In this paper, we give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of strong equilibria in games with non-ordered preferences. Our result does not require continuous preferences and, in the case of normal form games, (quasi-)concavity of payoff functions is not needed. The result has been obtained by using the Ky Fan minimax inequality. Examples illustrate our conditions in some economic situations and compare the result with the previous literature.

Existence of strong equilibrium in discontinuous games / Scalzo, V.. - In: JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS. - ISSN 0022-247X. - 491:1(2020), p. Article 124247. [10.1016/j.jmaa.2020.124247]

Existence of strong equilibrium in discontinuous games

Scalzo V.
2020

Abstract

In this paper, we give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of strong equilibria in games with non-ordered preferences. Our result does not require continuous preferences and, in the case of normal form games, (quasi-)concavity of payoff functions is not needed. The result has been obtained by using the Ky Fan minimax inequality. Examples illustrate our conditions in some economic situations and compare the result with the previous literature.
2020
Existence of strong equilibrium in discontinuous games / Scalzo, V.. - In: JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS. - ISSN 0022-247X. - 491:1(2020), p. Article 124247. [10.1016/j.jmaa.2020.124247]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11588/808111
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