A social choice rule (SCR) is a mapping from preference profiles to lotteries over outcomes. When preference profiles are close to being common knowledge among players, an SCR is continuously virtually fully implementable if there exists a mechanism such that all its equilibrium outcomes are arbitrarily close to the outcomes recommended by the SCR. When there are at least three players and a domain condition is satisfied, we obtain the following result: any SCR is continuously virtually fully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibria, as well as in interim correlated rationalizable strategies, by a finite mechanism.
Continuous virtual implementation: Complete information / Lombardi, Michele. - In: JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS. - ISSN 0304-4068. - (2022). [10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102605]
Continuous virtual implementation: Complete information
Michele Lombardi
Co-primo
2022
Abstract
A social choice rule (SCR) is a mapping from preference profiles to lotteries over outcomes. When preference profiles are close to being common knowledge among players, an SCR is continuously virtually fully implementable if there exists a mechanism such that all its equilibrium outcomes are arbitrarily close to the outcomes recommended by the SCR. When there are at least three players and a domain condition is satisfied, we obtain the following result: any SCR is continuously virtually fully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibria, as well as in interim correlated rationalizable strategies, by a finite mechanism.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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