Our aim is to investigate the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the general setting of ordinal games. Using a new property, called emph{ strict condition}, we identify a class of discontinuous games where there exists a unique Nash equilibrium if and only if the emph{single deviation property} is satisfied.
On the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous ordinal and normal form games / Scalzo, Vincenzo. - In: ECONOMIC THEORY BULLETIN. - ISSN 2196-1093. - 8:(2020), pp. 163-168. [10.1007/s40505-019-00175-3]
On the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous ordinal and normal form games
Scalzo, Vincenzo
2020
Abstract
Our aim is to investigate the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the general setting of ordinal games. Using a new property, called emph{ strict condition}, we identify a class of discontinuous games where there exists a unique Nash equilibrium if and only if the emph{single deviation property} is satisfied.File in questo prodotto:
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