Conviction and Demonstration. Die Beweis der Ausweisbarkeit as Case-Study

The aim of this essay is twofold: on the one hand, to reconstruct Husserl’s idea of the relationship between demonstration and conviction and to apply the results of this reconstruction to the Beweis der Ausweisbarkeit, in order to ascertain whether it plays a role in the definition of phenomenological transcendental idealism; on the other hand, to contribute to a clarification of the role of demonstration in the logical-philosophical context in which Husserl moved. The essay is divided into five parts. In the first, I will examine three models of demonstration: Brentano’s, Bolzano’s and Nelson’s. In the second part, I will analyse Husserlian definitions of formal and non-formal demonstration. In the third part, I will examine the relationship between the critique of demonstration and rational belief. In the fourth part, I will address the intertwining of motivation theory and the difference between assertion and proposition. In the fifth and final part, I will examine the different formulations of Beweis and give a unified presentation of them. In the conclusion, I will indicate what the paradoxical and metaphysical outcomes of the Beweisen might be and mention three possible, though not exactly painless, solutions.