Use your Intensionality, Wake Up to Reality. Intensionalità, compatibilità e intenzionalità in Husserl (1891-1905)

The aim of this essay is twofold. First, I will examine Husserlian contributions between 1891 and 1894 and up to 1906, focusing on a) on the problems related to the inductivistic and genetic justification of the extensional interpretation of deductive logic (with regard to which the privileged interlocutors are Schroder, Voigt, Venn and partly Boole), b) on the feasibility of a non-extensional calculus (a central theme in the correspondence with Venn) and (c) on the link between consequentiality and conditionality, inherited, albeit with different nuances, from both Brentano and Boole (a topic on which Husserl is mainly confronted with Marty, Mally, Höfler and Frege). I will also consider whether the results of these logical-philosophical elaborations could have been reused to some advantage first in the confrontation with Twardowski and then in the formulation of the phenomenology of logic advocated in the Researches, considering in particular a) the notions of incompatibility (limited to pure morphology) and b) of intentionality (limited to judgments of existence and reality). If my argument succeeds, it could be shown that what Husserl deals with in the last years of the 19th century is not just the Bolzanian-Brentanian problem of objectless representations or the admissibility of non-existent objects but the Schröderian-Brentanian problem of the extension of propositions. If this were the case, the combination of incompatibility and intentionality would also be decisive in distinguishing the different relevance of a semantic evaluation of intensions and extensions. The effects of this on the more general description of Husserlian semantics would not be few, as it would also provide a different key to understanding the classic disagreement between Hintikka and Mohanty about the intensional and world-possibilist or the extensional and referentialist character of intentionality.