Ethics and Law in Montaigne and Bruno

When Montaigne tackles the question of laws, he essentially throws light on their problematic nature. On the one hand, he refers to the primary laws of nature (in his “avis au lecteur” from the Essais, he evokes “la douce liberté des premieres loix de nature”) and to the possibility that there are natural laws imprinted on the human nature (Essais, II, 12); on the other hand, he claims that, in human communities, such natural laws have been lost or altered, and he stresses the multiplicity, diversity and instability of the laws (and the customs) that govern the various societies (II, 12). It is not by chance that in Chapter I, 13 of the Essais, he draws attention to the fact that every country, every town, every social group has its own particular form of correctitude (“sa civilité particulière”). We should note that, in Montaigne, the line between “loi” and “coutume” is not always clear: both are means through which human communities organize themselves and give a sense to the existence of their members, and they often hold a tyrannical and not easily contested power over the decisions and behaviour of individuals (I, 23). Bruno, however, stresses the links between laws, community life and morality: he identifies, in laws, a means through which “si ordina la pratica circa le azzione morali” (Cena de le ceneri, IV), a civilizing factor of mankind (Spaccio de la bestia trionfante). The best type of philosophy – writes Bruno in his De la causa, principio et uno – is that which aspires to the perfection of the human intellect, “più corrispondente alla verità della natura”, and which can make men the “collaborators” of nature herself: this can be done in various ways, including “ordinando leggi e riformando costumi”. Even if laws can be corrupted and thus lead to a brutalization of customs (De l’infinito, universo e mondi, I), they generally organize human communities, creating bonds and ties that civilize their members in harmony with – and not in opposition to – natural law. This is a particularly interesting aspect of Brunian thinking because it gives us a chance to compare him with Montaigne: while the latter believes that laws and customs distance man from the natural dimension so that civilization, in his eyes, means an alteration of the laws of nature, the former, while recognizing that patterns of behaviour are produced in certain contexts, which pervert natural law (Spaccio della bestia trionfante, “Epistola dedicatoria”), believes that it is through laws that men achieve perfection in a community dimension, by cooperating with nature (Spaccio, II). At the dawn of modernity, Montaigne stresses the multiplicity of laws and of customs and the obscure fundament of law (Essais, III, 13), while Bruno, unlike the philosopher from Bordeaux, draws attention to their ability to cement human communities, smoothing out rough edges and laying the foundations to develop the potential of their individual members. The question of the relationship between law, ethics and customs is answered differently by the two thinkers, albeit with the occasional concordance, and we are invited to reflect on the relationship between man and nature, and on whether laws represent a strengthening or an adulteration of nature.