Game Theory as a Yardstick for Antitrust Leniency Policy: the US, EU and Italian Experiences in a Comparative Perspective

The allocative and productive inefficiencies generated by cartels have induced many govern- ments to tackle them aggressively, thus making those agreements increasingly difficult to detect. Rewarding firms that help expose cartels with immunity or fine reductions is generally believed to enhance the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement, but no consensus exists as to how to frame leniency policies in order to maximize the incentives for firms to co-operate with antitrust authorities. The goal of this paper is threefold: (i) to compare the US, EU, and Italian leniency policies in order to identify their key differential features; (ii) to employ game theory as a yardstick to assess the different solutions and (iii) to single out the most effective ones for an optimal leniency scheme.