Modelling the impact of opinion flexibility on the vaccination choices during epidemics

Spontaneous behavioural responses of individuals to epidemics are a relevant factor in the understanding of infection dynamics. In this work, we consider a vaccine–preventable infectious disease spreading within a population, where vaccination is on a voluntary basis and individuals can conform to either the pro–vaccine or the anti–vaccine group. A switch of vaccinating attitude may occur following an imitation game dynamics. In particular, we incorporate the role of individuals’ opinion flexibility, that is a measure of the personal propensity to change opinion, in the switch of vaccinating attitude. We consider a disease dynamics of Susceptible–Infected–Removed type. Then, we use the tools of kinetic theory to describe the overall system at microscopic, mesoscopic and macroscopic scale. Finally, the role of flexibility of opinion on the vaccination choice during an epidemic is shown by providing some numerical simulations.