Le incursioni del legislatore “abusivo” e i “luoghi e i non luoghi” della produzione normativa nell’ambito della disciplina europea sui “Non Performing Loans”

The european regulator has recently updated the credit enhancement parameters for banks, making them more homogeneous. The definitive version of the Addendum to the Guidelines of the European Central Bank for the management of NPLs was followed by the publication of the measures to reduce the risks associated with impaired loans by the European Commission. The Addendum, which introduces new prudential requirements, makes the indications of the European Supervision more stringent by estimating the minimum prudential provisioning levels for impaired exposures. To this end, it provides for its own automatic system for the write-down of bad loans, with clear deadlines that differ from those indicated by the Commission. The most critical observers agree that the proposals made by the European Supervisor go beyond the mandate of the ECB and, therefore, end up interfering with the prerogatives of the European Parliament as the only holder, together with the EU Council, of the legislative function. In the present paper, a series of arguments will be attempted to show that neither the CRD IV nor the MVU regulation confer on the ECB the regulatory powers necessary to enact binding measures with erga omnes validity.