Arrow’s impossibility theorem has had several up dating after its initial formulation. In this note, after shortly resuming the main results concerning this celebrated theorem, we prove , by means of the adoption of a particular topology on the set of the preferences, the existence of an “invisible dictator ” in the case of infinite agents with infinite available alternatives. Moreover, the case of a locally compact space of alternatives is also investigated.
Arrovian social choices / Tarantino, Ciro. - In: RENDICONTO DELL'ACCADEMIA DELLE SCIENZE FISICHE E MATEMATICHE. - ISSN 0370-3568. - STAMPA. - LXXV:serie IV(2008), pp. 141-152.
Arrovian social choices
TARANTINO, CIRO
2008
Abstract
Arrow’s impossibility theorem has had several up dating after its initial formulation. In this note, after shortly resuming the main results concerning this celebrated theorem, we prove , by means of the adoption of a particular topology on the set of the preferences, the existence of an “invisible dictator ” in the case of infinite agents with infinite available alternatives. Moreover, the case of a locally compact space of alternatives is also investigated.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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