expected and actual weather conditions, we noticed that, as regards Northern Europe, the two variables seem barely related (0.05), while a stronger relationship is observed (0.36) in the Mediterranean area; in Central Europe, the correlation has a slightly lower value compared to the previous one (0.25).

In turn, the correspondence factor between expected and actual weather–climatic conditions during their holiday differs according to gender:

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in the score related to the correspondence between expected and actual climatic conditions, females have a significantly lower average than males (*t*-test; *p*-value < 0.05). This result can be interpreted by stating that women have greater expectations of finding the expected (or desired) climatic condition in their chosen tourist resort, but it is for this very reason that they are more exposed to greater disappointment if said expectation is not fulfilled.

5 Final Remarks

Even though it confirms some theoretical models widely quoted in the literature, the empirical investigation—carried out in Marrakesh between the late spring of 2014 and the winter of 2015 under the MEDCHANGe project, WP6, by administering a specific questionnaire to a sample of tourists—questions the exclusivity of the biological foundation of causal relationships between perception of tourism comfort and weather conditions and, therefore, their predictive value as regards the evolution of tourism flows following changes in local climatic conditions caused by Global Climate Change.

Based on the data collected so far, from the physiological stress model we cannot derive a corresponding model of comfort conditions perceived by tourists. As a matter of fact, the empirical investigation shows that it can be reasonably assumed that the perception of weather conditions that are suitable for a pleasant tourism experience varies significantly, according to the motivations and expectations of tourists, as well as their geographical origin and gender.

Therefore, the effects of weather variations on weather "comfort" perceived by tourists cannot be described by means of a deterministic model based exclusively on the effects of weather conditions on the human body's physiology. As a matter of fact, the same variations in weather condition parameters might have different effects on the comfort index given that the motivations, expectation, geographical region of origin and gender of tourists change.

These results are not only interesting on a merely theoretical level, but they can also have some interesting applications to a background that is undergoing rapid change both economically and socially and is, therefore, vulnerable to the stress to which one of the pillars of its economic and social system might be exposed. From this point of view, the choice of Marrakesh as a sampling area is very interesting as this city, with over 7 million annual arrivals, is Morocco's main tourism destination (a little more than 10 million annual arrivals). As we have seen, this is chiefly a "cultural" tourism but, if cultural tourism is usually comparatively indifferent to weather conditions, this is not true when considering the geographic origin of tourists, in this case originating mainly from Central and Northern Europe. It follows that, given the ascertained inevitable change in global climatic conditions, with a possible rise in temperatures, taking care of the "cultural" image of destinations such as Marrakesh and of how this image is presented in active tourism geographical areas is increasingly necessary.

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paradiso@unisannio.it

Gentrification and European Entrepreneurship in Marrakesh

Mauro Spotorno

Abstract

For a great part of the nearly 10 million of Western foreign tourists that every year go to Morocco, the *medina* of Marrakech is the most important stage of their trip offering the possibility to live for some days in an atmosphere that answers to the stereotypes of the "Orientalism". In fact during the French Protectorate, Marrakech turned into a symbol of the "Islamic World" and its *medina* began to be considered the stage and the background of the tourist activities and a tourist strategy which was based on an image of Marrakech corresponding to the canons and stereotypes of such "Orientalism". Thus, the *medina* was transformed into a sort of backcloth for the lives of the Europeans residing in the so-called European or new city and, shortly thereafter, for the tourists' holidays. The end of the French Protectorate witnessed a new deep structural and functional upheaval in the urban setting that later on led to the development of a particular kind of the tourist structures, called *riads*, with a particular evocative power of attraction on the tourists. As a consequence, more and more frequently traditional houses of the historical centre have been restored and renovated into hotel facilities, and nowadays, the *medina* is an interesting study case of the processes of gentrification. The aim of this chapter is to build a model that can offer a new perspective and possible future scenarios of the urban and social dynamic of the *medina*. This objective has been achieved by means of statistical data, integrated by field observations conducted from the spring of 2014 to the winter of 2015 within the European Union Seventh Framework Programme Marie Curie project MEDCHANGe. From the studies emerged that in a recent couple of decades, the growth in the number of the tourist housing in the *riads* has led to a gentrification of the *medina* that is related to the "migration" of many individuals from Western countries, mainly European, who own the *riads*.

Keywords

Gentrification · European mobility · Morocco Entrepreneurship

1 Objectives and Phases of the Survey

Marrakesh is undergoing rapid transformation, which is partly due to the growth of tourism flows. Among the over 10 million tourists that crossed the borders of the Alawite state in 2014,

M. Spotorno (✉)
University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy
e-mail: spot@unige.it

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paradiso@unisannio.it

more than 70% were registered in the city's accommodation facilities,[1] and between 2010 and 2014 tourism witnessed an average annual increase of approximately 4% (Word Tourism Organization—UNWTO, 2016). However, if stays in unregistered facilities could also be calculated, figures would definitely be higher. This success is unquestionably due to the fascination of a rich heritage that conveys an atmosphere of orientalism (Said 1991) adapted to a functional version that is suited to mass tourism (Minca 2006; Wagner and Minca 2012).

The growth of the tourism sector is definitely one of the main drivers of Marrakesh's urban, social and structural transformation, though not the only one. As a matter of fact, an equally important role is played by the flow of "new residents", mainly Europeans who are attracted to the "ochre" city by its climate, the possibility to earn income from tourism development and for the tax benefits that they can enjoy by moving there during retirement (Peraldi and Terrazzoni 2016b).

According to the 2014 census, the number of foreign residents in Morocco reached 86,206. Those residents living in urban areas amounted to 81,634, while those living in rural areas amounted to only 4,572; 36% of these new residents (31,239) lived in the Grand Casablanca-Settat region, 23% (20,212) in the Rabat-Salé-Kenitra region, and 10% (8,636) in the Marrakesh-Safi region, followed by the Tangeri-Tetuan-Al Hoceima region with 8% of residents (7,453), the Fès-Meknès region with 7% of residents (5,728), and the Souss-Massa region with 6% (4,914), while for the remaining regions the percentages are very low, especially those further south. Among the cities, Casablanca ranks first with almost 13,000 immigrants, followed by Rabat (13,000) and Marrakesh (about 7,000) (Royaume du Maroc. Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat. 2014). However, not all immigrants are Europeans because, though they make up the majority, there are also many immigrants from African countries. Moreover, it can be asserted that the actual number of immigrants in Morocco is higher than that reported in the official statistics. As regards non-Europeans, this is due to the increasing number of immigrants, often irregular and illegal, who settle in Morocco on a comparatively long-term basis awaiting emigration to Europe. On the other hand, European immigrants are often people who, being allowed to stay in Morocco for a maximum of three months with a tourist visa subject to extension by applying to any police station, remain in Morocco indefinitely returning home periodically in order to obtain a new tourist visa and this situation is also favoured by the fact that, although being completely convertible, the Moroccan national currency, *dirham*, is not exportable. This phenomenon also affects Marrakesh (Pellegrini 2016), and we believe that the current social and functional transformations in the urban fabric of its *medina* are an example of "gentrification" caused by tourism development (Abu-Lughod 1980; Gotham 2005; Dupuis Marchand et al. Dupuis et al. 2008; Spotorno 2016) as well as by a specific kind of European immigration closely linked to the former. So, the main aim of this chapter is to draw a new perspective and possible future scenarios of the urban and social dynamic of the *medina*. Due to lack of statistical data, investigating this phenomenon is not easy; therefore, we have to use direct, quantitative and qualitative surveys conducted from the spring of 2014 to the winter of 2015 within the European Union Seventh Framework Programme MED-CHANGe. After describing the methodology, the chapter analyses the urban fabric of the core district of Marrakesh and its transformations since the French Protectorate. In a third phase, it considers the characteristics of the demand and offer of the tourist accommodation. Finally, the geostatistical analysis of the collected data was conducted to identify possible clusters and correlations between the processes of gentrification and the urban regeneration of the *medina*.

[1] Royaume du Maroc—Ministère du tourisme (www.tourisme.gov.ma).

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2 Survey Methodology

This study is based on quantitative and qualitative surveys carried out between the spring of 2014 and the winter of 2015 within the scope of the MEDCHANGe project, and it was organised in three phases. The first one consisted in the description of the urban layout of Marrakesh's core district, including its *medina* and the Gueélize and Hivernage districts, and of its transformations since the French protectorate. During the second phase of the survey, we dealt with the distribution of tourism accommodation services, the *riads* inside the *medina* and the tourism flow. This survey was carried out by collecting and digitalizing "personal data" related to the accommodation facilities registered by the Centre Regional du Tourisme (CRT) of Marrakech, for a total of 1,123 files. Each file was transformed into a data string including: name of the accommodation facility, address (area, *derb, rue, douar* and house number), name and surname of the owner or manger or company; type (Hotel, Club Hotel, Residence Hotel, Guesthouse, *Gites d'étapes*, B&B, *Riad*, Camping); category; accommodation capacity (expressed in number of beds and rooms); telephone number and/or email address. The database was built for internal purposes by the CRT of Marrakech and kindly made available to us thanks to the collaboration of the colleague Ouidad Tebbaa of the Cady Ayyad University. Starting from the address and the name of each accommodation facility we then georeferenced each facility using Decimal Degrees (DD) and UTM coordinates, while starting from the owner/manager's name or the company's name. We classified the facilities into[2]: "owned/managed by non-Magherebis",[3] "owned/managed by Maghrebis",[4] "owned/managed by both groups"[5] or "owned/managed by companies".[6]

In turn, the analysis of the tourism flow distribution is based on "georeferencing" of tourism flows. To that end, we placed a matrix on the urban area map consisting of 196 square cells, with 250-m sides, georeferenced according to the WGS84 system and centred on the Jemaa El-Fna square (chosen as the main tourist attraction in the urban area).[7] Inside each cell, we selected four observation points[8] and, between May and July 2014, for each of them, we calculated the number of visits by tourists[9] at three different times of the day (9–11 a.m., 12–2 p.m., 4–6 p.m.), and their sum was associated to each cell's centroid. We thus collected approximately 10,000 valid observations, subsequently normalised between cell centroids with at least one passage. This allowed us to "weigh" tourist visits in every cell with an index ranging from 0 to 100 (Spotorno 2016). Finally, during the third phase, we carried out a geostatistical analysis in order to identify possible clusters and correlations with gentrification processes and the *medina's* urban regeneration processes. Moreover, in order to gauge the progress of the quantitative methods of the survey and its results, the survey was preceded by interviews with key players, i.e. persons in charge of public administrative structures and responsible for the promotion and development of tourism activities (2),[10] several *riad* owners and/or managers (7) and restaurant, travel agency, museum and cultural centre managers (9); for a total of 18 unstructured interviews.

[2]The classification was supported by on-site interviews to managers in order to evaluate the margin of error in the attribution.

[3]Hereafter "Non-Maghrebis".

[4]Hereafter "Maghrebis".

[5]Hereafter "Mixed".

[6]Hereafter "Companies".

[7]The quantitative survey described below confirmed the square's barycentric character compared to the city's overall tourism flow.

[8]Obviously, as this is neither an isotropic nor an equipotential area from an attractiveness point of view compared to the tourism flows, we tried to assess the geometric regularity of the observation points with the visits to sites observed during previous exploratory surveys.

[9]Counted persons were selected based on outward elements such as clothes and accessories, behaviour, language etc… of the persons walking through the observation points. Obviously, this implies a margin of error, but we believe that it does not invalidate the results.

[10]I.e. the directors of the Centre Régional du Tourisme (CRT) and of the Office National Marocain du Tourisme de Marrakech.

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3 Area Under Investigation

Marrakesh is located in the centre of the wide Haouz plateau, in south-central Morocco, dominated by the High Atlas Mountains in the South-East.[11] According to the 2014 census, the city had 928,850 inhabitants and it stretched over a 230 km^2 area; average density amounted to 4,038.5 inhabitants/km^2. However, it can be estimated that its population exceeds a million inhabitants, including those who live in "illegal" makeshift homes and *douars* in the city's suburbs (Sebti 2009b, pp. 221–253). In the centre of the urban area, there is the *medina*; i.e. the old town built between 1060 and 1070 by King Almoravide Youssuf ben Tacshifin (Rivet 2012). The *medina* covers an area of approximately 632 hectares, and according to the 2014 census, it hosted a population slightly exceeding 120,000 inhabitants; therefore, its population density exceeds 19,000 inhabitants/km^2.

Marrakesh's over millenary history witnessed an alternation of periods of splendour (with the Almoravide, Almohade and Saadiana dynasties) and decline (with the Marinid, Wattasid and Alawite dynasties), but it was during the French colonial domination that its urban structure underwent a transformation whose effects are still discernible in the current social and tourism dynamics. As a matter of fact, the construction of a *ville nouvelle* (currently the Guélize district[12]), characterized by a radial system centred in former "Place 7 Septembre" and current "Place 16 Novembre" and complying with urban rationalism principles, outside the city's walls, in the North and North–West of the *medina*, dates back to those years. Similarly to what happened in the same years in most of the main cities worldwide subject to nineteenth-century European colonization, its foundation aimed at providing services that could hardly be found in the *medina*. As a matter of fact, although multicoloured and picturesque, the latter was an overcrowded area mostly without running water, and its streets were not suitable for cars. The new city's perspective was based on a central axis consisting of Avenue Mangin and Marechal Lyautey (current Avenue Mohamed V), with the minaret of the elegant Koutoubia Mosque as its landmark, and the snow-capped Atlas mountains overlooking it. Therefore, it could provide its inhabitants with the possibility to enjoy the *medina's* panoramic and spectacular views without forgoing the benefits of modernity. On the other hand, the old city turned into a sort of picturesque backdrop (Kurzac-Souali 2009), and a stage of exotic experiences that Westerners yearn for. This drastic urban renewal gave rise to the division of the city into two distinct areas characterized by sharp ethnic and social segregation. The renewal also laid the foundations required for tourists to enjoy Marrakesh, in line with the cultural and aesthetic standards of the Orientalist vision (Said 1991) of the Islamic world, as well as for new forms of clusterization and gentrification. As Kurzac-Souali (2009, p. 303) noted, the social innovation led by the restoration of the *medina* strengths the socio-spatial segregation in the old city. In particular, as Tebbaa and Skounti (2011) wrote, in the *medina* of Marrakesh there is the risk of an unprecedented change caused by the massive transformations of the ancient houses (*riad*) into a sort of B&B by a social elite, mainly composed by foreigners.

Marrakesh's tourist attractions, with a few significant exceptions,[13] are located inside the *medina*. The analysis of the distribution of visits highlights a high concentration at a relatively limited number of points and axes, with rapidly decreasing figures when departing from them. The highest daily average visits are reported from Jemaa El-Fna square, declared intangible cultural heritage by UNESCO. However, slightly further north–east, close to Ben Youssef Madrasa, one of Marrakesh's main expressions of its historical and cultural heritage, the figures recorded are significantly lower, and they decrease further as

[11] At a latitude of 31°37′35″ N, a longitude of 7°59′42″ O and a height of approximately 470 m.

[12] From last century's fifties and sixties, the Hivernage district was built south of it.

[13] Majorelle gardens, Menara gardens and the *Palmeraie* on the North, West and North–East of the *medina* respectively.

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we move towards the suburbs. Significant figures are also recorded along the two roads connecting Jemaa El-Fna square with the tourism hub consisting of the so-called Saadian Tombs, south of the *medina*. However, in this case also, intense attendance rapidly decreases, and the figures recorded just outside the Kasbah are almost zero. Another axis starts from Jemaa El-Fna square, which is characterized by significant intense attendance and is represented by Avenue Mohammed V, with the highest percentages at 16th November square due to the various "international" restaurants and coffee houses. However, in this case also, a few hundred meters from the main axis tourists tend to disappear. Therefore, the urban area mostly affected by the tourism flow is a sort of strip extending from the *ville nouvelle* to the western part of the *medina*, reaching its *kasbah.*

4 Consistency, Features and Distribution of Tourism Accommodation Services

Considering only duly registered accommodation facilities, in 2014, the accommodation capacity of Marrakesh amounted to 65,730 beds, or 31% of Morocco's total capacity. Almost half of this capacity consisted of hotel facilities belonging to the three-star category or higher and residential hotels, while 20% consisted of *riads*. The biggest facilities or higher-quality accommodation is concentrated in the Guèlize and Hivernage districts, while the smaller facilities or the lower-quality accommodation such as guest-houses and *riad* are located mainly inside the *medina*. As a matter of fact, the latter includes almost 90% of Marrakesh's *riads* or two-thirds of their bed capacity. The noun *riad* is the transliteration of the Arab word رياض, which also means "recreation" and "leisure"; therefore, in the classical Arab world it recalls the peaceful quietness that should characterize each home, and today, it should cause tourists to yearn for a "unique" and "typical" atmosphere during their tourist experience. It is no surprise, therefore, that these structures are mainly the result of traditional house conversion.[14] Usually, they are almost completely closed to the outside world, while their numerous rooms overlook an inner garden, where there is often a fountain and fruit trees, mainly citrus trees, according to Greek-Roman as well as Iranian architectural models that reached the Maghrebian world through Andalusian civilization. As regards the services, *riads* provide overnight stay and Moroccan breakfast, although adapted to western tastes and expectations.

The reuse of these buildings is the result of a long process that started during the French protectorate, when a number of local entrepreneurs converted several trading centres along rue Riad Zitun El-Kedim and rue Riad Zitun El-Djedid into restaurants.

This change of use was part of the *medina's* tourism promotion, given that accommodation facilities for western customers were concentrated in the *ville nouvelle*. At the end of the protectorate, this process was reinforced and the *medina* became an area where tourists did not only walk through, but where they lived as well, as they opened new restaurants and coffee houses, as well as the first *riads* and a few large hotels. However, with increasing mass tourism, the tourist experience becomes trivial: second-rate restaurants and bars appear and disappear rapidly, imitating the most stylish coffee houses (Wilbaux 2001; El Faiz 2002; Courbage 2009; Kurzac-Souali 2009; Sebti 2009a, b; Boumaza 2011; Saigh Bousta 2011; Tebbaa and Skounti 2011; Boujrouf and Tebbaa eds., 2011).

Due to the development of Marrakesh into a tourism resort included in the great worldwide destinations, as well as to the idea that it is a good city to move to, following the example of notable jet-set representatives, the number of Europeans who in the past decades settled in Marrakesh on a long-term basis, or moved their residence there, increased. They purchase both old *riads* in the *medina*, i.e. typical houses, and traditional multi-stores houses at advantageous

[14]However, there are also many accommodation facilities identified as *riads* even though they are traditional hotel facilities or similar.

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prices, and then renovate and equip them with modern facilities. In the wake of this trend, both regular real estate speculators and the aforementioned tourists–entrepreneurs–immigrants entered the real estate and accommodation facility markets.

On the basis of the 2014 census, slightly less than 80% of foreigners residing permanently in Marrakesh lived in the *ville nouvelle* and the *medina* The number of those who settled in the *medina* is slightly higher than the one of non-Maghrebi managers or owners of *riads* inside the *medina.* Although no statistical data are available to confirm a coincidence between the two groups, the interviews with owners or managers made us believe that this assumption can be regarded as well-founded, and above all that there is also a significant number of non-Maghrebis living in the *medina* on a permanent basis as tourists and providing accommodation in their own houses. As a matter of fact, European owners who, being tourists cannot carry out any economic activity provide lodgings to their guests who are qualified as their "friends", or they rely on convenient managers, who are mainly local managers.

However, large parts of the *medina* are not involved in this evolutionary process, in particular the districts of Mellah, Qbour Choudada and Bab Debbagh that are characterized by decay and economic and social marginalization. Here, the percentage of illiterate women exceeds the already high average of the *medina* (54%) reaching more than 70%, while the percentage of illiterate school children between the age of 8 and 13 is close to 70%, with the average percentage in the *medina* being higher than 80%, and in two of these districts 1/3 of the houses is without electricity (Sebti 2009b, pp. 228–229). Therefore, they are avoided by most tourists, except for the most curious ones. Indeed, by georeferencing the *riads* we observed that they are not distributed uniformly in the urban area; rather, they are located in three different areas. The first one is between Bab Doukkala and Jemaa El-Fnaa square; the second one is between the latter and the tourism hub of the Saadian Tombs, while the third one forms a sort of wide crescent embracing the *souk* area in the east, between Ben Youssef Madrasa and rue Dabbachi.

The *riads* aimed at tourism activities inside the *medina* owned or managed by non-Maghrebis are 53%, a percentage that almost reaches 60% if we also take into account those that have at least one non-Maghrebis as their owner or manager, while on the other hand those *riads* belonging to or managed by Maghrebis amount to 39% of the total (Fig. 1). In order to gain a better understanding of the spacial dynamics related to the said presences, we took into account the distribution in the *medina* of *riads* belonging to each group. By doing so, we identified three factors affecting distribution: the distance from Jemaa El-Fnaa square, the density of the structures and proximity between *riads.*

As we have already pointed out, the statistical analysis of tourism attendance confirmed the centrality of Jemaa El-Fnaa square. However, the surrounding area is not functionally homogeneous, but it can be divided into three distinct areas: a wide area in the west extending to the border of the *medina* and including open spaces, the large Koutoubia mosque and several large high-quality accommodation facilities, the wide circular sector in the north and east including the *souks,* while in the south and south-east accommodation facilities reach the square. Based on a basic gravitational model, we would expect that outside these three areas, where the density of *riads* is necessarily limited or non-existent, in each of the 196 square cells of the grid overlapping the urban map, the density of *riads* will decrease in an undifferentiated way as the distance from the square increases. As a matter of fact, the statistical analysis shows that for the structures as a whole, the density is 0.122 riad/ha for the centroids located at a distance of 250 m, reaching a maximum of 0.298 riad/ha at a distance of 1,400 m, and decreasing to 0.228 riad/ha at a slightly greater distance than 1,500 m and 0.047 *riad*/ha for distances greater than 2 km. However, the decrease in density as the distance increases is more rapid for those *riads* belonging to non-Maghrebis than for those belonging to Maghrebis, and the correlation

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Fig. 1 The *Riads* of the medina by the origin of the owner/manager



coefficient *r* between density and distance from the square is 0.190 for the former and 0.120 for the latter. The role played by the square as the centre around which *riad* accommodation facilities are organized, in a differentiated way, and the consequent gentrification process is confirmed by the fact that no significant correlation was found between *riad* density and distance from the other tourist attractions[15] inside the *medina*.

Based on *riad* density in each cell and on the distance of every centroid from the square, we identified four distinct clusters. The first one includes those *riads* that are 54% owned by non-Moroccans and whose average density per hectare is 0.122 riad/ha; in the second one, the number of "non-Maghrebi" *riads* and total average density accounts for 69% and 0.298 riad/ha; in the third one, the number of "non-Maghrebi" *riads* accounts for 53% and the average density decreases to 0.228 riad/ha, while in the fourth cluster the number of "non-Maghrebi" *riads* accounts for 33% and total density is 0.047 riad/ha. In turn, the differences between average distances between all *riads* and the average distances between *riads* included in each of the two groups taken into account show that the average distance between "non-Maghrebi" *riads* is 4.8% lower than the total average one, and the average distance between "Maghrebi" *riads* is 5.5% lower than the average distance between all *riads* inside the *medina.* Therefore, it emerges that *riads* tend to aggregate according to the ethnicity of their owners.

Finally, when placing the *riad* distribution map on the map of the areas subject to urban renewal processes a significant coincidence between them emerges, and their overlapping is even greater if we leave out the areas subject to urban renovation in the west of Jemaa El-Fnaa square as they are occupied by gardens, squares as well as religious and public buildings (Fig. 2).

5 Final Remarks

The geostatistical analysis helped to clarify the geographical descriptive features of the gentrification of Marrakesh's' *medina*. First of all, the clusterization of accommodation facilities has different features according to the geographical scale at which the analysis is carried out. At the urban scale, there is a concentration of high-quality hotels in the Hivernage district or at the border with the *medina,* high-standard hotels, although on average lower than the previous one,

[15]It is the southern hub including the Saadian Tombs, the El badi and Bahia historical buildings, the Mellah (i.e. the old Jewish ghetto) and the Kasbah.

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

Fig. 2 *Riad* and urban regeneration

in the Guélize district, and lastly of *riads* inside the *medina.* On the other hand, at the single district scale, and limited to the *riads,* we noticed a clusterization related to the European or non-European origin of their owners or managers. As a matter of fact, non-Maghrebi *riads* tend to concentrate in tourist areas that are closer to Jemaa El-Fnaa square; therefore, more attractive, but also in areas with a higher land or income value. On the contrary, the distribution of *riads* belonging to or managed by Maghrebis is hardly related to proximity to the square. In turn, this process is related to the city's tourism performance and to its tourist image, presenting it as a symbol of the Maghreb's Oriental vision on the one hand, while on the other it depends on the flow of a new category of immigrants from western countries, especially from Europe and above all from France, Spain and Italy (Wihtol de Wenden 2013; Khrouz and Lanza 2016; Peraldi and Terrazzoni, 2016a, b; Pellegrini 2016). In some cases, these people transfer their residence to Marrakesh, where they start a tourism business, which often consists in opening a *riad.* Sometimes this happens after repeated and prolonged holidays, while at other times people decide to move to Morocco for economic reasons, such as the favourable tax legislation, and only afterwards decide to start a business. Still, in other instances, the transfer is due to love stories (a common phenomenon for *riads* managed by non-Maghrebis and Maghrebis), but there are also those who leave Europe with a clear investment project in mind. In all these cases, there are people who keep their residence abroad and who in Morocco are regarded (both statistically and legally) as "tourists", although they are actually immigrants.

Our survey referred to the first of the aforesaid groups. It follows that our results underestimate both the clusterization of accommodation facilities with the success of the *medina* as accommodation hub based on *riads,* and its gentrification carried out by a community of

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foreigners who either own or manage a *riad*. Therefore, the emerging scenario is one of urban and social transformation caused by the joint action of tourism development and migration. Thus, we are not witnessing only a tourism-driven gentrification, as in many other European and non-European historical centres, but also its combination with migration along the north–south axis.

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paradiso@unisannio.it

Climate Change-Induced Migration in Morocco: Sub-Saharian and Moroccan Migrants

Cayetano Fernández, María Luisa Sierra-Huedo and David Chinarro

Abstract

The vertiginous and unquestionable climate change could alter the delicate balance that exists between human beings and nature. Countries struggle to reach international agreements to set mitigation measures or adaptation to changing climatic conditions, otherwise, autochthonous population in certain vulnerable regions could be forced to search better living conditions. North Africa, highly vulnerable region against climate change effects, is characterized by large natural climate variability, a rapid land-use change, and high population dynamics. In such a way, climate phenomena have forced people to abandon rural areas. This chapter stems from the research developed inside MEDCHANGe-WP6 and aims to present the studies and experiences of scholars undertaken in Morocco, for fifteen months. The goal is to present a methodology through a systematic approach to initially assess the climate change impacts on the essential resources for the livelihood of rural population which could be deemed migration determinants. Mixed method was the necessary inquiry strategy to tackle the work. The complementarity among the methods permits to clarify and verify some intermediate levels of analysis in the course of discovering the change-induced migration. On the one hand, a qualitative methodology applies ethnographic methods such as participant observation and semi-structured personal interviews to key informants with Nussbaum's theory as a theoretical framework to develop the research tools. On the other hand, quantitative methods try to numerically show a connection of meteorological variability and natural extreme phenomena with the movement of population.

Keywords

Climate change · Migration · Sub-Saharians Morocco

C. Fernández · M. L. Sierra-Huedo
D. Chinarro (✉)
Universidad San Jorge, Saragossa, Spain
e-mail: dchinarro@usj.es

C. Fernández
e-mail: cfernandez@usj.es

M. L. Sierra-Huedo
e-mail: mlsierra@usj.es

1 Introduction: Literature Review for Initial Assumptions

In Europe, according to Eurostat (European Union [EU] 2015) "On 1 January 2015, … the number of people living in the EU-28 who had

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paradiso@unisannio.it

been born outside of the EU was 34.3 million", that is to say, approximately 14.1% of international migration is destined to Europe.

Although the main causes of migration have traditionally been attributed to economic factors and conflicts (Arango 2000; Bakewell 2009), certain current assertions indicate the influence of other components (Garcia 2003). High Commissioner for Refugee identified four causes that lead a person to migrate: political instability, economic tensions, ethnic conflicts and environmental degradation (UNHCR 1993). Since environmental factors and climate change are considered to be one of the causes that motivate people to migrate, the issue grows in complexity, so that, the "environmental migration is understood as a multi-causal phenomenon, in which environmental drivers play a significant and increasingly determinative role. These drivers can appear in the form of natural disasters or environmental degradation, and these may or may not be related to climate change" (IOM 2011). According to Myers (2005), in 1995, there were about 25 million displaced people and ponders that "when global warming takes hold, there could be as many as 200 million people overtaken by disruptions of monsoon systems and other rainfall regimes, by droughts of unprecedented severity and duration, and by sea-level rise and coastal flooding." That is to say, migration is caused by the intervention of different environmental aspects with more or less influence, depending, for example, of the moment or the geographical area.

Considering the reasons inherent to individual freedom, the intention that leads a person to emigrate can represent a much more complex process. Martha Nussbaum's capabilities are ten: Life; Bodily Health; Bodily Integrity; Senses, Imagination and Thought; Emotions; Practical Reason; Affiliation; Other Species; Play; and Control over one's Environment (Nussbaum 2012). These core capabilities are freedoms to accomplish things deemed necessary for a dignified life, where the control over one's environment plays an essential value (Nussbaum 2006, pp. 76–78). The principles that should guide the society to distribute environmental benefits and burdens are not sufficiently clear in the Nussbaum's "capabilities approach", according to Holland (2008). Nevertheless, Holland recognizes that Nussbaum's nonprocedural method of political justification provides the basis for adjudicating environmental justice claims and recommends an extended capabilities approach to assess the distribution of benefits and burdens associated with climate change. Held et al. (2011) consider that although the core of capability posed by Nussbaum is being able to live concerned for and in relation to the world of nature and for its justice implications, she does not analyze the climate change and other ecological interdependencies. Caney and Bell (2011), after analyzing the Nussbaum capabilities, explore the importance of climate change's effects on displacement and loss of "a sense of place". Mason (2011) inquires on the major liberal egalitarian alternative to social contract theory—the capabilities approach associated with the work of Nussbaum, to assess the capabilities perspective entangled to the global (and domestic) social justice in terms of social entitlements, which could likely trigger migration movements.

The evidence for climate change is nowadays considered indubitable after reports elaborated by International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2015), among others. Singular weather phenomena can have negative consequences for biodiversity and the conditions of human life. Findley's (1994) was a pioneer in studying the relationship between drought and migration in Mali during the 1983–1985 drought. Findley found that long-distance migration is notably followed by male household members and it decreased during drought periods, due to the food scarcity leads to increased prices, forcing people to spend more money on their basic needs rather than to venture a long-distance migration. However, local migration augmented during drought periods, since women and children left in search of work to contribute to household incomes. Droughts in 1972–1973 and in 1984–1985 in Sahel region reveal the vulnerability of hydrology and ecosystems resources which caused loss of human life and a decimation of livestock herds in the semiarid zone

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(Herceg et al. 2007). Sanfo et al. (2016) identify the key climate and environmental drivers that cause farmers of Burkina Faso to migrate, based on several model studies (Ibrahim et al. 2012) that revealed that this region, as the country's breadbasket, is affected by climate change. A similar analysis of consequences can be found in North Africa published by Tramblay et al. (2013).

Morocco, being a "frontier country of work" within the denominations given by Skeldon (1992) and separated from Europe by only 13 km, was historically an emigration crossroad, a transit country on the West-African migratory corridor, though also an origin of migration flow and as well as it has a characteristics of destination country for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, internal migration from rural population to the major cities is happening in the last decades. Since Moroccan societal evolution depicts four migration patterns, this country is the proper fieldwork for this study. Migration dynamism characteristics involving a spatial focus and behavior of internal and external movements are changing over time, according to the perception developed by Zelinsky (1971). Morocco is a country with high vulnerability with respect to climate change, and some studies explain how households have been affected by weather shocks (Schilling et al. 2012). While droughts and floods are not directly identified as major reasons for migration, insufficient agricultural revenue and a lack of agricultural employment are affected by adverse weather shocks (Nguyen and Wodon 2014). Going back just a few years, destructive weather episodes have happened in this country. The flood on November 29, 2010, caused enormous human losses in Casablanca. The flood on November 22, 2014, in the southern caused numerous damages and fatalities. In Settat, on December 23, 2001, several villages were flooded and several people were dead. The dramatic historical episode in the Ourika valley was the flood of August 17, 1995, that caused more than 230 deaths, 500 missing persons, and enormous damages (Saidi et al. 2003). In Morocco, of the total 4.2 million poor people (14% of Morocco's population), 69% live in rural areas (Douidiche et al. 2007); and most of them depend on rain-fed agriculture, making this population highly vulnerable to reduced rainfall and shifts in rainfall timing distribution (Tramblay et al. 2012). Since agriculture is a sector of strategic significance in Morocco, further reductions in precipitation will have an impact on both output and consumption (Azzam and Sekkat 2005).

Related to correlation models and interdependency between climate variables and human movements, Raleigh et al. (2008) through a multi-causal framework of analysis assess a possible contribution of environmental stresses to rural subsistence, which is related to the outbreak of forced exodus. Piguet (2010) describes and cites examples of six methodological approaches to the question of climate change and migration link: ecological inference based on area characteristics, individual sample surveys, time series correlation, multilevel analysis, agent-based modeling and qualitative methods. Migration, considered as an adaptation strategy instead of a direct impact of climate change, was assumed by Bardsley and Hugo (2010) after weighing linear and nonlinear effects of climate change and estimating thresholds above which the migration is triggered.

Since the above exposition, the literature on climate change and migration is increasing, but the issue requires a formal treatment with reasonable results. In this study, we relate the practice of a methodology to reveal the difficulty in assessing the far-reaching impacts of environment and climate change on population uprooting and migration. In the searching of migration causes, it should not be dissociated from its societal context. For these reasons, the parallel tackling of quantitative and qualitative methodology might shed light on addressing the identification and quantification of a causal model.

In the context of this work, we have assumed the concept of climate variability, given by IPCC (2012), as what "refers to variations in the mean state and other statistics (such as standard deviations, the occurrence of extremes) of the climate at all spatial and temporal scales beyond that of

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individual weather events. Variability may be due to natural internal processes within the climate system (internal variability), or to variations in natural or anthropogenic external forcing (external variability)". Also, we assume the concept of climate extreme (extreme weather or climate event) from the same IPCC reference, as "the occurrence of a value of a weather or climate variable above (or below) a threshold value near the upper (or lower) ends of the range of observed values of the variable".

Two research questions encourage our commitment to sixteen stay secondments accomplished in Morocco: *What is the weight of climate change in the set of determinants of migration process? In case of correlation between the variability of the climate system and natural systems supplying resources for subsistence, we can achieve a tentative model of environmental migration?* After fixing the target geographical area, we come up to test several multi-methods and mixed methodologies to match results from the social sciences investigation and ones from environmental engineering models.

2 The Study Area

In certain Moroccan regions, such as Marrakesh-Safi region, ecosystems and many human societies undertake significant vulnerability to current climate-related extremes, such as heat waves, droughts, floods, and hurricanes. The regional climate variability assessment has been encompassed with surveys on migratory flow paths from the Marrakech-Safi rural areas to Marrakesh city. Since ancient times, the population of this region has an exceptional adaptation to these abrupt changes. The variability of climate, weather, and geological features exposes this region to many natural events, sometimes devastating or with notable effects over the common life of inhabitants. This can turn on landslides, tsunamis, and also other more frequent events are included, such as persistent droughts, large floods, intensive wind, forest fires, heat waves, and strong storms (Khomsi et al. 2016). The spatial distribution of the five climate types given in the Marrakesh-Safi region according to Köppen–Geiger climate classification system (Kottek et al. 2006) trigger intense and diverse population flow to adapt to environmental and climatic conditions (Table 1).

Barrow et al. (2000) review the traditional agriculture in the Atlas Mountains, seeking to identify any breakdown in sustainable livelihood strategies. Livelihood is environmentally sustainable when "it maintains or enhances the local and global assets on which livelihoods depend and has net beneficial effects on other livelihood" (Chambers and Conway 1992).

Tensift River, a relevant geographic element, is very sensitive to climatic variations and fundamental support of agriculture and rural activity in the Marrakesh-Safi region. Tensift basin, extended over 19,400 km^2, is located inside latitudes 32° 10′ and 30° 50′ north and longitudes 9° 25′ and 7° 12′ west, enclosing the city of Marrakesh. It is drained by the Tensift River which flows from east to west for over 260 km. Its vegetation is generally poor and depends on the nature of soils and the rainfall regimen.

Table 1 Spatial distribution of the five climate types given in the Marrakesh-Safi region according to Köppen–Geiger climate classification system

Denomination	Köppen–Geiger notation	Percentage
Warm desert climate	BWh	26
Warm semiarid climate	BSh	24
Cold desert climate	BWk	6
Cold semiarid climate	BSk	17
Warm Mediterranean climate	Csa	27

Source Own work following Köppen–Geiger climate classification (Kottek et al. 2006)

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3 Methodology

In order to answer our main research questions, we needed to have access to both quantitative and qualitative information, and therefore, we used a mixed methods research design developed in three main phases. The problem addressed in this research is complex and interdisciplinary in nature that is why the use of both quantitative and qualitative approaches provided a better understanding of the research problem. This approach enabled us to verify whether in the areas identified as migration areas by the participants, due to lack of water, drought or climate change, there was a correlation between the evolution of atmospheric models in these domains and migration causes. This was indeed a cross-culturally research; therefore, it required knowledge of the cultures involved. We as the main researchers have ensured that interview questionnaires were translated into the main languages spoken in Morocco, as well as taking into account the cultures involved when developing the interview questions. Moroccan culture is a collectivistic culture, sharing characteristics such as giving importance to human relations based on their word, circular in their communication style, and prone to tell stories refereeing to the past involving their historical accounts and ancestors (Mernissi 1987, 2001; Northouse 2007). Thus, we developed our interview questions taking into account all these cultural factors and encouraging the participants to engage in a storytelling about their environment and their family's history in the migration journey, as well as climatic changes and natural events in their places of origin. We worked together with researchers from Moroccan universities, who helped us in our getting to know their culture better, and they reviewed our interview questions as well as our participant observation tool.

Since "structured design seeks to conquer the complexity of large systems in two ways: partitioning and hierarchical organization" (Page-Jones 1980), an overview of the posed problem permit categorized the *causation chain* in four levels. Each one constitutes a subsystem domain, and all are coupled each other by mutual influence. The first level shows the climate change evidence through indicators as hydrological cycle alteration or thermal trending. In the second level, the study of correlations and high statistics methods can help to reveal the human activities affected by the impact factors identified in first level. Third level assesses disparate impacts on environmental migration, climate refugees, life mode restructuring, loss of homes, medical facilities, and other essential services. The fourth level represents the social groups that suffer the greater consequences of climate change: special minorities, victimized women, unprotected children, uprooted native people, low-income populations, and inhabitants of areas with weak health infrastructure. The quantitative study is focused on second level and more exact on the water resources availability for critical activities, particularly agriculture. Quantitative upshots should be concordant or complementary of results coming from the qualitative study.

3.1 Mixed Methods

Mixed method research combines quantitative and qualitative techniques, methods, approaches, concepts, or language into a single study (Johnson et al. 2007, p. 120), interlacing the pragmatic method and the heuristic analysis. The most common and well-known approach to mixing methods is the triangulation design (Creswell et al. 2003) intended to converge different methods. The *convergence model* is the traditional model of a mixed methods triangulation design. It is a "quality control" which helps the researcher to control his/her biases (Fetterman 1989) by validating results and avoiding generalization (Stewart 1998). As Fetterman (1989) explains, it is a process that consists of "testing one source of information against another to strip away alternative explanations and prove hypothesis" (p. 89).

The *convergence model* was used to develop this project, in particular a concurrent transformative strategy since the procedures used are those in which the researchers converge qualitative and quantitative data providing a more in-depth comprehensive analysis of the study

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based on a specific conceptual framework and theory. The fact that we were an interdisciplinary research team coming from environmental and engineer sciences and social sciences promoted this method design. Quantitative and qualitative data are separately analyzed but with the same target: the critical resource for livelihood. The impact of the climate change on the critical resource is merely quantitative, and the study of dependency of migration on critical resource as a trigger of migration is mainly qualitative. In a consolidated stage, both types of outcomes should converge, by comparing, contrasting, validating, or corroborating quantitative results with qualitative assertions.

3.2 Qualitative Methodology

The objective of qualitative study is to propose an advance in the causality chain defined from the climate change phenomena to the availability of critical resources which could force people to migrate. That means setting up a methodology to connect the functional analysis of meteorological data with the social researching, i.e., mixed methods (qualitative and quantitative) carried out from a multidisciplinary study.

The use of qualitative methodology allowed us to give voice to the main characters of this work, being those people who migrate. Oral interviews give us the chance to listen to Moroccan migrants and sub-Saharian refugees living in Morocco and discover how they see the impact of climate change in their migration process. Oral interviews are indeed descriptions of social life and how their context has changed. This "invisible" knowledge of migrants' experiences help researchers to build better social understanding and theories.

We used ethnographic tools such as participant observation and semi-structured personal interviews to key informants with Nussbaum's theory as a framework to develop the research tools. Nussbaum's (2012) theory which is based on the different areas of human life, sets up ten central capabilities, which are the foundations for the development of human beings in the space in where they live, move, and socialize. The base of Nussbaum's theory emerges from this question: What is needed for a human being's life to be dignified. This issue is the core of our study, since people do not leave their region of origin unless they cannot live there with some kind of dignity. This issue is the core of our study, since people do not leave their region of origin unless they cannot live there with some kind of dignity. Nussbaum's approach, which is a revised version of Amartya Sen's theory, is based on a pluralistic view of basic social justice (Nussbaum 2005). Thus, Nussbaum centered on women's rights since they are the ones who suffer from violence and worse conditions in general "Many if not most women have worse tales to tell; what I want to stress is that even those who do not suffer from violence directly suffer from the threat of it, which greatly diminishes numerous valuable capabilities" (p. 168). Researching the uneven impacts of climate change in Morocco has brought us to use this conceptual framework, since the ones who first suffer from worse climate change conditions are people who survive in weak and poor economies, in other words, those who have one of the ten basic capabilities diminished. The lack for these human beings to just even have the agency, here understood as the capacity for humans to make choices and to impose those choices on the world, for developing as such. Thus just to imagine alternative possibilities. This lack of agency forces them to not be able to develop fully as human beings. "Our world is not a decent and minimally just world unless we have secured the ten [central] capabilities, up to an appropriate threshold level, to all the world's people" (Nussbaum 2006, p. 70). There is without a doubt the possibility of a person to be able to choose, if that does not exist then this person is lacking the basic ten central capabilities to flourish, grow and fully developed as a human being, which indeed happens to forced migration due to climate change (Nussbaum 2005).

A tool was developed for the participant observation that took place the first and second months of our fieldwork experience in Marrakesh and Casablanca and continued during the rest of the fieldwork experience in Morocco. During that time, we contact with organizations and NGOs

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that work with migrants and/or refugees. They helped us access most of the participants in our study. Participant observation is the door to the details and problems of the right social knowledge (McClung 1970). As Lofland and Lofland (1995) say, participant observation is also known as "field observation", "qualitative observation" or "direct observation" (p. 18), it is a process in which the ethnographer starts and establishes a relationship of a minimum of six months with the culture studied or the subjects and in their natural environment (Fetterman 1989; Lofland and Lofland 1995; Stewart 1998). We kept a fieldwork diary, and we completed an observation tool. According to Wolcott (2008), participant observation is what the researcher gains from experiencing the raw reality and it helps them to get in contact with the new culture under study, allowing researchers to clarify concepts, understand "how things work around here" and take in that reality is never what it really seems. The interview questions were approved by an ethics committee and by EU ethics commission. The personal interviews and collecting climate data took place over the period of five months of fieldwork in the area of Marrakesh and the area of Casablanca.

Regarding the scope of our study, 47 people have participated (30 men and 17 women), as can be seen in Table 2. Participants were randomly selected, most of them belonged to NGOs working with migrants and refugees in Morocco. Researchers were directly addressed to merchants from the Medina of Marrakesh to expose the questionaire and invite them to collaborate. Merchants always were very glad to participate because they considered this study is essential for understanding what is happening in Marrakesh demograph displacements and in its surroundings. The interviews aimed to inquire if people who may have migrated for different reasons, they might also have moved as a consequence of climate change, even though they would not mention it as such in their answers. The main participants in this study are: migrants, refugees, non-governmental organization (NGO) managers, as well as merchants from the Medina of Marrakesh. All participants signed an informed consent form, and there are not minors.

The interview questionnaire was structured into three main areas: the first section was designed to locate geographically the impact of climate change. We ask questions about their origin: Where do they live today; the main activity they develop in their place of origin and residence; to describe structural changes and weather conditions in their areas. Most of them come from Loudaya, Sidi Bou, Othmane, El Kelaaq des Sraghma, Ouzud, El Ouidane, Demnate, Timezguida, Ourika, Tahannaout, and Loulija.

The second section aimed to understand and analyze the causes of migration: Sometimes we interviewed people who did not migrate themselves, but we asked them if their parents, grandparents, or friends did it and why. We also enquire about remarkable meteorological phenomenon, such as droughts and floods, could have been drivers or causes in the migration, with different questions about the impact of climate and/or the weather in the life subsistence in their origin regions, how those rapid climate changes have impacted their daily lives and of their families. We inquired if they would have stayed in their place of origin if they have had the opportunity.

And finally, the third section deals with the future: They are asked what they would like to do or if they thought they would migrate to another city or to another country? Where and why?

Analyzing induced migration by climate change, we can encounter relatively difficulties beside of the complexity of the phenomenon. For example, there is no common concept accepted for designating people migrating due to climate change or environmental factors by international organizations and academia. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and United Nations Population Fund (IOM 2008) identify three categories: "environmentally motivated migrants," "environmentally forced migrants," and "environmental refugees" (Table 3).

We have found some limitations in the use of qualitative methodology. For example, not everyone interviewed is a migrant. For this reason, their answers are related to family or friend

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Table 2 Description of the participants by position and gender

Foundation/association/center	Activity/position	Number of men	Number of women
Amal Association (Marrakech)	Director	1	
	Pupils		13
Imadel	Director		1
Medina's merchant (Marrakech)	Merchant	9	
UNHCR (Casablanca)	External relations (Casablanca)	1	
IOM (Casablanca)	Responsible for programs (Casablanca)	1	
Foundation East-West (Casablanca)	Director/Responsible children accompanied	1	1
	Refugees	13	1
Refugee Association (Marrakech)	Director	3	
Cáritas	Priest (Casablanca)	1	
Service de centre accueil migrantes (SAM) (Casablanca)	In charge of the center		1
		30	17

Table 3 Own elaboration from source IOM-UNFPA

International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2008) and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) (2008)	
Environmentally motivated migrants who 'pre-empt the worst' and leave before the environmental degradation	Includes economic migrants who have anticipated the worst and have chosen choose to migrate either temporarily or permanently
Environmental forced migrants whose attempt is to 'avoid the worst'	Includes those who would leave permanently as their livelihood is reduced and as they try to avoid the worst
Environmental refugees who are 'fleeing the worst and may be displaced temporarily or permanently	Who will flee for their lives rather than their livelihood. These migrants may escape the harshest environmental conditions leaving their residences either temporarily or permanently and will migrate internally or outside national borders

experiences, which means that their answers are not based on personal experiences. Besides, another more complex problem is whether migrants are truly aware that their migration is due to environmental causes or climate change. For example, they may think they have migrated due to lack of food, but the real cause is that it did not rain, so they could not cultivate crops and as a consequence, there was no food, so they moved. Their way of life, linked to agriculture, is not sufficiently productive to survive because of climate change. However, other limitations we found were when responses pointed to more than one reason to migrate.

3.3 Quantitative Methodology

Through the interviews, we have obtained sites on which to study climate change over the past decades. Then, with a quantitative method, we have tried to establish a connection between meteorological variability and natural extreme phenomena, and the movement of population. The clarification of climate change impacts on migration involves quantitative methods from statistical regression and system dynamics based modeling in order to integrate the multiple triggers in the migration process (Lenin and Rodriguez 2011). Once the model is attained,

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simulations on the model could foresee the future migration patterns. Researchers of MED-CHANGe had planned a hierarchical analysis starting from the root cause of the problem to reach the social impact. Nevertheless, the implementation has very simplified due to the project scope and limited to a statistic analysis of daily and longer series of maximum and minimum temperature, and precipitation, in the Marrakesh region. Temperature and precipitation time series have been obtained from National Climatic Data Center (NOAA), following the data set description given by Menne et al. (2012).

The loss of water resources decreases the agricultural productivity due to climate change. The connection between climatology and hydrology and consequently agriculture has been well studied in the literature. From the pioneering Ricardian theory (Ricardo 1817), the impact of global warming on agriculture was well analyzed by Mendelsohn et al. (1994) and Cline (1996). The study of Kurukulasuriy and Mendelsohn (2008) examines the impact of climate change on cropland in Africa, using a Ricardian cross-sectional approach. Authors applied these results to possible future climates to reveal that dry land farms are especially climate sensitive in 2020s decade, where climate change could have strong negative impacts on currently dry and hot locations. Mendelsohn (2014) used a Ricardian study on China agriculture that estimated climate coefficients for Chinese crops, to interpolate potential climate damages across the whole Asian continent. Chen et al. (2013) assess the impact of climate change on China's agricultural production at a cross-provincial level using the Ricardian approach, incorporating a multilevel model with farm-level group data. Some statistic methods have been applied by Fleischer (2008) in Israeli agriculture, where exogenous and endogenous variables have different weights according to the particular circumstances, determined by the soil, local climate, market economy involvement, among others. The variability of precipitation patterns, with regarding intensity, duration and frequency of rainfall, will alter the surface water and groundwater availability. Consequently, in some way, agriculture profits and crops will be affected. Another application of Ricardian proposal comes from Salvo et al. (2013) to measure the impact of climate change on permanent crops in an Alpine region. Even more, Darwin (1999) explicitly includes the irrigation to improve the Ricardian analysis.

Morocco—where 40% of the population is dedicated to work the land—is already undergoing the impacts of climate change on its agricultural production, in order to find the most suitable model that could best reveal the causality or correlation between climate change and agriculture in the Marrakesh-Safi region. In this rural area, the agriculture is the basis of the economy and welfare of the most population and, in consequence, it can determine the likely conditions to estimate the live hood dignity threshold that, in certain extent, might force people to migrate. In a migration decision process, family structure economy depending on a critical access to resources necessary for subsistence increases the likelihood of migration.

The second level in the *causation chain* can be devised, from the social and economic development that depends on the availability and the sustainable management of water resources at a given place and time, and this availability is strongly affected by climatic conditions (Hammer et al. 2001). Among the research that has attempted to investigate the consequences of climate change on water availability and social livelihoods, Gohar and Cashman (2016) propose a dynamic nonlinear model to optimize the economy of irrigation and food security under extreme events of climatic assumptions. Ouhamdouch et al. (2016) estimate the climate change impact on hydrology system, particularly on the aquifer of Essaouira Basin (Morocco). Since climate variability establishes the hydrological cycle, any alteration in the climate pattern for a given region will signify an alteration in the availability of water and therefore in the entire dependent ecosystem. Water is considered the primary resource and agriculture as the essential economic support of the migrant potential in the origin areas studied.

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The quantitative study scope in this project is limited to some aspects of the second level in the *causation chain*, particularly on the water resources availability for the basic economy, such as agriculture. To identify the permanent components in non-stationary time series, least-squares method with fitting polynomial has been applied completed with discrete wavelet transform to extract a polynomial trend from the non-stationary time series (Craigmile et al. 2004). Also, wavelet transform techniques are very suitable to detect periodic components in this type of time series.

The Ricardian method is a classical cross-sectional approach to studying agricultural production. Under the principle that the value of land would reflect its net productivity, the method establishes a function with different parameters: the market price, the output of the crop, a vector comprising all purchased input, water flow, a vector containing soil variables, a vector of economic variables, and finally—the focus of the issue—a vector of climate variables (Mendelsohn et al. 1994). This empirical formula is the base of a model to assess the impact of the climate change on the agriculture activity. Nevertheless, a gray box in the context of system engineering is the proper way to model the interaction of weather processes and agriculture production. A gray box modeling is an intermediate technique when peculiarities of internal laws are not entirely known and statistic and experimental data analysis is required (Chinarro et al. 2014).

Tensif hydrological basin, on the one hand, is a relevant geographic element in the region, very sensitive to climatic variations; and, on the other, is a fundamental support of agriculture and rural activity in the Marrakesh-Safi region. Meteorological time series were analyzed from 1957 to September 2016 with daily samples of maximum, average, and minimum temperature, as well as daily rainfall from NOAA source database (Menne et al. 2016). Before analyzing time series, some issues should be addressed on the form of achieving raw data, check the integrity and reliability of preparing procedures. The raw time series have some data loss or unexpected values in some short periods mostly by the fifties and sixties. These deficiencies are discordant values that can appear in a time series, also named outliers and (Hawkins 1980) defined as: “the observation that deviates so much from other observations as to arouse suspicion that it was generated by a different mechanism”. In some cases, an excessive deviation of the expected spectrum of a signal was interpreted as the possible presence of outliers, so, lose data had to be regenerated and abnormal ones filtered applying Wavelet-Rosner test, as an extension of Rosner test in the frequency domain (Chinarro et al. 2011).

The meteorological data considered as highlighted impacts on agriculture have been temperature and precipitation. In the first approach of analysis of the time series of daily temperatures, we have computed the least-squares fit of a straight line (or composite line for piecewise linear trends) to obtain the straight-line trend slope. In order to try a more precise trend, the raw time series was filtered applying wavelet filter represented by brown line in Fig. 1. Over the filtered time series, a smoothing was applied (magenta line), the Savitzky–Golay filter (Savitzky and Golay 1964); and finally the red line is the nonlinear trend estimated by polynomial fit based on Wandermonde matrix obtained by fitting squares fit. Horizontal black line is drafted as reference for the evolution of the different fittings and is established on the 1983 value. Both testing methods clearly depict a trend with a steep rising about year 1983 with a slight decay in sixteen’s decade. Taking the polynomial Wandermonde tendency function, in the final part of line, it is appreciated an absolute difference of 1.64877° respect the horizon reference.

Decreasing rainfall trend in North and West Africa is dealt by several authors, e.g., Mahe and Paturel (2009) showing that the mean annual rainfall amount during four decades (1970–2009) remained lower than the mean annual rainfall recorded during the period 1900–1970. Three methods to detect trends have been applied to Marrakesh-Safi region to confirm the Mahe’s study. The time series of daily rainfall (Fig. 2) comprises the period from June 1973 to

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

Fig. 1 Average temperature time series and trends in Marrakesh-Safi, period: 1957–2016



Fig. 2 Daily rainfall in Marrakesh-Safi over the period from June 1973 to August 2017

September 2016, due to data before 1973 are not available with sufficient quality. The red line represents the linear trend which indicates a slight descent of the precipitation trend.

Indices of daily temperature and precipitations were calculated using the consistent approach similar to methods from Filahi et al. (2016), who provide a summary of Morocco's extreme climate trends during the last four decades to show a decrease in the number of cold days and nights and an increase in the number of warm days and nights.

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Drought severity is difficult to determine, due to it is dependent not only on the duration, intensity, and geographical extent of a specific drought episode but also on the demands made by human activities and by the vegetation on a region's water supplies. While a drought may take place in a season or in a run of years, its impacts on society may linger for many years. Also, the impact of a drought depends largely on society's vulnerability to drought at that particular moment. Subsequent droughts in the same region will probably have different effects, even if identical in intensity, duration, and spatial characteristics. Among the four ways to estimate the drought index, meteorological, agricultural, hydrological, socioeconomical (Wilhite and Glantz 2009), we only present here the meteorological drought as a sample of the work done, which is defined here in terms of the magnitude of a precipitation shortfall and the duration of this shortfall event.

In spite of drought can be considered a strictly meteorological phenomenon, in a rigorous work (Palmer 1965), all other indices from different types of droughts should be estimated because of its interdependency. Droughts are generally obtained with indices. Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) is extensively applied, but in this case, it has some disadvantages: in regions with disperse climatic variability, such as Marrakesh-Safi, a uniform PDSI estimated by self-calibration is not trustworthy; it lacks multi-timescale features, making it difficult to correlate with hydrological systems; and it assumes that precipitation is immediately available obviating the groundwater infiltrated and storage. For this study, a generic meteorological drought index has been configured from the Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) from Mckee et al. (1993), since it is widely used and recommended by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and gives a better representation of abnormal wetness and dryness than PSDI. The SPI is a transformation of the accumulated precipitation in a specific time period (in this study 2 months has been selected) into a normal distribution of mean zero and standard deviation 1. The precipitation normalization for the SPI calculations at different timescales can take values: extremely wet (more than 2), very wet (1.5–1.99), moderately wet (1.0–1.49), near normal (−0.99 to 0.99), moderately dry (−1.0 to −1.49), severely dry (−1.5 to −1.99), extremely dry (−2 and less). SPI index was calculated for Marrakesh-Safi on 43-year period 1973–2017 for NOAA data set. The SPI trend depicted in (Fig. 3) presents a decreasing slope, near to values corresponding to an extremely dry conditions in the last decades.

4 Results and Findings Discussion

The interviews were taped, transcribed, and analyzed using the program NVIVO (2017). Participant observation documents were kept in computer folders and later on coded using NVIVO. The transcriptions were kept in separate computer folders.

For coding, the NVIVO software program was used. Above some codes were set before analyzing the data, deductively, such as climate change, and Nussbaum's ten central capabilities. Thus, additional categories were added during the process of coding some codes were added inductively while the researchers analyzed the data. Restructuring the first coding and reviewing the list of codes aided to group similar codes and look for those that were redundant. This helped to reduce the codes to a more manageable number. The process continued looking again for new or redundant codes.

The researchers analyzed each data source separately and then look for themes that were common as the researcher worked to build explanations. After following this process and when the list was reduced to five or seven themes or categories that the participants talked the most about during the interviews, then those themes were the ones developed in a narrative way. Finally, the explanation building technique was used to analyze the data, as well as the use of NVIVO for coding the interviews and documents. The researchers decided to use NVIVO since it "helps analyze, manage, shape, and analyze qualitative data" (2017). The use of this

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

Fig. 3 SPI index trend in Marrakesh

software helped with the use of different languages (French, Arabic, Spanish, and English), and the researchers were able to manipulate the data and conduct different searches. This way, the coding was deductive and inductive, since some nodes were created before an in-depth analysis of the transcribed interviews, and inductive since some codes were created directly in the software. The constant comparative method of data analysis helped the researchers to manage the huge amount of data that was being collected and to create the larger themes. The researchers were open to new codes that were emerging during the analysis. According to Creswell (2009), the use of 'prefigured' codes is normally used more frequently in health sciences. However, following an inductive and deductive coding process helped the researchers to limit the analysis and build up from there. The researchers had certain codes in mind before transcribing and coding the data. Those main codes were deductively constructed from the literature review, such as Nussbaum's Central Capabilities among others, which is the theoretical framework of the study such as: affiliation; control over your own environment; emotions; feelings, imagination and thought; games (mainly right to play); life expectancy; other species within this one respect for the environment; physical health mainly access to good living conditions (housing, nutrition); physical integrity and finally practical reason. The researchers started making sense of the data, making decisions on how to narrow and focus the study, developing analytic questions, and incorporating themes on participants (Merriam 2009). All these established nodes were grouped under the node of Migration causes. As it is shown on Table 4, the nodes that were most coded where: respect the environment and within this node other species, as well as emotions. The first two cover everything related to the environment and climate change that the interviewees explained.

As Participant C10 explained when talking about what his grandparents have told him "they told us the weather was good, and the 4 seasons … (There were never problems with water) Never, because in their times there was a lot of rain and you could find water in 10, 15 m. Now not anymore, we have wells and to obtain water we have to find it 80, 60 m down … it depends

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Table 4 Coded references of participants' personal interviews, based on Nussbaum Central Capabilities (2012)

Nussbaum's capabilities	Number of references	Percentage
Access to social services to develop as human beings	1	0.7
Control over your own environment	32	21.2
Emotions	39	25.8
Feelings imagination and thought	6	4.0
Right to play and free time	2	1.3
Life expectancy	2	1.3
Respect the environment and other species	40	26.5
Physical health	17	11.3
Physical integrity	4	2.6
Freedom of movement	2	1.3
Freedom of conscious	6	4.0

Source Own work

on the region. Before it was 5 or 10 m. Even in our riad, we have wells. Now it's forbidden to have wells in the Medina".

As it can be seen in Table 4, the main common theme with approximately 47.7% of coded references was related to the *environment and other species (26.5%)* and *control over your own environment (21.2%)*. This reveals that the migration process was affected by elements related to the environment and climate change, such as droughts, heat waves, lack of water in wells. *Other species*, in Nussbaum principles, means to be able to respect the environment in where you live as well as the animals, plants and the natural world that surrounds you. It refers mainly to be able to feel that you are a respected element of the natural world in where we live in. This capacity is very much related to climate change, since most of the interviewees left their homes due to a harsh change in the environment in where they lived, not being able to survive due to droughts (lack of water) and survival environment, because of climatic disasters or simply climate change over time. As one of the NGO managers working with refugees and migrants in Casablanca stated when asked about rural migration people migrate because of "not having access to water, intensive agricultural practices, access to land" (Participant M 4).

The first and elementary results reveal clearly trends and periodicity of climatology in the last decades, and also frequency and intensity of droughts and heat waves that determine the extreme events in this region. As it is displayed on Fig. 3 with red bars the drought events, according to a drought pattern, determined by the length of a period without raining and with a high average temperature which determines intensive evapotranspiration conditions. Most visibly, there are more frequent drought events in the last decades, from year 2000. From the study of SPI evolution, Fig. 4 shows the progression of drought intensity by means of adjustments of minimum square (Wandermonde polynomial), confirmed and acuter by filter wavelet method. The upshot is that there is a remarkable evolution of the intensity of the droughts in the two the last decades. On the other hand, analyzing the frequency of drought occurrence, it is observed that in the last 17 years (2000–2016 and part of 2017), there have been 11 droughts, according to the defined drought pattern. This means that there were more droughts in those 17 years than in the precedent 27 years (1973–1999). Hence, the phenomenon of droughts trends to be more frequent in the Marrakesh-Safi region.

The analysis of droughts helps fill the current knowledge gap on the climate change and the consequent magnitude of impacts on the

paradiso@unisannio.it



Fig. 4 Draught analysis from 1973 to 2016 in Marrakesh-Safi. *Source* Own work

agriculture sector and its subsectors (crops, livestock, fisheries, and forestry) in rural areas where the migration emerges. Droughts are one of the natural hazards regularly impact heavily on agriculture and impede the eradication of hunger and achievement of sustainable development. Therefore, quantifying the full extent of sector damage and losses can be useful to estimate people's vulnerabilities and risks and to determine the extent to which this phenomenon is a trigger of migration. Empirical results presented by Gbetibouo and Hassan (2005) to prove that South African field crops are so sensitive to changes in temperature that there is a narrow margin of tolerance to increase temperature compared to changes in precipitation. Since the drought analysis, precipitation and temperature are fundamental parameters which configure the drought pattern.

Heuristic procedures of a local farmer in the rural area of study provide hints to increase the net revenue, acting mainly on the geographical distribution and the type of crops, and taking in account that this region is highly depending on the climate variations, besides other physical factors such as topography, vegetation, and soil. This suggests that the Ricardian approach could be also applied Marrakesh-Safi region by applied only to the 21 highlight events of drought graphics (Fig. 3).

The second most important common theme was emotions (Table 4), which it is related to be able to feel attached to possessions and people, to be able to correspond loving to those who love us and to those who worry for us; to be able to feel sorrow when those who love us are no longer with us; to love, to be sad and to feel homesickness and gratitude. Its main characteristic is to have the right and capacity to emotional development without unnecessary pain, either for fear or anxiety; to defend relationships and human associations that favor and promote this emotional development. Most of the migrants express how one of the reasons that they started their migration process was the lack of access to their basic natural resources, as house gardens and lack of water due to mainly droughts. As the second common theme emotions most migrants had experienced home violence by a close family member, which helped to feel unloved and in danger, as most of the refugees affirmed "what I want is to go to Europe and be happy"

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Participant R 5. They all missed their families so much it was even painful to talk about their homesickness.

After getting the drought impacts on the crops, the next stage is to show the existence of a correlation between agriculture impairment and the outward people flow. Two types of correlation coefficients have been applied in this research as a first approach. Initially, applying Pearson's correlation coefficient (a parametric method that is used to quantify the degree of linearity between two continuous variables) does not clearly comes out a relationship. The second intend was wavelet cross-correlation (Chinarro et al. 2011) which is a nonparametric method to determine similarity or coherence between time series in the frequency domain by the convolution of power spectra of signals. In this way, compound model to emulate climate change impacts on critical resources was built on the base of droughts, heat waves events and temperature and precipitation trends. This analysis in the study area might suggest a likely co-movement between a compound model of climate change and the outward people flow. Nevertheless, iterative tests and qualitative analysis by interviews are required to tune the functions implemented and improve the quality of the model.

5 Conclusion

Since agriculture is a sector of strategic significance in Morocco, a pressing rainfall deficit is harmful to the socioeconomic status, so that population's basic activities, such as agriculture, depend on the rainfall amount fallen. A rainfall lack means a drop in crop yields and consequently a scarce of food, so drought is an essential trigger in migration.

The convergence between indicators from qualitative and quantitative methods highlights a timing correlation between the analyzed phenomena and the increasing of migration flow in the Marrakech-Safi region. The burden primarily assumed by women in the local economy adaptation and during the migration process has been considered. The migration process does not start due to only one reason; it is a multi-causal decision that pushes a person to migrate. Our findings start to show that climate change might have a relation as a push factor for migrants to start an indeed complicated long migration process.

Certain correlations could be found between the migration process and climate change evolution. Nevertheless, in the quest of causality between two phenomena of very different nature, a series of caveats must be taken into account. Although correlation coefficient is very useful in many situations, its interpretation in this case can be difficult and confusing.

These findings hint that a kind of people in origin countries is particularly sensitive to the effects of climate change, especially the elderly, children, women and low-income populations. Nevertheless, a future study must be posed with more extended interviews and more amount of data to verify the suitability of the methodology. This research is indeed a first step toward understanding a very complex problem that is the connection between migration and climate change. More interdisciplinary research is needed in order to continue to tackle an issue that affects us all specially the Mediterranean area as well as the European Union policies.

In spite of literature on climate change and migration is increasing, some authors still remark that the study requires formal evidence. The issue characteristics along with its far-reaching impacts make its effects on population uprooting and migration difficult, though not impossible, to identify and quantify. In the searching of migration causes, it should not be dissociated from its societal context.

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paradiso@unisannio.it

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Mobilising Women's Participation in Urban Development in the Southern Mediterranean. Case Study of Algiers Metropolitan Area

Mohamed Alouat

Abstract

Algiers, like developing world large cities, has known a massive urbanisation wave, due an increasing birth rate and migration from the interior of the country, which provokes many urban problems such as housing, transportation, unemployment and environmental issues. Moreover, the government has implemented many programmes and plans to resolve those problems. All failed because they took a political approach based on centralised management which neglected the participation of local actors. Following the political openness in the early 90s, the government has made many efforts to develop a legal framework which empowers citizens' participation, with the role of women especially emphasised. Although the principle of citizens' participation in urban development has recently been disseminated in Algerian society, women's participation is still poor. The main aims of the paper are to show the actual situation of citizen participation in an Algiers metropolitan area (AMA), to evaluate the role of women in the urban development process, and, finally, to illustrate the attempts of both civil society and government to involve women. This chapter considers this a particularly important theme because participation in development is one of the factors which can discourage or stimulate migration flux from southern Mediterranean cities towards the northern shore if better development is carried out through women's empowerment.

Keywords

Women's participation · Urban development Southern mediterranean · Algiers

1 Introduction: Citizen Participation in Algiers as an Example of a Southern Mediterranean City Coping with Sustainability

In the second half of twentieth century, all countries of the Southern Mediterranean have completed their political independence and achieved various development processes at all strategic levels, especially that one of economic development. The majority chose socialist economics as a solution to follow the road of developed countries. In parallel with this, the majority of economic projects were based in great cities, which encouraged the phenomenon

M. Alouat (✉)
Ecole Normale Supérieure de Bouzareah, Algiers, Algeria
e-mail: alouat777@yahoo.fr

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of rural exodus and caused rapid increases of urban population.

Mediterranean cities have been historically characterised by the archetypal image of density, urban complexity and social diversity (Munoz 2003). In parallel, Southern Mediterranean cities have known a rapid and unplanned urbanisation process that has provoked complex urban crises: Southern Mediterranean cities are part of the global urban economy which generates almost 80% of the global economic output (Pauleit and Duhme 2000), but anthropogenic pressure on the urban environment has recently reached critical levels in numerous conurbations worldwide (Moussiopoulos et al. 2010). This situation has been exacerbated by the neglect of citizen involvement in the planning and management of these cities. However, over time the authorities realised that the participation of citizens in the process of urban development has become an imperative.

With the economic and political openness that the Southern Mediterranean countries experienced in the late 1980s, amendments defined by constitutions and basic laws, they began to take into account the participation of their citizens in decision-making at various levels. Although initially citizen involvement was mostly formal, it has undergone significant improvements over time, particularly after accession to many international treaties and conventions affecting human rights and environmental protections.

In traditional Algerian society, when rural communities were dominant, participation was known under other names, perhaps the most famous of which is the "*TWIZA*", a common tradition which is still rooted in North African societies (Ammari and Zemmouri, unpublished) in which participation is by invitation from the head of the tribe or mayor, or from a citizen who needs the participation and assistance of others. Although it represents a tool of social solidarity (because it is based on the cooperation of individuals in the completion of public projects such as mosques and roads, or for helping individuals in the construction of their own projects such as building a house or agriculture), it is based on the idea of stimulating the citizen to participate in public life. This happens by contributing ideas, money or manual work towards the realisation of projects which are basically considered part of the development of the region or area in which he lives.

New traditions of urban life presuppose deep intervention of citizens in public life in cities. Until now the idea of participation in its modern sense has been foggily understood in Algeria, partly because the procedures involved do not really transform the dominant understanding of participation (Wehling 2012), partly because they are managed in worst way by the local administration, despite the existence of Citizen Information Offices in all municipalities in Algeria. Citizen Information Offices are supposed to form the basis for citizens' communication with the government, thus building the first bridges to participation in civic life. However, they become a stumbling block on the path to citizen participation as a result of many employees' ignorance of the laws and administrative instructions that encourage citizens' participation making it one of the most important factors discouraging greater citizens' participation in Algerian society.

Algiers and its metropolitan area has been a particularly eminent and great urban area in the Southern Mediterranean with an important role as a political and economic capital, a centre of social interaction and cultural inspiration, from the Ottoman period, then French colonialism, to the stage of independence. The city has witnessed the overlap and integration of many forms of architecture, as well as the coexistence of many cultures as a result of its attraction for many residents of the Mediterranean basin and the migration of the population of rural areas after independence (as mentioned above). According to data gathered from a population census in 2008, Algiers metropolitan area (AMA) had a population of approximately 5 million (ONS 2008). Two-thirds of this population live in the city of Algiers and, as a result, it faces many complicated urban problems: the housing crisis, waste management, transport and movement within the city, and there is an absence of comprehensive citizen involvement in

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the planning process to solve these problems. Studying and defining the modalities of participation has produced lots of challenges for researchers in Algiers and suggests the need to better understand the barriers to and dynamics of participation in local governance (Gaventa and Valderrama 1999; Cornwall 2003; Taylor 2007).

2 Women's Empowerment in Algeria: Towards Enhancing Participation

Over recent decades, academics, politicians and NGOs have worked, according to their position, to involve citizens in decision-making. Research carried out by academics has laid the groundwork to provide a more accurate concept of citizens' participation. Florin and Wandersman (1990) define participation as "a process in which individuals take part in decision-making in the institutions, programs, and environment that affect them", allowing citizens to construct a framework of practical techniques and strategies to use their skills and energy to fulfil community goals (p. 43). As a result, participation means a new process to redistribute the power (Arnstein 1969) and roles in society, and the role of women must be taken into account during the process of redistribution of these roles, both in developed and developing countries. Thus, according Butcher (2010) the best way to involve the whole community in participation should be "sought in all aspects of public administration: from planning and the creation of policy to providing services that contribute to transparency, accountability, and evaluations to keep society informed" (p. 155). In contrast, as found by Jean-Arsene (2016), lack of participation, in particular in underdeveloped countries, results in a mismatch between local development projects and the real aspirations of the citizens. Thus, according Butcher (2010) for best way to implicate all community in participation should be "sought in all aspects of public administration: from planning and the creation of policy to providing services that contribute to transparency, accountability, and evaluations to keep society informed" (p. 155).

Before independence, Algerian women have been a main actor in rural life, responsible for managing and conserving water, food and housework, but after independence the government has worked to promote women's political rights by increasing their access to representation in elected assemblies (Algerian Constitution). The events of October 1988 were the turning point in the history of the individual and political freedoms of citizens in Algeria; after dramatic days, the government decided to allow openness of political participation and adopted multiparty processes which allowed many citizens to establish political parties and associations to express their political leanings and criticism of government policies within a pluralistic political environment. This process began strongly in the early 1990s, this situation acknowledged a marked decline in the black decade (1991–2000) known by Algeria, experienced a deterioration in political discourse, frustrating its citizens' hopes.

Women were the most fortunate in this political and economic transformation of Algeria, with their rights expressly recognised by law, and confirmed and accompanied by field application. Despite all the criticism by political activists and feminists about the limited rights of women in Algerian society, Algeria ranks highest among Arab countries in terms of female representation in its parliament (Benzenine 2013).

The number of women in Parliament increased from 3% in 1997 to 30% in 2016. Yet this is not the result of increased social awareness and a collective realisation that it is important to include women in legislative councils, rather it is because of the laws imposed by the state, which determines the necessary percentage of female representatives in the local and parliamentary electoral list. As such, it does not represent the real extent of women's awareness of the importance of their participation in decision-making in Algerian society.

On the other hand, one does find evidence of women's interest in assuming important positions in society; for example in the justice sector,

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women's representation increased from 33% of judges in 2006 to 42% in 2011. In the police, the female segment of the workforce grew to about 6% in 2012. As noted in previous years, women's presence was mostly limited to the education and health sector.

As an economic indicator, 10% of entrepreneurs in Algeria were women in 2011. A fact that contributed to the economic openness of Algeria to the international market was that the government accompanied this trend by facilitating the establishment of small and medium enterprises and supporting the women work at home through financing family projects with small, long-term and interest-free loans. It also activated vocational training for these women by opening specializations for women at times that suit their family circumstances.

However, the biggest problem remains the direct participation of women in urban development and in solving the problems identified by their cities through participation in planning or management (either directly, or through local associations concerned with the environmental issues and urban problems experienced by great urban agglomerations and in particular Algiers and its metropolitan area).

Based upon this situation, this chapter aims to describe the real situation of women's participation in urban development in AMA, with a focus on understanding the importance of participation for women, the relationship between types of work and women's participation in urban life and, finally, problems that hinder the participation of women, whether social, economic or cultural. This chapter deals with an important problem that is closely related to the subject of this book. The exclusion of citizens in general and women in particular from participation in the process of development creates an individual feeling of marginalization on the one hand and a deterioration of urban life on the other, thus making the citizen's life into a whirlpool of problems. He/she will try to get rid of them, by resorting to migration to developed countries. Often, a migration flux will be towards the Northern Mediterranean countries, due to family relations or friendships that they have created through social media; in parallel, these factors are reinforced by the paradisiacal image of life in Europe that the media has shaped.

3 Methods

The main objective of this study is to assess the situation and the real degree of women's participation in urban development and urban life in AMA.

In order to study the current situation of the degree of participation in urban development and attain this aim, the research mixed close-ended questionnaires and contingency questions. We choose this kind of questionnaire because it helps to collect data with minimum cost and greater ease than other methods (Hora 2014).

Targeted citizens are from the Boumerdes municipality (east of Algiers) of the Algiers metropolitan area. Two main criteria have determined the choice of area on which the investigation was to be conducted. Firstly, we choose an agglomeration that includes various segments of society; in taking into account disparities of income, the thing that helped us is that housing projects have been carried out by the state and distributed according to the monthly income per family, and we found that the municipality of Boumerdes combines different forms of housing. The second criterion is the situation of municipality in a suburb; it is a linking area between the city centre and rural areas and also adjoins the major industrial area of the city.

Initially, we contacted participants directly, but we found many problems due lake of awareness the importance of questionnaire results to resolve urban problems and help decision makers to promote their governance skills. Thus, in order to overcome this problem, we decided to communicate with citizens through their schoolchildren. This work was undertaken in cooperation with a group of teachers in secondary education, who helped in the distribution and retrieval of questionnaires and also assisted in simplifying the goals and objectives of the questionnaire for pupils to deliver to their parents.

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Table 1 Socio-economic characters of sample

		Women	Men	Total
Gender		83	200	283
		29.4%	70.6%	100%
Workplace	City	18	79	97
	Suburb	22	52	74
	Outside the province	16	44	60
	Unemployment	27	25	52

Source Author's elaboration



Fig. 1 Distribution of women by economic sector

During the data collection phase, 500 questionnaires were distributed equally among women and men in the area of study. However, of 283 questionnaires which were retrieved, 200 were completed by men (70.6%) and 83 by women (29.4%) as indicated in Table 1 (Figs. 1 and 2).

By contrast to the extensive participation by men in this survey, women have contributed weakly. The low response rate of women in this survey can be attributed to the reasons cited above, as well as to social norms, which require the consultation of the head of the family, often a man, in all matters pertaining to the world outside of the house.

Excluding questions about personal information, the questionnaire was based on three main questions:

- Have you contacted your local authorities with your opinion or suggestion of some projects?
- Have you ever responded to a call from local authorities to present your point of view on development issues?
- Do you have an idea about the activity of local associations interested in promoting the urban environment?

4 Results and Discussion

The study shows important results, each of them indicating directions for future studies and research about women's participation and empowerment in Algerian society. Table 2 presents the main results of the questionnaire.

In the sample, 80.7% of women (Table 2) had not contacted the authorities to inform them of their opinion about urban projects, whether about plans for the future in the municipality or projects already under way, or even to report on the

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

Fig. 2 Distribution of women by type of job

Table 2 Important results on women's participation

Questions	Yes	%	No	%	Total
Contact with authorities	16	19.27	67	80.73	83
Responding to invitations to participate debate about project	15	18.09	68	81.91	83
Ideas about local association committed to protecting and promoting the urban environment	3	3.6	80	96.3	83

Source Author's elaboration

negative or positive aspects of the conduct of the current equipment. This is due, in almost all cases, to ignorance of their right to express their opinion in front the local administrator about urban projects, or to unfounded fears of punishment. This is the legacy and result of the old policies in the country, before the political openness at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, which was based on a single-party system and centralised management of political decisions in all of the areas (economic, social, cultural, etc.) belonging to the various administrative levels. By way of illustration, we present this example: to create any economic project at the local scale, the investor needed the approval of central government; in contrast, the government needed to consider the view of the representative of one party at the local level, and the final decision would be more political than economic. This may have caused citizens to believe that expressing his/her viewpoint or participating would be useless if he/she has concluded that the decisions would be based on non-substantive factors.

Despite the new political and economic openness, which conferred progressive laws and instructions, particularly in the area of women's participation, women in Algiers are still very far from the desired level of participation in urban development.

4.1 Decline in the Level of Legal Protection Culture and Appreciation of Rights

As per the figures in Table 1, 81.9% of the women did not respond to municipal declarations, or participate in public opinion surveys about intended future projects. Other important studies of women's status have concluded that the decision makers need to develop and modernise the ways and means of communication (Benali 2016; Maragnani 2009) especially in rural zones, where society is very conservative. In this case study, the municipalities investigated have used only traditional ways to communicate with citizens, through paper adverts posted at the

paradiso@unisannio.it

Table 3 Pearson chi-square value for job and citizens' participation

	Value	df	Asymp.Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson chi-square	12,145	5	0.033
Likelihood ratio	11,262	5	0.046

Source Author's elaboration

entrance to the municipalities (disregarding the conditions necessary for publicity), or through newspapers that do not have a large readership among women in the society.

4.2 Correlation Between Job and Citizens' Participation

This association is important because women who have had successful career and/or a good educational level do participate effectively in development, or try to do so, by proposing urban projects, expressing their views, creating initiatives and so on. To demonstrate this, we use statistic method to calculate the Pearson chi-square value, shown in Table 3.

The table highlights that the Pearson chi-square value of 0.033 is inferior to 0.5 that confirms relationship between job type and participation of women in urban development. This association is due to the integration of women in the labour market, and increasing levels of female education, both factors allow professional women to share various daily problems with other segments of society, especially those related to the urban environment and welfare in the urban community. On other hand, the after-work social obligations of women in the Southern Mediterranean and Algerian society require them to perform additional duties (compared to men) as *mater familia*; this domestic burden increases most in the case of widows or divorced women, especially women with children, whose role is not confined to maternal care duties, but also to exercise the paternal functions required by children, in the absence of the institutions responsible for these children.

In addition to the above, many women are unaware of the rights that laws have conferred on them in the fields of participation and even leadership (Hora 2014); thus, laws and legislatures which empower and entrench participation in development do not differentiate between women and men in the way that they exercise these rights.

Despite the big number of local association in AMA, if we compare it with other regions and province in Algeria, no more than 4% of women have ideas about local association committed to protecting and promoting the urban environment, whereas we found only 2.32 local association per 1000 persons (Ministry of Interior 2011), but most of all, they have existed only in the papers.

5 Conclusion

This work has led us to conclude that municipalities must involve women from the initial steps to the final stages of urban projects and activate their desire of participation (Choi and Kent 1993). Yet, in Algeria, neither urban nor rural municipalities adapt to women's needs, in a substantial way, with processes to foster citizen participation in urban development. This is because the principle of participation in the new politics of urban governance is new and opaque to its citizens; this is illustrated by the infrequent and ineffective interactions by women in this system, resulting from several obstacles to the application of different laws and legislations which have been developed to strengthen this mechanism and intensify the role of women in public life. First, despite the existence of many laws which encourage participation, huge gaps exist between administration and citizens in urban areas; as mentioned in the previous part of this paper, municipalities needed to adopt the frameworks and channels to communicate with the population in general, and with women in particular. Modern communication technology is

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the best way to involve women in the process of planning for development in urban areas, especially with the proliferation in the use of the Internet (3G and 4G) in most urban areas of Algeria, at competitive prices and with variety of offers provided by the operators in the telecommunication sector.

Municipalities in the area of study do not have an Internet Web site, or official Facebook page, yet most young people use the Internet to connect to each other. According to preliminary results of a forthcoming publication (Alouat 2017), four great provinces in Algeria have official Web sites, but not all have social media platforms, and the number of members with Facebook pages in the provinces is disappointing. Though all municipalities AMA have IT cells, only 31.5% of municipalities have a public page Facebook.

Women do not respond to the requests from local authorities to join in participation processes, or they do not have genuine opportunities to do so. Thus, both the authorities represented on the municipal councils and local associations (in particular, those concerned with women's affairs) must work to educate women about their importance as a part of the society that should be involved in the development process and decision-making.

In this case, they need political suasion (Irvin and Stansbury 2004) accompanied by real tools and material encouragement at all levels of society, and women need to take a lead in this process through the establishment of childcare institutions to allow women to exercise and plan for neighbourhood activity.

In conclusion, it is necessary to identify the precise, non-formal role of women in the development process, whether in the preparatory steps of general laws or in the stages of planning and decision-making processes, and to take into account all categories of women: rural or urban, working woman or housewife, responsible or functionary worker and so on. Therefore, women must have the opportunity to achieve greater representation on the elected councils from the bottom up, and there must be processes of accountability to highlight the status of women in all government projects.

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paradiso@unisannio.it

Part V

Conclusions

The Mediterranean as 'Mobile Global Reality'. Lessons and Implications for Changing European Relationships

Maria Paradiso

Abstract

Following a mobility approach, this chapter elucidates MEDCHANGe research's findings in terms of concepts and narratives of Mediterranean mobilities. First, it aims at providing challenges to concepts which shape regional views and migration studies and secondly at highlighting feedback to European relationships and mobilities' policies.

Keywords

Mediterraneans · Mobilities · Europe Encounter · Crisis · Change · Relationships

1 MEDCHANGe's Contribution to Extend Knowledge. Aims and Structure

After four years after the inception of our FP7 Marie Curie MEDCHANGe grant. No. 612639, we are engaged in extending the body of reliable knowledge on people mobilities' role as a vehicle of adjustment under turbulences and deprivation, of linkages among Mediterranean shores, and as a challenge to instrumental policies of Europeanization beyond the EU's borders. Indeed, EU instrumental policies provided contested, fraught, unstable regional process, turbulence and weakness to Europe as well.

In a frame of turmoil and unsafety, it is worth to think about: how can people live together easily in the two spaces—Europe and North Africa? What is the potential future of the two spaces as intertwined and interconnected? What is the horizon for future developments of human fulfilment and prosperity? What implications do these tendencies have for regionalization patterns and trends?

The chapter develops considerations on unmasking contradictions between European self-images and critical perspectives by people both in terms of positive understanding than but also a less benign, eventually exploring emerging promising trends. Then, alternative thinking on connectivity, crisis and empowerment which has been elaborated on mobile people narratives will be elucidated to present element of crisis, empowerment linkages and opportunities. Additionally, we wish to complement the focus on Europe's critical points also with Southern critical issues par example those ones of schooling and educational measures.

M. Paradiso (✉)
Department DEMM, University of Sannio, Benevento, Italy
e-mail: paradiso@unisannio.it

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paradiso@unisannio.it

2 MEDCHANGe Contribution for an Extended Knowledge on Mediterranean Mobilities and Implications for Changing Relationships

2.1 Extended Knowledge on Mobilities and Regional Relationships

First, in terms of new knowledge we discovered and surveyed migration for economic reasons from Europe in particularly from Italy, Spain, Portugal! This is a different phenomenon vis à vis entrepreneurships par example in the touristic sector in Morocco medinas. The Italian team of UNISANNIO explored the Italian community and achieved motivations, characteristics and issues of 'integration' in hosting society: findings are extremely relevant and showed interesting profiles for benchmarking similar situation, conditions in Europe and eventually they may provide a crossed comparison for future project on mobilities and encountering in different cultural contexts. This knowledge will be published in a different venue.

Second, we found and proved that economic crisis fuelled a return migration to Morocco especially from Southern Europe. The issue of return migration and the profile of being double citizenships citizen in Morocco, with years of exposure and practice of European countries should be considered as an important issue for European cooperation policies and an opportunity for development in sending countries. In this regard, dimensions are multifaceted: reinsertion of children in local school system, improved opportunities for women, new and improved services, cultural and other urban facilities to foster level of social stimuli for families and individuals; altogether can turn out in opportunities in terms of human capabilities for investment from and to Europe.

Third, on the basis of our exploratory cases we are able now to track and interpret encounters with otherness, obstacles and enabling factors in our renovated paradigm of mobilities which occur in the coupled space of residential and virtual mobilities.

Fourth, we deepened an initial understanding of environmental change and impacts on mobilities as an additional relevant perspective of pushing factors of mobilities to North.

Fifth, last but not least, we developed knowledge on the basis of non-élites views and understanding of the Mediterranean area not as the malleable geopolitical courtyard of Europe but as a global mobile reality and driver of change for Europe in the world.

2.2 Southern Non-Élites Viewpoints of Europe and the Mediterranean and Implications for Mobility and Relationships

Graduate student perspectives both on the Mediterranean and on European engagement with the region make evidence of the discrepancy between European self-image in its dealings with the region and critical perspectives on this (In this book: Durac and Jones 2018; Paradiso and Favaro 2018). Particularly, student responses evince a clear shift from a more positive understanding of European engagement with the Mediterranean, typically seen in terms of a shared space, a common civilizational history and intertwined path to a much less benign view of Europe (In this book: Durac and Jones 2018; Paradiso and Favaro 2018). This is expressed in an unmasking of the degree to which relations between both sides of the Mediterranean are best understood, less in terms of partnership and shared objectives, and more in terms of an asymmetric power relationship in which European interests predominate (Durac and Jones 2018 in the book; Paradiso and Favaro 2018 in the book). This shift from benign to less benign leads some to reflect on alternatives without Europe and on the possible redundancy of the concept of the Mediterranean (In this book: Durac and Jones 2018). For Paradiso and Favaro, assessment

paradiso@unisannio.it

on the basis of a different and special target group of students—who came from people migrating to Europe and in cases some cases were raised in Europe (Italy)—provides opportunities for a complementary knowledge and probably implications for policies.

All authors who worked on the issue of Mediterranean and Europe agreed on the ambiguity of the responses of workshop participants towards orthodox constructions of the Mediterranean led some to propose very different alternative conceptualizations of the Moroccan–EU relationship par example. There is an emerging awareness of deepening regional ties in Africa with the view that Morocco's future lay to the south rather than the north. Actually, it is noteworthy to note that recent years Moroccan geopolitics concentrated efforts and objectives in Western Africa in particularly with countries like Senegal where a Muslim specific doctrine is shared between the two countries and many historical ties occurred between Moroccan and the region. Local press and TV report very often on Royal and Governmental efforts in this regard and constitute a reason of national pride of being autonomous.

Finally, the very concept of the Mediterranean was subjected to critical questioning by these students. As one participant explained 'is France more Mediterranean than European? The answer is no. Similarly, Morocco is more African than Mediterranean'. The advocacy by European elites of the Mediterranean as a physically and culturally unified homogenous space is questioned by these hitherto silenced, marginalized voices from the southern shores (Durac and Jones 2018 in the book).

The second experiment with graduate students proved particularly significant in terms of new possibilities of European relationships with Morocco (and possibly other countries with a similar experience). Paradiso and Favaro in their chapter purposely addressed a special population of students to assess and benchmark opinions of people with a direct and lived knowledge of Europe. The target was the students of Italian who have, in most cases, also lived in Italy or have strong connections with migrants or, in some cases, even have a double Italian–Moroccan citizenship. Thus, this target is an interesting segment of people with experience in encountering difference in North Africa and Europe as cross-bordering and mobile people. It provides new and different knowledge with possibilities of extending mobilities' knowledge and policies around the new issue of double citizenships of mobile people who are not any more migrants but members of return migrants' families from Europe. It symbolizes a bridging shores experience while keeping European educational and features of cultural background in North Africa. In this regard, it offers critical insights into the changing Europe–North Africa relationship, as driven by education, travelling, experience of encountering different cultures, and exposure to media.

The qualitative analysis on this second target, at a first glance, shows that the students' wording reproduces an ambiguous representation of Mediterranean space and Europe, positive and negative at the same time. They move in this space with contrasting feelings, the Mediterranean can be common and shared but also conflicting and incompatible. In the first category (negative attitude), students have drawn attention to a few symbolic representations, such as backwardness, ignorance, discrimination, racism, prejudice. Researchers interpreted them as a legacy of European snobbery and sense of inferiority as a legacy of a post-colonial space and probably internal public opinion discourses (see Paradiso, Favaro chapter). Interestingly, they do not consider, at the discussion's beginning, the Northern Mediterranean (part of Europe); the Mediterranean in this initial part of the discussion is the South, i.e. non-European. Students expressed in shared semantic fields their sense of exclusion, or the result of a real political form of exclusion. In this case, the vision of the Mediterranean space and Europe is negative because they underline the gap in terms of underdeveloped and exploited North Africa ('*Europeans are better received here, in Morocco, than Arabs in Europe where they are considered as a problem*' says a student,

paradiso@unisannio.it

Paradiso, Favaro in the book) against the rich, industrialized or developed northern coast of the Mediterranean Sea.

The second category reveals the Mediterranean as a stratified geographical space inherited from long-lived shared traditions: history, culture, body language, common physical and character traits, languages and food or ways of cooking. In this sense, narratives are relaxed, positive and infused by human relations and shared feelings of commonalities among people (Paradiso, Favaro in the book). Viewpoint is positive when they adopt a historical or cultural approach to highlight the common points, but the approach turns critical or negative when a political-economic interpretation is considered. It is important to point out that the perception of Mediterranean space is blurred, borders are neither clear nor identified, except when this space enters physically into contact with them: this is the case of Spanish or French communities living in Morocco or on the northern coast of the country that intrudes into Mediterranean Sea. From this angle, researchers point out that borders and bordering for immobile people are driven by mobile people entering or leaving the country and communicating with people in the home country. This point significantly highlights the importance of the conceptual category of mobility in addressing studies on Europe and the Mediterranean. It highlights the issue that barriers have been created by policies both from Europe and in-home countries while fragmenting, excluding groups for instrumental economic aims. The role of education keeps a role in creating proximity and shared feeling of belonging. However, issues of Arab education as noted by scholars who observed students' views contribute to popular knowledge which may block understanding of crossed cultures contribution and stratification of past experience beyond the Arab and Muslim experience. This may limit cosmopolitan attitudes and dialogue.

The analysis of terminology confirms at this stage that the relationship between Europe and North Africa is the product of a strategy of identification and exclusion (Didelon and Grasland 2014, p. 78), where the Mediterranean is at the same time perceived as a common and 'bordering–othering' space.

Actually and indeed significantly, our experiments proved that travelling experiences (migration and encounters with different cultures) can bring new positive attitudes and experience to mutual respect and recognition. New meanings are indeed brought by mobilities experience of the Mediterranean: mixed marriages, hope for change, mobility in itself.

As a matter of fact, except for those examples of direct connections with Europe (family members who migrated to Europe), it is true that the undergraduates privilege a vision of a main geopolitical space divided into two main zones, North and South; however, they acknowledge that they are permeable and variable according to *communication corridors/paths* that permit them to interfere with each other. MEDCHANGe, against dichotomic visions 'North–South', West-rest of the World, may lead to think instead of a permeable geography of borders or divides, re-casted and challenged by the mobility of people and networks of relations. They form the basis for developing, inside this space, different feelings like proximity or distance, sharing or excluding, affinities or differences. The internet, media, exchanges, contacts, tourism, food, history, hope, similarities, business and mixed marriages are useful terms to identify such a meta-geographical space. It is on this basis that the Mediterranean and Europe are negatively or positively defined. It is on the basis of communication corridors, encountering paths that our research suggest to realise constructive elements for policies aimed at detensing relationships and release more human development. Mobile people, their travelling experience, exposure to European education are most valuable driver of detensing and human development policies. How setting specific European policies in agreement with North African countries for empowering returned migrants with a double citizenship par example? Or returned migrants with cultural and linguistic skills as actors of local developments and interlocutors for European investment in the area?

paradiso@unisannio.it

Negative visions of the Mediterranean and Europe conversely have to be wisely contrasted. Students shared a negative vision of Europe and Mediterranean spaces based on their life expectancies when they employed words like backwardness, discrimination, racism and prejudice. Students' life expectancies are built on knowledge filters from media, mobility across shores, educational and cultural systems. Students tend to emphasize their perception of development and the good quality of life in the EU but they do not focus their attention on the way our common features are deeply intertwined and intersected. They do not enable themselves to see the opportunities offered by their developing nation, so they are always complaining. As a result, they only underline the similarities in a broad sense and only recognize the European manners and ways of doing, of so-called southern traits, which bring to mind their manners and ways of doing: shouting while talking, frequent gesticulation or friendly attitudes. They try to demonstrate the originality of their cultural heritage without considering historical links among cultural developments or deep explanations.

Their own schooling and the completion of a diploma gives them access to European universities in order to take up more gainful employment in a solid welfare system. Sentences like '*we live in a personalised zoological showcase*', '*we don't have money, healthcare, technology, science, organized trips*' are used by students to underline those things they lack in their life. They feature frontiers, visas, differences in the treatment of North African emigrants to Europe and European emigrants to North Africa, poverty, ignorance and underdevelopment as a consequence of an unbalanced system originating in the history of colonialism and the consequent post-colonial legacy, which can lead to restrictions on the possibilities for development. Their frustration is mounting in a world what is perceived as a political and military way of bordering and engaging in aggressive exclusion. In response to that, they have a strong need for reinforcing their collective cultural identity and for maintaining a passive-aggressive attitude (of those who get redress of grievance). In this way, they perceive Europe as a land to exploit in order to release their future.

Discussion provided about Mediterranean highlights a shared sense of Mediterranean space which is a defined as a whole of cultural exchanges, by immigrating or emigrating people, a strategic point both politico-economically, a not well-exploited resource and, significantly, an opportunity for changing one's life. The proximity of the two geographical areas get closer if internet usage is frequent: it is a highway of information flow and exchange. The Mediterranean becomes a liquid continent of opportunities for fulfilling human needs.

If stereotypes such as snobbery, colonial legacy and inferiority complex bring a negative conception of the Mediterranean space, other words such as history, food, shared languages, business, and mixed marriages and, above all, personal lived experience of mobilities across shores offer a positive image of a common and sharable space. When students are asked to explain what how the Mediterranean area is, they try to find similarities and differences in order to orient themselves within an unknown map, but they are not able to make out a common geographical, political, economic and cultural space because they do not recognize borders.

In fact, the denial of that space confirms its existence; it seems like they do not recognize the Mediterranean as a space, as a common background, but only some of its details without understanding it as a whole, made up of affinities, shared roots and power. Such fragmentation is also a result of forms of sub-regionalization inside the country where students live: the semi-periphery is divided not only into 'core' and 'periphery' but also into *communication corridors/paths* connecting bringers of different realities and values: Spanish or French communities living among or close to native people improve interplay and information-sharing, as well as the geographical proximity to Mediterranean Sea on the Moroccan northern coast does. Only in this case, are the undergraduates able to draw their Mediterranean mental map, but without nearness or some kind of direct interaction, the Mediterranean space and Europe are what's

paradiso@unisannio.it

left by schooling, media, stereotypes, political choices or dramatic events like the death of migrants who crossed the sea, and it is clear that the actual process of 'bordering and othering' is not fruitful in creating a sense of common space. It is in the liquid geographies of mobilities and networks that they find commonalities and benign views of a geographical entity which can be conceptualized more in terms of mobility, networks and encounters, disrupting the continuity of borders between lands.

2.3 Mediterranean Mobilities from North to South

2.3.1 Europeans' Mobilities Agency Impacts in Good and Bad in South

Morocco is a melting point of diverse people, cultures, social behaviours and beliefs. The personal stories of the European residents interviewed in Marrakech (Schlitz, Esteves; Diab, Paradiso, Schnell; Spotorno in the book) reflect the complexity of past and recent migration in the Mediterranean.

The investments by Europeans in the medina provided a significant economic improvement but also gentrification, socio-economic polarization, deregulation in housing market or tourism activities (Schiltz and Estevens 2018 in this book). In Marrakech, all these processes converge and risk to reconfiguring the city according to the interests of real estate investors or promoters. Local people are moving to peripheral neighbourhoods because they cannot respond to the growing housing prizes or simply because they feel alien to the 'new urban spaces' created by the intensive requalification and gentrification of the historic centres. The Western foreign residents, partly responsible for these changes, may feel more comfortable in these 'modernized' city and society but also regret the loss of tradition and social values.

Lesson for policies: The immigration of European is an important element, as they are the key actors for social, economic, urban and cultural transformation in the city of Marrakech. Initial citizens' voices however suffer from impacts of renewal of ancient housing and expulsion of poorer people in favour of tourists. This is a terrain for some resentment and xenophobia for Europeans. The different social and urban changes co-existing in the city (intensification of tourism, gentrification, displacement) do not only condition the shape but also the dynamic of the urban space.

2.3.2 Return Migration (Moroccans of Italy and Europe Back to Morocco)

Return migration shows interesting opportunities for an effective engagement by local authorities in enabling returnees will and means for local investments. Problems are multifaceted and the issue of return migration eventually constitutes a field of cooperation Europe–Morocco. Many returnees have double citizenships and anyway knowledge of professional and societal European practices. Children are raised in European schools. Many express dissatisfaction and emotional pressure regarding reinsertion issues par example in school system, contacts with local administration. Certainly, educational low profile in itself is a serious obstacle for better investments for returnees who generally invest in real estate, small commerce, agriculture. The area of children education and better local education could be an area of investment for cooperation between European and Moroccan authorities endeavour but not for profit making. Especially, young people ambitions to help their country can be frustrated by low and uncertain responses by local authorities (Elaklaa et al. in the book). Lessons for policies: Enabling and accompanying return migrants ideas of investment is a promising area for local development and creating conditions for limiting migration. The issue of rural deprivation is a very serious one.

2.3.3 European Economic Migration to Morocco

We discovered and surveyed migration for economic reasons from Europe in particularly from Italy, Spain, Portugal! It includes also graduates

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and postgraduates. People explain reasons to move are not only economic ones. This is a different phenomenon vis à vis entrepreneurships par example in the touristic sector in Morocco medinas. As elucidated in the above section 'extended knowledge', it can serve as basis for cross-comparison in intercultural dialogue and policies for integration.

2.4 Mediterranean Mobilities from South to North

2.4.1 Minors and adult mobilities

As the Accorinti et al. chapter (2018) impressively show, families may play a negative role since they may represent in several cases the environment's values where the teenagers wish to escape from. Families have a role not only in taking the decisions to leave.

Despite their small size and new migration, the Moroccan community living in Portugal and in Southern Italy (Campania Region) shows increasing internal variation with regards to labour profiles and educational levels according to patterns of settlement. Most are poorly educated and their patterns of integration in market labour differ between Portugal and Italy. More recently, a comparatively higher skilled presence is seen in the city of Lisbon, which is evidence of new flows between urban areas in Morocco in comparison with the rural–rural migration trajectory of the Algarve community (Fonseca et al. 2018 in the book). Indeed, the contrast between the individuals settled in the rural and urban areas is marked by different labour market incorporation and integration outcomes.

Fonseca et al. (2018 in the book) demonstrated the role that intra-personal networks play within the migration process between Morocco and Portugal. First, the selectiveness of information and actual assistance provided to very close family demonstrates the limited relational reach of network mechanisms in structuring the migration experience to the Algarve. It is this selectivity based on high levels of interpersonal trust that employers use to their advantage in ensuring labour when they need it. Second, the economic context in Portugal and Italy has served to reinforce this selectivity as migrants' capacity to help was further reduced by increasing financial constraints. In this context, migrants acted as 'gate closers' through the negative feedback that they sent home to their origin country, which may have changed perceptions of opportunities in Portugal and Italy.

Despite being a secondary destination for Moroccans, interviewees in the Algarve evaluate their migration experience and its outcomes in terms of quality of life very positively and a substantial proportion wishes to remain in Portugal. The same occurred to interviewed people in Italy (Diab et al. 2018 in the book). It is, nonetheless, interesting to note that a significant proportion, slightly under half, feel their economic situation has stayed the same or worsened suggesting other reasons for remaining in Italy and Portugal.

Besides the costs associated with the legal process of acquisition, the language exam is certainly one of the most challenging obstacles for Moroccans. If we interpret aspirations to live in Portugal in the future as being indicative of satisfaction with life in the country, then Moroccan migrants appear to be well adapted (Fonseca et al. 2018 in this book). Overall, a very small percentage would prefer to move back to Morocco. Same attitudes have been demonstrated in the Southern Italy exploratory cases. Migrants' opinion regarding their quality of life in Portugal and Italy, aside from economic issues, in comparison to what it would have been in Morocco if they had stayed, is even more positive showing the relevance of other non-economic issues. Indeed, a large proportion of the respondents said that Italy and Portugal are a better country to raise children.

2.4.2 Cross-Cultural Comparisons

Diab, Paradiso, Schnell study (see chapter in the book), an exploratory test of ethnic minorities and ethnic migrants success in embedding themselves in host societies either in destination country or their majority space, offer insights which stem from a cross-cultural comparison of

paradiso@unisannio.it

three cultural groups in three Mediterranean countries (Morocco, Italy, Israel).

The results show that minorities either tend to isolate themselves from host/majority milieus or to integrate by embedding themselves in both host/majority and origin places.

Lessons for policies: the assimilationist strategy is rejected in almost all cases (Diab et al. 2018). The main level for embedding in host/majority milieus is the emotional aspect that is followed by learning host/majority language and socializing in host milieus. Mixed neighbours proved more integration and positive encountering. Women issues in patriarchal families and first-generation migration can worsen conditions of adaptation in second generations and risks of self-segregation. About the issue of women empowerment even it is not fully explored in this book constitutes a serious challenge for policies of coexistence in Europe.

2.5 Digital Mobilities and Linkages Among Shores

Indeed a certain significance of individuals and behavioural variables in terms of hypothetical support to integration via ICTs has been revealed only for a few individuals who show stronger emotional attachment and identification in host places and are also ICTs' heavier users. ICTs for integration are not related to cultural exposure and interaction (resources space) or to encountering and contact spaces (Lamari et al. 2018 in this volume).

Age and education proved significant for very low Internet use among other conditions. The use of home, loneliness, or fleeting intra-ethnic relations suggests the lack of encounters and meaningful ones. Our exploratory test may suggest that the Moroccan population in Italy is somehow too precarious, and employed and self-employed in precarious sectors (agriculture, unemployed, small ambulant commerce), thus impeding the chances of encounters linked to friendship networks and public spaces. Can our research questions be tested again but only in a wealthier population having more free time and cultural resources for this?

Lessons for policies: Fleeting interethnic relationships are indeed among other reasons caused by illiteracy and low-level education of average migrants from Morocco in Italy and Portugal. They cause much isolation for several migrants employed in precarious jobs. They impede migrants to be exposed to positive resources offered by Internet and social networks. Conversely for more educated young people but often unemployed Internet led communications and information can become an overused resource with access to all kinds of artefact. The question is how Internet and media space can become area of investments for programs, resources useful for empowering migrants, fostering their skills and knowledge of host countries, vehiculating European positive values; creating fair knowledge accessible among shores how the Italian State TV performed in the past par example in countries like Tunisia. It can improve language skills too. Could media resources be designed for women and integrating them better in arrival societies?

3 Conclusions for Changing European Relationships in Light of Mobilities

3.1 Mediterranean Mobilities and European Changing Relationships

Interactions among individuals from different groups are important in building the feeling of belonging and mutual respect. For fruitful or meaningful contacts there must be a combination of enabling and substantial conditions combined with an appropriate 'time dimension' (see Fonseca et al. chapter). Additionally, MEDCHANGe approach in terms of focus on geography of emotions proved indeed extremely effective in highlighting substantial conditions for embedding in receiving societies and mutual respect beyond functional factors. Our contribution in

paradiso@unisannio.it

this regard should be considered for policy making.

Emotions are the basis for motivation to leave, not only economic conditions. A significant share of people became emotionally overwhelmed in their native countries by their life expectancies and decided to leave. This was the case for Africans (significantly for minors) and Europeans to South when they were upset by worsening State care, welfare conditions, social justice (Accorinti et al. 2018; Diab et al. 2018 in the book). It looks like there are three reasons to motivate migration to Europe: emotional factors of dissatisfaction; impoverishment; avoiding family breakdown.

Geographies of emotions acknowledge the journey too as a way of contacting with Europe and forming traumas or openness for the receiving society's values with implications for lived difference and adaptation in Europe. Journey is a connection between two cultural worlds and especially for minors is a formation trip (Accorinti et al. 2018 in this book).

For the return migration, emotional factors like the wish to contribute to local development may be limited by local conditions' barriers in local culture and policy arena (El Aklaa et al. 2018 in this book). 1/5 of returnees make investments in Europe while they could increase their impacts in native country. Especially young people wish to enhance local conditions. Women do not look supporting the return project since they can feel emotionally depressed by native country societal values for women real role in societies and places. Many times they decide to stay in Europe.

Research has shown that, among other variables, sharing a common language and interethnic contact during leisure time are both relevant for ensuring positive effects in optimal contact (Diab et al. 2018 in the book).

Illiteracy and at a large very low level of education is a barrier for integration/adaptation both in Europe and when back in Morocco to consolidate investments. Again emotionally, children suffer for reinsertion in native countries schooling system after being enjoyed European schools.

MEDCHANGe methodology (Diab et al. 2018 in the book) adding the emotional aspects may clarify to what extent intensifications of bridging linkages and personal reactions shaped by emotions are associated with adaptation and increase in sense of belonging to controlled spaces by the majority or with increase in racialization and sense of detachment from the majority controlled spaces. Thus, we refer and propose to the possibility of multiple identity (Sen 2016) or (Malouf 2010)—instead of the disrupting choice of self-ghettoized communities or assimilationist attitudes of host places—as a conceptual pillar for policies of inclusion and encountering. Assimilationist approach and laissez-faire approach of ghettoized communities are rejected according to our research findings and mutual transfer of knowledge in our Marie Curie project. Multiple identity à la Sen also implies working for decreasing the effects of closure which has driven par example by conservative and hegemonic view of religious codes, snobbery against the not religious people, the culture impeding equal opportunities. We found that some work should be done in origin countries for releasing education about the past with no hegemonic perspective which actually denies the complexity of intercultural forces in shaping heritage and current situation. Par example, Arabization or Islamization of education prevent openness to the 'Other' and the recognition of mutual intertwined contribution to the creation of Mediterranean cultures and societies. This situation in our view is not only the effect of post-colonial resentment or sense of inferiority for Northern richer societies.

Indeed, in the contemporary world, individuals are exposed to relations at a distance thru new media and ways of being connected with origin countries like ever in the past. Previous approaches or studies must evolve in our view in order to take into account the simultaneous presence, belonging, affectivity and emotional exposure and encountering of people in the digital and different worlds. Thus, spatialities or location refers to a continuum of host-origin places and the importance of individual exposure or fluency in active behaviour being exposed to host-origin

paradiso@unisannio.it

countries constraints and influences cannot be underestimated. Constraints and influences, relations at distance, constant exposure to here and there complicate the geography of encounters with otherness and thus the so-called integration-isolation geographies.

In the MEDCHANGe project, we pay a special focus on emotional aspects and refer to embeddedness rather than integration or segregation (Diab et al. 2018 in this book). In particular, it emerged promising for new knowledge creation oriented to policy making, the fuzzy area between belonging and identification with the host/welcome country mindset. Indeed apparent dichotomies can arise in terms of feeling of attachments to the country but refusal of main traits of dominant mindset: embedding is indeed a process of belonging, identification and transformation on a social and territorial continuum. Zero point does not exist indeed since individuals' subjectivities in places continue partially to be shaped by mindset of origin and emotions of encounters in new realities or with majorities. We found some dimensions of emotional geographies, particularly grasped by interviews accompanying questionnaires that need to be elucidated further and deeply included in future refinement of the method and embeddedness model: they should include aspects of emancipation (par example engendered dimension and patriarchal systems which can impede subjective embedding and encountering); identification with local main culture (moral reactions both sides and not only in Europe to values, taboos; certain transmitted attitudes of religious belongings can create ultimately diffidence or sense of superiority; prejudiced views in all groups; human rights); critical assessment of provided welfare access; clear defining of spaces and dynamics of encountering and integration which make a difference (family or domestic space? Public space? Encountering with neighbours? Schools? Traditional Markets).

3.2 The Mediterranean and Europe as an Action Space for Peaceful Conditions

Therefore, beyond the dichotomic pendulum of North/South, a third datum is emerging and sheds light on a possible new geographical significance and relationships between Europe and the South. An alternative point of view is offered by the undergraduates in the MEDCHANGe experiment: mobility and *communication corridors/paths/flows* permit the overcoming of negative perceived European heritage in North Africa, such as colonialism, languages, migrations and trades, and create a common space where contacts are tangible and experienced by people: northern seashore or European enclaves in North Africa may create connexions, better mutual understanding and personal elaborations of attachment, meanings of space which challenge, for those with an open mind, bordering narratives of victimization and inferiority and also Arabic bordering education in terms of its non-recognition of mutually intertwined cultures. Indeed, to European researchers with Italian transmission of knowledge of the past, students show that sometimes their educational system does not enable them to recognize the multiple cultural roots for people: they do not exclude reciprocally and provided multi-layer genealogies of all sorts of cultural tangible and intangible legacies. For example, students think of many artefacts or concepts as being Arab only products, when instead they are inherited and transformed by the past through more complex reciprocal influences among countries and cultures. Other biases were found involving the use of the adjective Arab referred to cultures, countries and people in the Muslim world who are indeed not Arab. Thus, bordering attitudes and closures to other cultures are visible in non-European education knowledge as well. Sometimes heavily distorted filtered knowledge and arguments (but they were confused by other

paradiso@unisannio.it

students too) were expressed by strictly religious sectary persons in the workshop. Thus, it was evident that in the contemporary age, the interpretation and observance of religion may be a heavy burden for human dialogue and conviviality in the Mediterranean (Paradiso, Favaro in this volume).

In conclusion, a real improvement of living conditions in the Mediterranean and the perception of Europe is not clearly going to be the result of economic relationships and it can be limited when religion is misled and misunderstood religion can drive intellect and conduct.

Lessons for policies: improved images of Europe and relationships with 'South' might be possible through the support 'in dignity' of good will people mobilities and their trajectories of encounters with difference. Policies supporting the welfare of mobile and sedentary people across shores and borders may disclose positive avenues of dialogue for Europe and the world, and the de-tensioning of the Mediterranean. Specifically, two issues among others seem highly relevant: about young people (minors) and women. About young people, par example they come with no knowledge of the hosting country (par example Italy, see in this book Accorinti et al. 2018). Youth should be reinforced as a special target of research and policy programs in terms of education and coaching. Missing minors can become a negative social concern in European societies and for the safety of minors. Families need to be supported in origin countries with local effective regional development. Families have been proven also playing a negative role since they represent their cultural behaviour and ways of parental care the negativity of the environment which teenagers wish to escape from.

4 Conclusions in Terms of Needed Future Research

More research is needed to explore future migration aspirations, namely the practice of transnational living across two countries, return and onward migration.

After assessing contours and strategies of embedding and revealing a relevant notion of territorial continuum for minorities' embeddedness, we want to scrutinize further what impedes encountering which makes a difference for healthy personal fulfilment, peaceful multiple identity mutual respect in countries and among shores.

Questionnaires disclosed salience of different possible behaviours and at a large refusal of assimilationist attitudes. Responses made clear that multiple identity formation and evolution (balanced attachment to two worlds of origin–destination and embedding) should be investigated further in future research (Diab, Paradiso, Schnell in this book).

Moroccan statistics in Morocco and ethnic composition of networks and communications of Italian Moroccan in our study confirm that ICTs are used for keeping ties with the country of origin, thus influencing the existential polarity of *here* and *there*, and possibly attenuating the integration classic idea in destination/host countries. Our exploratory sample (Lamari, Oukarfi, Paradiso in the book) also showed effectively, consistent with our conceptual standpoint, that transnational ties do not occur in isotropic spaces, and, even more in the case of Moroccan mobility in Italy, the socio-economic conditions of those staying in the country of origin are far better than conditions of those who expatriated. Therefore, the use of ICTs for keeping ties is double sided:

paradiso@unisannio.it

specifically in place and, in a certain measure, abroad. Thus, digital connections—in a framework consisting basically of the use of social networks—are for more mundane use, specifically for communicating at home or with the same ethnicity. Thus, the quality and impacts of communications among shores do exist, but their dimensions deserve further qualitative research via people's narratives.

Finally, in testing the methodology per se, i.e. questions extrapolated by MEDCHANGe questionnaire based on Schnell et al.'s (2015) methodology, we find some uneasiness by responders while responding on their metrics of use of cyberspace (number of hours, contacts, etc.), quantity of networks (in the home country, in Italy, on the job, and in private spaces).

This leads one to start to assume the following statements for future research: overall use of ICTs does not appear to help integration in the destination country. Specifically, we can split initial findings to be tested and deepened further in several considerations. Firstly, ICTs' impact on mobilities cannot be considered under a deterministic technological fix. A problematic issue is posed by the persistence of digital gaps of the second or third type, thus affecting per se the significance of ICTs as a way of supporting mobilities in hosting places as a gap in access to digital resources. The divide is also in age and in educational and occupation status. Thus, results can change in the future.

Regarding the rising phenomenon of minors and return migration, it provides evidence of new promising paths for research and cooperation among shores. Youth education and care both in Europe and South will be crucial for peaceful conditions and human fulfilment. The issue deserves special attention in research bids and educational and welfare policies.

Women empowerment here and there has to be more effectively achieved both in Europe for integration issues, avoiding emotions of frustrations for women, resentment for children towards conservative minds families and, finally, loss of human talent which can foster local conditions and human development.

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paradiso@unisannio.it

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